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AS UNDESIRABLE AMERICANS  
Michael John Mezzano Jr.  
Dissertation Abstract 
Main Advisor: James M. O’Toole, Ph.D.  
 
This dissertation argues that the movement to restrict European 
immigration to the United States in the early 1900s was critically supported by a 
set of ideas that the dissertation refers to as “classic racialism.” Derived from 
several intellectual traditions – such as anthropology, biology, criminology, 
eugenics and zoology – classic racialism posited that differences in human 
population groups were biologically determined and hereditary, and because of 
this fact, American nativists held that the “new” immigration to the United States 
had to be curtailed in order to save the American Anglo-Saxon racial stock. The 
dissertation uses Italian immigration to the United States as a case study for 
understanding the fluidity of racial and biological thought. While classic racialism 
played a key role in supporting nativists’ calls for immigration restriction, 
advances in methods of scientific research were revolutionizing the fields of 
biology, genetics and anthropology. Research in these fields cast doubts on the 
veracity of intellectual claims made by classic racialists, which were increasingly 
untenable in the light of advancing scientific knowledge. The tensions between 
these competing intellectual paradigms of classic racialism and modern 
experimentalism in the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-centuries reveal the 
esoteric nature of scientific revolutions, in that the uncertainty and complexity of 
the developing biological and genetic sciences kept knowledge of scientific 
advances in these fields restricted to a narrow audience of professional scientists 
   
and academics. While modern experimental biology raised significant scientific 
doubts about the principles of classic racialism, it was the latter that influenced 
American immigration policy in the 1920s because of classic racialism’s 
simplicity and the broad public recognition that “like produces like.”  
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 Introduction 1 
Introduction 
 
In early April 1897, Herbert Spencer Jennings, a Harvard Ph.D. candidate 
and recipient of a Parker Traveling Fellowship, wrote to a friend his perceptions 
of Naples. It was, he explained, a “fearful contrast” to Florence and Venice: “The 
people are the most worthless, dirty, indecent, vicious lot of creatures it is 
possible to imagine. It really has a very depressing effect on one, the first few 
days he walks about the city.” He wrote similar thoughts to an intimate female 
friend, noting that the people in Naples, as opposed to those he had seen in 
Florence, “are almost like the Digger Indians—they are not even pretty, 
considered merely as little living things, like dogs or cats, as some of the lower 
class people in North Italy are— [in Naples] they seem stupid, brutalized and 
miserable.” But at the end of his letter to the woman who would later be his wife, 
he moderated his criticism. Jennings said that he feared he had been unduly harsh 
on the Neapolitans. Although they gave one a “dreadful impression,” the future 
Johns Hopkins Professor wrote, “I am in hope that I was partly wrong however 
about their not being happy in their worthless lazy way.” Jennings’s statements 
have significance beyond providing commentary on the qualities of Neapolitans. 
His perception of the difference between lower-class Neapolitans and northern 
Italians is significant for understanding the growing impetus toward restricting 
“new” immigrants to the United States. His lessons and experience at the Naples 
Zoological Station where he conducted biological research on single-celled 
organisms are critical for understanding a dramatic shift that occurred during his 
lifetime in the way that scientific knowledge was obtained. Finally, Jennings also 
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illustrates important trans-Atlantic intellectual connections between the United 
States and Europe in the period between the American Civil War and World War 
I.1 
This dissertation argues that the success of the American immigration 
restriction movement in 1929 depended heavily on what the historian Elazar 
Barkan has called a “restrictionist language and epistemology” that is called here 
“classic racialism.”2 This loose amalgam of ideas was oriented around a simple, 
                                                
1 Herbert Spencer Jennings to Joseph Brennemann, 1 April 1897; Herbert Spencer Jennings to 
“Jess” (Mary Burridge), 18 April, 1897, both in Herbert Spencer Jennings Papers, American 
Philosophical Society Library, Philadelphia, PA, [hereafter Jennings Papers, APS].  
 
2 In the majority of the historiography of both eugenics and immigration restriction, the loose 
affiliation of ideas that I have termed “classic racialism” is most often referred to as “scientific 
racism.” Two essays in particular have influenced the use of my alternate term. The difference 
between “racism” and “racialism,” though seemingly slight, is a significant one. Racism implies 
an antipathy or action based upon an individual’s racial identity. I am more concerned with the 
formulation of the racial identity itself, that is, the formulation of ideas of group identity rather 
than the attitudes that grew from awareness of group difference. For example, the United States 
Immigration Commission believed it was possible to compile a definitive “Dictionary of Races or 
Peoples” that specifically and precisely listed the ethnological characteristics of various European 
population groups and their racial qualities. I aim to understand both how this racial taxonomy 
was achieved and how policy makers understood it as a precise set of ideas with specific 
intellectual content. “Racial” characteristics included physical qualities like head or skull shape, 
and mental or moral qualities like an inclination to crime or an inability to read. I am less 
interested in the attitudes that arose from those categories (although certainly that is an important 
part of this project as well). Historian Peggy Pascoe’s 1996 article employs the term “racialism” to 
“designate an ideological complex that other historians often describe with the terms ‘race’ or 
‘racist.’” John Higham also uses racism and racialism as precise and distinct terms, talking of 
“racial science increasingly intermingled with racial nationalism” to describe the intellectual 
foundations of racism that were perceived to have important biological or hereditary sources along 
with tangible physical differences. Additionally, a term is needed to convey the specific scientific 
language that restrictionists and racial nativists employed to justify restriction, the “restrictionist 
language and epistemology,” which was heavily scientifically oriented. Elazar Barkan’s article 
studying Jennings’s criticisms of eugenics describes Jennings’s early awareness of his teacher 
Charles B. Davenport’s “metaphysical reductionism”: it was based upon biological concepts, but 
bent them into the flat and simple faith that like produces like. The basic argument that I am 
making, that the conditions and methods of conducting scientific research were changing, 
precludes using the term “scientific”—what “science” was and held to be true in this period was 
contested and undergoing reformulation, so it cannot be used. The term “classic” suffices to 
signify older methods of scientific investigation based on description, collection, and inference by 
analogy rather than experimentation. The term is employed in a similar fashion by the historian-
scientist Elof Axel Carlson in Mendel’s Legacy to differentiate the experimental sciences that were 
replacing descriptive science. Keith Benson also describes American biological sciences 
experiencing the “gradual transformation… from its primary location in museum-oriented natural 
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biological determinism that was often expressed in the axiom that “like produces 
like.” While the modern experimental sciences of biology and anthropology 
proved this to be a dramatic and inaccurate oversimplification, government policy 
was shaped and justified by this simpler, more familiar set of ideas. The methods 
that Jennings absorbed in Naples, part of a larger epistemic shift toward modern 
experimental and laboratory sciences, ultimately showed classic racialist 
principles to be in error. Like did not always produce like. But classic racialism 
still remained a central rationale for excluding immigrants to the United States. 
Why was the more accurate method not used? Part of the reason is the uncertainty 
and the complexity of the new methods. The dissertation therefore also examines 
the inability of professional academics to successfully debunk the restrictionist 
language and epistemology of classic racialism and how “revolutions” in 
scientific knowledge are more accurately “evolutionary,” in that their widespread 
acceptance often takes time to diffuse from acceptance in professional 
communities to popular understanding. Support from the eugenic community is 
an essential component for understanding the passage of the Johnson-Reed Act in 
                                                                                                                                
history to its eventual setting within academic and research institutions.” “Biological 
determinism” is inadequate because some of the researchers recognized that environment did play 
at least some role in shaping the development of organisms. By using the term “classic racialism” 
then, I distinguish between this set of older ideas and language and the more recognizable 
“modern” experimentalism of laboratory sciences. Peggy Pascoe, “Miscegenation Law, Court 
Cases, and Ideologies of ‘Race’ in Twentieth-Century America” The Journal of American History 
v. 83, n. 1 (June 1996), 44-69, 47-8; John Higham, Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American 
Nativism, 1860-1925 (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1992; [orig. 1955]), 133; 
336. Elazar Barkan, “Reevaluating Progressive Eugenics: Herbert Spencer Jennings and the 1924 
Immigration Legislation” Journal of the History of Biology v. 24, n. 1 (Spring 1991), 91-112, 103 
for restrictionist language, 93 for Davenport; Elof Axel Carlson, Mendel’s Legacy: The Origin of 
Classical Genetics (Cold Spring Harbor, NY: Cold Spring Harbor Press, 2004), chapter 1; Keith 
R. Benson, “From Museum Research to Laboratory Research: The Transformation of Natural 
History in Academic Biology” in Ronald Rainger, Keith Benson, Jane Maienschein, eds., The 
American Development of Biology (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1988), 50. 
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1924 (the “National Origins Act”). By considering the history of science, rather 
than just the history of eugenics, this dissertation shows that the state of 
knowledge in biology and genetics after World War I had advanced to such an 
extent that eugenic theories were regarded by professionals as scientifically 
untenable. This not only led many “positive” eugenicists to distance themselves 
from the movement, but also slowly eroded any scientific respectability for the 
movement. When, as Jane Maienschein suggests, the basis of biological 
knowledge had shifted to an experimental and laboratory phase, which required 
advanced techniques, equipment, and institutional support, “negative” eugenicists 
had little legitimate scientific authority.3  
Although Jennings was an American scientist, born in Tonica, Illinois, 
European observers had already articulated the thoughts that he communicated on 
the dirty and brutalized Neapolitan population. Creuze de Lesser, a French tourist 
to the south of Italy in 1806 had observed, “Europe ends at Naples, and ends 
badly. Calabria, Sicily, and all the rest belong to Africa.” After the failed Italian 
                                                
 
3 As the history of eugenics shows, there were two strands of eugenic thought: positive eugenics 
and negative eugenics. The former focused on the improvement of man’s innate capacity—making 
all people “well-born.” Negative eugenics was more intense and racist, designed to prevent the 
“dysgenic” or “cacogenic” from reproducing, and increasing the propagation of the “aristogenic.” 
Many of the classic racialists and eugenic-minded restrictionists advocated negative eugenics, 
which encompassed forced sterilization, immigration restriction, and segregation of degenerates. 
As genetic science became increasingly sophisticated, however, many of the positive 
eugenicists—Jennings and Raymond Pearl, for instance—distanced themselves, or in Jennings’ 
case, became highly critical of the sloppy and racialized theories of negative eugenicists. Jane 
Maienschein, Transforming Traditions in American Biology (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1991). Also Kenneth Ludmerer, Genetics and American Society: A Historical Appraisal 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972); Daniel J. Kevles, In the Name of Eugenics: 
Genetics and the Uses of Human Heredity (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985); Mark H. Haller, 
Eugenics: Hereditarian Attitudes in American Thought (New Brunswick: Rutgers University 
Press, 1984 [orig. 1963]).  
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revolutions in 1848, the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Sardinia, Massimo 
d’Azeglio, commented “In every way the fusion with the Neapolitan makes me 
afraid; it is like putting yourself to bed with a smallpox patient.” In August 1861, 
Carlo Farini, the chief administrator of southern Italy for Prime Minister Camillo 
Cavour after unification, wrote his superior that the south “is not Italy! This is 
Africa: compared to these peasants the Bedouins are the pinnacle of civilization.” 
Jennings was merely one in a long line of observers who noticed the “difference” 
in the population of the Italian south.4 This perceived difference, largely believed 
to be biological and hereditary, followed southern Italians as they emigrated to the 
United States. It would become a key justification for excluding them and other 
“inferior” southern and eastern Europeans from admission to the United States.  
During his time in Naples, Jennings continued to develop his proficiency 
with experimental research methods. But his scientific training was important not 
only for the history of biology but for immigration restriction as well. Jennings 
was the only professional biologist to contest Harry H. Laughlin’s testimony 
before the 1924 House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization. Laughlin 
was the “Expert Eugenical Agent” whom the House Committee commissioned to 
research biological aspects of immigration. Laughlin described his research 
project as “a study in comparative degeneracy. It is one of the several 
                                                
4 Creuze de Lesser, “Voyage en italie et en sicilie,” (1806), cited in Gabriella Gribaudi, “Images 
from the Mezzogiorno as seen by Insiders and Outsiders” in Robert Lumley and Jonathan Morris, 
eds. The New History of the Italian South: The Mezzogiorno Revisited (Exeter, UK: University of 
Exeter Press, 1997), 87; D’Azeglio quoted in Don Doyle, Nations Divided: America, Italy, and the 
Southern Question (Athens, GA.: University of Georgia Press, 2002), 71-2; Carlo Farini to 
Camillo Cavour, from Carteggi di Camillo Cavour, La Liberazione del Mezzogiorno e la 
formazione del regno d’Italia, III, 208, cited in Nelson Moe, The View from Vesuvius: Italian 
Culture and the Southern Question (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002).  
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investigations into the biological or eugenical aspects of immigration which I am 
conducting under the immediate auspices of this committee.” He continued, “The 
idea of course is to use such data to gauge the relative soundness and stability of 
the different racial and nativity groups in the United States, which gauge, in turn, 
would constitute a measure of their relative long-time value to the Nation, 
especially, when viewed in the light of the inborn quality of future generations. 
More specifically, it is a measure of the relative soundness of recent and older 
immigrant stocks.” He devised statistical studies that purported to demonstrate 
that the southern and eastern immigrants were exceeding what should be their 
quota of socially inadequate and undesirable classes.5 Jennings appeared to try to 
correct the Committee’s approval of Laughlin’s incorrect biological determinism. 
Heredity was a highly complex phenomenon, Jennings argued, and heredity, the 
environment and culture worked together to shape human development. Where 
Laughlin wanted to argue for precise, biological “racial” characteristics, which 
then made ranking superior and inferior racial stocks easy, Jennings argued that 
nature and nurture were two essential, interdependent components of human 
development.6 Jennings believed this because he had spent almost thirty years 
                                                
 
5 Harry H. Laughlin, “Analysis of America’s Modern Melting Pot” Hearings before House 
Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, 67th Congress, 3rd Session, 21 November 1922 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1923). 731, emphasis added. 
 
6 Statement of Herbert Spencer Jennings, “Restriction of Immigration” Hearings before the 
Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, House, 68th Congress, 1st Session, Dec. 26, 27, 31, 
1923; Jan. 2-5, 7, 8, 10, 19, 1924 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1924), 510-13. 
On Jennings and Laughlin, crucial are Bentley Glass, “Geneticists Embattled: Their Stand Against 
Rampant Eugenics and Racism in America during the 1920s and 1930s” Proceedings of the 
American Philosophical Society v. 130 (1986), 130-54; Frances Janet Hassencahl, “Harry H. 
Laughlin, ‘Expert Eugenics Agent’ for the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization” 
(Ph.D. diss.: Case Western Reserve University, 1970); Elazar Barkan, The Retreat of Scientific 
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after his Naples trip practicing the methods of laboratory experimentation he 
learned there. Jennings was part of a larger epistemic shift within the natural 
sciences in the West at the turn of the twentieth century. New ways of knowing 
were transforming the pursuit of scientific knowledge, as more modern 
laboratory, chemical and microscopic methods gradually displaced the older, 
traditional methods of what may be called a natural history or philosophical 
approach to science.7  
Professional academics in the United States at the end of the nineteenth 
century were experiencing a change in accepted methods, particularly in the fields 
of the natural sciences. “Naturalists” were becoming zoologists, cytologists, and 
biologists, examining the biological development of creatures in laboratory 
settings, performing experiments and closely observing their development. Philip 
Pauly describes the emergent “division of labor between the field [researcher] and 
the naturalist’s ‘closet,’ combined with the increasing emphasis on painstaking 
microscopic observation,” as indicative of a new urban, professional class of 
                                                                                                                                
Racism: Changing Concepts of Race in Britain and the United States Between the World Wars 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Idem., “Reevaluating Progressive Eugenics: 
Herbert Spencer Jennings and the 1924 Immigration Legislation” Journal of the History of 
Biology v. 24, n. 1 (Spring 1991), 91-112; Michael Mezzano, “The Progressive Origins of 
Eugenics Critics: Raymond Pearl, Herbert Spencer Jennings and the Defense of Scientific Inquiry” 
Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era v. 4, n. 1 (January 2005), 83-97. 
 
7 Philip Rehbock describes the “philosophical naturalists” in Britain who in the early nineteenth 
century –Darwin’s book was only  “the climax of a half a century of searching for the 
philosophical foundations of the new science, ‘biology’” – set out to discover natural laws of 
development and to understand the morphology and distribution of organisms in space and time. 
Philip Rehbock, The Philosophical Naturalists: Themes in Early Nineteenth-Century British 
Biology (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983), 6, 9.  
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biologists.8 This “transformation” in scientific knowledge, as Jane Maienschein 
terms it, is central for the dissertation’s argument that the more easily 
comprehended, simple hereditarian language of biological determinism was easier 
to communicate to politicians and laypersons; while it was widely regarded with 
                                                
8 Philip Pauly, “Summer Resort and Scientific Discipline: Woods Hole and the Structure of 
American Biology” in Rainger, et al, eds., The American Development of Biology, 126. I argue 
that just as the scientific language in the United States was undergoing a significant 
epistemological shift that precludes talking about a monolithic community of researchers in the 
United States, these shifts were also occurring in the main European communities as well. Thus, 
Italy and Great Britain both had their divergent camps. On Italy’s competing scientific camps, see 
Steven C. Hughes, Crime, Disorder and the Risorgimento: The Politics of Policing in Bologna 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1994); Silvana Patriarca, Numbers and Nationhood: 
Writing Statistics in Nineteenth-Century Italy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); 
Mary Gibson, “Biology or Environment? Race and Southern ‘Deviancy’ in the Writings of Italian 
Criminologists, 1880-1920”; Nelson Moe, “The Emergence of the Southern Question in Villari, 
Franchetti, and Sonnino”; Jane Schneider “The Dynamics of Neo-orientalism in Italy (1848-
1995)” all in Jane Schneider, ed. Italy’s “Southern Question”: Orientalism in One Country (New 
York: Berg, 1998); Gabriella Gribaudi, “Images of the South: The Mezzogiorno as seen by 
Insiders and Outsiders” in Lumley and Morris, eds. The New History of the Italian South; Aaron 
Gillette, Racial Theories in Fascist Italy (New York: Routledge, 2002).  On Britain see Hamish 
Spencer and Diane B. Paul, “The Failure of a Scientific Critique: David Heron, Karl Pearson and 
Mendelian Genetics” The British Journal for the History of Science v. 31 (1998), 441-52; Edward 
J. Larson, “The Rhetoric of Eugenics: Expert Authority and the Mental Deficiency Bill” The 
British Journal for the History of Science [Br Jl His Sci] v. 24, n. 1 (March 1991), 45-60; David 
Barker, “The Biology of Stupidity: Genetics, Eugenics and Mental Deficiency in the Inter-War 
Years” Br Jl His Sci v. 22, n. 3 (September 1989), 347-75. In terms of intellectual or epistemic 
change in methods of inquiry or general, guiding theoretical principles, I am guided by Thomas 
Kuhn’s insightful analysis of “scientific revolutions.” Kuhn does not suggest that in an instant, one 
scientific paradigm or theory displaces another as the reigning paradigm. Rather, as crises in the 
“normal science” paradigm grow, new methods or ideas are introduced, eventually generating 
competing, incommensurable theories. Ultimately it is individual practitioners – very often 
members of a younger generation – who undergo a “conversion experience” or “gestalt-switch” 
that compels them to embrace the new paradigm. This difficulty of the “conversion” process – the 
physicist Max Planck declared that “a new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its 
opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a 
new generation grows up that is familiar with it.” – is one of the reasons that change in scientific 
knowledge is gradual, a process of “speciation” as Kuhn later suggested. Max Planck, Scientific 
Autobiography quoted in Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 2nd ed, enlarged 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970 [orig. 1962]), on 151; crises on 77-91; gestalt switch 
121; incommensurability from 150; generations 144; conversion experience 151-59. Speciation is 
from Thomas Kuhn, The Road Since Structure: Philosophical Essays, 1970-1993, with an 
Autobiographical Interview James Conant and John Haugeland, eds. (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2000).  
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skepticism by the professional scientific community, the general acceptance of 
classic racialism by the public remained undiminished.9 
Writing from the Naples Zoological Station, Jennings finally highlights 
the trans-Atlantic nature of the scientific communities in this period. Participating 
in international meetings of their professionalizing disciplines, exchanging data 
and publications across the Atlantic, and traveling to the best European 
institutions to train, there was a sizable international community of researchers 
who contributed to advancing the knowledge of nature.10 Classic racialism, so 
central to the world-view of what historian John Higham calls America’s “racial 
nativists” was ironically partly European in origin. Two strands, one from 
                                                
9 Maienschein, Transforming Traditions in American Biology. See also Pascoe, “Miscegenation 
Law, Court Cases, and Ideologies of ‘Race’”; Sharon Kingsland, “The Battling Botanist: Daniel 
Trembly MacDougal, Mutation Theory, and the Rise of Experimental Evolutionary Biological in 
America, 1900-1912” Isis v. 82, n. 3 (September 1991), 479-509; Garland Allen, “Naturalists and 
Experimentalists: The Genotype and the Phenotype” Studies in the History of Biology v. 3 (1979), 
179-209; Philip Pauly, Controlling Life: Jacques Loeb and the Engineering Ideal in Biology (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1987); Jan Sapp, Beyond the Gene: Cytoplasmic Inheritance and 
the Struggle for Authority in Genetics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987); William 
Provine, The Origins of Theoretical Population Genetics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1971).  
 
10 On the Naples Zoological Station, see (n.a.) “The Naples Zoological Station. I.” Science v. 1, n. 
17 (1 June, 1883), 479-81; Emily A. Nunn, “The Naples Zoological Station. II.” Science v. 1, n. 
18 (8 June, 1883), 507-10; C. O. Whitman, “The Advantages of Study at the Naples Zoological 
Station” Science v. 2, n. 25 (27 July, 1883), 93-97; Henry F. Osborn, “American Students at the 
Naples Zoölogical Station” Science n.s. v. 1, n. 9 (1 March, 1895), 238-39; (n.a.) “The Naples 
Zoological Station” Science n.s. v. 9, n. 225 (21 April, 1899), 596-97. On the nature of the change 
in biology and the natural sciences, see Maienschein, Transforming Traditions in American 
Biology; Keith Benson, “The Naples Stazione Zoologica and Its Impact on the Emergence of 
American Marine Biology” Journal of the History of Biology [Jl H Bio], v. 21, n. 2 (June 1988), 
331-41; idem., “American Morphology in the Late Nineteenth Century: The Biology Department 
at Johns Hopkins University” Jl H Bio, v. 18, n. 2 (June 1985), 163-205; Philip Pauly, “The 
Appearance of Academic Biology in Late Nineteenth Century America” Jl H Bio v. 17, n. 3 
(September 1984), 369-97; Robert Kohler, All Creatures: Naturalists, Collectors, and 
Biodiversity, 1850-1950 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006); Philip Pauly, “Summer 
Resort and Scientific Discipline: Woods Hole and the Structure of American Biology”; Keith R. 
Benson, “From Museum Research to Laboratory Research: The Transformation of Natural History 
in Academic Biology” and Toby A. Appel, “Organizing Biology: The American Society of 
Naturalists and its ‘Affiliated Societies,’ 1883-1923” all in Rainger et al, eds., The American 
Development of Biology. 
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England and one from Italy, had a powerful influence in the late nineteenth 
century in the direction American restrictionists would take nativism. Yet at the 
same time that classic racialism was so powerful, it was also methodologically 
wrong. This dissertation also examines a shift in scientific language, a scientific 
revolution – what Thomas Kuhn called “those non-cumulative developmental 
episodes in which an older paradigm is replaced in whole or in part by an 
incompatible new one” – that disproved classic racialism.11 It finds that while 
proper “scientific” research was now conducted in a more modern, experimental 
method, the complexity of modern experimental genetics and biology was too 
esoteric to displace classic racialism from the public’s mind. The halting, 
uncertain answers of modern biological science as they gradually developed were 
too complex as a base for policy or public understanding. 
Two of the foundations of the biological determinism of Laughlin and 
other American classic racialists came from an English relative of Charles 
Darwin, the Victorian polymath Sir Francis Galton, and an Italian physician, 
Cesare Lombroso. Galton and Lombroso contributed theories that certain 
characteristics of the human organism were determined biologically through 
heredity or evolutionary atavism. Their ideas diffused throughout the “world of 
common referents,” in Daniel Rodgers’s phrase, via magazine and journal 
articles, personal correspondence, books and study, and international meetings.12  
                                                
11 Higham, Strangers in the Land, 133-36; Kuhn, Scientific Revolutions, 92.  
 
12 Daniel Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age (Cambridge, MA: The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1998), 3. Rodgers’s book was a key inspiration to 
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The “transformation” occurring in the way science was conducted in this 
period, personified by an image of Jennings standing over a microscope at a table 
in the Naples Zoological Station, surrounded by aquaria with live specimens from 
the waters around Italy’s largest city, would eventually establish experimental, 
laboratory research as the foundation for all modern biological knowledge. A 
student and friend of Jennings, Raymond Pearl, discussed “Trends in Modern 
Biology” in 1922, in which he described how this modern form of an 
experimental research methodology was fundamental because “the essential 
problems of biology are questions of dynamic relationships and not of static 
phenomenon.” Because biology was dynamic, it had to be observed and studied 
experimentally. Pearl appreciated the difficulty in displacing classic racialism’s 
older language, describing “the seductive lure of certain rules by which the game 
was played, which rules (such as ontogenetic recapitulation of phylogeny, certain 
aspects of homology, etc.) were mistakenly supposed to be natural laws, whereas 
in point of fact, at best, they were only imperfect expressions of certain inherent 
necessities of the philosophic principle of organization, and at the worst just plain 
buncombe.”13 Biological principles could not be inferred from what Pearl 
explained was “purely static phenomena (the intimate structure of the body)” via 
description or classification, or the other methods of natural history.  
                                                                                                                                
search for some of the roots of American ideas in this period in the “largely forgotten world of 
transnational borrowings and imitation.” 7.  
 
13 Raymond Pearl, “Trends in Modern Biology” Science n.s. v. 56, n. 1456 (24 November, 1922), 
581-92; “dynamic” from 585; “intimate structure” from 584.  
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This scientific language of experimentalism was ultimately restricted to a 
small number of its professional practitioners. It was a complex, sophisticated 
method that functioned best in dedicated research institutions or academic 
laboratories, and it was hesitant of prematurely declaring veracities and truths. 
This uncertainty, complexity and esotericism would have fateful implications, 
which crystallized when American immigration policy reversed course in 1924 
with a dramatic limitation on the number of European emigrants the nation would 
admit. The movement to restrict immigration, active for over thirty years, was 
significantly supported and legitimized by a language that declared certain “races” 
of Europeans to be biologically and hereditarily inferior, but which experimental 
research had proven to be flawed.  
The language of classic racialism was based heavily on the language of 
eugenics, a theory that human beings could direct human evolution through 
judicious and fertile marriages of talented and healthy stock, while limiting the 
reproduction of inferior or degenerate branches of the human stock. In turn, 
eugenics was biologically determinist, based on the belief that an individual’s 
basic biological composition – sealed, somehow, at the moment of conception – 
determined irrevocably that individual’s development. A third basic component of 
classic racialism was the belief in fixed, immutable, unchanging or static 
population groups that passed on their racial qualities – the good and the bad – to 
their progeny with no change or moderation. It believed, in short, “that all men 
are created bound by their protoplasmic makeup and unequal in their powers and 
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responsibilities.”14 The professional, academic and institutional scientific 
community had, during the 1920s, largely disproved this simplistic approach to 
heredity and human development, but was unable to influence Congressional 
control of immigration to the United States.  
It was not only biologists that combated this misperception of heredity and 
unchanging racial types. Cultural and physical anthropologists like Franz Boas 
and Ales Hrdlicka, along with biologists like Jennings and Pearl, criticized the 
“bad science” of the eugenicists, although they too were ineffective at stopping 
Congress from passing immigration quotas on the basis of racial identity in 1924. 
Despite their best efforts to oppose the simplistic eugenic theories—Jennings 
wrote an article in Scientific Monthly in 1924 in which he insisted that “no single 
thing that the organism does depends alone on heredity or alone on environment; 
always both have to be taken into account”—they were unable to counter the 
easily comprehensible scientific “laws” the eugenicists insisted on.15 Though 
academics like Boas and Jennings continually argued that culture and 
environment were as essential to understanding human development as biology 
and heredity, heredity was more easily “proven.” Although scientific knowledge 
of human development in the period between 1860 and 1930 ranged from narrow 
                                                
 
14 Charles Benedict Davenport, Heredity in Relation to Eugenics Introd. Charles Rosenberg (New 
York: Arno Press, 1972 [orig. 1911]), iv, emphasis in original.  
 
15 Herbert Spencer Jennings, “Heredity and Environment” The Scientific Monthly v. 19, n. 3 (Sep. 
1924), 225-38; 225. Jennings also pointed out that “We are warned not to admit to America 
certain peoples not differing from ourselves, on the basis of the resounding assertion that biology 
informs us that the environment can bring out nothing whatever but the hereditary characters. 
Such an assertion is perfectly empty and idle.…” 237.  
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biological determinism to theories of environmental and biological 
interdependence, simple determinism was easier to communicate to—and thereby 
persuade—political leaders and the general public. As Jennings lamented, “to 
clear and definite questions nature declines to give clear, definite, and generally 
valid answers. The evidence, so far as it goes, is that in some degree or in some 
organisms, both doctrines are correct.”16 Classic racialism suggested that it did 
have clear and definite answers to these questions.17  
The definitive work on American attitudes toward immigration in this era 
remains John Higham’s Strangers in the Land (1955), which suggests that three 
distinct types of nativism circulated through the United States in the years 
between the Civil War and 1925: anti-radical, anti-Catholic, and racial. Each of 
these iterations of xenophobia was driven by political, social or economic crises.18 
Higham argues that the outbreak of World War I and the attendant desire for “100 
Per Cent Americanism”—a uniform nationalist ideology—ultimately obliged 
policy makers to exclude the immigration of Europeans who were perceived as 
racially different, and thus unable to assimilate to American ideals and identity.19 
                                                
16 Herbert Spencer Jennings, “The Inheritance of Acquired Characters” The Forum v. 76 (Nov. 
1926), 702-11; 707.  
 
17 For instance, consult John S. Haller, Outcasts from Evolution: Scientific Attitudes of Racial 
Inferiority, 1859-1900 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1971) for an overview. 
 
18 Higham, Strangers in the Land.  
 
19 Ibid. Some notable contributions to this field are Reginald Horsman, Race and Manifest 
Destiny: The Origins of American Anglo-Saxonism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1981); Alexander Saxton, The Rise and Fall of the White Republic: Class, Politics and Mass 
Culture in Nineteenth Century America (New York: Verso Press, 1990); Matthew Frye Jacobson, 
Whiteness of a Different Color: European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1998); Desmond King, Making Americans: Immigration, Race, and the 
Origins of the Diverse Democracy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000); Thomas A. 
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Higham’s narrative, however, is insufficiently attentive to developments in 
scientific language. Although he correctly places great emphasis on the 
complexities of “racial nativism,” his depiction of science leaves the reader with 
the impression that, like nativism itself, scientific knowledge waxed and waned 
along with nationalist emotions and sentiments. The racial nativism in Higham’s 
account is based in large part on cultural descriptions and stereotypes; Higham 
recounts Laughlin’s “expert” eugenics testimony before Congress, but does not 
record the academic witnesses who strongly criticized the scientific content of 
Laughlin’s testimony. He examines the “scientific race thinking” that was the 
critical component of racial nativism without recognizing that there were 
professional critics who dismissed it as non-scientific.20 Higham himself is aware 
of these shortcomings and in a new afterword to the 1992 edition admits that his 
chapter on Nordic racism in the nineteenth- and twentieth-centuries was “only 
partly successful in analyzing the scientific ideas that affected race thinking.”21 
This dissertation will examine these scientific ideas regarding race more closely 
                                                                                                                                
Guglielmo, White on Arrival: Italians, Race, Color, and Power in Chicago, 1890-1945 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003); Mae Ngai, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of 
Modern America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004). 
  
20 Higham, Strangers in the Land, 313-14 for Laughlin; 273ff for “race thinking.”  
 
21 Ibid., 336. See also John Higham, “Instead of a Sequel, or How I Lost My Subject,” Reviews in 
American History v. 28, n. 2 (June 2000), 327-339. Higham explained that to keep American 
nationalism at the center of the narrative “I treated the ethnocentric attitudes displayed in 
stereotypes as a relatively stable precondition for the much more volatile passions of nativism.” 
Higham Strangers in the Land, 343. Two important examples of the fragile state of American 
racial ideologies are presented in Kristin Hoganson, Fighting For American Manhood: How 
Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998); 
Gail Bederman, Manliness and Civilization: A Cultural History of Race and Gender in the United 
States, 1880-1917 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995). 
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by looking at their formulation and the professional academic critics who had a 
different, more modern understanding of “scientific” knowledge and research.  
Other historians of immigration restriction have examined the prominence 
of eugenic theorists in the restrictionist movement. While the eugenics movement 
within these accounts is frequently (and rightly) branded as pseudo-scientific, that 
it did have scientific credentials in an era dedicated to scientific management, 
efficiency, and the central role of the “expert” in a complex society is 
significant.22 The founder of eugenics, Francis Galton, and his student Karl 
Pearson, were talented theorists and mathematicians. Eugenics advanced the idea 
that gifted people of superior stock, through careful use of their desirable 
hereditary material, could increase their number in the population. It was also 
important to limit the reproduction of the unfit and undesirables. And eugenicists 
took that “good” or “bad” qualities would be passed on to future generations 
                                                
 
22 E.g. John S. Haller, Outcasts from Evolution: Scientific Attitudes of Racial Inferiority, 1859-
1900 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1971); Alan M. Kraut, “Southern Italian Immigration 
to the United States at the Turn of the Century and the Perennial Problem of Medicalised 
Prejudice” in Lara Marks, Michael Worboys, eds. Migrants, Minorities and Health: Historical 
and Contemporary Studies (NY: Routledge, 1997), 228-50; Alan M. Kraut, Silent Travelers: 
Germs, Genes, and the “Immigrant Menace” (New York: Basic Books, 1994); Amy Lauren 
Fairchild, “Science at the Borders: Immigrant Medical Inspection and Defense of the Nation, 1891 
to 1930” (Ph.D. diss. Columbia University, 1997); idem., Science at the Borders: Immigrant 
Medical Inspection and the Shaping of the Modern Industrial Labor Force (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2003); Leila Zenderland, Measuring Minds: Herbert Henry Goddard 
and the Origins of American Intelligence Testing (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); 
Nancy Leys Stepan, ‘The Hour of Eugenics’: Race, Gender, and Nation in Latin America (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1991); Charles Rosenberg, No Other Gods: On Science and American 
Social Thought (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, rev. ed. 1997 [orig. 1976]); Robert F. 
Zeidel, Immigrants, Progressives, and Exclusion Politics: The Dillingham Commission, 1900-
1927 (Dekalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press 2004); David M. Reimers, Unwelcome 
Strangers: American Identity and the Turn Against Immigration (NY: Columbia University Press, 
1998); John Higham, Send These to Me: Immigrants in Urban America rev. ed. (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1984 [orig. 1975]); Barbara M. Solomon, Ancestors and Immigrants: A 
Changing New England Tradition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956); Dale Knobel, 
“America for the Americans”: The Nativist Movement in the United States (New York: Twayne 
Publishers, 1996). 
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unchanged, was an established fact. Men were born unequal in gifts, and so they 
and their progeny would remain.23 
Galton’s studies of hereditary characteristics by family pedigree were an 
important contribution to classic racialism. Italian criminal anthropologists, a field 
pioneered by Cesare Lombroso and then Giuseppe Sergi, also had influence on 
American immigration restriction. The search for the origins of the scientific 
language of classic racialism, which was so central to American immigration 
restriction, begins not in America but in Europe. Within Britain and the young 
Kingdom of Italy, ideas emerged that would heavily influence the classic 
racialism that nurtured American xenophobia.  
The Heredity of the Genius and the Body of the Criminal 
The publication in 1869 of Hereditary Genius provides an essential 
beginning point for the intellectual theories that would underpin and support the 
American immigration restriction movement. In the book, the English gentleman 
Francis Galton began laying the groundwork for what would become the 
scientific language of “eugenics.” Galton’s scientific researches, like Cesare 
                                                
 
23 Richard Hofstadter, Social Darwinism in American Thought (New York: George Braziller, Inc., 
rev. ed., 1955). Diane Paul, “Eugenics and the Left” Journal of the History of Ideas 45 (October-
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Thought (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1984 [orig. 1963]); Barry Mehler, “A History 
of the American Eugenics Society, 1921-1940: (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois-Urbana, 
1988); Daniel J. Kevles, In the Name of Eugenics: Genetics and the Uses of Human Heredity 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985); Robert C. Bannister, Social Darwinism: Science and Myth in 
Anglo-American Thought (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1979); Thomas Gossett, Race: 
The History of an Idea in America 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997; [1963]); 
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Lombroso’s, mark the beginning of a shift in methods that would ultimately lead 
to many of his scientific theories being discredited. In the preceding centuries in 
Western civilization, what one might call “gentlemen scientists,” had made 
extraordinary contributions to the advance of scientific knowledge.24 The 
generations that followed Galton were of a different breed, carefully trained in 
research universities on narrow topics to enable the mastery of both method and 
content. Like Jennings in Naples, these “new” scientists would rely upon their 
professional training and credentials rather than their social position to prove the 
value of their scientific work. Their academic positions at research universities 
and the countless hours spent in laboratories conducting careful experimental 
research marked the new generation as fundamentally different from Galton’s in 
methodological approach.  
Galton made two absolutely crucial contributions that would flower in the 
immigration restriction movement in the United States: the fields of eugenics and 
pedigree analysis. After his death, Galton bequeathed a significant portion of his 
wealth (£45,000) to the University of London to endow a chair in Eugenics and 
support the Eugenics Laboratory (at present the Galton Laboratory of the 
                                                
24 Two critical books that advance the importance of social position, trust, and knowledge are 
Steven Shapin, A Social History of Truth: Civility and Science in Seventeenth-Century England 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994) and Peter Burke, A Social History of Knowledge: 
From Gutenberg to Diderot (Cambridge, MA: Polity Press, 2000). Shapin describes the early 
community of scientific practitioners: “all the individual can do is offer claims, with evidence, 
arguments, and inducements, to the community for its assessment. Knowledge is the result of the 
community’s evaluations and actions, and it is entrenched through the integration of claims about 
the world into the community’s institutionalized behavior. Since the acts of knowledge-making 
and knowledge-protecting capture so much of communal life, communities may be effectively 
described through their economies of truth.” By contrast, “Modern epistemology has 
systematically argued that legitimate knowledge is defined precisely by its rejection of trust: if we 
know something on basis of trust, we do not possess genuine knowledge.” Shapin, Social History 
of Truth, 6, 16.  
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Department of Human Genetics and Biometry) that he had previously created. 
Galton had also organized a Eugenics Record Office in 1904 (identical in name to 
that founded by Charles B. Davenport at Cold Spring Harbor, New York in 1910) 
to facilitate the development of eugenics in Britain and to assess and organize the 
pedigree data that provided the evidence in favor of eugenic advancement.25 
Hereditary Genius represented Galton’s first attempt to analyze the 
inheritance of specific qualities within family lines, what is also known as 
“pedigree analysis.” The book analyzed biographical and genealogical data of 
men of “high reputation” that Galton had gathered from dictionaries of biography, 
encyclopedias and the London Times obituary index of 1868. His interest in the 
inheritance of certain mental characteristics emerged out of an earlier ethnological 
                                                
 
25 D. W. Forrest, Francis Galton: The Life and Work of a Victorian Genius (London: Elek Books, 
1974); Michael Bulmer, Francis Galton: Pioneer of Heredity and Biometry (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2003); Nicholas Wright Gillham, A Life of Sir Francis Galton: From 
African Exploration to the Birth of Eugenics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001). The 
essential starting point for any understanding of Galton’s work and life is Karl Pearson, The Life, 
Letters and Labours of Francis Galton 3 vols. (London: Cambridge University Press, 1914, 1924, 
1930). Pearson, Galton’s protégé, was named the first Galton Professor of Eugenics at University 
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fingerprints in law enforcement, statistical theories of inheritance, and contribute to geographical 
knowledge of Africa. Gillham describes that the purpose of the Galton Laboratory was “to permit 
highly trained experts to gather and analyze masses of data pertinent to eugenics.” Gillham, A Life 
of Sir Frances Galton, 342. See also 330-357 for an assessment of Galton’s influence on eugenics 
worldwide. Garland Allen, one of the United States’s best historians of eugenics and genetics, has 
an excellent article on the American version of Galton’s lab, “The Eugenics Record Office at Cold 
Spring Harbor, 1910-1940: An Essay in Institutional History” Osiris 2nd series, v. 2 (1986), 225-
64. By the time the American Eugenics Record Office was closed by the Carnegie Institution of 
Washington, it had amassed over a million cards containing pedigree information and family data, 
nearly all of which Allen explains were “of a subjective, impressionistic nature” and “worthless 
from a genetic point of view.” 242-43. Terman’s assessment of Galton’s I.Q. rating from Forrest, 
Francis Galton, 7.  
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inquiry, and came to convince himself that “genius was hereditary.”26 He aimed to 
prove his thesis by “showing how large is the number of instances in which men 
who are more or less illustrious have eminent kinsfolk.” He broke down the 
biographical data of male ancestors and descendants of talented men, enabling 
him, Galton believed, to compute statistically the extent to which eminence and 
genius were inherited.27 Beginning with an historical investigation of biographies 
of English judges from the English Revolution to 1865, Galton maintained that 
the historical examples proved that “ability is not distributed at haphazard, but 
that it clings to certain families.” So statesmen, English peers, military 
commanders, literary men, scientific men, poets, musicians, painters, theologians, 
oarsmen and “wrestlers of the North country” were all testimony of the extent that 
great ability ran in immediate family lines. But although the scientific community 
in Britain politely received Hereditary Genius, Galton’s underlying premise was 
flawed.28 
                                                
 
26 Francis Galton, Hereditary Genius: An Inquiry into Its Laws and Consequences (London: 
MacMillan and Co., 1869), v for origins of study; 1-6, 8-10 for the sources and method.  
 
27 One of Galton’s more fantastic statistical calculations was to compute the likelihood of a 
military man being shot in the field, either by accident (i.e. not specifically aimed at) or by specific 
effort. The statistical risk of being accidentally shot was the square root of the product of a man’s 
height and his weight – a man of 16 stone standing 6 feet 2.5 inches, would escape harm for 2 
years; a man of 8 stone standing 5 feet 6 inches would be safe from chance wounds for three 
years. Except, Galton pointed out, the taller and heavier man, because of his conspicuousness, 
would more likely be assumed to be an important personage and “made the object of special aim.” 
Galton, Hereditary Genius, 144. 
 
28 Galton, Hereditary Genius, “kinsfolk” from 6; 50-54 for notation of study; 67 for distribution of 
heredity. Also, Forrest, Francis Galton, 101 for reviews. Galton later expressed regret for using 
“genius” instead of “talent” which he felt would have been more accurate. Accuracy of term in 
Forrest, Francis Galton, 101. Gillham records a diary entry of Galton’s wife Louisa in which she 
notes that “Frank’s book not well received, but liked by Darwin and men of note.” Quoted in 
Gillham, A Life of Sir Francis Galton, 169. Gillham records other reviews and reactions to 
Hereditary Genius on the following pages. Hereditary Genius also had, as a biographer points out, 
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Galton’s greatest problem was that he had no vector for inheritance. 
Throughout Hereditary Genius, Galton affirmed that special ability – whether 
called eminence, distinction, genius or talent – was inherited along the male line, 
and tended to pass from father to one son. He was certain that the proof of his 
theory lay in the weight of accumulated examples. At the conclusion of 
Hereditary Genius, Galton confidently declared, “There cannot, therefore, remain 
a doubt as to the existence of a law of distribution of ability in families.”29 Yet the 
difficulty of proving, through an analysis of pedigree or ancestry, that ability was 
inherited was nearly impossible without any idea of a vector of that ability; before 
the rediscovery of Gregor Mendel’s work on recessive and dominant inheritance 
strands (which, ironically, was taking place in Germany at exactly the same time, 
only to slip into oblivion), or August Weismann’s theory of the germ-plasm, no 
one could precisely identify how these characters were biologically inherited. For 
Galton to leap to the conclusion that eminence or genius was a purely biological 
quality, and not the result of parental influence, training and encouragement, was, 
in the context of his social relationships, partly understandable. After all, in his 
own family tree, Galton had his own gifted intellect, his cousin Charles Darwin, 
and their shared grandfather Erasmus Darwin. When Galton’s work began to 
achieve significant influence in the United States, this flaw became the basis for 
                                                                                                                                
several minor errors that in the context of the work had a significant effect in altering the study’s 
results. Forrest, Francis Galton, 90-91. 
 
29 Galton, Hereditary Genius, 318.  
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restricting the admission of the non-gifted inferior immigrants from southern and 
eastern Europe.30 
In Galton’s mind, however, there were no doubts or flaws. The results 
from his biographical study suggested to him not only the idea that superior 
ability could be inherited; it also created the possibility that it could be 
intentionally bred in future generations. His introduction to Hereditary Genius 
declared “it would be quite practicable to produce a highly-gifted race of men by 
judicious marriages during several consecutive generations.”31 In his second book 
on heredity Galton tried to ascertain the practicability of this goal by weighing the 
relative influence of “nature” and “nurture.”  
Another Galton book, English Men of Science, published in London in 
1874, was a more focused investigation of the inheritance of ability, though it was 
equally problematic. Galton based his study on membership lists of Fellows of the 
Royal Society, and winnowed the list of subjects whose genealogical backgrounds 
                                                
 
30 For an outstanding example, see the book by Charles B. Davenport – whom Garland Allen calls 
the “chief American advocate” of eugenics (Allen, “Eugenics Record Office,” 225) – Naval 
Officers: Their Heredity and Development (Washington, D.C.: The Carnegie Institution of 
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thalassophilia to be a recessive trait, “so that, when the determiner for it (or the absence of a 
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Sometimes a father who shows no liking for the sea, like [Commodore George Hamilton] 
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31 Galton, Hereditary Genius, 1.  
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he would investigate by adding points for winners of scientific medals, presidents 
of learned societies, and professors. Thus supplied with the names of 180 men, 
most residents of London, Galton wrote to these distinguished men asking for 
them to supply him with any and all information about their ancestors they felt 
comfortable providing. Galton required his readers to have faith in his 
scrupulousness; all of his respondents would remain anonymous, so no 
verification of his computations or analysis was possible.32 
Galton attempted a sophisticated statistical approach to heredity, 
describing in the introduction that nature and nurture (a phrase he coined) were 
both important influences on a human being’s development, although he was, like 
later classic racialists, unable to remain consistent regarding the interdependence 
of biology and the environment.33 When he began to discuss the Darwin family, 
and that family’s love of natural history and theory, he expressed his conviction 
that “I am sure that these characteristics are hereditary rather than traditional.” 
Analyzing family traits, or studying an individual’s hereditary pedigree, would in 
Galton’s mind foreshadow that individual’s development. Thus, taking into 
account the intellectual ability of Erasmus Darwin, the maternal grandfather he 
shared with cousin Charles, it was not surprising that his offspring achieved 
                                                
 
32 Francis Galton, English Men of Science: Their Nature and Nurture (London: Macmillan and 
Co., 1874), 11. Also, Shapin, A Social History of Truth.  
 
33 Galton described nature as “all that a man brings with himself into the world; nurture is every 
influence from without that affects him after his birth. The distinction is clear: the one produces 
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strengthened or thwarted, or wholly new ones implanted.” Galton, English Men of Science, 
emphasis added, 12.  
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eminence in science, medicine, and other fields.34 Ultimately, Galton believed the 
ability to be hereditary, and not due to education or socialization.35  
The eminent Darwin family was not the only hereditarily gifted brood in 
England though, and Galton’s study of English scientific men tried to prove the 
hereditary character of intellectual interests. Galton pointed to several qualities 
that he felt his respondents had proven were inherited: great energy, good 
constitutions, perseverance, practical mental habits, “good verbal memory, as for 
prose and poetry,” facility with numbers and figures, mechanical aptitude, secular 
inclinations, and “good memory for form.”36 Hampered by the difficulty of not 
knowing how these qualities were transmitted from generation to generation, 
Galton assumed that the coincidence of ability or particular aptitudes in a family 
line was not a coincidence or a result of socialization, but was the result of 
heredity. But since the hereditary transmission could not be proven, Galton 
included lengthy quotes from the letters he received from his subjects to verify his 
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Shapin makes, and a very significant component to Galton’s own social position and research as 
well. See Stephen Jay Gould, Ever Since Darwin: Reflections in Natural History (New York: W. 
W. Norton, 1977), quote from 33; 28-29 for Darwin’s role on board the Beagle. Also, Shapin, 
Social History of Truth. Charles Darwin’s son Leonard later became the head of the Eugenics 
Education Society in England, and supervised over the first International Congress of Eugenics as 
its President, although he made few original intellectual contributions to the study of heredity, 
evolution, or natural science.  
 
35 Karl Pearson, in his biography of Galton attributed the family’s scholarly success as due to the 
inheritance of a “scientific imagination.” Pearson, The Life, Letters and Labours of Francis 
Galton, I, p. 58. Discussed further in Gillham, A Life of Sir Francis Galton, 22ff.  
 
36 Galton, English Men of Science, ch. 2.  
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assertions. He relied on an uncritical acceptance of anecdotal evidence as “proof” 
of his theory.37 
Finally, in English Men of Science, Galton expressed an underlying 
assumption of a connection between an individual’s social position and their 
societal value. The historian Steven Shapin suggests that the high social position 
of scientific investigators in the pre-modern period was absolutely crucial to 
assessing the veracity of their work. Because his respondents were all men of high 
intellectual and social reputation, there was no need to critically evaluate their 
responses, so Galton did not. He was convinced that the replies he received were 
unimpeachably accurate: “As regards the scientific men, I find, as I had expected, 
vanity to be at a minimum, and their returns to bear all the marks of a cool and 
careful self-analysis. My bias has always been in favour of men of science, 
believing them to be especially manly, honest, and truthful, and the results of this 
inquiry has [sic] confirmed that bias.”38 This lays bare one of the critical 
distinctions between the methods employed by classic racialists and the modern 
experimentalists. For the latter, the veracity, utility, and accuracy of a scientific 
experiment or truth-claim resided in the ability of any investigator to replicate the 
results in a duplicated experiment. As Jennings would later insist, “we must study 
biology in such a way that what we find out can either be proved or disproved, not 
merely left hanging in the air. We must find out things that we can show people; 
                                                
 
37 One respondent to Galton’s inquiry replied that “I seem to posses the same unweariedness as my 
father, and find myself trotting in the streets as my father used to do.” This struck Galton as an 
indicator of inheritance of intellectual ability. Galton, English Men of Science, quoted on 83.  
 
38 Ibid., 148. Also, Shapin, A Social History of Truth.  
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we must be able to say to doubters—you try it yourself and you will see that it’s 
true.”39 Jennings absorbed these methods and techniques in part at the Naples 
Zoological Station, where laboratory research was the sine qua non of scientific 
investigation. Galton, airing one of the final gasps of pre-modern science, 
expected his reputation, and the reputation and social positions of his respondents, 
to satisfactorily stand as truth claims on their own. His results were true because 
he and his respondents – all men of high Victorian social standing – said they 
were.  
In Hereditary Genius and English Men of Science, Galton evolved toward 
an understanding of heredity and inheritance that culminated in one of the most 
important books of the late nineteenth-century, Inquiries into Human Faculty and 
Its Development, published in 1883. Human Faculty was enormously important 
for the development of American classic racialism. Indeed, it could be argued that 
it was the single-most influential book for the entire American immigration 
restriction movement, as it created the scientific language of eugenics, which in 
turn held a profound sway over American immigration policy. Within this book, 
Galton unified his hereditary assumptions of pedigree in the description of the 
new field of eugenics.40  
                                                
39 Herbert Spencer Jennings, “Some Unsettled and Unsettling Questions in Biological Science: An 
Unpopular Talk” Lecture n. 37, unpublished manuscript, Jennings Papers, APS, delivered at 
University of Pennsylvania, 11 March 1926, p. 37, emphasis in original.  
 
40 Despite the sloppiness with which he employed it, Nicholas Gillham declares Galton’s work in 
pedigree analysis to be a tremendous contribution to modern genetic science: “Today pedigree 
analysis is the essential analytical tool that human geneticists use in localizing the genes 
responsible for different human maladies both physical and mental.” Gillham, A Life of Sir 
Francis Galton, 4; also 171.  
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Galton explained that his intent in the book was “to take note of the varied 
hereditary faculties of different men, and of the great differences in different 
families and races, to learn how far history may have shown the practicability of 
supplanting inefficient human stock by better strains…” and the extent to which 
this direction of evolution was feasible.41 This was the kernel of eugenics that 
Galton developed throughout the book. It built on the arguments of his previous 
books – namely that ability, talent, and eminence were inherited – to advance the 
proposition that these superior characters could somehow, because of their 
hereditary basis, be augmented and propagated through judicious and careful 
procreation of superior stocks. This hope would play directly on the fears and 
aspirations of native-born Americans in the future.  
Galton used the word “eugenics” to describe this process of breeding 
superior stocks. “We greatly want,” he explained, “a brief word to express the 
science of improving stock, which is by no means confined to questions of 
judicious mating, but which, especially in the case of man, takes cognizance of all 
the influences that tend in however remote a degree to give to the more suitable 
races or strains of blood a better chance of prevailing speedily over the less 
suitable….” The Greek word eugenes, meaning “good in stock, hereditarily 
                                                
 
41 Francis Galton, Inquiries into Human Faculty and Its Development (Bristol, UK: Thoemmes 
Press, 1998 [orig. New York: MacMillan and Co., 1883]), 1-2, emphasis added. In the 
introduction, Galton explained his method for obtaining composite portraits that he put on the 
frontispiece and which demonstrated the continuity of the physical structure in family lines: he 
would collect photos, focus, crop, or reduce them to be of similar size, set up his photographic 
equipment, place the photos on a spot on the wall, and over-expose one photographic plate while 
inter-changing the photos. This, he claimed, would “bring into evidence all the traits in which 
there is agreement, and to leave but a ghost of a trace of individual peculiarities.” 10. This is a 
rather surprising reversal from Hereditary Genius, wherein Galton declared “features and mental 
abilities do not seem to be correlated.” 333. One of the “Personal and Family Specimens of 
Composite Portraiture” was of Alexander the Great, derived from six different medals or coins.  
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endowed with noble qualities,” he stated, adequately expressed that science.42 So 
was born a concept, a scientific language, that would have dramatic implications. 
But almost immediately after introducing this nettlesome neologism—a mere 
three pages—Galton began to undercut the “science” he just created. What 
exactly was a “good” stock? What were the desirable, “noble qualities”? These 
were not scientifically precise terms; they were subjective evaluations. And how, 
exactly, were these noble qualities “hereditarily endowed”?  
As many of his acolytes would, Galton ran into a severe difficulty in 
trying to measure or quantify something that defied easy empirical analysis when 
applied to human beings. After describing this new, promising “science” of 
eugenics, Galton wrote that he believed that in any scheme of improving the 
hereditary capabilities of future human beings, “energy is the most important 
quality to favor.”43 Galton meant not only physical energy, the body’s capacity to 
perform a given physical task, but also mental energy, those traits that he had laid 
out in English Men of Science: practical business habits, perseverance, good 
verbal and mathematical memory, and a secular inclination, among others. But 
with mental testing and psychology in their infancy, there was great difficulty in 
quantifying, let alone understanding, how mental energy worked.  
Galton aimed to remedy this difficulty of quantification by recommending 
extended generational studies of human beings. Pedigree analysis was the core of 
                                                
 
42 Galton, Human Faculty, fn. 1, pp. 24-25.  
 
43 Ibid., 27. 
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his work in heredity; Hereditary Genius and English Men of Science were at heart 
studies of the genealogies of gifted men. As he explained in Human Faculty, the 
principal limitation in advancing the goal of eugenics, of mastering “the 
conditions under which men of a high type are produced” was the lack of “full 
family histories, both medical and general, extending over three or four 
generations.”44 Galton was confident that he had already established the hereditary 
nature of ability and eminence. In Human Faculty he tried to broaden his 
investigation to more general characteristics, so that the possessors of desirable 
traits could be encouraged and appropriately supported to produce offspring of “a 
high type.” 
Surprisingly, Galton turned to the United States for evidence in support of 
his argument. The American “Juke” family provided theoretical proof for 
Galton’s pedigree studies. While the British polymath was investigating the 
pedigree of English scientific men and distinguished Britons from history, an 
American researcher, Robert Dugdale, was uncovering a hereditary lineage not of 
ability or eminence, but of degeneracy. Dugdale wrote that the several generations 
descended from “Max Juke” “run along lines of descent so that you can follow 
them from generation to generation,” and that the criminality, poverty and 
immorality of the family’s descendants could be traced through this genealogy. 
                                                
44 Ibid., 44.  
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Galton approvingly cited the Jukes as an example of the usefulness of pedigree 
analysis to show that both ability and criminality were inherited.45  
But this trans-Atlantic affirmation of the heredity of moral and mental 
characteristics did not help Galton solve all of his methodological or theoretical 
problems. His difficulty in quantifying heredity extended beyond attempting to 
measure things like energy, perseverance, or practical business habits. His 
biographer Nicholas Gillham notes that the “diversity of Galton’s interests was 
not atypical for a Victorian scientist,” but that diversity, and Galton’s “enthusiasm 
for analyzing scientific problems quantitatively” in many ways limited the utility 
of Galton’s work on heredity on a conceptual level.46 His diverse interests drove 
his work into unusual places; he wanted to measure and quantify everything. In 
Human Faculties he described “Psychometric Experiments,” an intriguing 
anticipation of Sigmund Freud’s “free-association,” wherein Galton would go for 
leisurely walks and record his thoughts and the influences on these thoughts from 
his immediate environment. He tried to quantify color associations and mental 
                                                
45 Robert Dugdale, The Jukes: A Study in Crime, Pauperism, Disease and Heredity Fourth ed., 
Intro. by Franklin Giddings, Foreword by Elisha Harris, M.D. (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 
1910 [orig. 1877]), quote from 16. Significantly, Dugdale very frequently ascribed a high 
importance to environmental influence, which Galton did acknowledge, though to a diminished 
extent. Galton, Human Faculty, 63. On the Jukes see also Carlson, The Unfit, esp. ch. 10.  
 
46 Gillham, A Life of Sir Francis Galton, 3. I distinguish the “conceptual level” here to 
acknowledge that Galton did make significant theoretical and practical contributions to the study 
of heredity (e.g. the law of ancestral inheritance) as well as significant contributions to statistics in 
helping to develop standard deviation, regression and error analysis, correlation and others. The 
historian Theodore Porter describes Galton’s statistical contributions as leading to quantitative 
genetics and biometrics. Theodore Porter, The Rise of Statistical Thinking, 1820-1900 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1986), 129-30. Sharon Kingsland argues that Galton’s statistical 
ability was central in making the study of heredity a “positivist science”; Lombroso aimed to do 
the same for the study of criminology. See Sharon Kingsland, “Evolution and Debates over 
Human Progress from Darwin to Sociobiology” Population and Development Review v. 14 
Supplement: Population and Resources in Western Intellectual Traditions (1998), 167-98; 186. 
See also Gillham, A Life of Sir Francis Galton.  
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imagery and its vividness. He tried to objectively determine the efficacy of prayer 
by examining the average age at death of a variety of professions (he found it 
ineffective).47 Galton’s conceptual approach to the world was effectively pre-
modern, in that he still practiced a method of scientific investigation and inquiry 
that, despite its positivist ambitions, was really about observing and describing 
phenomena and making inferences from those phenomena.48  
An example will help illustrate this point. As a well-traveled Victorian 
gentleman, Galton was certainly familiar with the processes of emigration and 
colonization.49 But what inspired or compelled a man to leave the comforts of his 
familiar home and environment for the great uncertainty and hazards of 
relocating? For Galton, an “exile,” as he called emigrants, left all that was safe 
                                                
47 Galton was not a particularly religious man, but he understood that very frequently, great 
statesmen, religious leaders, and monarchs were often (though perhaps insincerely) the recipients 
of hopeful, well-wishing prayers from their subjects or congregants. He found that 97 members of 
royal households lived to an average age of 64.04; nearly 1000 members of the clergy lived an 
average of 69.49 years; lawyers, of whom he had 294 records, lived an average of 68.14 years; and 
noted contributors in fields of literature or science, whose sample numbered 395, lived to an 
average of 67.55 years old. So clergy and kings who received prayers did not live any longer than 
those anonymous members of society that did not. He thus logically concluded, “If prayerful 
habits had influence on temporal success, it is very probable, as I must again repeat, that insurance 
offices…would long ago have discovered and made allowance for it.” Galton, Human Faculty, 
table on p. 281; quote 292.  
 
48 Galton did perform some experiments. For instance, to test Darwin’s theory of pangenesis, 
Galton transfused blood from rabbits. See the description in Gillham, A Life of Sir Francis Galton, 
174ff. Galton also presented the results of a two-year surveying trip in Africa, charting and 
mapping parts of what is now Namibia to the Royal Geographical Society in the early 1850s. This 
presentation, Gillham argues, “launched his scientific career.” Ibid., 91. 
 
49 Another useful example that Galton used can be found in Human Faculty. He used an analogy 
of sticks thrown into a stream to demonstrate the co-operative influence of heredity and 
environment. A person throwing bits of a stick into a stream, he explained, would observe the 
halting progress of the sticks as they were variously arrested, deflected, or facilitated in their 
course by “a combination of circumstances.” The observer might think “how largely the destiny of 
the stick has been governed by a series of trifling incidents. Nevertheless,” he wrote, “all the sticks 
succeed in passing down the current, and in the long run, they travel at nearly the same rate. So it 
is with life, in respect to the several accidents which seem to have had a great effect on our 
careers.” Galton, Human Faculty, 241, emphasis added. 
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and easy because he was a man of great character, strength and virtue. They were 
by definition great, eminent men, because “a quiet man would endure and 
succumb” to inertia or oppression, and remain safe at home. Galton declared that 
“exiles are on the whole men of exceptional and energetic natures, and it is 
especially from such men as these that new strains of race are likely to proceed.”50 
Certainly, this could be true; the settlement of British North America showed 
many such examples of gifted and exceptional men taking great risks. (This 
would be precisely the argument American supporters of immigration restriction 
would make, that the early colonists and pioneers in what became the United 
States were a special, select, and highly superior breed whose offspring were 
tragically being overwhelmed by inferior races.) But it could also be said that a 
great number were not gifted or exceptional at all, but were compelled to leave 
England behind because of desperation, crushing poverty, criminal prosecution, or 
were searching for significant economic gain. Ireland would have provided a 
perfect example of some of these “other” factors that led Irish men and women to 
uproot themselves from their homeland and loved ones. Galton’s great logical 
flaw, and it was Lombroso’s too, was to assume or infer that qualities or causes 
that may or may not have been true were indeed true.  
The trans-Atlantic impact of Galton’s work can be seen in the reception of 
his theories in America. It attracted the attention of Charles B. Davenport, an 
American zoologist also interested in human heredity and biology, who would in 
time become the leader of eugenics in the United States. Davenport felt that 
                                                
50 Galton, Human Faculty, 308.  
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Galton’s application of statistical analysis to biological inheritance held great 
promise. The American aimed to emulate Galton’s work, writing a book of his 
own titled Statistical Methods: With a Special Reference to Biological Variation 
(1899) to use in his zoology classes at Harvard University and at research 
laboratories in the United States. When Davenport sent a copy of the book to 
London, Galton replied, “Your beautiful little book with its kindly & charming 
lines of gift to me, has of course interested me greatly. I am delighted to see how 
steadily the application of the higher statistics is making its way in biological and 
social matters.”51 Davenport shared many qualities with the English gentleman, 
such as a high confidence in the efficacy of eugenics, an appreciation of the 
importance of statistical analysis in biological studies, a conviction that many 
characteristics in human beings were directly inherited, and the utility of pedigree 
analysis in proving the heredity of those characteristics. But perhaps their most 
important similarity was a like tendency toward sloppy analysis that, over time, 
radically undercut the scientific standing of eugenics.  
One might describe Galton as a late pre-modern scientist. His social 
standing and position as a Victorian gentleman was a more important 
endorsement of the veracity of his scientific statements than his institutional 
                                                
51 Francis Galton to Charles Benedict Davenport, 20 October 1899, Charles B. Davenport Papers, 
American Philosophical Society, Philadelphia, PA [hereafter Davenport papers]. See also Charles 
B. Davenport, Statistical Methods, with a Special Reference to Biological Variation (New York: J. 
Wiley and Sons, 1899). Davenport explained that the book was “issued in answer to a repeated 
call for a simple presentation of the newer statistical methods in their application to biology.… 
[particularly] for use at summer laboratories where material for variation-study abounds.” iii.  
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affiliation or his academic credentials.52 His research consisted of poring over 
biographies and pedigrees of socially or historically notable men, conducting 
calculations of correlated qualities and characteristics, and generalizing findings 
from there. He had certainly put, in Theodore Porter’s phrase, his “trust in 
numbers,” and his empiricism and positivism reflected a commitment to the 
development of objective knowledge. But he was more a natural scientist than a 
zoologist or biologist. Particularly in dealing with heredity and inheritance, there 
was no knowledge of how heredity actually worked, though the framework of 
Darwinian evolution was certainly a tremendous intellectual advance. Galton tried 
to express hereditary inheritance by distinguishing between “latent” and “patent” 
characteristics.53 With Mendel’s results from his work on peas unknown, and 
before the “germ-plasm” theory of inheritance, Galton groped in the dark – albeit 
with modest success. 
                                                
52 See Gillham, A Life of Sir Francis Galton, chapters 2-3 for Galton’s education. Steven Shapin 
describes early modern science as implicitly founded on trust. Many scientists in the period “were 
gentlemen and their codes of scientific conduct were adapted from those circulating in 
gentlemanly society,” such as integrity, honor and free action. But he also notes that the ability of 
empirical scientific ideas to “travel,” to diffuse from local and particular contexts and 
circumstances, is reliant on “a trust relationship” to an even greater extent than modern scientists. 
Steven Shapin, “Placing the View from Nowhere: Historical and Sociological Problems in the 
Location of Science” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers n.s. v. 23, n. 1 (1998), 
5-12; 8. Also Theodore Porter, Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public 
Life (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998). 
 
53 “Latent” and “patent” were adequate terms to describe what Mendel had named “dominant” and 
“recessive” traits. As Mendel’s work was not rediscovered until 1900, Galton was unable to use 
the terms. Darwin also tried to explain reversion (the appearance of characteristics from an earlier 
generation), and described two separate classes of “gemmules,” one of which was dormant, the 
other active. In an essay titled “On Blood-relationship,” Galton introduced his alternate 
terminology to explain the problem of reversion. Francis Galton, “On Blood-relationship” 
Proceedings of the Royal Society v. 20 (1872), 394-402. Gillham describes the essay as “verg[ing] 
on the incomprehensible.” Gillham, A Life of Sir Francis Galton, 179. Carlson, Mendel’s Legacy 
describes Weismann’s alternative theory of inheritance via the germ-plasm theory of heredity. 
 
 Introduction 35 
In contrast to Galton’s methods, Herbert Spencer Jennings conducted 
scientific investigations in a completely different, “modern” way.54 Although he 
spent his summers as an undergraduate working for the Michigan Fish 
Commission’s survey of the Great Lakes doing mostly descriptive work (his 
advisor at Ann Arbor was its director), Jennings used the materials to further his 
knowledge and interest in morphology and developmental mechanics. His desire 
to go to Naples to conduct research stemmed from a laboratory and experimental 
approach to science. He told a friend that “a combination of the natural history 
way of looking at things with the morphological or philosophical way is the ideal 
condition for one who is going to do something in science.” In Naples Jennings 
continued his training as a zoologist using modern experimental methods, and 
after getting his Ph.D. in zoology at Harvard, he taught courses at the University 
of Michigan in Experimental Morphology. He was ultimately lured to Johns 
Hopkins University – one of the country’s preeminent research universities – to 
reorganize the zoology department. He taught there for over thirty years, and his 
approach to science remained what it was at Naples: study the processes of 
development by experimental research. “I have been more and more attracted,” he 
explained to the zoology chair at Michigan before he left for Italy’s largest city, 
                                                
54 On this general intellectual and epistemic shift, see the following: Hamilton Cravens, The 
Triumph of Evolution: American Scientists and there Heredity-Environment Controversy, 1900-
1941 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1978); Jane Maienschein, Transforming 
Traditions; Kohler, All Creatures; and Keith Benson, “From Museum Research to Laboratory 
Research”; Pauly, “Summer Resort and Scientific Discipline”; and Diane Paul and Barbara 
Kimmelman, “Mendel In America: Theory and Practice, 1900-1919” all in Rainger, et al, eds. The 
American Development of Biology; Philip Pauly, Biologists and the Promise of American Life: 
From Meriwether Lewis to Alfred Kinsey (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); Paul, 
Controlling Human Heredity. 
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“to the line of work often called Developmental Mechanics—the work of the 
‘new school.’” Jennings was of a generation that helped gradually shift American 
biology from its natural history orientation to an academic and research 
orientation.55  
The “new school” that Jennings described, however, faced several 
difficulties in completely displacing a language of scientific inquiry based in part 
on natural history and natural science. It was competing against an entrenched 
understanding of the “restrictionist epistemology,” the classic racialism of the 
early 1900s. As the long-lasting influence of eugenics and classic racialism in the 
United States shows, although experimentalism may have been epistemologically 
“better,” it was highly complex and esoteric. By contrast, Galton’s and 
Lombroso’s simple theories that men of talent and born criminals were naturally 
gifted or depraved were easy to digest and understand. Classic racialism argued 
that the blood of the Jukes, and later the Kallikaks, would carry their degenerate 
characters into future generations because of the immutability of heredity. Classic 
racialism’s essence was easily reduced: like produces like. Modern biologists 
could produce no similar dramatic argument of their science’s essence. Jennings 
later lamented that “Heredity is not the simple, hard-and-fast thing that old-
                                                
55 For Jennings’s biography and early training, see Mezzano, “The Progressive Origins of 
Eugenics Critics”; on reorganizing Hopkins consult T. M. Sonneborn, “Herbert Spencer Jennings, 
1868-1947: A Biographical Memoir” Biographical Memoirs v. XLVII (Washington, D.C.: 
National Academy of Sciences of the United States, 1975). For his interests in Naples, see, 
Jennings to Mary Louise Burridge, 20 October, 1895; “morphological” work in Jennings to Joseph 
Brennemann, 1 August 1894, Jennings papers. Calendar of the University of Michigan, 1899 - 
1900 (Ann Arbor, MI: 1899), Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 
[hereafter Bentley], 103-04 for Jennings’s courses at the University of Michigan. For 
“Developmental Mechanics” see Jennings to Jacob Reighard, 29 December 1895, Box 1, Jacob 
Reighard Papers, Bentley.  
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fashioned Mendelism represented it [to be],” but disabusing the public of this 
beguiling simplicity was not easy.56 Modern biology did not reduce to aphorisms. 
The “new school” could not displace the old outside the narrow audience of its 
practitioners.57 
Another essential contribution to classic racialist language and ideas 
involved a biological determinism similar to Galton’s. An Italian medical doctor, 
working amidst an allegedly unlawful and rebellious population in southern Italy 
after unification in 1861, found physical predictors of the criminal behavior of 
southern Italian brigands. Deviants and criminals had physical stigma and 
abnormalities that manifested their antisocial inclinations. His ideas became so 
popular and compelling that Cesare Lombroso’s criminal anthropology appeared 
in fiction: “The Count is a criminal and of criminal type. Nordau and Lombroso 
would so qualify him, and quâ criminal he is of imperfectly formed mind. Thus, 
in a difficulty, he has to seek resource in habit.” In that habit laid the method of 
tracking down and destroying the fictional fiend Dracula.58 Published in 1897, 
Bram Stoker’s novel Dracula at once attests to the diffusion and persuasiveness 
of the theory of the “born criminal,” first articulated by Lombroso in 1876 in 
L’uomo delinquente [Criminal Man]. Lombroso’s theory, that there existed a type 
of criminal whose actions were determined by an inherent, biological disposition 
to depravity and delinquency that manifested itself in physical form was an 
                                                
56 Jennings, “Heredity and Environment” 230.  
 
57 This dilemma is discussed in Kuhn, Scientific Revolutions; idem., The Road Since Structure.  
 
58 Bram Stoker, Dracula Introduction by Leonard Wolf (New York: Signet Classic, 1992 [orig. 
1897]), 343.  
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essential and fundamental contribution to classic racialism, and in turn had a 
significant impact on the American immigration restriction movement. As the 
founder of the “Italian school” of criminal anthropology, Lombroso’s own 
writings, as well as those of his followers Giuseppe Sergi and Alfredo Niceforo 
contributed to the trans-Atlantic origins of American racial nativism, and 
provided an additional pivot from pre-modern methods of scientific investigation 
to modern laboratory- and experimentally-derived scientific truths.59  
Lombroso made several key contributions to the foundations of classic 
racialism, but of primary importance was his work in criminal anthropology. 
Reacting against the Enlightenment approach of Cesare Beccaria and others, who 
attempted to rationalize and make uniform the punishment of crimes, Lombroso’s 
training as a medical doctor oriented his approach to the criminal rather than the 
crime. Serving as a doctor in the newly-unified Italian army, Lombroso came 
across the bodies of “brigands,” Southern Italian peasants who refused to submit 
to the Piedmont-dominated Royal government, which southerners viewed as 
another manifestation of foreign domination of the Italian south (il 
Mezzogiorno).60 After a few years’ service in the Italian army, Lombroso worked 
                                                
59 I maintain this trans-Atlantic connection despite the good suggestion of Frederick Churchill for 
greater scrutiny of local and national contexts and institutions to escape the competing dyad of 
“naturalists” versus “experimentalists.” See Frederick Churchill, “In Search of the New Biology” 
Jl H Bio, v. 14 (1981), 177-91. Also, Kingsland, “The Battling Botanist”; David Hull, Science as a 
Process: An Evolutionary Account of the Social and Conceptual Development of Science 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988).  
 
60 For the origins of il questione meridionale – what Italians called the “Southern Question” – see 
the essays in Robert Lumley and Jonathan Morris, eds. The New History of the Italian South: The 
Mezzogiorno Revisited (Exeter, UK: University of Exeter Press, 1997); Nelson Moe, “‘This is 
Africa’: Ruling and Representing Southern Italy, 1860-61” in Albert R. Ascoli and Krystyna von 
Henneberg, eds. Making and Remaking Italy: The Cultivation of National Identity around the 
Risorgimento (Oxford: Berg, 2001); Nelson Moe, The View from Vesuvius: Italian Culture and the 
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with mental patients, and then took a position at the University of Turin in 1876 
as professor of legal medicine.61 During this time, Lombroso examined the body 
of an executed brigand, Giuseppe Villella, and found several strange anomalies in 
the dead criminal’s skull. It became, as Mary Gibson describes, Lombroso’s 
“foundation myth” for criminal anthropology.62 
Villella’s delinquency was inscribed on his body, and ultimately pre-
determined the course of his life as a criminal. The physical body of Villella, 
Lombroso argued, betrayed his criminal behavior.63 Lombroso then began to 
examine and measure the bodies of other criminals and delinquents, amassing 
enough evidence to publish L’uomo delinquente in 1876 in which he described the 
new field of positivist criminal anthropology. The argument of L’uomo 
delinquente was simple: most criminals possessed abnormal physical features and 
characteristics that demonstrated them to be evolutionary throwbacks or atavisms, 
which disposed them to delinquent and criminal behavior. The circumference of 
their skulls tended to be abnormally small, their cheekbones wide or 
                                                                                                                                
Southern Question (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); John Dickie, Darkest Italy: 
The Nation and Stereotypes of the Mezzogiorno, 1860-1900 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999); 
and the essays in Jane Schneider, ed. Italy’s “Southern Question”: Orientalism in One Country 
(New York: Berg, 1998). 
 
61 See Peter D’Agostino, “Craniums, Criminals, and the ‘Cursed Race': Italian Anthropology in 
American Racial Thought, 1861–1924” Comparative Studies in Society and History v. 44, n. 2 
(April 2002), 319-343; 322; Mary Gibson, Born to Crime: Cesare Lombroso and the Origins of 
Biological Criminology (Westport, CT: Praeger Press, 2002).  
 
62 Gibson, Born to Crime, 20.  
 
63 What Lombroso specifically found was that Villella’s skull had an abnormal indentation at the 
base of his brain, which he believed suggested the existence of “a fairly small cerebellum.” Cesare 
Lombroso, Criminal Man translated and edited by Mary Gibson and Nicole Hahn Rafter (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2006) [Hereafter Lombroso, Gibson/Rafter, Criminal Man], 48. Also, 
Cesare Lombroso, L’uomo delinquente: in rapporto all’antropologia, alla giurisprudenza, ed alle 
discipline carcerarie (Rome: Napoleone Editore, 1971 [orig. 1876]). 
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overdeveloped, and they had a high incidence of prognathism (a jaw that projects 
beyond the nose). Certain classes of criminals, Lombroso found, had specific 
physical similarities. Thieves had thick and close eyebrows and expressive faces 
accented by small, darting eyes. Their beards and hair were scanty, and they had 
large ears. Rapists, too, had large ears, but also had “sparkling eyes, delicate 
features, and swollen lips and eyelids.”64 Criminals also frequently had tattoos, 
they spoke in a jargon or vernacular particular to their deviant profession, and 
they tended to have a notable lack of affect.65 These characteristics, Lombroso 
declared, “clearly prove that the most horrendous and inhuman crimes have a 
biological, atavistic origin in those animal instincts that, although smoothed over 
by education, the family, and fear of punishment, resurface instantly under given 
circumstances.”66 The dangerous class of criminals, to an expert who knew how to 
properly read the human body for these stigmata and marks of atavism, was 
readily visible. The danger they represented, for Lombroso and his followers, lay 
in the fact that their propensity to crime was innate and biological.67  
                                                
64 These descriptions are all from Lombroso, Gibson/Rafter, Criminal Man: circumference from 
45; cheekbones, 49; rapists and thieves, 51. Lombroso declared that “It can even be said that each 
type of crime is committed by men with particular physiognomic characteristics…” Ibid., 51.  
 
65 Ibid., chapters 3 and 4.   
 
66 Ibid., 91. This emphasis on “given circumstances” ultimately made Lombroso’s theory slightly 
less deterministic than Galton’s theory of hereditary ability, though, as I have suggested, Galton 
was at least aware of some role for environmental factors.  
 
67 Lombroso did not use the phrase “born criminal” [delinquente nato] until the third edition of 
L’uomo delinquente, which appeared in 1884. One of Lombroso’s students, Enrico Ferri, first 
coined the phrase. See the explanation in the editors’ introduction to the third edition in Lombroso, 
Gibson/Rafter, Criminal Man, 9; 161. Lombroso also had difficulty solving the problems this class 
represented. He suggested that crime had a symbiotic relationship to society, but since born 
criminals could not be rehabilitated, this concept ends logically in negative eugenics or 
extermination. Lombroso stated at the end of the fifth edition of Criminal Man that “born 
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But Lombroso’s conclusions were problematic. He often seemed confused 
regarding the efficacy of the environment, socialization, and other cultural factors 
in explaining crime; Lombroso was a committed socialist (as were most of his 
followers), and tended to also perceive an economic basis for some types of 
crime. Again, certain criminals acted on their innate dispositions only in certain 
circumstances. Lombroso eventually devised four typologies of male criminals, of 
which the born criminal was only one type. The Italian physician used anecdotes, 
paintings, literature, and ancient history as evidence in support of his theory.68 The 
greatest problem in his positivist criminology, however, was also its greatest 
strength: simplicity. Lombroso tried to compress what is ultimately a very 
complicated phenomenon (crime and criminal behavior) into a very concise 
explanation (biology). In this way, what may have been merely coincidental 
correlations, or random chance, became elevated to a type of scientific law.  
Lombroso’s positivist criminology was challenged by the emergence of a 
“French” school of criminology at the Second Congress of Criminal 
Anthropology in 1889 that emphasized the sociological origins of crime, rather 
                                                                                                                                
criminals are impervious to every social cure and must be eliminated for our own defense, 
sometimes by the death penalty.” Ibid., 354.  
 
68 Typologies from the editors’ introduction to the fourth edition of L’uomo delinquente in 
Lombroso, Gibson/Rafter, Criminal Man, 228; anecdotes and proverbs from Ibid., 311. Lombroso 
suggested that archeologists had demonstrated that the worst of the Roman Empire’s leaders – 
Commodius, Nero, and Tiberius – all had “jug ears and swollen temples.” Ibid., 53. Lombroso 
also declared that “Great artists depicted criminal physiognomy in their painting long before 
criminal anthropologists demonstrated scientifically the existence of a criminal type.” Among 
those he singled out were the depraved executioners in the work of Mantegna, Titian, Rubens and 
Goya. Ibid., 312. See also Lombroso, L’uomo delinquente, 88-89 for a variety of regional proverbs 
in Italy that also allegedly provided evidence of the anthropological theory of crime; on p. 90 
Lombroso lists Dante, Shakespeare and Dostoyevsky as artists especially skilled at accurately 
describing the physical characters of criminals.  
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than the biological.69 Other Italians, particularly the sociologist Napoleone 
Colajanni, also disputed his biological explanations for crime. But Lombroso 
made significant efforts to diffuse his work across the Atlantic, and in this effort, 
he found receptive audiences in the United States. Although there was no 
adequate English translation of L’uomo delinquente until Lombroso’s daughter’s 
abridged translation was published in 1911, early on Lombroso tried to 
disseminate his ideas to Americans through short articles in journals.70  
In the introduction he wrote for his daughter’s abridgement, Lombroso 
pointed out that the United States had always provided “a warm and sympathetic 
reception to the ideas of the Modern School which they speedily put into 
practice.”71 His first English description of criminal anthropology was published 
                                                
 
69 At the First International Congress of Criminal Anthropology at Rome in 1885, Lombroso’s 
theory had no opponents and very few critics. At the Second Congress, in Paris in 1889, the 
physician Alexandre Lacassagne offered an alternative “French School” of criminal anthropology 
that was heavily environmentalist and sociological rather than anthropological. See Gibson, Born 
to Crime, 43. There was also an Italian camp of sociological criminology, in which Napoleone 
Colajanni was a significant presence. See Gabriella D’Agostino, “Napoleone Colajanni and 
Human Sciences” Europæa, v. 3, n. 3 (1997); also Piers Beirne, Inventing Criminology: Essays on 
the Rise of Homo Criminalis (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993). After the 
Fourth International Congress of Criminal Anthropology in 1896, the American magazine The 
Nation detailed the meeting in Geneva: the French and Italian schools continued their rivalry, and 
Lombroso again showed “that lamentable weakness known as hasty generalization” but also 
showed great facility with “scientific ‘accommodation.’” Lombroso’s positivist criminology had 
evolved over time, the article reported, incorporating criticisms and refinements, “and now, at the 
fourth congress, applauds the proposition of the men who are seeking to substitute a criminal and 
social psychology for the anthropology which he (Lombroso) started out.” “Fourth International 
Congress of Criminal Anthropology” The Nation v. 63, n. 1631 (1 October 1896), 247-8; 247. 
 
70 I take the two following definitions of positivism to be excellent: “Positivism was an intellectual 
frame of mind—rationalistic, naturalistic, attentive to collecting facts, critical of metaphysics, and 
prone to draw analogies between nature and society. Grounded in Social Darwinism, it captivated 
a broad spectrum of liberal and socialist intellectuals in the late nineteenth century.” P. 
D’Agostino, “Craniums, Criminals” 321; and defined as a philosophy of history, a philosophical 
system that offered a structured way of thinking about the nature of the world, and a moral 
philosophy. Teresa Neyhouse, Positivism in Criminological Thought: A Study in the History and 
Use of Ideas (New York: L.F.B. Scholarly Publishing, 2002). 
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in 1891, where he described the field in relation to Emile Zola’s fictional 
criminals. Lombroso felt that although Zola had certainly done his homework 
regarding the physical anomalies of criminals, the French writer placed too much 
emphasis on contingent, dramatic props in the story, which suggested that 
criminal acts were contingent.72 For Lombroso, there was no contingency. Murder 
most often occurred because of the biological disposition of the criminal. Using 
this popular, fictional manifestation of his positivist criminology, Lombroso took 
the occasion to introduce the principles of criminal anthropology to the American 
reader. In the second part of his article, Lombroso described experiments he 
performed in his laboratory on the chemical composition of criminals’ urine, their 
scientifically tested power of smell (using an “osmometer”) and taste, and the 
walk and gestures of criminal subjects. Finally, Lombroso discussed the 
morphology and the physical abnormalities of criminals, particularly their skull 
size and shape.73 These helped an expert observer to know that the subjects were 
                                                                                                                                
71 Gina Lombroso-Ferrero, Criminal Man: According to the Classification of Cesare Lombroso 
intro. Cesare Lombroso (Montclair, NJ: Patterson Smith Publishing Corp., 1972 [orig. 1911]), 
xxix. Lombroso defined his criminal anthropology as “modern” to contrast it to Beccaria and 
Enlightenment theories of penology and criminality. It is not used in the same sense as I am using 
“modern” to distinguish from “classic racialism.” The methods and key concepts were still derived 
by analogy, description or measurement, not through chemical and laboratory experimentation.  
 
72 “In ‘La Fortune des Rougon,’” Lombroso explained, “there is a certain musket which serves for 
the murder of gendarmes…; as if the cause of the fatality was not the hereditary instinct, but this 
silent and unconscious instrument.” Cesare Lombroso, “Illustrative Problems in Criminal 
Anthropology, Part I and II” The Monist v. 1, n. 2 (January 1891), 177-96; 178. Lombroso liked 
Zola’s work in general, describing him as “the only one of the Latin race who endeavors to 
introduce the scientific method into his literary work.” 177. The essay is also reprinted in Cesare 
Lombroso, The Criminal Anthropological Writings of Cesare Lombroso Published in the English 
Language Periodical Literature During the Late 19th and Early 20th Centuries David M. Horton, 
Katherine E. Rich, eds. Criminology Studies, v. 22 (Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press, 
2004). Preface by Nicole Rafter.  
 
73 Ibid., 187-88 for osmometer; 190 Wrinkles, tattoos, and the relative infrequency of “canities” 
(one’s hair turning grey) were also described as markers of criminality. In his own schema, two of 
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criminals, he argued, because their measurement in these categories regressed 
from normal measurements. 
In a later issue the same year, Lombroso discussed his anthropological 
measurements of political criminals during Italian unification, along with the 
physical appearances of nihilists and Communards, and suggested that political 
criminals were ultimately different from born criminals. He pointed to anarchists 
detained in Turin and Chicago who did not universally display the attributes of 
the “born criminal.” Muddying the relative influence on human development of 
heredity and the environment, Lombroso wrote that “I do not mean that political 
criminals, even the most violent anarchists[,] are true criminals; but that they 
possess the degenerative characters common to criminals and the insane, being 
anomalies and possessing these traits by heredity.” So they had abnormal physical 
features, which were biologically inherited from their ancestors, but their ultimate 
compulsion to crime – and a particular type of crime directed against the “state” 
and not an individual – was the result of contingent or accidental circumstances. 
He mentioned that the father of Charles Guiteau was a “religious lunatic” who 
had passed on his mental and moral instability to his son and that the father of 
John Wilkes Booth contributed to his murderous son a radical ancestor’s mental 
instability.74 But ultimately it was a contextual event, not biology that drove these 
two American political assassins to act. They were not “born” murderers.  
                                                                                                                                
the fictional examples of murders from Zola’s work could easily be classified as a criminals of 
passion, or an “occasional criminal,” one “driven to crime through external circumstances.” 
Lombroso, Gibson/Rafter, Criminal Man, 288. Gibson and Rafter point out Lombroso’s 
inconsistencies in their introduction to Criminal Man. See especially 12, 18. 
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A German-born British national, who was a well-known translator of 
Italian, also assisted with the dissemination of Lombroso’s ideas throughout the 
United States. Helen Zimmern published an article in 1898 in the American 
magazine Popular Science Monthly describing the field of Italian criminal 
anthropology, and Lombroso’s accomplishments in establishing the scientific 
study of criminals and their pathological abnormalities. While impressed with 
Lombroso’s new field, Zimmern did point out problems in the Italian’s research, 
problems that would plague many of the Americans who followed in his steps. 
She explained that “His work is by no means perfect; he is apt to jump too rapidly 
at conclusions, to accept data too lightly; thus he was led at the beginning to 
overestimate the atavistic element in the criminal, and at a later date he has 
pressed too strongly the epileptic affinities of crime.” Just as Galton would do, 
and later the American eugenicists under Charles Davenport (whose work built on 
these classic racialist foundations), Lombroso interpreted coincidence as 
causation. But as a trailblazer, opening up new lines of investigation, Zimmern 
had unqualified admiration for Lombroso, and she passed those sentiments on to 
the American readers.75  
The intellectual connection between Lombroso and the United States was 
strong. He followed developments in the American criminal justice system very 
closely. He favorably mentioned the American reformatory system, which was 
                                                                                                                                
74 Cesare Lombroso, “Illustrative Studies in Criminal Anthropology, Part III: The Physiognomy of 
the Anarchists” The Monist v. 1, n. 3 (April 1891), 336-43; 339.  
 
75 Helen Zimmern, “Criminal Anthropology in Italy” Popular Science Monthly v. 52 (April 1898), 
743-60; quote from 752.  
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designed to rehabilitate what Lombroso called “occasional criminals.”76 In an 
English article, Lombroso stressed that “All efforts at reform should be 
concentrated upon occasional criminals. They are the only ones for whom much 
can be done.”77 But his American biographer Mary Gibson points out that his 
positivism and socialism were ideologically at odds; his explanations for Jewish 
criminality tended almost exclusively to environmental or social causes of crime 
rather than biology (Lombroso was Jewish). At times he emphasized very stark 
differences in behavior between whites and non-whites, whom he held to be 
biologically different and more primitive.78 
Through the various editions of L’uomo delinquente, Lombroso evolved 
his schema on criminality, and the late-emerging category of occasional criminals 
again shows some of the contradictions and confusions in Lombroso’s own 
writing. He consistently argued, however, that there was a category of born 
criminals, and like Galton used The Jukes as evidence of its biological basis. In 
his second edition of L’uomo delinquente (1878), Lombroso incorporated 
Dugdale’s study of the Juke family as evidence of hereditary criminality.79 There 
                                                
76 Lombroso describes this class in great detail in Lombroso, L’uomo delinquente, Parte VIII. See 
also Lombroso, Gibson/Rafter, Criminal Man, Chapters 32-41. Lombroso further breaks down 
delinquenti d’occasione into pseudo-criminals, criminaloids, latent criminals, and epileptoids. See 
Lombroso, L’uomo delinquente, 327-46.  
 
77 Cesare Lombroso, “Criminal Anthropology: Its Origin and Application” Forum v. 20 
(September 1895), 33-49; 46.  
 
78 Gibson/Rafter, Criminal Man, 106-7; 100. In 1871 Lombroso published L’uomo bianco e 
l’uomo di colore. Letture sull’origine e varietà delle razze umane [The White Man and the Man of 
Color: Lectures on the Origin and Variety of Human Races] (Padua: F. Sacchetto, 1871).  
 
79 Dugdale, The Jukes, 8 for list of crimes committed by one sample of the family. One historian 
has claimed of Dugdale that “there was no one of his generation, not even Lombroso, whose work 
had greater impact on the new sciences of eugenics and criminology.” Ysabel Rennie, The Search 
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was a certain appropriateness to his utilization of Dugdale, as Lombroso’s 
deepening socialist convictions coincided with the American’s recommendations 
for penal reform, and their descriptions of the causes of crime were very close as 
well.80 There was one crucial difference between Dugdale and Lombroso, though. 
Dugdale traced the pedigree of the Juke family, noting the consistent appearance 
in each generation of criminals, delinquents and paupers. But Dugdale did not 
explain this to be solely due to their heredity or a biological disposition to 
criminality. Rather, Dugdale explained that “the logical induction seems to be, 
that environment is the ultimate controlling factor in determining careers, placing 
heredity itself as an organized result of the invariable environment.”81 The multi-
causal etiology of degeneracy was, we have already seen, attended to, to an 
extent, in Lombroso’s work to an extent. Yet when it was deployed in classic 
racialist thought in the United States, it would be almost completely dropped, with 
a singular emphasis on the biological causes.82  
                                                                                                                                
for Criminal Man: A Conceptual History of the Dangerous Offender (Lexington, MA: Lexington 
Books, 1978), 79. See also Mark Haller’s history of American eugenics, which describes the quick 
acceptance of Dugdale in America as due to medical and scientific assumptions of heredity and an 
unconscious bias of college-trained middle class physicians and social workers. Haller, Eugenics: 
Hereditarian Attitudes in American Thought.  
 
80 Near the end of The Jukes Dugdale refers to “first offenders,” a category very similar to 
Lombroso’s “occasional criminals.” He also recommended both “immediate” or “correctional” 
and “remote” or “preventive” methods of penal reform. Among the latter he included greatly 
enhanced sanitary improvements and child education. Ibid., 110-12; 117-19.  
 
81 Dugdale, The Jukes, 66. 
 
82 See, for instance, Arthur Estabrook, The Jukes in 1915 (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Institution 
of Washington, 1916). In revisiting the degenerate New York family, Estabrook, who was a paid 
researcher of the Eugenics Record Office at Cold Spring Harbor, concluded that the family was 
still propagating the bad heredity. Estabrook noted that heredity “has its complemental factor in 
environment. The two determine the behavior of the individual.” However much the environment 
might be improved or perfected, though, “the response of the individual will still depend on its 
constitution” which was more important than environmental changes or improvements. 85. See 
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Dugdale impressed Lombroso, as the Jukes seemed to verify his findings 
of il delinquente nato, and Lombroso consistently expanded his analysis of 
Dugdale’s work on heredity in his books on criminology. In an extended 
treatment of the etiology of crime in a later edition of L’uomo delinquente, 
Lombroso devoted an entire chapter to crime and heredity, race, and disease.83 
After describing the effects of direct heredity – those characters directly passed 
from father to son – Lombroso inserted a large table that graphically showed the 
criminal heredity of the Jukes.84 The bottom of the chart added up the totals of the 
various crimes by bloodline – the criminality of Juke blood far outstripped the 
ratio of delinquency of non-Juke blood. Before the rediscovery of Mendel’s 
inheritance ratios, however, like Francis Galton, Lombroso’s understanding of 
hereditary mechanisms was highly flawed.85 He presumed a hereditary basis of 
criminality because a family had an abnormal number of criminals in it. He 
discussed parents that were insane, epileptic, alcoholic, and aged passing on their 
criminal dispositions to their children.86 But he lacked any mechanism of 
                                                                                                                                
also Nicole Hahn Rafter, ed. White Trash: The Eugenic Family Studies (Boston: Northeastern 
University Press, 1988) for a collection of other family studies published in the period.  
 
83 See Lombroso, L’uomo delinquente, part IX, “eziologia del delitto,” Chapter 2, “Fattori ereditari 
ed ethnici.”  
 
84 Ibid., 356-57. 
 
85 Lombroso, L’uomo delinquente, 356-57. Lombroso’s column was broken down into two groups 
– the Jukes and “X.” Lombroso explained that “By X is meant the outsiders or those married into 
the Jukes but not originally derived from them.” 357.  
 
86 Ibid., 360-61. Lombroso pointed out that the duel threat of aged criminals having offspring was 
not only that their children tended to be violent criminals (old fathers sired 52.9% of the 
murderers, 40% of assailants, 37% of the swindlers, and 30% of the rapists), but the longevity of 
the parents meant that they produced more children as well. 360. Issues of fecundity would be of 
paramount concern in American classic racialism.  
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transmission of the inheritance, any real concept of how heredity functioned on a 
cellular level, nor a consistent appreciation of non-hereditary factors that may 
have been equally important in developing the criminal tendencies of the family.  
In the etiology of crime Lombroso linked criminal tendencies to races. For 
Lombroso, racial identity was organized around cranial circumference. 
Geographic regions with predominantly dolicocephalic cranial indices had 
homicide rates nearly double the Italian national average.87 He pointed out that a 
large proportion of London’s thieves were Irish, and that the most skilled English 
thieves hailed from Lancashire. He cited Alfredo Niceforo’s book Delinquenza in 
Sardegna as documenting the importance of race as a factor in Sardinian crime. 
He argued that African and Oriental elements in the population were the major 
source of murder in Calabria, Sicily and Sardinia.88 Albanians generated a 
bloodline of notable criminals in Calabria and Molise. Even Jews as a race had 
slight hereditary dispositions to lesser crimes as swindlers, perjurers, slanderers, 
usurers, and conspirers with brigands, but they were rarely assassins or murderers. 
Two pages later, though, Lombroso discussed a wide variety of social factors that 
also impacted the rates of criminality, which included economic conditions and 
                                                
 
87 Lombroso published a whole study of criminal and racial anthropology, In Calabria (1862-
1867) (Catania: Nicolo Giannotta, 1898). Gibson describes Lombroso’s racial anthropology in In 
Calabria as “this scientifically unsteady base of racial classification,” upon which Lombroso built 
“elaborate and colorful typologies of criminal behavior.” Gibson, Born to Crime, 105.  
 
88 Lombroso, L’uomo delinquente, 360-2. Curiously, Lombroso does not say elements of African 
or Oriental blood, though just pages before had mentioned the delinquency in the Jukes’ 
bloodlines. American classical racialists would later claim that one of the reasons southern 
Italians, particularly Neapolitans and Sicilians, were undesirable was an infusion of African blood 
through their ancestors, so that their blood was corrupted and therefore racially inferior to that of 
the Anglo-Saxon or Teutonic races.  
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religion.89 This confusion and ambivalence toward what were the decisive causes 
of crime – heredity or environment? – reflect the pre-Mendelian confusion about 
how heredity worked. When Mendel’s findings were rediscovered at the turn of 
the century, some Americans would take it as proof that there was no ambiguity 
or confusion, because they felt that Mendel had decisively shown how these 
characters were transmitted.90 
Because of this brief attention to the issues of race and heredity in a book 
ultimately numbering over 1000 pages, it fell to one of Lombroso’s students to 
explore more fully this expression of biological racial difference. Giuseppe Sergi 
provided a key conduit of Lombrosian determinism to the United States, through 
his participation in international conferences and the acquaintances he made with 
American researchers, and through his own writings on Italian racial 
anthropology. In this latter instance, we see the trans-Atlantic language of 
biological determinism migrating directly into the classic racialism of American 
nativists.  
                                                
 
89 Lombroso, L’uomo delinquente, 363 for Jews; homicide rates 362; 365-72 for social factors.  
 
90 On Mendel, Diane Paul suggests that Mendel seemed to seal the affirmative case for heredity. 
Paul, Controlling Human Heredity, 48. Also relevant is Elof Axel Carlson, Mendel’s Legacy: The 
Origin of Classical Genetics (Cold Spring Harbor, NY: Cold Spring Harbor Press, 2004). Carlson 
argues that the period of “classical genetics” spanned the rediscovery of Mendel in 1900 to 1953, 
with the announcement of the Watson-Crick DNA model. Classical genetics fused breeding 
analysis, cytology, evolution, and reproductive and developmental biology into a scientific 
language that was assimilated into modern molecular genetics. Importantly, Carlson describes four 
phases of the “life sciences” in the 19th century, describing the fourth phase from roughly 1880-
1900 as one in which experimental science was gradually displacing descriptive science in 
biology. Carlson uses “classical” in the same sense in which I use it in describing “classic 
racialism” – a method or language that had certain scientific foundations, but was ultimately 
supplanted by a more superior language (in this case of chemical strands of DNA). Also helpful 
for Mendel’s impact is Cravens, The Triumph of Evolution.  
 Introduction 51 
Giuseppe Sergi was born in Sicily, and left the island to assume the chair 
in anthropology at the university in Bologna in 1880. After moving to Rome to 
take the same position in 1884, he began to collaborate with Lombroso in the 
latter’s journal, Archivio di psichitria, antropologia criminale e scienza penali. 
Although they shared the key assumptions of positivist criminology, namely, that 
physical form determined development and characteristics, Sergi and Lombroso 
used different measurements to determine racial identity. Whereas Lombroso and 
many other racial anthropologists utilized the cephalic index (the ratio of the 
width to the length of the skull), Sergi used only cranial morphology (the physical 
shape of the skull).91  
Sergi’s alternate method shows the lack of unity or agreement in physical 
anthropology that weakened the ability of opponents of classic racialism like 
Franz Boas to combat arguments of fixed racial identities. That there were several 
competing methods made it difficult to assert decisively that the essential idea 
was wrong. In 1893 Sergi described his new method, in which the shape of the 
skull and its volume capacity were indicators of separate human population 
groups. The volume capacity of the skull, Sergi believed, limited the size and 
development of the brain, in his mind the most important human organ. Sergi 
believed his new method to be superior because his system was attuned to 
measurements and dimensions of internal skeletal structure, which, he thought, 
                                                
 
91 See P. D’Agostino, “Craniums, Criminals”; Gibson, Lombroso, and Gould, Mismeasure. The 
German-born American anthropologist Franz Boas would ultimately demonstrate the cephalic 
index to be a very poor indicator of racial identity in his studies for the United States Immigration 
Commission in the late 1900s, the same Commission that used Sergi’s work to affirm the racial 
difference of Southern Italians.  
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were fixed and unchanging. While internal skeletal structure – especially cranial 
capacity – divided all human beings into two great “species,” other physical 
aspects like skin or hair color were more fluid and changeable. The environment 
had a pronounced effect on these external elements of population groups, but 
never changed the internal skeletal structure.92 
Because he believed the skeletal structure was unchanging, Sergi was able 
to talk about population groups on an archeological or geologic scale of time. He 
posited two fundamental, basic human species, the Eurafrican and the Eurasiatic, 
organized around four primary cranial forms. These great species then broke 
down further into varieties, marked by external characters like skin, hair, and eye 
color. From these varieties, population groups were then subdivided into ethnic 
groupings, primarily arranged by linguistic, cultural and historical associations. 
After examining 3500 human crania, Sergi noted that he could not answer how 
many different varieties there ultimately may be, but explained that “I affirm with 
some personal satisfaction that, as regards the new anthropological method, I have 
surmounted its uncertainties.” Sergi insisted that his method was superior because 
its measurement of the cranial capacity showed “the persistence of forms from 
immemorial epochs, and their reproduction through numerous generations 
                                                
 
92 Giuseppe Sergi, La varietá umane: Principi e methodo di classificazione (Turin: Bocca, 1893); 
also published as “The Varieties of the Human Species: Principles and Methods of Classification” 
Smithsonian Miscellaneous Collections v. 38, n. 969 (November 1894); Giuseppe Sergi, Origine e 
diffusione della stirpa mediterranea (Rome: Dante Alighieri, 1895); Giuseppe Sergi, The 
Mediterranean Race: A Study of the Origin of European Peoples (London: Walter Scott, 1901); 
Giuseppe Sergi, “My New Principles of the Classification of the Human Race” Science v. 22, n. 
564 (24 November 1893), 290. See also John Weeks, The Library of Daniel Garrison Brinton 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Museum, 2003) which lists several of Sergi’s books in 
the American anthropologist’s library. Brinton is discussed later.  
 
 Introduction 53 
notwithstanding amalgamation with other types.” Sergi claimed that he had 
“clearly demonstrated” this persistence, which had the ultimate implication of 
supporting the belief in immutable and unchanging skeletal forms, a significant 
component of classic racialism.93 And with English translations of his books, 
Sergi made these ideas accessible to the American community. 
Sergi ran into two difficulties, however, in presenting his new 
classification scheme. The first was the large number of population groups his 
measurements showed –  at least sixteen groups of human varieties, which made it 
an unwieldy classification scheme. Second, in to introduce a new method of 
measurement, Sergi would have to displace the old. This, he was aware, would 
not be easy. In training and education, scientists absorb a particular approach and 
methodology to science, which Thomas Kuhn has described as a paradigm. New 
paradigms replace “normal” scientific paradigms when the explanatory utility of 
the normal paradigm begins to falter. But the old method was not particularly 
vulnerable, and Sergi noted, “The scientist cannot, indeed, free himself of certain 
sentiments which are acquired in following scientific habits and which have 
become a part of scientific and public opinion…” In this capacity a scientist’s 
training became essential in structuring his or her openness to new ideas.94 Sergi 
was personally willing to make this leap to the new method that he proposed in La 
varietá umane, but gaining followers and adherents for such a complex scheme 
was another matter. 
                                                
93 Sergi, “Human Varieties,” “surmounted” from 47; “amalgamation” from 12.  
 
94 Ibid., 20-21. See also Kuhn, Scientific Revolutions and The Road Since Structure.  
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It was not Sergi’s method that was particularly dramatic, though. It was 
the way he used it to recast European racial history. Sergi tried to combat the 
perception that the Italians of the south (Sergi was Sicilian) were racially different 
from Nordics or northern Europeans. In Sergi’s scheme bands of Eurafricans 
emerged from Africa and made their way into Europe. The physical 
characteristics of the skull and face of the Eurafrican species, which stretched 
from the Red Sea to the Atlantic, was “uniform.” But the physical characteristics 
of the skin and intermediate parts, “that is to say the development and form of the 
soft parts, vary.”95 Elements of this Eurafrican race peopled the British Isles, 
France, Italy and Africa; from this foundation grew Greco-Latin civilization. The 
barbarians and savages that filtered into Germany from the Russian borderlands 
were the Eurasiatics who destroyed the Roman Empire. Sergi was trying to create 
a racial affinity between Italians, the French and British by suggesting that in 
some primeval way, they developed from the same species (the Eurafricans), 
which then splintered into African, Mediterranean, and Nordic varieties. The 
“Germans and Scandinavians,” (i.e. Nordics) were the “primitive” inhabitants of 
the Eurafrican species that were concentrated in the Scandinavian peninsula. At 
the end of the Neolithic period, the Eurasiatic species that formed various Celtic, 
Slavic and Germanic varieties emerged into eastern Europe. This made the 
Aryans, in Sergi’s scheme, Asiatic. So although he had based his classification on 
observation, his work was ultimately driven by an agenda.96  
                                                
 
95 Sergi, The Mediterranean Race, 249.  
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Sergi’s project had additional significant impacts other than to buttress 
Italian nationalism. Peter D’Agostino argues that Sergi’s “browned Europe” had 
strong nationalist overtones combating the emergence in northern Europe of pro-
Aryanism or Indo-Germanism.97 In his attempt to displace Aryans from the center 
of the narrative of the development of European civilization, Sergi offered 
members of the United States Immigration Commission a theory that skeletal 
forms of the two different species did not change. That the physical structure of 
these different races had remained uniform, unchanging and trans-historical 
implied that the physical differences between species might also be permanent 
and unchanging. And likely his association of Mediterraneans with a “Eurafrican” 
species did not bode well for dark-skinned Italian emigrants arriving in the United 
States, which was already acutely aware of skin color and race.98  
Sergi’s Italian edition of Specie e varietá umane of 1900 was used, like 
The Mediterranean Race, by the United States Immigration Commission to devise 
a definitive classification of immigrant population groups. Sergi’s tri-partite 
system of classification of species, variety or race, and physiognomic type could 
then be further organized by non-physical factors like language, social form, 
                                                                                                                                
96 Ibid., v-vii.  
 
97 See P. D’Agostino, “Craniums, Criminals,” 24-27; 25.  
 
98 Sergi, The Mediterranean Race, especially chapter 13. These would effectively be “Alpines,” 
who occupied the Alps, parts of Germany and France, plains of Russia, and a great part of Central 
Europe and the Po Valley. Ibid., 263. For the Eurasiatics, four principle skull shapes linked them 
together: cuboid, cuneiform or sphenoid, spheroid and platycephalic. For the Eurafricans the four 
types were: pentagonoides, ellipsoidal, ovoid and beloides (arrow-shaped). Sergi, The 
Mediterranean Race, 263 for Eurasiatics; 256 for Eurafrican. See also Andrea Orsucci,  “Ariani, 
indogermani, stirpi mediterranee: aspetti del dibattito sulle razze europee (1870-1914)”, Cromohs, 
vol. 3 (1998), 1-9. 
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family form, intellectual and emotional characteristics, and forms and modes of 
activity.99 While the Immigration Commission’s “Dictionary of Races or Peoples” 
tended more to the older methods of anthropological measurement, Sergi’s 
distinction between two main human species that subdivided into varieties or 
races, which were then further subdivided into physiognomic types, did set a 
template for the organization of European population groups. Specie e Varietá 
closed by reiterating Sergi’s belief in the utility of cranial and facial 
measurements as markers of unchanging species types. He insisted that the 
internal characteristics that were determined by skull and facial measurements 
(the two absolutely primary skeletal structures in his scheme) were “constant and 
persistent in their form and do not change from exterior influences of habitat, 
climate or diet…”100 His insistence on immutable and unchanging physical forms 
would ultimately provide compelling arguments in favor of excluding certain 
types of immigrants from entering the United States.  
Sergi’s system was meant to abolish confusion about population groups by 
classifying “species” as population groups fundamentally linked by skull shape 
and capacity. But moving on to varieties and then to types was riddled with 
confusion, because Sergi argued that the characteristics of varieties and types 
could vary and change. He ended the book by effectively endorsing the American 
                                                
99 Sergi, The Mediterranean Race, 171-72. Lombroso’s English biographer Mary Gibson sees in 
Sergi’s assertion of psychological differences between the Eurasiatic species and Eurafrican 
species, which he claimed were based on their physical differences, to be “Undocumented by any 
rigorous data, [and his] analysis showed that Sergi was as careless as his colleagues in assuming 
that biology determined psychology.” Gibson, Lombroso, 114.  
 
100 Sergi, Specie e Varietá, 168. The verb Sergi uses is “subiscono” to express the cranial 
resistance to change.  
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“melting pot” theory by suggesting that the original English population of North 
America, leavened with Irish, Scandinavian, German, French, Italian and Russian 
varieties, among others, would ultimately merge [“assumeranno”] into a distinctly 
American race.101  
So how stable was physical form then? If the kindred races of the 
Eurafrican species diverged to form varieties of Africans, Italians, and Anglo-
Saxons, but the only place their similarities could be seen was in their skeletal 
structure, how practical a system was this? The contradictions and complexities of 
Sergi’s system limited its utility in terms of classifying and organizing human 
population groups. Physical anthropology was plagued by multiple organizational 
schemes including the cephalic index and cranial capacity, among others. 
However complex this system of Sergi’s may have been though, the basic 
agreement he had with Lombroso was that the physical structure of bodies 
dictated what an individual was, whether that was a criminal, a Eurafrican or 
Eurasiatic. These essentialized concepts would make important contributions to 
American racial thought in the early decades of the twentieth-century. 
Unfortunately, although both Galton and Lombroso made significant use 
of Robert Dugdale’s study of the Juke family, they appear to have skimmed past 
Dugdale’s explanation of his method of research and his cautionary warnings. The 
American described two potential statistical methods that could be used to 
examine the genealogical data of the family that he had accumulated: Positive 
Statistics and Conjectural Statistics. For The Jukes he chose to use the former – a 
                                                
101 Ibid., 173.  
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method like that employed by the Census Bureau, which enumerated and 
coordinated facts of similar type to reduce them to a common measure of 
quantity, frequency, time and place.102 He perceived positive statistics to be the 
simplest and safest scientific method for handling his data. But he emphasized the 
hazards of Positive Statistics, namely its liability to “a fundamental error, that of 
comparing similar facts which are not identical because they do not occur under 
similar conditions…” He expressly warned that Positive Statistics “does not 
explain the causes or consequences of facts, therefore conclusions drawn from its 
figures are inferential and may lead to mistaking coincidences for correlations, as 
where it is concluded that because criminals show a larger percentage of illiteracy 
than the average of the community, therefore illiteracy is a cause of crime.”103 
This was precisely what Galton, Lombroso, and the American classic racialist 
community did.  
Dugdale’s use of illiteracy as causing crime for an example was eerily 
prescient for the American community. When southern Italians began to emigrate 
to the United States in large numbers at the end of the century, the high rates of 
illiteracy in the Italian south, Americans believed, was directly correlated to the 
                                                
 
102 Dugdale, The Jukes, 9. Dugdale’s Positive Statistics and Conjectural Statistics are described on 
9ff. Giddings, a professor of Sociology at Columbia University, described Dugdale’s work as “the 
best example of scientific method applied to a sociological investigation” in his foreword to the 
1910 edition. Page iii. Giddings also reminded his readers that “Far from believing that heredity is 
fatal, Mr. Dugdale was profoundly convinced that ‘environment’ can be relied on to modify, and 
ultimately to eradicate even such deep-rooted and wide-spreading growths of vice and crime as the 
‘Jukes’ group exemplified.” iv. This would be precisely the avenue that more progressive 
scientists would explore as “positive eugenics.” Dugdale described “Conjectural statistics” as 
made up of largely political arithmetic and probability theory. 10.  
 
103 Ibid., 10, emphasis added. 
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growth of crime in urban areas with Italian settlements. Furthermore, that so many 
were illiterate suggested some type of inferiority or backwardness. Perhaps this 
was due to a biological difference, one that made them racially incompatible with 
the American Anglo-Saxon stock. If criminality and illiteracy could be linked in 
the minds of American xenophobes, perhaps they could be linked to biology or 
heredity too.  
Galton, Lombroso and Sergi all laid out schemes whereby heredity and 
biology formed specific types of people. Whether by talent, depravity, or 
physiognomy, the physical and mental characteristics of human beings were 
determined by their basic, biological inheritance. These ideas were rapidly 
assimilated into the consciousness of an American public inclined to practical 
scientific thinking. They formed a cornerstone of classic racialism that the 
American public began to understand in the first decades of the twentieth century. 
But as an example of the evolutionary nature of scientific revolutions – what 
Peggy Pascoe calls “intellectual trickle-down theory” – the public’s understanding 
was wrong.104 Modern biology had no certainty as to how exactly heredity 
worked, but modern biologists knew the methods to achieve certainty, and these 
were derived from experiment and research. Jennings may not have known how 
inheritance passed from generation to generation the natural characteristics of his 
little paramecia, but he knew that the only way to understand their development 
was microscopic research and experimentation.  
                                                
104 Pascoe, “Miscegenation Law,” 97. 
 
 Introduction 60 
At his Naples research tables, at the Great Lakes, and researching in 
laboratories in Ann Arbor, Philadelphia and Baltimore, Jennings embraced the 
new experimental methods. But the public largely ignored Jennings’s science. 
They could not grasp the complex associations of germ-plasm or genes when even 
professional scientists only dimly apprehended them. When the American 
biological community did finally begin to understand the mechanisms of heredity, 
the complexity of chromosomes and genes prevented the public from solidly 
grasping the principles. The key was simplicity. Modern experimental science 
simply could not yet describe or explain succinctly and simply how heredity 
worked or was transmitted. Although they were wrong, classic racialists’s 
principal idea was elegantly simple: like produces like. This dissertation is a study 
of these tensions over the bodies and biology of immigrants into the United 
States.  
  61 
PART I: THE PROGRESSIVE IMPULSE OF RESTRICTION 
Chapter One examines ways Americans conceptualized immigration to the 
United States, in terms of demographic, racial, economic and social impact, and 
how these fears shaped the development of classic racialism. It establishes a 
template for regarding immigration as a “problem,” something that increasingly 
disrupted the stable development of American civilization as the sources of 
immigration became less homogeneous – that is, as immigration shifted from its 
“old” sources to “new” sources in southern and eastern Europe. The formation of 
the Immigration Restriction League and their focus on the passage of an 
“illiteracy” test to restrict immigration is one of the key developments the chapter 
explores, along with the intellectual contributions of William Z. Ripley and 
Francis A. Walker, who provided the critical base for the development of 
racialized nativism in the United States. 
Chapter Two considers the role of critics of American classic racialism, 
examining the intellectual training that Herbert Spencer Jennings, Raymond Pearl 
and Franz Boas received, which later compelled them to criticize the highly 
problematic assumptions of classic racialism. The sophisticated scientific and 
intellectual training they (and others) received predisposed them to approach 
biological and hereditary issues of race and human development in fundamentally 
different ways from determinists and classic racialists like Charles Davenport and 
Prescott Hall. 
Chapter Three follows the work of the United States Immigration 
Commission’s comprehensive investigation of immigration to America. The 
pressure that restrictionists placed on commissioners to secure a report favorable 
to excluding certain races of immigrants is an important manifestation of the 
political influence groups like the Immigration Restriction League wielded. Of 
especial importance are three volumes that the Commission published – 
“Immigration and Crime,” the “Dictionary of Races or Peoples,” and Franz 
Boas’s volume on the “Changes in the Bodily Form of Descendants of 
Immigrants.” The Commission’s final reports demonstrate in particular the 
influence that classic racialist ideas had on influencing the recommendations of 
the special Congressional committee.  
Chapter Four looks at how inaccurate scientific knowledge was 
disseminated through organizations like the Race Betterment Conferences, and 
how the assumptions of classic racialists were increasingly challenged by 
professional academics, who were in the final analysis unable to definitively state 
with confidence what exactly scientific knowledge had established as true. The 
critical professional reception of work by Davenport and Madison Grant in 
particular show an increasing understanding that classic racialist ideas regarding 
heredity and development were wrong, but modern experimentalism was as yet 
unable to declare what was correct and scientifically true. 
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Chapter 1: The Problem of Immigration 
 
Francis Galton may have believed that emigrants were “on the whole men 
of exceptional and energetic natures,” but in the United States at the end of the 
nineteenth century, he would have held a minority opinion. Native-born 
Americans viewed with alarm the rapidly increasing numbers of European 
migrants landing on American shores. “So broad and straight now is the channel 
by which this immigration is being conducted to our own shores,” one concerned 
American noted in 1891, “that there is no reason why every stagnant pool of 
European civilization, the worst defeats in the struggle for existence, the lowest 
degradation of human nature, should not be completely drained off into the 
United States.”1 So feared General Francis A. Walker, former superintendent of 
two censuses of the United States, and in 1891 the President of the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology. Walker knew firsthand the impact that immigration to the 
United States was assuming in the 1890s from his work on the Census. As he 
began laying out the demographic and statistical implications of the human tide 
crashing on American shores, Walker found an increasingly receptive audience 
among native-born Americans from “old” families, whose Anglo-Saxon and 
Protestant heritage were critical elements of their self-identity, which 
simultaneously reflected how they perceived the racial composition of the United 
States as well. These “racial nationalists,” as John Higham called them, turned 
                                                
1 Francis Galton, Human Faculty, 308; Francis Amasa Walker, “Immigration and Degradation” 
Forum v. 11 (August 1891), 634-44; 644.  
 
 Chapter 1 63 
increasingly to an idiom of science to both articulate and understand the changes 
occurring in the United States around the turn of the century.2 
The introduction of biological definitions of “race” began shifting the 
meaning of American nativism. “Racial nationalism,” Higham explains, “having 
arisen out of political and literary speculation, not out of scientific inquiry, 
displayed a characteristic vagueness.” A romantic or literary origin had 
contributed, both to the United States and England, an Anglo-Saxon tradition or 
ideology that embraced “the inner vitality of one’s own culture.” But at the turn of 
the century, the character of racial nationalism began to change, and as it 
incorporated classic racialist ideals – Higham calls it “racial science” – it 
transformed Anglo-Saxon nationalism from a vague concept into “a sharp-cutting 
nativist weapon…a completely racist philosophy.”3 This chapter examines the 
role that men with professional and scientific credentials played in articulating the 
problems of immigration to the United States.   
The clarity with which statistics depicted trends in the development of the 
United States made it an important source of restrictionists’ anxieties over the 
quality of immigration. Administrative needs of the state and economic interests 
(for example, life insurance companies) needed regular statistical information to 
function properly, and the growing social sciences helped articulate methods and 
categories of study like demography, moral statistics (e.g. criminality and 
                                                
2 See Higham, Strangers in the Land, chapter 1 for an introduction to the various strands of 
American nativism.  
 
3 Ibid., 11; 133; 134. I would again emphasize here that defining these sentiments as “scientific” is 
inadequately imprecise in the context of the changes occurring in methods and forms of scientific 
investigation. It was racial, but not “science” to men like Jennings, Pearl, or Boas. 
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pauperism) and medical and psychological statistics (insanity and mortality and 
birth rates). The social and racial implications of the statistics were important 
concerns to the public.4 One of the core fears of the opponents of immigration was 
that these aliens would outbreed the native-born Americans, fundamentally 
changing what nativists saw as the basis of the American racial stock. Walker 
played a central role in articulating in the late nineteenth century a theory that the 
“old stock” was being “replaced” by the arrival of different immigrant stocks, a 
theory that reinvigorated the immigration restriction movement in the United 
States.5 
Born in Boston in 1840 to a father who was an economist, Francis Amasa 
Walker became one of the premier American statisticians of the nineteenth 
century. His contributions to statistics were well received on the European side of 
the Atlantic where theoretical work in statistical science was more advanced than 
in America. Walker’s 1875 book The Statistical Atlas of the United States won 
first prize at the Paris Geographical Congress, despite the fact that Walker had 
never taken any formal statistical training. In the United States, though, as the 
historian Patricia Cline Cohen has argued, statistics were more practical and 
                                                
4 Robert C. Davis, “The Beginnings of American Social Research,” in George H. Daniels, ed. 
Nineteenth Century American Science: A Reappraisal (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University 
Press, 1972), 152-78. See also the recent book by Sarah Igo, The Averaged American: Surveys, 
Citizens, and the Making of a Mass Public (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 
which argues that between the 1920s and 1950s, empirical surveys came to be seen as increasingly 
effective ways to create a “mass society,” and particularly disclose what existed as statistically 
“normal” behavior, as in the Lynd’s survey of Middletown and the Kinsey sex studies.  
 
5 John Higham explains that “Since no clear-cut difference of complexion was apparent between 
native Americans and any European group, the old instincts of white supremacy did not extend to 
the new immigration as easily as they did to the Chinese. To a large extent, race lines would have 
to be manufactured.” John Higham, Send These to Me: Immigrants in Urban America rev. ed. 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984 [orig. 1975]), 45.  
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utilitarian. The strong capitalist base of the United States economy in the mid-
nineteenth century required strong calculating skills, so the origin of statistical 
thinking in the United States was centered more on practical business 
mathematics rather than on complex theoretical propositions. European observers, 
she explains, were impressed by the extent to which ordinary Americans thought 
in terms of calculations and computations, but Americans rarely produced a 
theoretical thinker of the stature of Galton, Adolphe Quetelet or Joseph Fourier. It 
was, in essence, a fundamental difference between theoretical and applied 
statistical sciences.6 Walker’s international recognition made him a logical choice 
to direct the 1870 census of the United States. His effort, however, was plagued 
by methodological and computational errors, though this was not particularly the 
fault of Walker but was instead due to the lack of professional training for the 
enumerators and statisticians who copied the final results. Walker was retained for 
the 1880 census, and under a new law that gave him greater control over the 
selection of enumerators, helped create a more professional and accurate 
enumeration.7 But lingering problems with analysts manipulating statistical 
                                                
6 Patricia Cline Cohen, A Calculating People: The Spread of Numeracy in Early America 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982); see also Margo Anderson, The American Census: A 
Social History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988); Theodore Porter, The Rise of Statistical 
Thinking, 1820-1900 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986). Anderson attributes some 
of the severe methodological problems in the 1840 and 1870 censuses to the shortage of 
sophisticated theoretical methods for accurately obtaining and analyzing census data despite this 
widespread numeracy.  
 
7 A. W. Coats and Patrick Williams, “Walker, Francis Amasa” John A. Garraty, Mark C. Carnes, 
eds. American National Biography (New York: Oxford University Press); Jeannette P. Nichols, 
“Walker Francis Amasa” Allen Johnson et al, eds. Dictionary of American Biography (New York: 
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1958-1964). See also Hyman Alterman, Counting People: The Census in 
History (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1969); Cohen, A Calculating People; Anderson, 
The American Census; Carroll D. Wright, The History and Growth of the United States Census 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office [GPO], 1900) which are all useful for studying 
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correlations into causation and statistical inaccuracies persisted, reflecting many 
of the later problems eugenicists and classic racialists would have with their data, 
which like the census, was also collected by field investigators. As the problems 
in Galton’s work showed, the tendency to conflate correlation and causation was a 
difficult conceptual obstacle, one not always easily surmounted.  
Though he left the Census Bureau in 1881 to become the president of the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Walker continued to follow developments 
in American statistical science, and began digesting and analyzing some of the 
trends he found in the enumerations and tables. John Higham considers Walker’s 
statistical and economic contributions to be the only “original contribution to 
nativist thought” in the United States, and that Walker exerted a “telling 
intellectual influence” on racial nativism by coupling it with Darwinian fears of 
the survival of the fittest.8 The publication of the census of 1890 gave the MIT 
president plenty of material to ponder, as it did many other academics. Of the 
larger demographic trends taking place in the country, Superintendent Robert 
Porter’s introduction pointed out that “more than one-third of the total 
immigration to this country since 1820 has come during the last ten years,” and 
the vast majority, the returns showed, lived in urban areas. Although the 
percentage of foreign-born aliens in the United States arriving from southern and 
eastern Europe had not yet surpassed the percentage from the north and west of 
                                                                                                                                
the growth of Census categories. The Appendix of the latter is particularly helpful, as it 
republished many of the schedules of inquiry of the early censuses. The U.S. Census of 1850 
similarly republished the early inquiries.  
 
8 Higham, Strangers in the Land, 142.  
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Europe, the tendency of the new immigrants to settle in cities made them more 
visible.9 Additionally, the rapid growth of urban areas, particularly in the 
northeast, created many problems with effective management of urban services, 
housing, poverty, crime and corruption. 
Statistical evidence showed that native-born Americans, particularly those 
of an Anglo-Saxon and Protestant background were not reproducing at the rate 
they previously had. In terms of population growth, no country had ever 
experienced such demographic expansion as the United States did in the century 
after its independence. While much of the gain was due to natural increase, there 
were important contributions to the nation’s human stock from European 
immigration even in the first decades of the country’s existence, although the 
contribution was difficult (if not impossible) to accurately determine because no 
official records of immigration were kept until the middle of the nineteenth 
century. As the population of the country grew, so did the categories that the 
United States Census enumerated. In an effort to determine the origins of the 
immigrant population, in 1850 enumerators were instructed to ask about the 
nativity of respondents. In 1870 the accumulated statistics of criminality and 
                                                
9 United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, The 11th Census of the United 
States (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1895), vol. I, p. lxxix. On page lxxx of the 
introduction, the total number of immigrants arriving between 1881 and 1890 was listed by 
country of origin: out of a total of 5,246,613 immigrants in those years, almost three million 
originated in the United Kingdom and Germany. Italy provided only 307,309 of the remainder, 
and Russia and “Poland” combined for 265,088. Although the population of the country was only 
22.34% urban (defined as an incorporated area with a population greater than 2500), 44.13% of 
immigrants lived in urban areas (p. xc). Ibid., V. 2, part 2 (“Social Statistics of the Population”) 
listed the literacy of America’s population, and showed a much higher proportion of illiterate 
immigrants than native-born illiterates (pp. xxxi-xxxv).  
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pauperism were broken down by color and nativity.10 These early census returns 
still showed, however, that the geographic origins of the immigrants to the United 
States was sufficiently similar to enable the forging of a particularly robust “old 
stock” of Anglo-Saxon and Teutonic origins. This was the beginning of what 
Higham describes as the “recasting of the Anglo-Saxon tradition into the mold of 
a gloomy, scientific naturalism,” and statistical evidence was key to that transition 
and the anxieties that arose from fears of natural selection.11 
Statistics showed that this demographic growth was primarily in urban 
areas, which created a highly visible foreign-born population. In 1900 the entire 
urban population of the country was 20 million, out of a total population of 76 
million.12 The proportion of the urban population was especially high in the North 
Atlantic region, where it was 58.6% of the total population, but the national total 
was also inching upwards, standing at 32.9% in 1900.13 It is not unusual, then, that 
anti-immigrant agitation in the late 1890s gathered steam in these northeastern 
states as native-born Americans realized this new change in the basic demography 
of the country. Furthermore, between 1890 and 1900 it became clear that the 
source of immigration was shifting to the southern European “races.” Politicians 
                                                
10 United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Seventh Census of the United 
States, 1850 (Washington, D.C.: R. Armstrong, 1853) v. 1, p. xxxvi; United States Bureau of the 
Census, Ninth Census of the United States, 1870 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
1872), v. 1, p. 568ff.  
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12 United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, The Twelfth Census of the 
United States, 1900 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1901), vol.1, pp. lxxii-lxxiii. 
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like Representative Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts argued that these groups 
were racially inferior and that politically the United States had every right to 
restrict them, while academics like William Ripley their racial and biological 
difference, and the Census showed their dramatic growth in numbers.14 
The dramatic increase in immigration and its changing characteristics led 
Walker to publish articles in 1891 and 1896 in which he described, for “old stock” 
native-born Americans, a new and worrisome development in American 
demographics. In “Immigration and Degradation,” published in the popular 
magazine Forum in August 1891, Walker showed that between 1790 and 1830, 
the population of the United States grew by 227%, from just under 4 million to 
over 12 million in 1830.15 This was by and large a natural increase of the native 
born population, since immigration in these early decades, despite very poor 
record keeping, never exceeded 151,000 over a ten-year period. In the 1830s, 
immigration increased to almost 600,000 for the decade. Walker found that over 
time the growth rate of the native population, which averaged over 30% in each of 
the first four decennial enumerations, began to slacken. Although the population 
of the country “was almost exactly what it would have been had no increase in 
foreign arrivals taken place,” demographic growth after mid-century was not from 
natural increase of the native-born population, but from the addition of these alien 
                                                
14 For instance, see Henry Cabot Lodge, “Lynch Law and Unrestricted Immigration” The North 
American Review v. 152, n. 414 (May 1891), 602-13; idem., “A Million Immigrants a Year: I. 
Efforts to Restrict Undesirable Immigration” The Century Magazine v. 67, n. 3 (January 1904), 
466-9; William Z. Ripley, The Races of Europe: A Sociological Study (New York: D. Appleton 
and Co., 1899); idem., “The European Population of the United States” Journal of the Royal 
Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland v. 38 (July-December 1908), 221-40.  
 
15 Francis A. Walker, “Immigration and Degradation” Forum v. 11 (August 1891), 634-44; 634.  
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immigrants.16 Walker argued that the decline in native-born fecundity was not due 
to the inability of the native stock to reproduce, but rather was caused the 
“appearance of the foreigners themselves.”17 He suggested that arrival of 
immigrants was inhibiting the native Anglo-Saxon stock’s reproduction, which 
would have the alarming effect in the long run of replacing the Anglo-Saxon 
stock. While it was statistically true that native-born Americans were producing 
fewer offspring than previously, the cause of that decline was not clear-cut as 
Walker posited.  
Walker wrote that this conclusion could be explained only three ways: by 
coincidence, by an actual decline in vitality of the native population, or by his 
radical idea that immigration constrained native-born reproduction. After 
dismissing the first two by using statistical data, Walker demonstrated his 
“replacement thesis” by utilizing both economic and moral arguments. The native 
stock, he explained, expected a standard of living that was much higher than the 
expectations of the immigrants. Americans would not lower themselves to 
compete in an economic sphere with immigrants who would labor at dramatically 
lower wages. Ethically, he claimed, the native-born American “was even more 
unwilling to bring sons and daughters into the world to enter into that 
competition.”18 Walker made the implication of this moral and economic 
constraint explicit: “foreign immigration into this country has, from the time it 
                                                
16 Walker, “Immigration and Degradation,” 637-38; 638. 
 
17 Ibid, p. 637. Emphasis in original.  
 
18 Ibid, p. 641.  
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first assumed large proportions, amounted not to a re-enforcement of our 
population, but to a replacement of native by foreign stock.”19 Walker also 
detected a troubling difference in the type of immigrant that was now arriving on 
American shores. No longer were immigrants the “more alert and enterprising 
members of their respective communities,” those men of ability and exceptional 
energy that Galton had described. Because modern technology made the Atlantic 
passage a quick and relatively safe journey, immigrants arriving now were “the 
unlucky, the thriftless, the worthless…”20 Aided by statistical data, Walker’s 
“replacement” thesis suggested that the long-term extermination of the old native 
stock of the American people was, in the face of unrestricted immigration, 
inevitable. Yet when he wrote his first essay in 1891, few heeded his warnings.21  
After Walker’s 1891 essay on immigration and racial degradation, several 
events transpired that would invigorate the nascent American statistical 
movement and refocus the public’s attention on demographic figures. In an 1893 
lecture to the American Historical Association, the then-unknown young historian 
Frederick Jackson Turner used demographic data from the 1890 census to learn 
about the main characteristics of American development. Turner’s “frontier 
                                                
19 Ibid, p. 642.  
 
20 Ibid, p. 643.  
 
21 Historian Theodore Porter’s study of the development of statistical thinking places much 
emphasis on the European Enlightenment as the genesis of proper theoretical statistics, 
particularly as seen with Adolphe Quetelet’s l’homme moyen. But it was Francis Galton, the 
British polymath, who first used statistics to study natural variation, which Porter argues “also 
provided the key in biology of the quantitative study of heredity, leading to what is now the most 
purely statistical of the natural sciences, quantitative eugenics.” Porter, The Rise of Statistical 
Thinking, 1820-1900, 110.  
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thesis” suggested that the western expansion of the country acted as a school for 
Americanizing immigrant settlers on the frontier, forging a new breed of 
“Americans” that were rugged, independent, hard-working and resourceful. The 
frontier, for Turner, is what made an American; by pushing further and further 
away from the east coast and its continuing attachment to Europe, truly American 
institutions emerged and took hold in the western frontier. For old-stock natives 
fearful of the invading immigrant horde, Turner declared “in the crucible of the 
frontier the immigrants were Americanized, liberated, and fused into a mixed 
race, English neither in nationalities nor characteristics.”22 Dramatically, Turner 
reiterated the 1890 Census Superintendent’s declaration that the frontier was now 
“closed”—the open tracts of unsettled land had reached a population density that 
technically defined the western frontier territories as settled and inhabited. There 
no longer existed that open area which forged a hardy American population. 
Turner closed his address by noting that “now, four centuries from the discovery 
of America, at the end of a hundred years under the Constitution, the frontier has 
gone, and with its going has closed the first period of American history.”23 This 
served to fuel the anxiety of the old-stock American population. 
With the description of the close of the frontier, and in the aftermath of a 
severe cholera outbreak in Europe in 1891, the Panic of 1893, and widespread 
labor unrest in 1894, Walker revisited immigration in an article for The Atlantic 
                                                
22 Frederick Jackson Turner, “The Significance of the Frontier in American History,” in Frederick 
Jackson Turner, The Frontier in American History Introduction by Ray Allen Bilington 
(Huntington, New York: Krieger Publishing Co, 1976), 4, 23. Turner’s lecture was originally 
delivered at the AHA in Chicago, July 12, 1893 during the World’s Columbian Exposition. Note 
that Turner imagined the ethnic base of the American population to be fully English in origin. 
 
23 Turner, “The Significance of the Frontier,” 38. 
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Monthly in 1896.24 The volume of immigration had recently become so great, he 
warned, that the new arrivals, some “unfit to be members of any decent 
community” were not being carefully examined as they passed through entrance 
ports, which served as the first defensive bulwark against the admission of 
inferior, diseased, criminal, or subversive immigrants. Although they contributed 
an increasing proportion of the population of prisons, asylums, and almshouses, 
this was not his greatest fear of the new increased volume of immigration. 
Instead, he explained, it was the “vast throngs of ignorant and brutalized 
peasantry” that threatened the wages of American laborers, the American standard 
of living, and the quality of American citizenship. Walker expressed a note of 
urgency in this article, explaining that current conditions in the United States 
necessitated swift action to protect the quality of American life and its 
population.25  
Demographic data was central to fueling anxiety over immigration. The 
historian Mae Ngai has suggested that demographic statistics “was to twentieth-
century racists what craniometric data had been to race scientists during the 
nineteenth.…If statistics showed that immigrants were less healthy, less educated, 
and poorer than native-born Americans, the data were deemed to be evidence of 
                                                
 
24 On the cholera outbreak and its effects on immigration, see Alan M. Kraut, Silent Travelers: 
Germs, Genes, and the “Immigrant Menace” (New York: Basic Books, 1994); Frank M. 
Snowden, Naples in the Time of Cholera, 1884-1911 (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 
1995).  
 
25 Francis Walker, “Restriction of Immigration” The Atlantic Monthly v. 77, n. 464 (June 1896), 
822-29; 822; 827. 
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the immigrants’ inferior physical constitution, intelligence, and ambition.”26 The 
close of the frontier, the fall of agricultural prices, labor problems, the economic 
depression after 1893 and public health threats from immigration suggested that 
the immigration question demanded new answers. The old policy of welcoming 
anyone to American shores, Walker insisted, must be curtailed. The old 
immigrants that first populated the North American continent had had to be 
“enterprising, thrifty, alert, adventurous and courageous” – Galton would have 
been in agreement – in order to survive the rugged, undeveloped American 
environment. Now, the new arrivals did not have to worry about these difficulties 
that old stock pioneers had faced, and consequently, were of poorer quality.27 
Walker hoped his article would finally force Americans to seriously address the 
immigration problem. In 1896 the Immigration Restriction League was listening, 
and ready to help.  
The Immigration Restriction League [IRL] was founded in 1894 by “five 
young blue bloods” who, John Higham notes, came from “well-to-do, long-
established families, steeped in Boston ways and Boston ideas.…determined to 
mount a counteroffensive against the strange invaders who seemed so grave a 
threat to their class, their region, their country, and their race.”28 Prescott Hall, 
Robert DeCourcy Ward, Joseph Lee, Robert Treat Paine and Richards Bradley 
                                                
 
26 Mae Ngai, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 31-2.  
 
27 Walker, “Restriction of Immigration,” 827.  
 
28 Higham, Strangers in the Land, 102.  
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would be actively involved in protecting America from these alien immigrants for 
decades. The historian Barbara Solomon, who studied the League extensively, 
argued that an “Anglo-Saxon complex” underpinned the activities of League 
members, who were buffeted by social, economic, and racial anxieties in their 
long fight to secure restriction. They were sophisticated in terms of their 
intellectual approach to achieving restriction, and they were well connected to 
political power through their professional paid lobbyist, James Horace Patten.29  
One of the most complex facets of the Immigration Restriction League is 
their racial ideology. Numerous scholars in the last ten years have commented on 
the multiple valences that “race” as an identity marker carried. For members of 
the Immigration Restriction League, “race” existed not in an abstract, intellectual 
sphere, but in the day-to-day realities of their lives. Races of inferior immigrants 
settled in their cities, corrupted their politics, and intensified rates of poverty. Yet 
“race” also existed as something to be handled cautiously because it was a very 
amorphous concept. As they preached their restrictionist doctrine, many of the 
core members showed confusion about what constituted a “race,” what characters 
were peculiar to different races, and how immutable, unchanging, and biology 
racial identity actually was. By looking closely at the language they used to alert 
                                                
29 Biographical information on Lee: Neva R. Deardoff, “Joseph Lee” Dictionary of American 
Biography, 374-5; The National Cyclopedia of American Biography v. 33, 66-7; Biographical 
Dictionary of Social Welfare in America ed. Walter Trattner; on Warren, Dictionary of American 
Biography supplement 5 (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1977), 730-31; biographical 
information for Ward from The National Cyclopedia of American Biography, v. 24; Who Was 
Who in America, v. 1; Dictionary of American Biography; and Robert Tracy Jackson, “Robert 
DeCourcy Ward” The Scientific Monthly (February 1932), 192-94. See, in addition, Solomon, 
Ancestors and Immigrants, where the author describes Patten, who was paid a yearly salary of 
$3,000, as a key figure in ending the “amateur standing of the League.” 124. See also Matthew 
Frye Jacobsen, Whiteness of a Different Color: European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998).  
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American Anglo-Saxons to the perils of the immigrant tide, we gain a new 
understanding of the League and its members which attempts to read through their 
racism, and see their own imagined racial identity. 
The League was founded, as its Constitution stated, to “advocate and work 
for the further judicious restriction or stricter regulation of immigration…and to 
arouse public opinion to the necessity of a further exclusion of elements 
undesirable for citizenship or injurious to our national character.”30 Its fourth 
publication, from around 1894, listed “Twenty reasons why Immigration should 
be further restricted now.” These twenty reasons were reducible to largely one 
key idea: the immigrants did not measure up—morally, economically, socially, or 
politically—to the standards of Anglo-Saxon America.31 One of the League’s first 
methods to achieve restriction was through recommending that Congress pass an 
immigration bill that excluded immigrants unable to read. The “literacy 
restrictionists,” as Higham describes them, saw this test as an effective way of 
weeding out aliens who were perceived to be of this “new” immigration; it was he 
explains, “a highly ‘respectable’ cultural determinant which would also minister 
                                                
 
30 Constitution of the Immigration Restriction League, box 3, Joseph Lee Papers, Massachusetts 
Historical Society, Boston, MA [hereafter Lee papers]. Barbara Solomon described Walker’s 
impact on the group: “The happy ideal of assimilation…disintegrated under Walker’s cogent 
proofs, and, for old New Englanders, immigration became a matter of racial preservation.” 
Solomon, Ancestors and Immigrants, 77. Solomon described the young founders of the League 
being buffeted by “the conviction that neither the economic nor the social promises of democracy 
seemed to work in the divided society of rich and poor, native and foreigner, educated and 
illiterate, Anglo-Saxon and scum of Europe.” 102. The medical historian Alan Kraut describes the 
League as “a highly organized, extraordinarily tenacious lobbying group.” Alan Kraut, The 
Huddled Masses: The Immigrant in American Society, 1880-1921 (Arlington Heights, IL: Harlan 
Davidson, 1982). 
 
31 “Publications of the Immigration Restriction League, Twenty Reasons why Immigration Should 
be Further Restricted,” n.d., box 3, Lee papers. 
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to Anglo-Saxon sensibilities.”32 Statistics and demographics quickly became the 
preferred way of the League to warn the public of the dangers of immigration. 
These were well-educated men – three of the League’s founders (Robert 
DeCourcy Ward, Prescott F. Hall, and Charles Warren) were all members of the 
Harvard Class of 1889. Nearly all of the active members of the League, 
throughout its forty-three year history, were somehow affiliated with Harvard.33 
The members of the IRL also had significant social and political connections that 
served them well. One of the League’s chief financial backers, Joseph Lee (A.B. 
Harvard, 1883; L.L.B. Harvard, 1887), was a cousin of Henry Cabot Lodge, long-
time congressional representative from Massachusetts. After getting his Harvard 
Law degree in 1892, Charles Warren served as the private secretary to 
Massachusetts Governor William Russell. The League’s Washington, D.C. 
lobbyist, James H. Patten (A.B. Harvard, 1897, A.M, Harvard, 1899, L.L.B. 
Harvard, 1905), married the daughter of Senator A. C. Latimer of South Carolina. 
Robert DeCourcy Ward was the son of the representative of the Republic of Chile 
                                                
 
32 Higham, Strangers in the Land, 101. 
 
33 The youth of most of the League’s early leaders was important as well. For the cultural anxieties 
of the League, see the letter from Charles Francis Adams to Prescott Hall, July 28, 1905, Box 1, 
Immigration Restriction League papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts [hereafter IRL papers]. Concerning immigration, Adams noted, “the question is too 
big and too intricate for me to meddle with. I have gone on the retired list, and a generation other 
than that to which I belong must in future, if possible, save the country from the ‘eternal bow-
wows.’ My generation, for better or worse, has done its work.” This is remarkably similar in 
theme to a note to Lee almost thirty years later: “it would be a tremendous job to start propaganda 
necessary to excite people on the dangerous legislation now threatened when the whole world is so 
stirred by other and more pressing problems. I’ll keep on thinking what, if anything, we three old 
gentlemen can do, but it is certainly a hard task.” John F. Moors to Lee, August 31, 1934, box 2, 
Lee papers; also Solomon, Ancestors and Immigrants. 
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to Germany. The political savvy and experience these men possessed was 
impressive, and they used this knowledge remarkably well. 
Socially, the core members of the Immigration Restriction League were 
decidedly upper class, and they engaged in various reform movements in the 
United States, suggesting that restriction was not exclusively a reactionary or 
conservative mindset. Lee organized the Massachusetts Civic League in 1897, 
published the book Play in Education in 1915, and became President of the 
Playground Association of America in 1910, which he nurtured into the National 
Recreation Association. During World War I, Lee organized the War Camp 
Community Service within the Recreation Association. He was active on the 
Boston School Board, and got Massachusetts to adopt annual vision and hearing 
tests for its students. He was, as one historian put it, “the quintessence of the 
creative social conscience of New England.” Hall practiced law part-time in his 
downtown Boston office, which doubled as the headquarters for the Immigration 
Restriction League. In 1910 Ward became the first Professor of Climatology in 
the country. He taught at Harvard University for over thirty years, was on the 
administrative board at the College, and for several years chaired the Department 
of Geology and Geography. He was a Fellow in the American Academy of Arts 
and Science, the Royal Meteorological Society, the Association of American 
Geographers, and the American Meteorological Association. For four years in the 
late 1890s he edited the American Meteorological Journal. His 1925 book The 
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Climate of the United States became one of the standard works on American 
meteorology.34  
These men were not amateurish intellectuals. Their education and social 
status gave them powerful outlets to act on their racial ideologies. Their racial 
nativism was not the same kind as that expressed by other groups like the defunct 
American Protective Association or the Ku Klux Klan. The League’s 
sophisticated racialism gave them an edge in lobbying for Congressional 
legislation that they deemed was necessary to protect Anglo-Saxon America from 
the invasion of inferior, criminally-inclined, feeble-minded hordes of non-Nordic 
European aliens.35 And at the foundation of that opposition to immigration were 
the principles of classic racialism. By looking closely at the language they used to 
                                                
34 Biographical information on Hall in Who Was Who in American History, v. 1; and Prescott F. 
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alert other proud Anglo-Saxon elites to the perils of the immigrant tide, one can 
begin to perceive the efficacy of their racial thought. 
The League’s goal was simple: the preservation of the United States as a 
white, Anglo-Saxon Protestant nation. In articulating their fears, the League used 
three primary strategies: to cast the immigrants as inferior because of their 
unsuitability for participation in a democracy; on a “scientific” basis, which cast 
them as biologically inferior; and as an economic threat to native-born Americans. 
Hall commented in a 1904 article that, “We are trustees of our civilization and 
institutions with a duty to the future, and as trustees the stocks of population in 
which we invest should be limited by the principle of a careful selection of 
immigrants.”36 By arguing that new immigrants were biologically inferior, the 
United States was endangering, as the League’s leaders felt, American 
civilization. These immigrants therefore must be excluded to preserve the 
character of the United States. 
To achieve this, and solve what they believed was the problem of 
immigration, League members turned to a sympathetic legislator from their own 
backyard – Henry Cabot Lodge of Boston. In an 1891 article in The North 
American Review, Lodge had described a mechanism for restriction based on 
basic literacy skills that the League later endorsed. As he commented on the 
apparent decline in the quality of immigrants, Lodge drew the same comparisons 
between northern and southern Italians that were being made in Italy. He 
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explained that although immigrants from the northern peninsula were desirable 
additions to the United States, those from the southern districts and Sicily were 
inferior and undesirable. The latter hailed from “the most illiterate parts of Italy,” 
regions that he explained had also long been plagued by brigandage. Lodge 
associated literacy with desirability. And as a sovereign country, Lodge 
maintained, “We have the right to exclude illiterate persons from our 
immigration, and this [literacy] test…would, in all probability shut out a large part 
of the undesirable portion of the present immigration.”37 This became the central 
thrust of the League’s strategy – secure passage of an immigration bill that 
contained a literacy test, which would go a long way toward solving the 
immigration problem. 
Lodge was also quick to absorb Galton’s lessons on the heritability of 
ability and genius. In 1891, he conducted his own historical study of the 
distribution of ability in the United States, using, just as Galton had, dictionaries 
and encyclopedias of biography. Armed with the names of 14,243 American men 
of ability, Lodge broke down both by geography and race the character of these 
desirable American-born men. The vast majority of these men of ability were 
geographically located in the New England and Middle-Atlantic states, and 
preponderant number were of English descent.38 Lodge defined as an “immigrant” 
                                                
37 Henry Cabot Lodge, “The Restriction of Immigration” The North American Review v. 152, n. 
410 (Jan. 1891), 27-36. Quote from p. 36. 
 
38 Henry Cabot Lodge, “The Distribution of Ability in the United States” The Century (September 
1891), reprinted in Henry Cabot Lodge, Historical and Political Essays (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Co., 1892), 138-39 for sources and the total number of names; 147 for geographical and 
racial breakdown. 5,456 came from New England, 5,021 from the Mid-Atlantic states; 10,376 of 
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any man on the list who came to the United States after the Constitution was 
adopted, and found that “the production of ability has been remarkably 
concentrated” in descendants of non-immigrants.39 Lodge took a curious position 
on slavery; despite the fact that the slave-holding aristocracy produced, in relation 
to New England and the Mid-Atlantic states, a very small number of men of 
ability, Lodge argued that “no finer people ever existed than those who settled and 
built up our Southern States.” He explained that despite laboring “beneath the 
burden of a slave system,” they had achieved a remarkable degree of success, “the 
mass of ability they produced under such adverse conditions is a striking proof of 
the strength of the race.”40 The superior characteristics of these men could have 
not be blunted or submerged beneath the burden of running a slave society. These 
qualities were hereditary, and could not be suppressed.  
Lodge provided a direct connection between the inheritance of ability and 
the dangers of immigration. In explaining why the Germans and French 
Huguenots produced a comparatively small proportion of men of ability in 
relation to their numbers in the population, Lodge said the answer was because 
these immigrants tended to concentrate in groups. These immigrant populations 
established themselves in two or three isolated communities, and retained their 
social networks and their native languages. In short, “they did not quickly become 
                                                                                                                                
the 14,243 were of English heritage, 1,439 of Scotch-Irish ancestry, 659 German, 589 French 
Huguenot, and 7 Italian.  
 
39 Ibid., 142 for “immigrant”; 160 for concentration. 
  
40 Ibid., 163.  
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Americans.”41 Lodge regarded the ability or capacity to become “American” – 
which he never precisely defined – to be the single most important factor in 
creating men of ability. Lodge closed his Galtonian exercise by invoking, just as 
Galton had, impartiality based upon his social standing as a genteel, upper-crust 
American.42 
In 1891 Lodge also wrote an article concerning the recent lynching of a 
group of Italian immigrants in New Orleans, who were suspected of murdering 
the local chief of police. Of the eleven Italians that the New Orleans police 
rounded up, six were acquitted, three freed as the result of a mistrial, and two 
were still awaiting trial in March 1891 when a mob broke into the prison and 
lynched all eleven. The Italians were suspected of belonging to the Italian 
criminal organization known as the Mafia, which would provide additional 
evidence of the criminal tendencies of Italian immigrants; Lodge wrote that “The 
men were not killed in the New Orleans prison because they were Italians, but 
because they were believed to be members of a secret-assassination society 
responsible for a brutal murder.” He used the occasion to demand the restriction 
of undesirable European immigration: “it certainly is madness to permit this 
stream [of Italians] to pour in without discrimination or selection, or the exclusion 
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42 Lodge explained, “I did not create the figures. I merely collected and tabulated them.” Ibid., 165 
for Germans and Huguenots; 166 for assimilation and tabulation. 
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of dangerous and undesirable elements.”43 Lodge would come to support a literacy 
test as the most effective way to achieve this.  
In a piece written for the Century Illustrated Magazine in 1893, the 
Massachusetts Representative maintained his position on the necessity of 
restricting undesirable immigration, which he justified by using the returns of the 
newly available 1890 Census. because Lodge argued that restriction was justified 
on two grounds: the quantity of immigration was excessive, and at the same time 
its quality was decreasing. He added that the “very undesirable” immigration then 
arriving in the United States was lowering the quality of “our citizenship” and 
wages.44 In a letter to Prescott Hall in 1896, Lodge hoped that the IRL could help 
him protect “our citizenship.” He encouraged Hall “to urge, by every method at 
your command the importance of passing the bill reported from the 
[Congressional] conference….”45 The bill he referred to was the first proposed bill 
containing a provision barring illiterate immigrants from entering the country to 
make it through Congress, but it was vetoed by President Cleveland in 1897. 
Although they were defeated in this first attempt to change immigration policy, 
the League had found an irreplaceable ally whose cooperation would dramatically 
increase the visibility and influence of the League.46  
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46 See E. P. Hutchinson’s excellent resource Legislative History of American Immigration Policy, 
1798-1965 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1981). Cleveland opposed the “radical 
 Chapter 1 85 
The League’s connection with Lodge paid quick dividends. League 
members Prescott Hall, Robert DeCourcy Ward and Robert Treat Paine secured a 
private audience at hearings of the House Committee on Immigration and 
Naturalization in 1896 where they presented a petition in favor of immigration 
restriction. After his appointment to the Senate, Lodge continued to press the 
literacy test, arguing in a report appended to Senate bill 4127 that adopting the 
literacy test “will tell exclusively on the most undesirable portions of 
immigration.”47 As the House of Representatives again debated immigration 
restriction in 1898 – after President Cleveland’s veto – the Immigration and 
Naturalization Committee received thousands of petitions in favor of restriction 
from across the country. The petitions show the success organizations like the 
IRL had in unifying opinion in favor of the literacy test, in particular the effect it 
would have on keeping out only the “undesirable” immigrants. Petitioners 
endorsed a statement that declared their opposition to “the illiterate, pauper and 
criminal classes” of immigrants that came from the southeast of Europe. These 
immigrants were explicitly contrasted with those “intelligent, industrious and law 
                                                                                                                                
departure” in policy that the literacy test would force. “In my opinion it is infinitely more safe to 
admit a hundred thousand immigrants who, though unable to read and write, seek among us only a 
home and opportunity to work,” the President explained, “than to admit one of those unruly 
agitators and enemies of governmental control, who can not only read and write but delights in 
arousing by inflammatory speech the illiterate and peacefully inclined to discontent and tumult.” 
Senate Document n. 185, 54th Congress, 2nd Session, “Message from the President of the United 
States” 3 March 1897, p. 3.  
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abiding classes” that typically had northern, Anglo-Saxon origins.48 These 
petitions resulted in little significant change in immigration policy, but the 
passage of the Immigration Act of 1907 established a special committee to 
investigate immigration whose final report in 1911 legitimized many of these 
popular opinions. 
Lodge utilized the distinctions that Italians had already been making about 
northern and southern Italian immigrants. He wrote an article favoring 
immigration restriction in 1904 that explained that the great surge in immigration 
from southern Italy, which, “without exaggeration, may be described as appalling 
in quality and in amount…” necessitated that the United States act to exclude a 
significant number of these new arrivals. Southern Italian immigration, which was 
comparatively new and growing rapidly, represented a people “with whom the 
English-speaking people have never before amalgamated,” he noted. It was 
unfortunate that it was not immigration from the north, because with them, “one 
can say at least that they are a people of the Western civilization like our own, 
[and] that there is among the northern Italians an infusion of Germanic blood, and 
that they present in themselves no alarming feature.” But other races however, 
like Bohemians, Jews, Southern Italians, Hungarians, Slavs, Russians, Greeks, 
                                                
48 Petitions in files of House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, RG 233,  HR 55A – 
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Syrians and Armenians, Lodge was not willing to admit, because they were 
racially different, and because they had no infusion of Germanic blood.49 
The statistical evidence of the declining rate of natural increase of their 
talented, Anglo-Saxon stock, and the growing volume of immigration that was 
illiterate and non-Anglo-Saxon, created significant worries for the social elites of 
the IRL. Equipped now with ample statistical evidence, and with an ambitious and 
devoted senator favoring restriction, the Immigration Restriction League had two 
of its major weapons in hand. Now the League’s leaders needed convincing 
scientific proof of the inferiority of these new immigrants to provide additional 
support and legitimacy for restriction. They did not have to wait long. 
Biological Problems of Immigration  
In 1899, William Z. Ripley was dividing his teaching duties between the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where he was an instructor in sociology 
and economics, and Columbia University, where he was the Prize Lecturer in 
Physical Geography and Anthropology. In 1901 he was named professor of 
economics at Harvard University, where he taught for the next thirty-two years, 
eventually holding an endowed chair in the department.50 But the publication of 
his book, The Races of Europe in 1899 had much larger significance than 
anything he did at Harvard, Columbia, or M.I.T. The Races of Europe generated 
tremendous impact on political and intellectual arguments in favor of restriction.  
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Yet the evidence in Ripley’s book, significantly, was not collected from 
first-hand examination or study. For much of the data used in Races, Ripley relied 
on monographs written by other specialists, and personal contacts through which 
he was able to obtain his desired information. His membership in international 
societies like the Royal Anthropological Institute and the Anthropological 
Societies of Rome and Paris provided him with distinguished contacts, but, as 
with Charles Davenport, Ripley’s work was predominantly correlative. He did not 
have the extensive field-work experience and experimental background that 
would later mark the differences between his and Davenport’s work and that of 
the anthropologists Franz Boas and Ales Hrdlicka, and the biologists Jennings and 
Raymond Pearl.51  
Ripley opened the book by listing the factors that shaped human history: 
race, environment, and epoch. Unlike many of the classic racialists, Ripley 
emphasized the importance of the built and social environment on human beings, 
since these often had significant impact on human physical development, but the 
individual was fundamentally limited and constrained by their biological makeup. 
“Race,” he pointed out, “denotes what man is; all these other details of social life 
represent what man does.”52 Ripley’s book aimed to classify the major racial types 
of the European population, and he insisted that there was no monolithic 
European race. Instead, there were three ideal types of European races, each 
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52 William Z. Ripley, The Races of Europe: A Sociological Study (New York: D. Appleton and 
Co., 1899), 32, emphasis original.  
 
 Chapter 1 89 
essentially geographically isolated and identifiable by cephalic index, and these 
races were then further broken down by linguistic and cultural attributes. 
Although he placed a strong emphasis on the shape of heads, Ripley declared that 
head shape was useful only for identifying these ideal racial types, and did not in 
any way correlate to intelligence.53 The three major European races he named 
were the Teutonic, the Alpine, and the Mediterranean; each race had 
corresponding geographical bases of population, and although the racial identity 
was not static, there were significant and inherent social characteristics associated 
with each type. He explained that the physical character of populations groups 
“often changes at the line which divides the hills from the plains” and that there 
were profound “structural” differences between eastern European populations and 
western European populations.54  
The Races of Europe was profoundly influential on the emergence of 
American classic racialism in two ways: it established for an American audience 
the principle of separate and distinct racial identities of European population 
groups, and it provided a direct conduit for Giuseppe Sergi into American race 
thinking. Every book on immigration or racial types – Prescott Hall, the United 
States Immigration Commission or Madison Grant – that relied on Ripley 
imported, indirectly or directly, the Italian’s description of the separate racial 
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54 Ibid., 31. Despite his lack of primary observational and experimental data, Ripley’s book 
became, as John Higham notes in Strangers in the Land, one of the landmark intellectual 
contributions to racialized nativism. Higham, Strangers in the Land, 154-5. But Higham also 
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empted by Italians like Sergi.  
 Chapter 1 90 
groups within Italy. In Ripley’s scheme, Italians were of two separate, distinct 
racial groups. In the north, the Alps blocked the migration of the Teutonic race 
into the Italian peninsula, so a distinct Alpine race developed near the mountains 
and in the Po River valley. “As we leave the river,” he pointed out, “and rise 
slowly across Emilia toward the mountain range the heads gradually become less 
purely Alpine; and then suddenly as we cross the watershed we step into an 
entirely different population.”55 Among Ripley’s sources for making this claim: 
Giuseppe Sergi, whom he described as a “brilliant anthropologist” and Cesare 
Lombroso.56   
Ripley’s division of Europe into three distinct, fixed racial types would 
reinforce the attitudes of American nativists toward European immigrants from 
southern and eastern Europe. The Teutonic, Alpine, and Mediterranean races all 
had specific geographic origins – the Teutons dominating the northern countries 
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56 Ibid., 592 for “brilliant.” The Races of Europe supplied footnotes for source information, but did 
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enough to supply the American researcher “a complete catalogue of my works,” from which, he 
told Ripley, “you can know better my ideas.” Napoleone Colajanni to William Ripley, 12 January 
1899; Colajanni to Ripley 25 October 1898; quote from Giuseppe Sergi to William Ripley, 21 
April 1898, but see also Sergi to Ripley 14 May 1898; Sergi to Ripley 25 May 1898; and Cesare 
Lombroso to William Ripley 11 June 1898, all in William Zebina Ripley Papers, box 1, Harvard 
University Archives, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA.  
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from their “historical” origins in Scandinavia and Germany (as Sergi had posited) 
and including the Anglo-Saxons, while the Mediterranean race’s concentration in 
Spain, Italy, and Africa was due to the mountainous obstacle of the Alps which 
produced its own distinct racial type. Despite superficial physical similarities in 
racial characteristics between the Teutonics and Alpines, Ripley asserted, “there 
can be no doubt of two distinct races of men.”57 This alleged distinctiveness lent 
scientific credibility to fears of American nativists that their Anglo-Saxon racial 
identity might be overwhelmed.  
Transitioning from general racial types to specific national racial 
identities, Ripley selected the British Isles as a quintessential example of 
geographic isolation producing a stable racial type. The British population, he 
argued, was homogeneous – though his argument did not include the Irish 
population – and was, by measuring its remarkable stability of head form, 
uncorrupted by other racial influences. “We are,” he declared, referring to Britons 
and their descendants, “generally known as Teutonic by descent.”58  
Despite the shift in his professional interests to economics after publishing 
The Races of Europe, Ripley revisited European immigration in a paper for the 
Royal Anthropological Institute’s Huxley Memorial Lecture in 1908. “The 
European Population in the United States” moved away from biological races to 
incorporate an environmental explanation for somatic differences, which Ripley 
was increasingly embracing as an equal factor in human racial development. 
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European populations, he argued, “are the product of their immediate 
environments; dark in the southern half, blonde at the north, stunted where the 
conditions are harsh, well developed where the land is fat. Even as between city 
and country,” he continued, “conditions have been so long settled that one may 
trace the results in the physical traits in the inhabitants.”59 The European 
population in the United States, however, was as yet unrelated to its physical 
environment because its movement to the other side Atlantic was comparatively 
recent. But the geographical differences in Europe, he insisted, were partly the 
cause of the difference in racial types on the continent. In this lecture, Ripley 
transitioned away from a strict biological determinism. 
Ripley’s lecture showed the difficulty of trying to precisely define and 
codify “racial” identities among human populations. When environmental 
conditions were considered, and the somatological effects on human populations 
of the surrounding geography were taken in to account, Ripley conceded that his 
racial groupings in The Races of Europe needed to be reclassified. Mediterranean, 
Alpine, Slavic, Teutonic and Jewish types, divided on the basis of physical 
features, and “disregarding…mere linguistic affiliations” seemed to provide a 
more accurate system of classification than the three types that he posited in The 
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Races of Europe.60 Still, Ripley did argue in favor of specific racial characteristics 
and qualities, and ended his lecture with a declaration that while environmental 
influences did have an impact on the physical characteristics of racial groups, 
there were racial distinctions in degree of physical and mental evolution that 
could be utilized in a classificatory system.61 The lecture presented some distinct 
difficulties in precise classification because of environmental influences on 
human bodies and human evolution. What is significant about Ripley’s Huxley 
lecture was that an internationally respected American academic was unwilling to 
declare the existence of fixed, immutable racial types that eugenicists and 
restrictionists argued so heavily in favor of. Ripley, whose book would become so 
central to American classic racialist thinking, seemed to back away from his 
earlier suggestions of a biological determinism. But those who found this new 
position unsettling conveniently overlooked his Huxley lecture.  
Ripley was not the only American investigating the ethnology and racial 
background of European populations in the late 1800s although he had the largest 
influence on American racial thought. Another investigator, a Pennsylvanian from 
an old Quaker family, Daniel Garrison Brinton, studied medicine at the Jefferson 
Medical School in Philadelphia before traveling to Europe in the early 1860s to 
study ethnology at Paris and Heidelberg. After serving in the Union Army as a 
surgeon in the Civil War, Brinton embarked on a career in ethnology. As the first 
American university professor in anthropology (at the University of 
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Pennsylvania), Brinton had the makings of being a leader in the field. He was one 
of the American Philosophical Society’s most eminent ethnologists after his first 
two books, Anthropology and Ethnology (1886) and The American Race (1891) 
were published, and he was the President at the International Congress of 
Anthropology in Chicago in 1893. Brinton, however, failed to grasp the 
intellectual shift that was then occurring in the scientific community, despite his 
European training. Although he was a member of the University of 
Pennsylvania’s faculty, he worked mostly in the University Museum, and taught 
no students. Franz Boas, after he was established at Columbia University as a 
professor of anthropology, used Brinton as an example of – and a warning of the 
dangers of – anthropological work that was based principally on theory instead of 
fieldwork.62 
Two books of Brinton’s assumed importance in creating a coherent classic 
racialist position for American nativists and later influenced the federal 
government: Anthropology and Ethnology and Races and Peoples (1901), the 
latter a posthumous collection of lectures he delivered at the Academy of Natural 
Sciences in Philadelphia in 1890. In Anthropology and Ethnology, the 
Pennsylvanian defined anthropology as a field studying physical differences, 
whereas ethnology was an examination of social and mental characteristics. In 
characterizing the physical differences between types of people, Brinton used two 
systems: the Linnaean system of geographical location (European, Asiatic, 
African, American, Australian, Oceanic), and Blumenbach’s system of skin 
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assortment (white, yellow, black, brown, red). This was a different method than 
that used by Ripley or Sergi, which relied on physical structure to determine racial 
differences. Although he bucked the strictures on racial purity of some of his 
contemporaries by noting that race mixing can be beneficial, he meant it only in 
terms of mixing within racial groups. The English, for example, the “most 
vigorous and energetic” of all races, were the product of numerous crossings of 
Celtic, Romance, and Teutonic breeds. But, Brinton insisted that the “highest race 
will, however, always preserve the purity of its blood… [due] to the abhorrence of 
its females to mingling with the lower stock….”63 Like his focus on theoretical 
outlines of anthropology and ethnology rather than field work in this 
methodological treatment of these developing fields, Brinton relied on long-
accepted cultural sentiments rather than observed and measured facts. This 
became the hallmark of American classic racialism, particularly when it came to 
understanding the problems of immigration.  
Races and Peoples was another important contribution to American 
classic racialism, but was more specifically geared to applying some of the 
theoretical arguments he had laid out in Anthropology and Ethnology. The ten 
lectures that Brinton delivered in the early months of 1890 covered many topics in 
the field of ethnography.64 In his first lecture, Brinton laid out the core classic 
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racialist belief: “The traits of the race thus [overwhelm] the variable characters of 
the family, the sex or the individual, and maintain themselves uniform and 
unalterable in the pure blood of the stock through all experience.”65 An 
individual’s “nature” could never be changed. The mental and physical 
differences between races might escape the notice of a casual observer, but this 
did not make them any less permanent. Cranial measurements, facial and 
maxillary [jaw] angles, teeth, bones, and skin color all helped the skilled student 
identify and separate racial groups.66 The mental and psychological characteristics 
of racial groups were also, just as it was for Lombroso, inscribed on the physical 
body. Brinton tried to convince his audience that culture, environment, and 
education had a negligible effect on racial characteristics. “We are accustomed 
familiarly to speak of ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ races, and we are justified in this even 
from merely physical considerations. These indeed bear intimate relations,” he 
confidently stated, “to mental capacity, and where the body presents many points 
of arrested or retarded development, we may be sure that the mind will also.”67 
Brinton’s second lecture continued the physical elements of ethnography, but 
                                                
65 Ibid., p. 18, emphasis added. Lectures 4-9 studied particular ethnological groups, while the 
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66 Brinton’s exposition of the importance of skin color shows very clearly the importance that 
classic racialism maintained for some students of ethnology. The coloration of Africans, he 
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67 Ibid., 47. He also explained that measured by these objective physical measurements of capacity 
and quality, “the European or white race stands at the head of the list, and African or negro at its 
foot.” 48. 
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considered more the mental and psychological differences between races, which 
“are real and profound” and hereditary.68 
Though Brinton was attempting to create a workable and sophisticated 
scientific classification system, he was unable to divorce himself from certain 
cultural assumptions. When he discussed gradual changes between races in the 
lectures, he elevated the white race as the “leading race in all history,” and thus 
justified his extended treatment of physical differences of the various stocks of the 
white race. His description of the Celtic and Italic stocks reflected the biases of an 
old-stock American, proud of his long lineage back to England. The Celtic stock 
was turbulent, boastful, alert, courageous, and deficient in caution, persistence, 
and self-control. They were “a dangerous element in the body politic of a free 
country. In religion they are fanatic and bigoted.”69 “Italic peoples” were divided 
into two population groups, Umbrians in the north, and Latins in the south, again 
suggesting the influence of Italian racial anthropology; Brinton argued that Latin 
southerners were very different racially from Americans.70 He closed his last 
lecture, in which he discussed problems of acclimation, amalgamation and 
civilization, with one last paean to the perfection of the European white race. 
“Every navy and every army of any fighting capacity belong to the European 
whites and their descendants,” he claimed. “No nation and no race or other 
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70 This is difficult to prove, however, as Brinton did not provide any footnotes, and his List of 
Authors at the end of the book did not mention Lombroso, Sergi, Niceforo or the Italian 
anthropologist Rudolfo Livi (who was an important source for Ripley’s book).  
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lineage dare withstand an attack or disobey an order from a leading European 
power.”71 Madison Grant and Lothrop Stoddard would later repeat this conceit, 
which had no basis in actual scientific or objective evidence, in the late 1910s and 
1920s, and which helped support the entire rationale for immigration restriction in 
the United States. To maintain American civilization, its homogeneity had to be 
preserved. 
One other important ethnographical source for the creation of classic 
racialism, and which influenced the development of solutions to the “immigration 
problem,” was the product of a Russian-born Frenchman, Joseph Deniker. 
Deniker’s outline of anthropology and ethnography, The Races of Man, grew 
from his doctoral dissertation for the Faculté des Sciences in Paris, and was 
released in an English translation in 1900. Deniker was born to French parents in 
Astrakhan, Russia in 1852, and spent several years after his graduation from the 
Technological Institute in Petrograd traveling the Caucasus, Persia, and Europe 
researching the major ethnographic features of the inhabitants. His doctoral 
dissertation for the Faculté des Sciences in Paris (1886) was the result of these 
researches, and Deniker quickly became one of the premiere theoreticians of 
human races.72 Like Ripley, Deniker’s work tried to organize the varieties of 
human beings into coherent groups, while recognizing the remarkable variations 
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within these groupings. To create associations, he relied principally on language, 
cranial measurements, and cultural characteristics, which were, as I have 
suggested, were pretty common metrics in early racial anthropology. But 
Deniker’s work was very much ethnography in its original sense: much of the 
book detailed the characteristics and qualities of “primitive” and “uncivilized” 
cultures.73 His chapter on ethnic characters, for instance, described the linguistic 
attributes of non-literate cultures, and how inflection, signals, glyphs, and 
pictographs functioned as modes of communication in human groups that lacked 
written alphabets.74  
Deniker’s book offered a cautious approach to racial groupings of human 
populations. He hesitated to deny influence of the environment on human groups, 
and conceded that biological laws regarding inheritance and heredity were “still 
very dimly apprehended.” He argued against Lamarckian inheritance, and mocked 
the phrenology of Franz Joseph Gall.75 Sociological characteristics of racial 
groups were discussed in three lengthy chapters, demonstrating Deniker’s 
appreciation that while “race” was largely a physical artifact, grouping “peoples” 
or nations together was much more complex. But deviating from common 
anthropological metrics, Deniker’s organizing principle of racial groups was hair 
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type, which resulted in six large “types” of population, which were then broken 
down into races and sub-races by eye color, skin type, and cranial measurement.  
This led to a wildly complicated organization of world racial populations. 
It demonstrates two important aspects of classification schemes of “races” at the 
turn of the century: that there was no agreement in principle on standards of 
evidence, and there were a number of strange classification schemes. This 
complexity is significant because it demonstrates a lack of an academic or 
professional consensus, one of the keys for the emergence of a new scientific 
paradigm in Kuhn’s framework. Without agreement in what constituted the 
organizing principles of racial classification, professional academics and 
researchers had difficulty talking about “scientific” systems of race. Ripley, 
Brinton, Deniker, Sergi and others each suggested their own independent method 
of grouping populations by physical and mental characteristics. Thus, when 
historians refer to the ideological complex of “scientific racism” they obscure the 
divergence of opinion on what constituted a “race.” This complexity allowed less 
reticent advocates to flatten out these complexities into the convincing and simple 
aphorism that like produced like.  
Nativists like the IRL’s Prescott Hall used this lack of consensus to 
advance claims that had dubious scientific credibility, but in the context of this 
uncertainty, scientists had inadvertently created space for amateurs and non-
scientists to declare that there was consensus and certainty with little fear of 
opposition. Hall’s 1906 book Immigration and Its Affects was forthright in the 
danger that the new immigration presented; instead of contributing an analysis 
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based on first-hand research, he merely expanded many of the basic points he 
made in a 1904 article. Noting the increase in illiteracy, disease, insanity and 
crime that the southeastern immigrants brought with them, as well as the danger – 
as Walker pointed out – of racial degradation, Hall argued that failing to curtail 
immigration, “will probably mean, not merely a change of race but a change in 
average quality.” He burnished Walker’s replacement thesis as proof that 
undesirable immigration was a great peril to the country. Despite the fact that he 
was a lawyer by training, Hall felt compelled to speak on “recent discoveries in 
biology [that] show that in the long run heredity is far more important than 
environment or education.”76 There was no mention of the complexity of the racial 
sciences or the disagreements by professional students over proper and accurate 
classification schemes, or that academics were unwilling to dismiss the 
importance of environmental influences on individual development.  
While Hall’s book Immigration became one of the standard texts the 
federal government would use in formulating its immigration policy for decades 
(Madison Grant still listed it on his recommended reading list to the House 
Committee on Immigration in 192577), the assumptions that underlay the book put 
it at odds with the objective, experimental trend developing in modern science in 
the early-twentieth century. It was quintessential classic racialist thought. Hall 
claimed that the “Keltic” and “Iberic” populations within Italy reflected the 
                                                
76 Hall, Immigration pp. 99-110; quote from 99.  
 
77 “A List of Authoritative Books on Immigration compiled by Madison Grant for the Immigration 
Committee of the American Defense Society, Inc.” RG 233, HR 68 A – F. 18. 1 box 264.  
 
 Chapter 1 102 
general geographical divisions that the United States Immigration Bureau was 
using at that time to distinguish between north Italians and south Italians. Hall’s 
Keltic element comprised any immigrant from Tuscany, Emilia, Liguria, Venice, 
and Lombardy, and the Iberic element made up all other territories to the south. 
Those Italians from the north, Hall described, were of “much better stock, and are 
more enterprising, thrifty, and intelligent than their southern fellow-
countrymen.”78 Curiously, Hall’s historical analysis of Italian immigration to the 
United States conflicted with the statistical evidence gathered by the Immigration 
Bureau in the nineteenth century. Hall claimed that, “The earliest Italian 
immigration to the United States,” he argued, “was of a very low class” and 
included the organ-grinders and rag-pickers featured so prominently in Jacob 
Riis’s book How the Other Half Lives (1890); Italian immigrants that followed 
comprised the better class of northerners, who took jobs as barbers, bootblacks, 
fruit vendors and shoemakers – people who were, “on the whole, peaceable and 
industrious.”79 Statistically, however, Hall was wrong – it was the northern 
Italians who had arrived in the United States first, and northern Italian immigrants 
tended to move away from east coast cities to the interior of the United States.80  
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Despite having no formal training in the natural sciences, Hall devoted a 
thirty-page chapter to the biological and racial effects of immigration on the 
United States. One of the central elements of this chapter was General Walker’s 
replacement thesis. Recent biological discoveries, Hall explained, showed that in 
the long run, it was heredity, and not environment, that was of paramount 
importance in determining the racial composition of a country. Hall and his 
colleagues in the Immigration Restriction League would maintain this position – 
despite growing scientific evidence to the contrary – for the next two decades. 
Using statistics from the Immigration Bureau for 1904, Hall emphasized the non-
Teutonic racial background of the majority of immigrant arrivals: Slavic and 
Iberic immigrants totaled 56.4% of all arrivals, while only 24% had a Teutonic 
background.81 
Hall discussed possible legislative action that would preserve the Teutonic 
racial composition of the United States. Since its formation in 1894, the 
Immigration Restriction League had advocated a literacy requirement for all 
arriving immigrants. As he traced the development of legislation that included this 
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provision, Hall noted that it was two Massachusetts congressmen – Senator Henry 
Cabot Lodge and Representative Samuel W. McCall (later the governor of 
Massachusetts for two years) – who consistently favored this form of “selection.” 
Hall spent several pages emphasizing the importance of the literacy requirement. 
The League faced obstacles in securing this precision; President Grover Cleveland 
had already vetoed a literacy clause in an immigration bill in 1897, because it 
represented a “radical departure” from policy that could only be justified by “the 
necessity of protecting our population against degeneration and saving our 
national peace and quiet from turbulence and disorder.” Enacting a clause 
restricting immigrants based on their ability to read would be no protection 
“against these evils.”82 Such an act by the President led Hall to conclude that 
Cleveland simply misunderstood the idea behind the literacy test, and the 
League’s role was to educate not only political leaders, but the public as well, 
about the true benefits of a literacy clause: it would preserve the racial character 
and homogeneity of the United States.  
Manipulating the description of it, Hall explained that the premise behind 
the “educational test” was that “it furnishes an indirect method of excluding those 
who are undesirable, not merely because of their illiteracy but for other reasons.”83 
Illiteracy also correlated with a low amount of money an immigrant brought, 
making him (Hall specifically used the male pronoun) more susceptible to 
                                                
82 Senate Document n. 185, 54th Congress, 2nd Session, “Message from the President of the United 
States” 3 March 1897, 2-3.  
 
83 Hall, Immigration, 273. He did not explain what the “other reasons” might be.  
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pauperism, crime, a low standard of living, and an inability to assimilate 
politically and socially to his adopted country. Since Hall took illiteracy to also be 
a sign of hereditary mental inferiority, the test would presumably (and 
conveniently) exclude racially undesirable immigrants too.  Significantly, the 
Boston lawyer attributed illiteracy not to environmental or social causes, but to 
heredity. Illiteracy can be conquered in certain instances, Hall explained. But the 
“hereditary tendencies of the peoples illiterate abroad, and especially of their 
uneducated classes, cannot be overcome in a generation or two.” Their hereditary 
inferiority was permanent, and since Hall maintained the classic racialist belief 
that like produces like, their offspring, though born in America, would always 
inherit these inferior, undesirable qualities.  
Yet there were American academics capable of performing solid analyses 
of immigration problems that could still be used to justify the exclusion of the 
new immigrants. Columbia University Political Economist Richmond Mayo-
Smith was one, and he wrote a balanced and sophisticated book with a wealth of 
statistical information on immigration. Mayo-Smith, who was named a full 
professor of Political Economics and Social Science in 1883, was another highly 
regarded American statistician in the late-nineteenth century. Barbara Solomon 
notes that he was “the most important” member of the American Economic 
Association to affect “the intellectual development of the restriction movement.”84 
He made key contributions to the development of classic racialism and its 
incorporation by the government into immigration policy by providing an 
                                                
84 Solomon, Ancestors and Immigrants, 77. 
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alternative language to xenophobia or racism. An Ohioan of Puritan descent, 
Mayo-Smith spent two years in Germany after his graduation from Amherst 
College studying statistics and political economy. He improved his international 
credentials throughout his career; he joined the International Statistical Institute in 
1889, and was named an Honorary Fellow of the Royal Statistical Society in 
1890. His two-volume Science of Statistics (1895, 1899) became one of the 
foundational texts for statistical instruction in the early twentieth century.85 
In 1898 Mayo-Smith addressed European immigration to the United States 
in an important book, Emigration and Immigration. The sources that the 
Columbia professor used in compiling his book on immigration were varied: the 
Tenth Census of the United States (1880), the New York Commissioners of 
Emigration reports, Statistical Tables relating to Emigration and Immigration 
from and Into the United Kingdom (1887), the Bulletin de l’Institut international 
de statistique (1887), Statistica della emigrazione italiana per gli anni 1884 e 
1885, the Massachusetts census of 1885, and the New York State Board of 
Charities Annual reports among others. While this gave the book a strong 
statistical background, its “whole argument…has been to show that it is desirable 
to correct certain evils which flow from the perfect freedom of immigration.”86 
While he insisted that the country restrict immigration, Mayo-Smith deplored 
nativist justifications based on the racial difference of immigrants. Mayo-Smith 
                                                
85 W. R. L., “Mayo-Smith, Richmond” Dictionary of American Biography Dumas Malone, ed. 
(NY: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1933) Vol. 12, 467-68.  
 
86 Richmond Mayo-Smith, Emigration and Immigration: A Study in Social Science (New York: 
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1898), p. 277-78.  
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was not so concerned with the racial degradation of the country as the economic 
instability that the immigrant labor pool created. The desired end of restriction 
was to exclude “elements incompatible with our civilization,” defective and 
delinquent classes, and large numbers of immigrants that would “threaten the 
integrity of our political institutions or to cause economic disturbances.”87 But in 
Emigration he took pains to demonstrate the positive impact that immigrants had 
on the United States, particularly its economic and industrial development.  
Yet at the same time he celebrated immigrants as one of the three chief 
factors responsible for the country’s growth, Mayo-Smith insisted on the 
importance of the immigrant’s impact on the racial composition of the nation. 
Noting that the African-American population in the south would “always be a 
problem for us” – they were “by birth and race and previous condition of 
servitude incapable of representing the full American capacity for political and 
social life” – Mayo-Smith recommended a careful approach to restricting the 
admission of European aliens, although he declined to provide an exact method. 
He cautioned that absolute prohibition of immigration was neither necessary nor 
desirable.88  
                                                
87 Ibid., p. 278-9.  
 
88 Ibid.: 64-6 for the African-American population; 279 for opposition to absolute prohibition. 
“The end to be desired is perfectly plain. It is, that immigration shall be controlled in such a way 
that elements incompatible with our civilization shall be excluded; that the defective and 
delinquent classes, who are only a burden and a danger to us, shall also be excluded; and that the 
immigration shall not be on such a scale as to threaten the integrity of our political institutions or 
to cause economic disturbances. The general method is to establish some process of selection by 
which the immigration of undesirable persons shall be discouraged.” Ibid., 278.  
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At the end of the nineteenth century, the increasing volume of immigration 
to the United States came to be defined as a “problem.” Professional academics 
and non-scientists alike examined the apparent differences between the aliens 
arriving on American shores and the characteristics of its native-born population. 
Professional academics like Ripley and Brinton relied upon second-hand analysis 
and observations to compile their organizational schemes of the world’s racial 
groups. Others approached the issue in sophisticated and cosmopolitan ways, 
examining immigration and racial typologies, as Mayo-Smith and Deniker did, 
cautiously and with an objective eye. The wide variety of interpretations, the lack 
of certainty or proof, created ambiguity in the intellectual approach to racial 
thought. This ambiguity and uncertainty enabled non-scientists, like Prescott Hall 
and his associates in the Immigration Restriction League, to insist that there were 
specific biological population groups whose dangerous and undesirable attributes 
and characteristics would be propagated in future generations. Once those groups 
could be defined as “undesirable” or biologically different, the “problem” of 
immigration could be advanced as a danger to the American native-born 
population. Using fears articulated by men like Walker, Lodge and Turner, the 
differences between the new immigration and the old immigration could be 
portrayed as threatening and dangerous. And the lack of a coherent scientific 
opposition to the deterministic thinking of classic racialism gave it a degree of 
influence that ultimately enabled restrictionists to propose their specific solutions 
to the problem of immigration. 
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Chapter 2: The Value of Scientific Cosmopolitanism 
 
In 1904 Immigration Restriction League founder and Boston lawyer 
Prescott Hall published an essay in The Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science that defined the nature of inferior immigration. Any 
immigrant is undesirable, he explained, “which is ignorant of a trade; which is 
lacking in resources; which has criminal tendencies; which is averse to country 
life and tends to congregate in the slums of large cities; which has a low standard 
of living and lacks ambition to seek a better [standard]; which fails to assimilate 
within a reasonable time, and which has no permanent interests in this country.”1 
Several of those categories could be determined statistically; the urban 
concentrations of population and the nativity of criminals in particular were 
clearly listed in the census. These two categories became two of the more 
frequently cited empirical “proofs” of the undesirability of the “new” 
immigration.  
For Hall and his associates in the Immigration Restriction League, 
southern Italian immigrants were among the most undesirable elements of new 
arrivals because they were perceived to embody several of these categories. The 
association of southern Italians and crime – as witnessed in the vigilante action in 
New Orleans – was particularly powerful. Hall’s colleague Joseph Lee made the 
case explicitly, stating in a committee report of the National Conference of 
                                                
1 Prescott F. Hall, “Selection of Immigration” The Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science (July 1904), 175. This essay was a slight variation on arguments Hall had been 
publishing for a decade. See, for instance, Prescott F. Hall, “Immigration and the Educational 
Test” North American Review v. 165, n. 4 (October 1897), 393-403.  
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Charities and Correction that “It is generally conceded that the North Italian is a 
much more desirable immigrant than the South Italian. He is stronger, more 
enterprising, has laid aside much more property, and is better educated.”2 The 
southern Italians’ overrepresentation in the criminal and illiterate populations 
suggested to restrictionists an eminently justifiable cause for their exclusion from 
American’s shores. Their criminality threatened law-abiding native-born 
Americans with violence and theft. Their illiteracy made them unable to secure 
good jobs, which left them economically vulnerable, which in turn reinforced an 
innate propensity to crime. Their urban concentration retarded their assimilation 
of American ideals and values. All of these had statistical evidence to support it. 
These tendencies – to say nothing of their non-Nordic racial identity – made them 
undesirable Americans. The same Proceedings that published Lee’s report to the 
Charities of and Correction conference carried a defense of recent immigrants by 
New York medical doctor Maurice Fishberg. “Many writers on the racial effects 
of the recent immigration have alleged that ‘inferior racial elements’ are likely to 
deteriorate physically the people of the United States,” he explained. “None of 
these writers have to my knowledge made an effort to study the problem directly 
from the strictly scientific standpoint, so that their statements on the subject can 
be considered merely opinions not necessarily based on facts.” One writer that 
had studied the problem directly would have strongly disagreed with Lee’s 
assertion, and in fact made a concerted effort to correct these misunderstandings. 
                                                
2 Joseph Lee, “Report of the Committee” in Proceedings of the National Conference of Charities 
and Correction v. 33 (May 1906), 1-17; 9; Dr. Maurice Fishberg, “Ethnic Factors in 
Immigration—A Critical View” in ibid., 27-36; 27, emphasis added. 
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The critic, a sociologist and statistician, was an Italian named Napoleone 
Colajanni.  
Just as Galton and Lombroso reached across the Atlantic Ocean to spread 
their ideas, Colajanni published essays in the United States; Colajanni’s essays, 
however, tried to combat the perceptions that southern Italians were undesirable 
immigrants. He aimed to cast doubt on the validity of the arguments made in 
favor of their exclusion by criticizing the alleged biological and hereditary 
permanence of racial identity. He was not simply an apologist for Italian 
immigrants, however – Colajanni used a sophisticated (or at least less simplistic) 
approach to social phenomenon like crime and illiteracy. In this regard he created 
important precedents for later critics of classic racialist thought in the United 
States.  
Colajanni first wrote an English article to reexamine the statistical 
evidence used to allegedly prove the criminality of many southern Italian 
immigrants in the magazine The Forum in March 1901. He emphasized the 
importance of social and cultural context in understanding empirical facts, and 
consistently argued against a racial determinism that presumed a perpetual 
inferiority of certain population groups. Colajanni admitted that the assassination 
of Italy’s King Umberto in 1900 had reinforced the perception, even of 
sympathetic observers, that “our beautiful country is privileged ground for the 
production of criminals,” but his essay marshaled statistical evidence to disprove 
that perception. Colajanni took aim at the Lombrosians and their “poorly 
collected” and “still more poorly interpreted” statistical evidence of Italian 
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criminality, which had been, through Lombroso’s and Zimmern’s articles, 
accessible to American audiences.3 Although Colajanni could not dispute the fact 
that Italy did have a high rate of homicide (compounded in the public’s mind by 
an association with organized crime), he took pains in the essay to shift the 
explanation from a racial or biological source to an economic and educational 
problem, and tried to undermine Lombroso’s and Sergi’s arguments about the 
“characters” of the Italian people and their immigrants. That the highest rates of 
homicide in Italy at the end of the nineteenth century were in the regions of the 
south was true, he noted, but a similarly high rate was found in northern Italy at 
the end of the eighteenth century. There was, he insisted, no racial predisposition 
to criminality in the Italians; crime was primarily a primarily of poverty and 
environmental influences.4  
Colajanni was a professor of statistics at the University of Naples and 
deputy of parliament in 1906 when he republished his book Latini e anglo-
sassoni: razze inferiore e superiore (Latins and Anglo-Saxons: Inferior and 
Superior Races) [orig. 1903], which sought to combat the racially determinist 
arguments that pervaded European and American thought. In the late 1890s, 
Colajanni, like Giuseppe Sergi and Cesare Lombroso, had been in touch with the 
American economist, sociologist and physical geographer William Z. Ripley, 
exchanging with him publications and bibliographies of racial anthropology. 
Colajanni even offered to review Ripley’s 1899 book The Races of Europe in the 
                                                
3 Napoleone Colajanni, “Homicide and the Italians” Forum (March 1901), 62-68; pp. 62-3. 
 
4 Ibid, 67.  
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Italian journal Rivista popolare di politica lettere e scienze sociale.5 But 
Colajanni’s own view about European races, which he laid out in the literature 
review in Latini e anglo-sassoni, suggested that discussing “race” was inherently 
difficult because even among students of human varieties (as the last chapter 
showed), there were “profound differences” in the classification systems. 
Colajanni told of the wild variations in the classification systems of Buffon, 
Aggassiz, Huxley, Sergi, Ripley, Keane, Deniker and many others.6  The 
important point for Colajanni – as with anthropologists other later critics of 
classic racialism – was that environmental influences on an organism could not be 
ignored, and that “pure” races had not existed for tens of thousands of years, so 
there was little sense in trying to preserve the racial homogeneity of the United 
States. American authors who favored a purely biological or hereditary 
classification were missing an essential component of the development of human 
population groups. Although Colajanni was a statistician, he approached 
biological problems with an open and flexible mind, suspicious of what statistics 
purported to “prove.” He had a somewhat cosmopolitan perspective like Boas, 
Jennings and Raymond Pearl, which inclined him to believe in multicausality. 
Ripley’s book had some of these same cosmopolitan inclinations – despite the fact 
                                                
5 Napoleone Colajanni to William Z. Ripley, 12 January 1899, Papers of William Z. Ripley, 
Correspondence: Box 1, Harvard University Archives, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA. 
Colajanni noted that he was opposed to the racial theories of Vacher de Lapouge, who would 
become an important influence on American nativists like Madison Grant. See also Giuseppe 
Sergi to Ripley, 21 April 1898; 14 May 1898; 25 May 1898; Cesare Lombroso to Ripley, 11 June 
1898, all in Ripley papers.  
 
6 Napoleone Colajanni, Latini e anglo-sassoni: razze inferiori e razze superiori Second ed. (Roma: 
La rivista popolare, 1906), 4.  
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that Ripley spent the rest of his career in economics and not in anthropology – but 
which were wholly absent in the claims and publications of Hall and 
restrictionists. American classic racialists would abandon this cosmopolitanism 
and Colajanni serves as a useful point of departure for later critics of the 
determinism of immigration restrictionists.  
As he debunked each of the arguments leveled against the “new” 
immigration, Colajanni relied on a wealth of American sources that showed that 
global migrations involved not only individual immigrants, but also abstract 
representations of them that also migrated around the world. The statistical 
sources that Colajanni cited – the reports of reformatories in upstate New York, 
annual reports of the United States Commissioner of Immigration, the Secretary 
of Commerce’s Prisoners and Juvenile Delinquents, 1904 (one of his favorites) – 
demonstrates two points: the assertion that Italian immigrants were  “undesirable” 
was contested on both sides of the Atlantic; and statistical proof of inherent 
characteristics of racial “types” was vulnerable to manipulation.7 As scientific 
knowledge lurched fitfully toward an understanding of heredity and genetics in 
the early twentieth-century, the ambiguities of what scientific knowledge had 
established as proven left a space for statistics (which were perceived to be 
“harder” or more accurate because of their numerical basis) to be utilized to prove 
simple arguments of heredity and racial type. Classic racialists, as Galton showed, 
                                                
7 In one of Hall’s first public articles opposing Italian immigration in 1896, his piece was preceded 
by two months by an article written by a medical doctor and a United States Commissioner of 
Immigration, which declared Italian immigrants to be generally desirable additions. “Italian 
immigrants, even in the first generation,” he pointed out, “succumb sooner or later, like those of 
other European nationalities, to the irresistible influence of freedom and prosperity.” Joseph H. 
Senner, “Immigration from Italy” North American Review v. 162, n. 6 (June 1896), 649-57; 651.  
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favored a statistical analysis of heredity because it was perceived to be less 
ambiguous. Colajanni used statistical evidence to counter that, and to demonstrate 
that Southern Italians were not biologically predisposed to violent crime. 
Colajanni used statistical evidence to demonstrate that Southern Italians were not 
biologically predisposed to violent crime. But it was not so easy to disabuse a 
hazy understanding of Italians’ alleged hereditary criminality in the popular 
imagination, as the reports of the Dillingham Commission would later show. 
Statistics could be made to show just about anything. 
Some American magazines also tried to deter this perception of Italian 
criminality, as The Independent did in a 1909 editorial. Writing on “Undesirable 
Citizens,” the journal described that murderers, of all undesirable immigrants, 
were certainly the worst. And, it reported, the most “hateful” murderers were “the 
banded, cowardly professional murderers represented by the Camorra, the Mafia 
and the Black Hand oath-bound societies.” The editorial described how these 
underground, secret societies effectively cowed the law-abiding citizens of Italian 
colonies in the United States by intimidation, threats, and violence. The tragedy of 
the situation, The Independent informed its readers, was that the honest Italian 
workers, the desirable immigrants from the Italian peninsula, lived in perpetual 
fear of retribution, which had the added effect of preventing the American police 
forces from more effectively enforcing law and order. The editorial took a 
cosmopolitan, sophisticated approach to the issue of Italian immigration. “Far be 
it from us,” it stated, “to say one word against Italians as Italians. There is no 
nobler or abler stock out of which to make citizens. The race of Cicero and 
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Caesar, of the Gracchi and the Scipios, of Dante and Galileo, of Raphael and 
Michael Angelo [sic], of Cavour and Garibaldi is no mean stock.”8 It was unfair, 
irrational, and wrong to presume that an entire race could not possibly breed good 
and noble men because of its inferiority. But despite the fine qualities of this race, 
there were also negative and dangerous qualities in it that necessitated careful 
attention. What mattered was the cause of crime: was it biological or contextual? 
The Independent editorial clearly leaned to the latter. 
Italian immigration, which was at this time being studied by the United 
States Immigration Commission, was a concern for the Italian government as 
well. In fact, as the reports on educational efforts in the south of Italy in the 
Bolletino dell’emigrazione reflect, the Royal Government tried to extend 
education and literacy programs throughout the rural Italian south after the 
American government passed the literacy requirement in its 1917 immigration 
bill.9 In 1909 Colajanni published Gli italiani negli stati uniti, a remarkable 
manifestation of a trans-Atlantic concern over immigration problems, but Gli 
italiani was not the work of Colajanni alone; it was a collection of documents, 
some originally in English, which touched on broad immigration matters. In 
publishing the essays, Colajanni noted in the preface that the goal of the collection 
was to refute the statistical, historical, and scientific arguments used to support 
                                                
8 “Undesirable Citizens” The Independent v. 66 (1 April, 1909), 712-13.  
 
9 For instance, see “Scuole per emigranti istitute dal Commissariato” Bolletino dell’emigrazione 
(Roma: Commissariato Generale dell’Emigrazione) 1921, n. 3, doc. 1384. These were the same 
programs that Colajanni criticized in his essay “Homicide and the Italians.” In 1911, a whole issue 
was dedicated to describing the work and reports of the United States Immigration Commission. 
“Lavori della Commissione federale per l’immigrazione negli Stati Uniti” Bolletino 
dell’emigrazione, 1911 n. 4, doc. 527. The Bolletino will be discussed in more detail below. 
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“racial prejudice” against Italians. “This prejudice,” he explained, “has 
condemned the Italians, especially from the South, in North America as 
‘undesirable’ elements, that could not assimilate to civilization in the [American] 
Republic.”10 Latini e anglo-sassoni had been specifically written to combat this 
perception, but Colajanni noted that it garnered little attention in the United 
States; The Nation, while unable to confute “a single line in the book,” still 
published a negative review of the book.11 Colajanni’s purpose in Gli italiani, 
then, was to bring together American authors that also tried to dispute the 
“undesirability” of Italian immigration, and to give Italians living in the United 
States a truer idea of how desirable they were as immigrants.12 
Colajanni’s volume included American authors Frank Sheridan, Amy 
Bernaby and Emily Meade. All had backgrounds in dealing with immigration 
matters. Sheridan published a report he wrote for the Bureau of Labor in 1907 that 
described the valuable economic contribution unskilled Italian, Polish and Slavic 
immigrants made to the United States, and he summarized some of his findings in 
Gli italiani. Bernaby’s contribution to the collection was an examination of the 
reasons immigrants tended to group together in urban areas – it was primarily to 
retain peer networks that provided crucial social services. Meade’s essay used 
statistical returns of the 1900 census to document sizable Italian participation in 
                                                
10 Napoleone Colajanni, “Prefazione” in Francis J. Sheridan and Napoleone Colajanni, eds. Gli 
italiani negli stati uniti: lavoro, salari, risparmi; agglomeramento nelle città; vita rurale; 
laboriosità, delinquenze ecc. (Roma: Rivista Popolare, 1909), 3.  
 
11 Colajanni, “Prefazione,” 3.  
 
12 Ibid., 5. 
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agricultural industries rather than just as unskilled industrial and urban laborers.13 
These were in essence refutations of Hall’s reasons for classifying certain 
immigrants as undesirable. 
But it was Colajanni’s essay that addressed head-on the arguments made 
by restrictionists that Italian immigration was undesirable. The list of 
“undesirable” immigrants in the United States, he explained, included “the 
Chinese, the Japanese, the Slavs, Hungarians, and above all the Italians.” Most 
alarming to American nativists, as Colajanni perceived, was the size and the 
ethnic composition of the Slavic, Hungarian and Italian immigration as opposed 
to that “old” immigration of northern Europeans of British, German, French and 
even Irish background – precisely the argument that the United States 
Immigration Commission would support when it issued its report two years 
later.14 Colajanni acknowledged the point, noting that there was an obvious 
growth in the number of immigrants, as well as a shift in the country of origin of 
immigrants in the preceding twenty years. But since he did not believe in fixed 
and “pure” racial types, Colajanni would not concede that this geographical shift 
in and of itself was undesirable. This begged the question: where did this aversion 
to the “new” immigration come from?  
                                                
13 Francis J. Sheridan, “Salari, ore di lavoro, consumi e risparmi degli italiani negli stati uniti”; 
Amy A. Bernardy, “Perchè gli italiani si addensano nelle città americane”; Emily Fogg Meade, 
“Gli italiani nell’àgricoltura” all in Sheridan and Colajanni, Gli italiani negli stati uniti. See also 
Francis J. Sheridan, Italian, Slavic and Hungarian Unskilled Immigrant Laborers in the United 
States (Washington, D.C.: Bulletin of the Bureau of Labor, no. 72, 1907).  
 
14 Napoleone Colajanni, “I non desiderabili” in Sheridan and Colajanni, Gli italiani, 85.  
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Colajanni saw that the aversion came from racial antagonisms, particularly 
those laid out by General Francis Walker, Henry Cabot Lodge, Prescott Hall, and 
“a hundred others.” These authors argued that the “new” immigrants – Colajanni 
once again noted “above all the Italians of the south” – were undesirable because 
they were poor and lived as burdens on state and local government; they were 
illiterate; they were unskilled and had a low standard of living. Keying in on 
Walker’s “replacement thesis,” Colajanni explained that the “new” immigrants 
were represented as being highly fecund, and were changing the composition of 
the population with their “rapid multiplication.” Restrictionists claimed that new 
immigrants refused to work in agriculture, concentrating instead in cities where 
they created and aggravated social instability. Opponents of immigration, the 
Italian wrote, complained that the immigrants were birds of passage, traveling 
back to Europe with American capital. New immigrants were represented to be 
criminally inclined, they did not assimilate, and they would not Americanize.15 
Those were the reasons nativists saw the new immigrants as undesirable, but 
Colajanni felt that they had a questionable basis in scientific fact. 
In the ensuing pages, Colajanni demolished each of the representations 
that Walker, Lodge, Hall and the “hundred others” had made, one by one. 
Utilizing statistical reports from public charities, for instance, he reported that 
Italians actually made up a tiny proportion of inmates in poor-houses and insane 
asylums. Compared to the proportion of Irish, German and Scandinavian inmates 
                                                
15 Ibid., 87-88. Colajanni noted the “special preoccupation with ‘undesirable’ Italians” as evinced 
by the extended examination of the conditions in Italy conducted by Immigration Commission 
members Dillingham, Latimer, Howell, Bennet and “Burdet” [sic]. See footnote 1, p. 88. 
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on some form of public support, Italians were a negligible drain. Italians, he 
noted, relied on other Italians for help. The statistics showed that in that respect, 
they were actually the “most desirable” immigrants.16  
Colajanni was not the only Italian with an interest in protecting the 
reputation and managing the perception of Italian immigrants. In 1901 the 
Kingdom of Italy created the Commissariato Generale dell’Emigrazione within 
the Ministero degli Affari Esteri to supervise and enforce Italian regulations 
regarding the emigration of Italian nationals. The Commissariato published a 
bulletin of issues concerning Italian emigration to help officials and interested 
parties understand the policies of the Italian state regarding emigration, but also 
presented valuable and important information about the attitudes of the nations 
that Italians were emigrating to. For example, the 1903 issues of the Bolletino 
dell’Emigrazione provided information on aid societies for Italian immigrants in 
the main ports of entry in the United States, updates on legislative trends in the 
United States Congress – particularly concerning the progress of the literacy 
clause – and conditions in labor camps in the mines of West Virginia.17 
                                                
16 Ibid., 89-90.  
 
17 Egisto Rossi, “Instituto di patronato dell’emigrazione italiana negli Stati Uniti” doc. 73, v. 2, n. 
4 (1903) Bolletino dell’emigrazione, 29-47; “Nuova legge sull’immigrazione negli Stati Uniti” 
doc. 86, v. 2, . 6 (1903) Bolletino dell’emigrazione, 94-106; Gino Speranza, “Inchiesta sugli abusi 
contro gli italiani nel West Virginia” doc. 118, v. 2, n. 14 (1903), Bolletino dell’emigrazione, 10-
23. Information on the Commisariato and a tremendously helpful index can be found in Francesco 
Cordasco, Italian Mass Emigration: The Exodus of a Latin People: A Bibliographical Guide to the 
Bolletino dell’Emigrazione, 1902-1927 (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1980). The 
immigration historian Donna Gabaccia warns against placing too sharp an emphasis on the 
“tyranny of the national,” reminding readers that migration is at its core a personal and human 
story. Still, she insists that “When we write transnational histories of modern migration, we 
produce a world history in which nations and nation states continue to be important constituent 
elements and explanatory forces.” Donna Gabaccia, “Is Everywhere Nowhere? Nomads, Nations, 
and the Immigrant Paradigm of United States History” The Journal of American History v. 86, n. 
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The Bolletino also reprinted and translated documents from immigration 
officials in the United States for Italian emigrants. Robert Watchorn, who was 
appointed to the immigration commission in New York City in 1905, published 
an article in the American Metropolitan Magazine in 1909 that the Bolletino 
translated so Italians could understand American attitudes toward the arriving 
Italians. Watchorn defended the tendency of the new immigrant arrivals to settle 
in cities along the eastern seaboard by pointing out that most of the available 
unskilled jobs were concentrated there. He explained that the only major 
differences between the native-born unskilled workers and foreign-born unskilled 
workers were the language barrier and differences in standards of hygiene and 
living. There were, in Watchorn’s mind, no significant problems of race.18 The 
Bolletino also reprinted Colajanni’s essay on the alleged criminality of Italians in 
the United States, to prepare emigrants from the peninsula of the attitudes they 
may encounter in America.19 
Throughout the period of Italian immigration to the United States, the 
Italian government kept its citizens informed of changes in American immigration 
policy and American attitudes toward immigrants. Particularly in the early 1920s, 
when American policies against unregulated immigration hardened, the Bolletino 
                                                                                                                                
3 (December 1999), 1115-1134; “tyranny of the national” discussed on 1116-1117; quote from 
1117. See also Donna Gabaccia, From Sicily to Elizabeth Street: Housing and Social Change 
Among Italian Immigrants, 1880-1930 (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984); 
idem., Italy’s Many Diasporas (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001).  
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sought to inform Italians of the conditions and attitudes in the United States. 
Colajanni forged a path for later opponents of the immigration restriction 
movement and classic racialism by showing how empirical analysis that purported 
to show that Italians were undesirable did not demonstrate that with the certainty 
that it was presented. Ultimately, however, the most important criticism of classic 
racialism was from the American scientific community itself. To this end, Herbert 
Spencer Jennings’s cosmopolitan training and devotion to the experimental basis 
of science became critical. 
The Problem of Heredity  
Early in his career Jennings embraced the new experimentalist methods in 
biological research that he was exposed to in Naples.20 After Jennings left the 
University of Michigan for graduate work at Harvard in 1895, he wrote a note to 
his former advisor in Ann Arbor to discuss on his interests in experimentalism. He 
told Jacob Reighard that his work at Harvard was becoming more and more 
focused on mechanics, what he described as “the processes of development…with 
a view to presenting some evidence as to mechanical and other explanations of 
morphological processes.”21 Before he left for Naples he explained his basic 
approach to science in a letter to Mary Louise Burridge, his future wife. “Careful 
                                                
20 Keith Benson cautions against assigning too much importance to Naples as the “Mecca” for 
biological investigations. He notes that Johns Hopkins University in the 1880s was critical for 
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American Marine Biology” Jl Hist Bio, v. 21, n. 2 (Summer 1988), 331-41. 
 
21 Herbert Spencer Jennings to Jacob Reighard, 29 December 1895, Jacob Reighard Papers. 
Emphasis original. 
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observation shows,” he told her, “that when an animal is put into new conditions, 
it begins to change to suit these conditions.” He then asked the key question that 
showed his underlying orientation to scientific knowledge of biological 
principles: “what makes it change that way?”22 By 1896, Jennings was already 
essentially opposed to one of the core principles of classic racialism, namely, that 
the characters of organisms were fixed and unchanging. This was something that 
direct observation and experimentation proved to him to be wrong. The Naples 
Zoological Station provided him the opportunity to further his work studying 
processes of development and the way stimuli affected the behavior of unicellular 
organisms.23 While in Europe he also studied physiology in Germany under Max 
Verworn at Jena.24 Upon his return to the United States, Jennings moved to 
Montana to take a position as instructor of botany at Montana State Agricultural 
and Mechanical College in Bozeman, which at least afforded him a practical 
environment to continue his experimental work in developmental mechanics.  
But Jennings desired to return to Ann Arbor to be closer to Mary, whose 
family lived in Tecumseh, Michigan, a small town about thirty miles south of Ann 
Arbor. After a detour to Dartmouth College for a year, as an instructor in zoology, 
he returned to Michigan. While at Dartmouth, he made the acquaintance of a 
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gifted mathematician named Raymond Pearl. When he returned to the University 
of Michigan, Jennings encouraged Pearl to come along, and working with 
Jennings and Reighard, Pearl was awarded the University’s second Ph.D. in 
zoology in 1902.  
Although Jennings and Pearl worked closely together as instructors and 
researchers, their research interests were different. Jennings’s interest, as he had 
explained to Mary, was of individual organisms’ processes of development. Pearl, 
on the other hand, was more interested in changes in population groups, or as 
Garland Allen describes, “selection acting on large-scale groups of organisms, 
rather than on individual breeding pairs.” One worked with microscopes, the other 
with statistics. Despite this divergence, however, they embraced the same general 
principal of the importance of careful, exact measurement and experimentation, 
an epistemological mind-set that they developed and frequently discussed over 
their careers.25 And it was this epistemological cosmopolitanism that underpinned 
their opposition to biological arguments in favor of immigration restriction in the 
1920s.  
Pearl’s interest in using biometrics to understand changes in population 
groups led him to inquire, in 1904, about obtaining a laboratory position at 
research facilities at in Cold Spring Harbor, New York, that were being organized 
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by Charles Davenport, Jennings’s old Harvard instructor. Pearl wrote to 
Davenport to ask if there were openings at the “biological farm,” and explained 
that ideally he would “like nothing better than an opportunity to do uninterrupted 
research work along biometrical and experimental lines…”26 When Davenport 
replied that he had given the biometrical position to his long-time assistant, he 
still encouraged Pearl to come anyway to conduct new investigations over the 
coming summer.27 But because Davenport expected Pearl to work on research 
specific to work being conducted at Cold Spring Harbor, rather than Pearl’s own 
interests, in early March Pearl finally informed Davenport that he would have to 
decline the offer. Pearl then prepared to return to teaching at the University of 
Michigan, while he filed for grants that would eventually enable him to go to 
London to study under the pioneer of biometrical studies, the gifted 
mathematician Karl Pearson, which he did in 1905.28 
When Pearl returned from London the following year, Jennings had 
already accepted an appointment as associate professor of experimental zoology 
at Johns Hopkins University, where he would teach until 1938.29 By the time he 
assumed a stable, professional position, Jennings had embraced the new 
experimental methods, and instructed younger researchers that the best methods 
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for performing useful scientific work were for them to do the same. When another 
young zoologist prepared to move from the Midwest to the mid-Atlantic to train 
in the new investigative and experimental methods, he approached Jennings for 
advice. The newly established professor insisted to the student, Robert Mearns 
Yerkes, that “in attempting to classify and draw conclusions from objective 
investigations, we must be true to the objective point of view… we must not get 
the impression that this gives us certain distinctions which we have really brought 
to the matter a priori.” Jennings had been exposed to research conducted that way 
at Harvard, when he worked under Davenport, and he found it to be very 
frustrating.30 Almost two years later, he repeated the advice to Yerkes, who was 
now using his Ph.D. in zoology to work in animal behavior and psychology.  “My 
general principle would be, that we are always to begin with the facts, proceeding 
only very gradually to definitions, and that we should keep our definitions always 
in close touch with the facts, and regard them simply as ways of expressing the 
facts,” he counseled Yerkes. “We should recognize that fixed definitions are then 
hardly possible.”31 Jennings believed in this sophisticated approach and counseled 
others to adopt it. In terms of how to learn the “facts,” the advice and instructions 
Jennings gave to his younger colleagues was clear and unambiguous. 
Pearl’s understanding of the proper method of learning the facts shaped 
his career decisions as well. After his return from Europe, Pearl accepted a job at 
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the University of Pennsylvania for one year, and in the following year accepted a 
position from the University of Maine, to be the director of biology at the Maine 
Agricultural Experiment Station at Orono. Pearl relished the prospect 
tremendously, telling Yerkes, whose acquaintance he too had made, that he now 
hoped to be done with teaching, “I hope for evermore.” “The prestige which is 
supposed to go with a big university place has no attraction for me in comparison 
with the opportunity to do research work…” which in Maine took the form of 
studying the inheritance of characteristics in chickens.32 But Pearl was not quite as 
secure as Jennings in his knowledge of the mechanisms or rules of inheritance, 
and turned to Jennings for help, which prompted a lengthy exchange between the 
two men that demonstrated the developing chasm between the old investigative 
methods of classic racialism and the new paradigm of research experimentalism.  
The context of this remarkable exchange – really a snapshot of the process 
of “speciation” in the biological sciences – was an article that Pearl was drafting 
about the results he was getting from his chicken research.33 In late 1907, Pearl 
had dispatched a draft to Jennings, and Jennings replied with helpful criticisms of 
some of Pearl’s theoretical formulations. In the second week in January, Pearl had 
an opportunity to substantively engage Jennings’s critique. The theoretical 
problem Pearl faced was how to explain the origin and development of an 
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individual organism, a process also known as ontogeny. How was it, Pearl asked, 
that a cat developed to be a cat? There were clearly a host of organs that had to 
develop properly for the cat to develop – how did that happen? What if dietary 
habits changed or food availability shifted so that internal organs like the pancreas 
had to supply higher levels of digestive enzymes – how did the pancreas know 
how to do that? How did blood vessels in the heart “know” what angles to form as 
the organ developed in embryo? Answers to these questions, Pearl wrote, could 
only be obtained experimentally.34 But therein lay the rub: you could see the 
angles develop, or the pancreas secrete extra enzymes, but how this capability 
developed, Pearl was struggling to understand.  
Embryology was an essential avenue of investigation to answer these 
questions. Examining and studying the processes of development were the only 
ways to achieve results. But lacking knowledge of genetics or chromosomes, 
“certain proof” was impossible.35 Pearl told Jennings that a lot of the theoretical 
problems in ontogenetic development were because “there are certainly a great 
many biologists who have not particularly followed the work in experimental 
embryology.” How organisms adapted to changed conditions as they developed, 
but still followed their normal development into the finished organism – what 
Pearl referred to as “internal modes of selective action” – were, if not mysterious, 
still rather opaque. “I do not know of one single bit of concrete, definite, tangible 
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evidence,” he wrote to Jennings, that explained adaptiveness in organisms. 
Selection, Pearl pointed out, seemed to be mostly trial and error, but “when an 
animal developes [sic] or the pancreas pours out just the right kind of juice at a 
moment’s warning…where is the evidence of ‘trials,’ the failure or ‘errors,’ and 
the persistence of the right, i.e. the [teleological]?”36 Pearl explained that one 
would see examples of the “right,” but of the failures or of the trials, one would 
see nothing. What is necessary, Pearl insisted repeatedly throughout the letter, 
was “evidence.”37  
In his letter, Pearl repeatedly insisted that evidence could only be obtained 
through experimentation, which he said was to “observe with precision” how 
certain processes unfolded. In a chick blastoderm, he explained, how is it that 
blood vessels formed in the way they did? Laws of hydrodynamics provided 
“absolute criteria as to the proper angles of branching to give the best” results, but 
as Pearl examined teratological developments – malformations and defects in 
development – he had no evidentiary cause of the defects. Pearl suggested that if 
one biometrically studied the process, and then experimentally made new 
conditions, worked the processes out again, and compared the results, that “this 
ought to throw a lot of light where it is needed.”38 He expressed his confidence in 
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experimentation, observation, and manipulation – these were the methods that 
would produce adequate evidence. 
But science could offer no certainty, so Jennings wrote a very long, hand-
written reply to Pearl, first offering hope that Pearl would not put off publishing 
his paper, but publish it as it was, in the hope of generating both discussion and 
new experimental and theoretical work on individual selection. The trouble at that 
time was that since so many of the processes biology and zoology were studying 
were internal and microscopic, observations were exceedingly difficult. But 
conceptualizing the developmental process in organisms, Jennings told Pearl, 
might best be done by analogy. And for the analogy, he turned to the same 
example that Francis Galton had used: a stick traveling down a stream. 
Jennings explained the development of organisms in very practical terms 
that obscured the larger difficulties of modern experimentalism. If one thought of 
physical development in an organism as entelechy, a process requiring energy for 
actualization, Jennings explained that any interference with the flow of energy 
results in “starting up new things till something relieves the stoppage…” at which 
point the organism continues its normal development. A stream of water behaved 
the same way. He told Pearl that if anything interferes with the flow of a stream, 
the stream will regulate itself and continue on its course: “It is not limited to one 
method of accomplishing its results, any more than the organism is. Some 
obstacles it carries away; some it digs under and buries; some it dissolves; some it 
goes around… one [method] finally prevails, because it works best. I can’t help 
but believe that there is a really great similarity here with regulation in 
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organisms.”39 Jennings used this analogy to distinguish between end results and a 
process of development, and in many ways, made a distinction that stands for the 
elemental difference between classic racialism and modern experimentalism.  
Jennings, Pearl, Boas and Colajanni were interested in the processes, the 
way things developed and how they developed. Classic racialists like Davenport, 
his associate at his research station in New York Harry H. Laughlin, Madison 
Grant, and the members of the Immigration Restriction League were interested 
only in the results. This led the latter group to minimize the processes; it assumed 
that it would always, and universally, produce the same end result. Jennings and 
Galton both used a stream analogy to explain development and heredity. But there 
was an absolutely key difference: Galton was interested in the stream and sticks 
on a meta-level. Jennings was interested in the stream on a specific, immediate 
level. For Galton, the stick would always reach the end of the stream because of 
its natural weight and shape, so how it got there was irrelevant. It simply would. 
You could, because of the nature of the stick and the water in the stream, assume 
that the stick would remain a stick and inevitably ricochet down the stream. The 
experimentalists, these “new” biologists, these cosmopolitan, modern researchers, 
did not share that conviction or assumption, because they understood the 
importance of the process – the path the stick traveled downstream was just as 
important as the fact that it did travel downstream. Perhaps it cracked or broke on 
a rock or became pinned against a bend in the stream. One could not, therefore, 
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accurately deduce from the qualities of the stick or the characteristics of the water, 
what would happen to the stick without carefully observing it.  
The example of the stream illuminates the principal differences between 
these competing languages or idioms of science – between classic racialism and 
experimentalism – which were two-fold: the nature of proof, and the subject of 
investigation. Classic racialists took patterns, correlations or associations to be 
adequate proofs, and utilized broad non-controlled samples as subjects for 
investigation. From Galton to Lombroso to Davenport, the main question was 
“what rules can be deduced from a given phenomenon?” Galton would answer 
that one can deduce, from pedigrees of 300 men, that talent and genius is 
inherited; Lombroso would reason that a sample of 800 criminals shows that they 
are deviant by nature and atavistic in form; and Davenport would argue that a 
sample of 60 naval officers’ pedigrees shows thalassophilia, or “love of the sea,” 
to be hereditary. In a pronounced way, classic racialism was a syllogistic or 
deductive method of inquiry into biological processes and phenomena.  
The developing alternative, seeking to provide answers that the classic 
racialist paradigm could not adequately solve, took tangible, direct, and 
experimental evidence to be the essential proof, and frequently took the individual 
as the principal subject of investigation. Definitive evidence of biological laws of 
development was best – or most accurately – obtained through experimentation 
and the replication and verification of its results. Its reasoning and logic were 
primarily inductive. But it faced a tremendous obstacle in that it was very 
methodologically complicated and esoteric, and the correspondence between 
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Pearl and Jennings shows this. The medical historian Charles Rosenberg describes 
the difficulty in this way: “The more tenuous an area of scientific knowledge, the 
smaller its verifiable content, [and] the more easily its data may be bent to social 
purposes.”40 The professional scientific community, with only a very tenuous 
grasp on the mechanisms of hereditary transmission, and an absence of consensus 
in method and theory (which would not develop and crystallize until the 1920s) 
lacked a universal agreement of “its verifiable content” of biological principles. 
And as Rosenberg suggests, biological knowledge was thus quite easily bent to 
social purposes, particularly the restriction of immigration based upon spurious 
accusations of biological and heredity “racial” inferiority.  
This dilemma between inductive and deductive reasoning in the biological 
and natural sciences can also be seen in the association and interaction between 
two additional exemplars of each method: Franz Boas and Charles Davenport. 
Boas represented the new method of inductive research and reasoning; Davenport 
the older method of deductive inference and association.  
The emerging science of anthropology examined the development and 
origin of human beings, and was in essence, designed to study differences among 
population groups. It should not be surprising, then, to find anthropologists among 
the early defenders of the boundaries of proper scientific method: advocating 
careful assertions of truth, verified by experimental research and proofs. Two of 
these defenders—who were both immigrants themselves—were Columbia 
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University anthropologist Franz Boas, and the head of the Smithsonian 
Institution’s Division of Physical Anthropology, Ales Hrdlicka.  
Boas was an early and consistent critic of the methods and conclusions 
derived from classic racialist principles. He was particularly prominent in 
criticizing the biological determinism of immigrants that restrictionists relied 
upon to support exclusion. Born and educated in Germany, Boas immigrated to 
the United States in 1887. He was appointed a full professor of anthropology at 
Columbia University in 1899, and remained at the university for the rest of his 
professional career. His early ethnological research was among Native Americans 
of the northwest, and it imparted to Boas a firm belief in the malleability of 
human body form and a wide variety of intellectual ability in population groups. 
His early research exploded the classic racialist myth that like would always 
produce like, regardless of environmental influence; his examinations of primitive 
peoples showed that the form of human bodies was elastic, and environmental 
influences were profoundly important in determining physical development.41 As 
he accumulated evidence throughout the early twentieth century, Boas tried to 
refute the arguments of nativists that the new immigrants from southern and 
eastern Europe were unassimilable and undesirable. Just as with Italian 
anthropologists who argued for a loose-fitting categorization of the Italian 
population in opposition to their racial determinist countrymen, and American 
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biologists who cautiously worked toward a heredity theory of chromosomal 
inheritance and developmental mechanics, Boas had difficulty in combating 
classic racialism’s theory of fixed racial identities in the immigrant populations in 
the United States.42  
One of the first opportunities Boas had to examine changes in immigrant 
body types was through his appointment to the United States Immigration 
Commission in 1908. When Cornell political economy professor Jeremiah Jenks 
was named to the federal commission in 1907, Boas used his contact with Jenks 
to suggest a detailed anthropological study of the physical changes that 
immigrants underwent after they arrived in the United States and what, if any, 
physical changes occurred in their children.43 In mid-March 1908, Boas outlined 
his plan to Jenks for investigating five immigrant racial types, hoping that the 
political economist could secure Congressional funding for the project as part of 
the Commission’s larger study of immigration. Boas’s proposal called for an 
examination of about 120,000 immigrants, studying their physical development to 
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determine the extent, and the success, of assimilation. The size of the sample was 
immense, the anthropologist acknowledged, and although he would reduce the 
number in the study if it was necessary, doing so would “seriously reduce the 
usefulness of the investigation.”44 Boas intended his report to be thorough and 
scientifically rigorous.  
Boas was confident that his study would generate important results that 
may help undercut nativist opposition to immigration. Shortly after outlining the 
study, he tried to reassure Jenks of the study’s likely success. Noting that there 
was indeed a physical difference between the newer immigrants and those who 
had arrived in the nineteenth century, determining the ability of the new 
immigrants to be amalgamated and assimilated was of great importance. Modern 
anthropological methods of carefully and precisely conducted measurements of a 
wide variety of physical characteristics, Boas said, were sufficiently sophisticated 
to provide a definitive answer to this complex problem. The study would examine 
emigrants, physical changes in their children, and the effects of intermarriage 
between North, Central, East, and Southern Europeans.45 Boas was confident in 
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anthropological science and quantification, though not completely so: “I believe I 
can assure you that the practical results of this investigation will be important in 
so far as they will settle once and for all the question whether the immigrants 
from southern Europe and from eastern Europe are and can be assimilated by our 
people.” Jenks agreed, writing back that he was convinced of the utility and 
import of the proposal, and the Cornell professor recommended the proposal 
strongly to the other eight members of the Immigration Commission. Yet when 
they voted on the project on April 29 1908, with one member absent, the 
Commission deadlocked at four in favor, four opposed. The reason for the 
opposition, Jenks wrote to Boas, was the opinion that the results would not be 
clear enough to justify the outlay of money. The critical factor was what some 
members felt was the inability, even of modern anthropological methods, to 
provide definitive, certain proof: “there would be so much dispute over the 
significance of the figures that the results would probably be considered barren 
and would not be of any special credit to the Commission.”46 But Boas believed 
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his methods could show definitively the capacity for immigrants to be assimilated. 
He argued that the congressional opponents lacked any real understanding of 
anthropology (and none were professional anthropologists), and Boas felt their 
opposition was based on this ignorance. In an instance like this, whose scientific 
authority would be more convincing?  
Apparently, it was Boas’s. Throughout May and June he and Jenks 
continued to flesh out the anthropologist’s plans for the immigrant study, 
outlining reasons why the study would contribute positively to the scientific 
knowledge of immigration to the United States and the capacity of immigrants to 
assimilate, and hoping Jenks could persuade enough members of the Commission 
to back it. Boas already had a reputation as a solid anthropologist, which helped 
Jenks ultimately win a majority of votes from Commission members to approve 
the study. Boas set to work. At schools throughout the New York City area, the 
Columbia anthropologist and his team conducted careful measurements on 
immigrant children, and in some cases extended the physical measurements to the 
parents and extended family. Cooperation from the foreign-language press 
smoothed the way for these important measurements to be taken.47 
In February 1909, Boas wrote a preliminary report for distribution to 
Congress. The early results of the study, the report explained, indicated that the 
American environment might act favorably upon some immigrant types, and 
unfavorably on others.48 Shortly after submitting it to Congress, Boas wrote a 
                                                
 
47 Franz Boas, “Changes in the Bodily Form of Descendants of Immigrants.”  
 
 Chapter 2 139 
more elaborate statement to Jenks in an attempt to prevent Congress from cutting 
back on appropriations for the Commission’s work. The anthropologist explained 
that his investigation had shown that descendants of immigrants born in the 
United States developed physically earlier and better than the immigrants 
themselves or their ancestors in their native countries, that the environmental 
effect on body form was remarkably strong – the longer the parents resided in the 
country before reproducing, the more noticeable the influence of environment – 
and finally, that the children of immigrants born in this country showed a change 
in form approaching an American type.49  
Boas’s final report to the Commission, published by Congress in 1911, 
provided a wealth of statistical and anthropometric data on the physical changes 
that immigrants and their children underwent in their new homeland. Over 400 
pages of the appendix were devoted to computations and analysis of the 
measurements Boas and his carefully selected researchers obtained. He presented 
a rather shocking finding: “not even those characteristics of a race which have 
proved to be most permanent in their old home remain the same under the new 
surroundings; and we are compelled to conclude that when these features of the 
body change, the whole bodily and mental make-up of the immigrants may 
change.”50 There was a direct correlation between period of residency of the 
parents in the United States and the plasticity of the bodily form of their children. 
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If classic racialism assumed that body form and mental characters were 
unchanging and stable, if they were fixed and hereditary qualities, Boas’s study 
results seemed to dramatically explode these claims. Yet despite a favorable 
academic reception, despite an additional Boas article in American Anthropologist 
in 1913 that provided further evidence for plasticity of body type, the perception 
of fixed and unchanging racial types persisted in the public mind and the minds of 
policy makers.51 Why was this careful scientific cosmopolitanism not more 
effective? 
One of the difficulties was that the dominant physical perception of the 
parents, the immigrants themselves, was that they were so different and alien. But 
a larger difficulty was a lack of answers: how did this adaptation occur? Was it a 
reversion to a mean or a product of dietary improvement? Would these 
anthropometric changes be passed on to later generations? If so, how? 
Anthropology could provide no positive answers. In contrast, though not exactly 
based on certainty, classic racialism would provide these answers, even if they 
seemed to be wrong.  
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Eugenics played an essential role in legitimizing the answers that classic 
racialism provided. The American Breeders’ Association (ABA), founded in 
1903, was designed to help farmers and agriculturalists apply the principles of 
genetics to plant and animal stocks. The establishment within the ABA of a 
Committee on Eugenics in 1906 offered an opportunity for scientists to not only 
explain the goals and methods of eugenics to a lay-audience, but also provided 
themselves with living laboratories to test out the mechanisms of heredity and 
inheritance.52  
Charles Davenport understood early on the opportunities that plant and 
animal husbandry provided for testing theories of inheritance and heredity. 
Writing to the American inventor Alexander Graham Bell in 1907 for advice on 
how to prevent the eugenics section of the ABA from splintering off into a 
separate organization, Davenport emphasized the importance experimental 
research had for genetics, and in fact, how the whole idea of hereditary science 
had come from work done on inherited characteristics in peas. “Students of 
eugenics must be scientifically trained,” explained Davenport, and have 
particularly rich experience in experimentation. “A separate eugenics society 
would be cut off from the main body of experimentalists and would attract rather 
the speculative and those with a sentimental interest in the subject who have no 
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training to advance it as a science.”53 Ironically, though the split was prevented, 
this was exactly what happened to the eugenics movement in the United States. 
Heredity could very easily be studied, over long generational lines, in plants and 
animals. This was the same idea that induced Pearl to move to the Maine 
agricultural experiment station. Experimental proof from breeding plants and farm 
animals was essential to advance the knowledge of heredity, and the thousands of 
farmers and farms throughout the country could provide a wealth of experimental 
data.  
Therein lay the great difficulty: farmers did not care about the theoretical 
or scientific aspects of breeding. They were not scientifically trained. They were 
farmers, not experimentalists. Farmers wanted practical and useful knowledge of 
how to improve crop yields or get cows to produce more milk. Relying on farmers 
to produce rigorous scientific data was futile – most had zero interest in ensuring 
the purity of their breeding specimens or maintaining the complex records of 
generational characteristics and measurements. That was one of the things 
Davenport liked about Bell – Bell did maintain detailed records that were of 
genuine scientific utility. So keeping eugenics within the ABA, while important 
for Davenport, ultimately inhibited the proper scientific and experimental growth 
of knowledge of heredity. Thomas Hunt Morgan, who studied the simple fruit fly, 
discovered the great advances in heredity. Morgan kept meticulous records, 
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examined with microscopes the changes in his fruit fly populations, and searched 
for chromosomal markers for changes, modifications or mutations in the 
drosophila populations he bred in his lab. Farmers and breeders in the ABA not 
only lacked the scientific knowledge and equipment to conduct productive 
studies; they had no interest in doing so.  
Despite Davenport’s protestations that eugenics work be carried out 
carefully, and integrate multiple methods and approaches (i.e. both analytical and 
experimental work by trained professionals), his inability to follow his own 
advice in the ensuing decades would be partly responsible for the decline of the 
legitimacy of the movement. In fact, it quickly became quite clear that Davenport 
was merely paying lip-service to the high standards that he espoused for eugenic 
knowledge. When a permanent subcommittee on immigration was established 
within the Committee on Eugenics in the ABA in 1911, Davenport, who was 
serving as Secretary under Chairman David Starr Jordan, wrote to an old Boston 
friend with a good deal of experience in immigration matters for help filling out 
the sub-committee’s membership. Prescott Hall, one of the founders of the 
Immigration Restriction League, received from Davenport a possible list of 
members, which included Franz Boas, William Williams (the Ellis Island 
Immigration Commissioner), and Commissioner General of Immigration Daniel 
Joseph Keefe. Although Davenport explained that the sub-committee’s main 
object would be “a more detailed study of the hereditary traits that immigrants are 
bringing into this country,” he insisted that the group not commit itself in advance 
to any position of liberalizing or restricting immigration, and that it especially 
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avoid propaganda.54 In asking for Hall’s input on men to serve on the immigration 
sub-committee, however, Davenport was either acting very shrewdly, or was 
being incredibly naïve. A man with Hall’s record of opposition to free 
immigration would not be likely to appoint objective workers. 
As one of the founders of the Immigration Restriction League, Hall’s 
opinion on what the sub-committee should ultimately recommend was a foregone 
conclusion. His 1906 book Immigration and Its Effects upon the United States 
argued that the “new” immigrants arriving on American shores posed a great peril 
to the American way of life. It argued that many of the races of the new 
immigrants, particularly southern Italians and Jews, were incapable of 
assimilating to the core of “old stock” Americans because they were biologically 
different.  Immigration and Its Effects used Darwinian and classic racialist 
arguments that, in alarmist tones anticipating Madison Grant, unrestricted 
immigration would mean the degeneration of the “average quality” of the 
American stock.55 In his letter, Hall assured Davenport that he agreed that the 
work of the committee should be “strictly impartial,” but in the same sentence 
undermined that impartiality by opposing recommended members that would 
likely disagree with his desired recommendations.  Although the Boston lawyer 
conceded Davenport was in a “much better position” to know who would make 
suitable candidates, he strenuously opposed the selection of Boas. Hall was far too 
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deeply enmeshed in immigration matters and too well connected not to have been 
up-to-date on Boas’s work for the Immigration Commission of the United States.56  
Hall’s suggestions reflected the League’s overall attitude to science: it was 
a tool to be used to justify their ideological positions against immigration. Instead 
of Davenport’s list of candidates, Hall suggested several of his close associates in 
the IRL. “Of course, it always sounds ungracious to say that people on one’s own 
side are patriotic and sincere, and the people on the other side are not,” explained 
the Boston lawyer, “but I know the men who have worked with me for many 
years…and I know that while they may be prejudiced, they are sincere.” How his 
recommendations of prejudiced but sincere men would establish an impartial, 
unbiased investigation by the committee, Hall did not say. Speaking specifically 
of Boas, Hall conceded that his technical qualifications were suitable, and that he 
himself was not competent to pass on the results of Boas’s work. But like his 
preceding objection to another suggested candidate, Herbert Sherwood, Hall 
questioned Boas’s ability to be neutral because Hall believed them to be opposed 
to restriction because of previous associations with pro-immigrant groups.57 
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Davenport was unable to completely accept Hall’s suggestions, as he 
desired the subcommittee to have at least some professional credibility. When the 
list of members for the sub-committee on immigration finally came from 
Davenport, who was still acting as secretary of the Eugenics Section, it included 
the following names: Hall (as secretary), Boas, Alexander Cance, James Field, 
and Robert DeCourcy Ward. Davenport explained that he felt it was necessary to 
have “Boaz” on the committee, “even if he has liberalizing tendencies,” because 
he was such a well-known leader in anthropology. He could, Davenport hoped, 
add some scientific gravitas and respectability.58  Hall had no need for 
respectability. He wanted a report from the ABA to affirm the position of his 
Immigration Restriction League. Ward, Hall’s associate and friend, supported him 
in this approach. In the following year, as the sub-committee drafted a report for 
the ABA on what policy solutions and field examinations should be studied, Ward 
laid out suggestions: “I think we ought to make as strong a report as 
possible…and give the impression that we have done a lot of thinking, if not any 
original investigation.” With Ward and Hall on the committee, it seems in 
advance that the “thinking” would be geared specifically toward finding suitable 
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justifications in favor of restriction.59 Armed with this suggestion, Hall prepared to 
write out the draft of the report.  
He drafted it in about five weeks, which suggests that no original or deep 
research had been conducted in the matter.60 He sent out the draft to the members 
of the immigration committee for their comments; the copy for Boas arrived at 
Columbia while the professor was out of the country. When he finally returned 
and read the draft, the anthropologist was not pleased. Firing off a terse note to 
Hall, Boas regretted to inform him that “I do not consider the report acceptable, 
since I disagree with practically all the positions taken in it. If a serious report is 
to be drawn up, I am ready to attend a meeting, but I cannot approve, much less 
sign your draft.”61  What could there have been to object to? For starters, Boas 
likely resented the implication that certain “elements of immigration” were 
dangerous to the “well being of the nation for eugenic reasons.” But it is likely 
that the assumptions underlying the report were even more unacceptable to Boas. 
The arguments of restrictionists like Hall and Ward, particularly later in the post-
war years, centered around classic racialist precepts that biological identity, 
physical stature and mental ability were unchanging and static, and the draft 
implied that the entire subcommittee worked with the assumption that this was 
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true.62 Boas’s research with immigrant body form for the Immigration 
Commission had proven this assumption wrong: he knew that human body form 
was quite malleable, and subject to both positive and negative environmental 
influences that impacted its development and abilities.  
Boas, Hall and Davenport represented competing thrusts of the 
Progressive movement, though they were not mutually exclusive. Boas 
represented the professionalizing impetus of the period. Professional academics 
were able to provide expertise to address the social problems that Progressives 
tried to confront. One of the mechanisms to create consensus on the new 
professionalizing fields was through the establishment of disciplinary journals, 
like the journal Science, which in 1894 was taken over by the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science and its editor James McKeen Cattell, 
a professor of experimental psychology at Columbia.63 Settlement house workers, 
social workers, academics in newly articulated and defined disciplines, 
statisticians and political economists, among many others, offered specific areas 
of knowledge that they were willing and able to deploy for the benefit of society. 
Hall’s social circle, which contained many old families and blue-blood pedigrees, 
manifested the social anxieties of a rapidly changing society that was described in 
the early historiography of Progressivism, but also fits in with what the historian 
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Michael McGerr has recently described as an exclusionist and segregationist 
impulse within certain Progressive circles.64 Joseph Lee, one of Hall’s colleagues 
on the Executive Committee of the IRL was deeply involved in the playground 
reform movement as part of a broader involvement in helping children “become 
productive citizens who would contribute to the continuing development of a 
democratic society.”65 Madison Grant, who came to the IRL somewhat later and 
penned The Passing of the Great Race, was also a dedicated conservationist, a 
movement that unified the scientific management and preservation of the 
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country’s natural resources.66 Davenport’s facilities at Cold Spring Harbor, which 
were partially funded by the Carnegie Institution of Washington manifested the 
power of philanthropy to address social problems. The knowledge of eugenics 
that emanated from his New York facilities was aimed at improving the public 
health and the quality of life for American families.67 
If the subcommittee represented the broad thrust of Progressivism, it also 
reflected some of its tensions. Boas refused to sign the report that was based on 
this assumption of fixed and permanent racial types. Hall took offence that Boas 
implied it was not a “serious” report: “I do not think it is very courteous to the 
three members of the committee who will sign the draft sent you, to imply that it 
is not a serious report.” (It was apparently not necessary to inform Boas that only 
one member wrote the bulk of the draft.) To placate the distinguished 
anthropologist, Hall suggested that perhaps a few changes could be made — if 
Boas would suggest some — that would be amenable to all. Boas does not appear 
to have replied, which did not surprise or disappoint Hall. After writing his reply 
to Boas, the Bostonian immediately penned a gossipy letter to another member of 
the immigration sub-committee, James A. Field. After recounting the letter he 
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received from Boas, Hall was able to take satisfaction in being proven right. “I 
told Davenport at the start there would be trouble if Boas was put on the 
committee,” he explained, “not because I don’t agree with [Boas], but because 
very few Jews have any manners.” Why Davenport would have even 
recommended Boas to serve on the committee in the first place had been a 
mystery to Hall. Despite the modest acclaim Boas received from his work for the 
Dillingham Commission, Hall told Field that “Madison Grant tells me the 
biologists are all laughing at his measurement of school children’s skulls.”68  If 
Grant or Hall had read any of the reviews of The Mind of Primitive Man that were 
circulating, however, perhaps they have would re-assessed their position on 
Boas’s professional work.69  
Ultimately, the report was issued and printed in The Journal of Heredity in 
1913 as the official position of the Committee on Immigration of the Eugenics 
Section of the American Breeders Association, the objections of Boas 
notwithstanding.70 It appeared with a brief notice that “Professor Boas dissents 
from the conclusions and recommendations of the Committee.” The 
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recommendations themselves were in favor in increased proscriptions against 
admitting “unfit” immigrants, increased inspection facilities and more immigrants 
inspectors, a restriction on the use of discretionary admissions by the Secretary of 
Commerce and Labor, extensions of the period of deportation in the cases of 
insanity and public charges and greater fines on steamship companies that 
transported knowingly inadmissible immigrants.71  
The report reflected another instance of tension between theoretical and 
applied science, in this case between the axiomatic principles of classic racialism 
against the anthropological and biological results gained from experimentalism. 
As Boas applied theory in his anthropological researches, he occasionally found 
theory to be inadequate to explain the observed phenomena. For a professional 
researcher, this meant that the theory was either wrong, or needed to be modified 
to incorporate the observed and experimental anomalies. In certain fields, like 
mathematics or theoretical physics, deduction and inference was a necessary and 
essential way to develop theories. But in matters of biology and the life sciences, 
where inductive research could be conducted in laboratories, it was possible to 
achieve confidence in the answers that nature provided. To non-scientists like 
Hall, however, the theory was the theory, and it could therefore be used in all 
cases, all the time. And when such a theory could be used to advocate a certain 
policy goal, it would be.  
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Hall witnessed the success of manipulating theories to fit goals by 
isolating Boas and his dissenting opinion, and was therefore able to present a 
unified, unanimous report of the Subcommittee on Immigration in the ABA. 
Advocates of restriction like Hall would use these lessons to influence politicians 
to support the League’s policy goals, as they did with the Dillingham Commission 
and during the Congressional debates on immigration restriction in the 1920s. To 
members of the ABA, perhaps this would imply that there was in fact scientific 
unity on the eugenic aspects of immigration. Certainly, non-academic readers of 
the American Breeders’ Magazine or its later guise, the Journal of Heredity 
would be inclined to believe it; their subscription demonstrated their support of 
hereditary and breeding studies. But the scientific unanimity they presumed was 
wrong and opposed by actual scientists who worked in the field. Hall and the 
other members ignored the dissent of professionals whose research and cautious 
conclusions were often a function of their professional training they utilized 
sophisticated approaches to accumulating small and modest solutions to 
biological and hereditary problems. Many, like Jennings and Boas, were 
cosmopolitan in that they perceived a complex interplay of factors combining to 
direct the development of organisms like the stick traveling downstream. They 
understood that many elements impacted and shaped the journey toward definitive 
biological answers, and used caution in declaring scientific truths because of the 
complexity of hereditary and environmental influences on development.  
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Chapter 3: Science, Prejudice and Politics: The United States Immigration 
Commission  
 
In 1907 the United States Congress passed a new immigration bill. In the 
debate over the bill, Republican Charles Henry Grosvenor, a House member from 
Ohio, had the clause featuring a literacy test deleted, and replaced it with a clause 
establishing an investigative body to examine all aspects of immigration to the 
United States. Funded by revenues from the head tax imposed on steamship 
companies and Congressional appropriations, the United States Immigration 
Commission played a central role in the legislative history of restriction. A recent 
history of the commission places it firmly within the Progressive tradition of 
having experts examine social and policy issues, and the broad statistical and 
empirical base, and its endorsement of a literacy test as a practical policy of 
limiting immigration, provided key support for the American nativist community. 
The final report, the historian Robert Zeidel notes, was crucial in rejuvenating the 
“stagnant” restrictionist movement.1  
But the Commission’s findings also played an important role in enabling 
the members of the Immigration Restriction League to justify their policy goals 
against the dark-skinned, broad-headed immigrants from southern and eastern 
Europe that were arriving in larger and larger numbers on American shores. The 
final report of the Congressional body enabled them to talk more about the 
qualities the immigrants lacked, along with their perceived racial differences. The 
                                                
 
1 Robert Zeidel, Immigrants, Progressives, and Exclusion Politics: The Dillingham Commission, 
1900-1927 (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 2004), 115; also E. P. Hutchinson, 
Legislative History of American Immigration Policy, 1798-1965 (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1981), 141-43 for the 1907 Immigration Act. 
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Commission’s work, in essence, proved that the attitudes of the League’s leaders 
were not those of a marginal or fringe group, but attitudes that had broad support 
throughout the country.  
Leaders of the Immigration Restriction League understood the importance 
of perceptions. One of the reasons they repeatedly used Francis Walker’s 
replacement thesis to warn about the perils of swarthy and non-Anglo-Saxon 
immigrants was because it was a statistical or a demographic argument and not 
overtly an argument about “race.” The IRL sent out a brief questionnaire to its 
supporters in early 1905, asking their opinion on certain restrictionist stances in 
an attempt to increase their mailing list and solicit, if possible, donations from 
supportive respondents. When replies from upper-class elites arrived that 
suggested confusion or ambivalence to the restrictionist position, Joseph Lee took 
up the task of replying to clarify the reasons why the League advocated the 
dramatic tightening of the immigrant flow. Walker’s thesis was one of his favorite 
weapons. One respondent was puzzled why the IRL’s animosity seemed to be 
directed in particular at Jews and Italians, who seemed to the author to be good 
types of people. Lee replied that he agreed that both groups were “excellent 
people,” but that the essential question was “are they better than the native 
American? The statistics show that we shall not have both, or at least, that in 
proportion as we have Jews and Italians we shall not have the native.”2 In another 
letter, Lee invoked Walker explicitly. The respondent contended that immigrants 
should be excluded only if there was no likelihood that they could assimilate to 
                                                
2 Joseph Lee to Mr. Barrows, 13 December 1905, box 1, Lee papers.  
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the native standards and values. To Lee, thinking along these lines was 
completely wrong. “General Walker,” he explained, using the M.I.T. President’s 
military rank from the Civil War, “showed that the bringing in of immigration 
means the sterilization of the old stock[;] at least there has been a great fall in the 
native birth rate with each great wave of immigration…”3 The advantage “General 
Walker’s” argument provided was that it did not blame the immigrants for social 
problems like crime, poverty, or labor unrest, which as Colajanni was trying to 
point out, could be attributed to a variety of factors. It simply used statistics to 
demonstrate the impact of immigration on native-born Americans, although the 
causal connection was typically assumed rather than proven. 
But what happened when members of the old stock, who Walker said were 
metaphorically sterilized by immigrants, opposed the League’s goals? This 
happened in 1906, when the President of Harvard University, Charles Eliot, sent a 
letter to League member Richards Bradley, criticizing the group’s activities.4 Eliot 
was an important advocate for the reform of higher education in the United States, 
and was president of the University when many of the leaders of the League were 
undergraduates in Cambridge.5 The tone of Eliot’s reply must have been 
                                                
3 Lee to Mr. McMahon, 14 December 1905, box 1, Lee papers.  
 
4 Bradley would later become an influential and important member of the IRL in the 1920s, after 
the death of Prescott Hall in 1921. He was born in Vermont in 1861, graduated from Harvard in 
1882 and then spent two years studying law at Harvard. He formed a law firm in 1897, and a real 
estate company in 1900, around the same time that he joined the League. By 1913 he was the 
League’s treasurer. “Bradley, Richards Merry” The National Cyclopedia of American Biography 
(New York: James T. White and Co., 1962), v. 45. He was listed as Treasurer of the League after 
the reorganization in 1913. See the draft of letterheads in Box 1, “Immig. Rest. League – List 
records” folder, IRL papers.  
 
5 Philo A. Hutchinson, “Eliot, Charles William” American National Biography; see also Kim 
Townsend, Manhood at Harvard: William James and Others (New York: W. W. Norton, 1996); 
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discouraging for the members of the League, considering how important Harvard 
University was to them. Eliot had received a copy of the League’s 1905 survey on 
immigration matters in December, and his February reply to Bradley was 
inflexible in its opposition to further restriction.6  
Certain legislative aspects of the IRL’s agenda did meet with the Harvard 
president’s approval, such as the closer medical inspection of arriving immigrants 
to prevent the arrival of criminals, paupers, and diseased immigrants. Eliot also 
favored further regulations on steamship companies to improve conditions in 
steerage, where most immigrants traveled. The other methods of restriction the 
League favored, such as an increased head tax, literacy tests, property 
qualifications, “and all exclusion on the ground of race” Eliot rejected. His 
opposition to restriction rested upon fundamental philosophical differences with 
the leadership of the Boston-based group. Describing the attitude of the League as 
“vicious, economically, politically, and sentimentally,” Eliot stated that the 
previous 300 years of immigration to the United States by foreigners had been 
essential to the improvement and development of the country. He noted that these 
continuous infusions of immigrants had, “on the whole,” allowed the country to 
be “safely and well developed, and never faster or better than in the last fifty 
years.” The correct attitude toward immigration, Eliot counseled Bradley, was to 
continue the “hospitable, generous, freedom-trusting attitude” that had guided 
immigration policy during those 300 years. Eliot was not criticizing the League 
                                                                                                                                
Louis Menand, The Metaphysical Club: A Story of Ideas in America (New York: Farrar, Straus 
and Giroux, 2001). Eliot was president between 1869-1909.  
 
6 Charles W. Eliot to Richards Bradley, 7 February 1906, box 1, Lee papers.  
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members personally. “I regret to differ in this subject from you and Messrs. 
Moors and Lee. I should feel safer if I agreed with you and them, but it seems to 
be a real case of different faiths and expectations.”7 As Eliot’s letter shows, some 
old stock elites did have different attitudes toward arriving immigrants. Even Lee, 
whose social conscience manifested itself in additional matters besides 
immigration restriction, believed, in part, that the proper environmental and 
cultural influences could improve all human stock.8  
Eliot’s opposition to the League’s policy goals presented a significant 
threat to the success of restriction. On one hand, it clearly demonstrated the 
importance of not using intemperate or discriminatory language in their efforts to 
gain new supporters, and League members took this lesson to heart. In 1910, for 
instance, Lee was referring to the group not as a “Restriction” league, but as an 
organization that favored the “selection” of immigrants.9 Lee wrote to Gustave 
                                                
7 Ibid. Moors was another of the founders of the League. See Solomon, Ancestors and Immigrants.  
 
8 Historian Kim Townsend’s study of Harvard University suggests that Harvard graduates in the 
post-Civil War years were “exceptional in that they thought of manhood not merely as an 
advantage in the struggle for survival but rather as an opportunity and a responsibility to foster and 
spread what they thought of as civilized life.” Townsend, Manhood at Harvard, 11. In a short 
letter to a friend, Lee once remarked that Havelock Ellis’s The Dance of Life was “pretty nearly 
my own doctrine.” Lee to Ellery, 24 March 1928, Box 2, Lee papers. Ellis’s The Dance of Life 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1923) is a collection of essays that describe ways to enjoy 
the full meaning of life, including dancing, thinking, writing and religion as forms of art that 
enrich one’s experience. It contrasts remarkably with his bleak writings in Essays in War-Time: 
Further Studies in the Task of Social Hygiene (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1917) and The 
Philosophy of Conflict and Other Essays in War-Time (Freeport, NY: Books for Libraries Press, 
1970 [1919]). 
 
9 One of the methods they used to garner support was a type of discursive or rhetorical 
manipulation. Describing the reading test as a “literacy” test might not convey the same inferior 
connotations as an “illiteracy” test would. League members alternated between the two 
descriptions of it, though privately they used the “illiteracy” test far more frequently. Clearly, with 
the latter terminology, the prospective immigrant lacked some quality, and was inadequate or 
inferior in some way; “illiterate” was a more powerful adjective. Yet, in other situations where 
greater tact was required, the League described it as a “literacy” test. 
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Hitzel, a German immigrant in Buffalo, to express Lee’s support for methods of 
promoting German immigration. Lee introduced himself in the letter by 
explaining that he had been given Hitzel’s name, and explained that the IRL, 
despite its official title, “is really an immigration selection league.” The goal of 
his group, Lee suggested, was to encourage the government select the types of 
immigrants that were admitted to the country, rather than admitting any and all 
aliens with no evaluation of quality. The goal was to change the source of 
immigration back to the original northern and western regions of Europe, since 
these immigrants were more easily assimilated, and of kindred racial stock. The 
favored method at the moment was the “illiteracy” test, but something else, Lee 
said, would have to be tried since this would not exclude a sufficient number of 
undesirable immigrants. The Walker thesis applied not only to old-stock natives 
who would not reproduce if forced to compete with “inferior” immigrants, but in 
Lee’s mind, applied to other immigrants as well. In the IRL pamphlets that he was 
enclosing, Lee assured Hitzel that the New Yorker would notice “an extraordinary 
coincidence between the increase in immigration from southern and eastern 
Europe and the falling off of immigration from Germany.”10 German immigrants 
were desirable because Germans and Anglo-Saxons shared similar racial origins, 
and Lee believed that two thousand years of history had proven that southern and 
eastern Europeans lacked a capacity for self-government and building effective 
and stable political institutions, while the recent history of Germany and German-
Americans had shown these attributes to be “eminently present” among the 
                                                
 
10 Lee to Gustave A. Hitzel, 16 February 1910, box 1, Lee papers, emphasis in original. 
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Teutonic and Aryan races. In closing, Lee hoped Hitzel’s German-American 
Association would make an effort to study the characteristics of contemporary 
German immigration and strategies for increasing it.11 The League was not 
opposed to all immigration, just certain kinds of it. 
On the other hand, Eliot’s opposition to the League’s agenda was 
dangerous because it showed how difficult it was to make compelling arguments 
in favor of restriction. Using abstract statistical data lacked any real punch. Eliot 
could object on philosophical grounds, or on political, economic or sentimental 
grounds. Describing the League’s goals as favoring “restriction” or “selection” 
may help it gain supporters and economic contributors, but it was unlikely to 
generate fear or distrust of the new type of immigrants that were arriving in the 
United States. It was fear that would rouse the conscience of political and social 
leaders to move decisively to exclude certain types of immigration. And stoking 
fear of racial impurity, and racial contamination or degradation of biologically 
different and inferior races, as they knew from Eliot’s reaction, had to be achieved 
carefully. It had to be presented as unimpeachably accurate scientific knowledge. 
In an undated typescript in Lee’s personal papers, a short essay called 
“The Ethics of Immigration Restriction” drew these ideas together, and placed 
them within a classic racialist frame. The science of genetics and breeding, Lee 
suggested, gave man a high degree of control over nature. Darwin’s theory of 
natural selection allied with this theory to show how certain species succeeded, 
                                                
 
11 Ibid.    
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while others died out. In its application to the human races, however, Lee’s essay 
argued that it was not necessarily the best individuals that survived, but merely 
those “better fitted to perpetuate themselves.” The science of eugenics as 
advanced by “Messrs. Pearson and Galpon [sic]” provided a method for 
improving racial stocks and maintaining their purity, although Lee conceded that 
“probably the world is not yet ready” to put these ideas into practice. But as he 
discussed the hierarchy of races, Lee argued precisely for such a eugenic 
strategy.12 The Teutonic and Anglo-Saxon races must be encouraged to breed 
prolifically (and maintain the purity of their stock), and the “Iberic” race, whose 
days of glory had long passed, must be limited. 
“Just at this point,” Lee wrote, “I seem to hear something said of the 
colossal Teutonic conceit which thinks its race better than others. I frankly accept 
the challenge.” The history of recent centuries had shown the Teutonic stock to be 
“the finest in the world.” When compared to the Spanish American republics – 
peopled by the “Iberic” racial stock – England, Germany, Scandinavia and the 
United States all presented superior examples of development. Lee ended his draft 
by posing a rhetorical question: “If our country had been settled by the Galicians, 
Croatians, Sicilians or Greeks, can anyone suppose that our institutions and 
achievements would have been what they have, or that the movement toward 
political and religious liberty throughout all the world would have been the 
                                                
12 Joseph Lee, “The Ethics of Immigration Restriction” Typescript, n.d. [ca. 1907], box 3, folder: 
J. Lee—Immigration restriction (writings)-additions, p. 1.  
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same[?]”13 Despite the intense contradictions in his concluding statement – 
American anti-Catholicism and international isolationism call into serious 
question a genuine movement to spread political and religious liberty – Lee took 
the superiority of the Teutonic race to be a certified truth. These contradictions 
would not prevent the “Teutonic conceit” from being disseminated on a wide 
scale. 
The members of the League obviously did not agree with Eliot’s 
assessment of their “viciousness.” For members, theirs was a patriotic duty to 
protect the American experiment in democracy. In their eyes, the “new” 
immigrants lacked any historical or cultural experience with republican or 
democratic ideals. Their undesirability was, in part, due to their perceived racial 
difference, but in the letters of League members to supporters and potential 
supporters, a related argument was the new immigrants’ inability to appreciate 
and perpetuate democratic institutions. Old-stock Americans found the statistical 
and demographic implications of unrestricted immigration powerfully persuasive 
as they attempted to navigate the dramatic economic and cultural changes of the 
Gilded Age and Progressive Era. Describing qualities that immigrants lacked, 
such as the ability to read or a history of participating in democratic government 
was a compelling, non-offensive or non-discriminatory rationale for restriction. It 
provided a safe rhetorical tool for the League to get support for restriction without 
seeming to play on racial antipathies.  
                                                
13 Ibid, p. 5. 
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For the core leadership of the League, the prospect of Mediterranean and 
Alpine races, swarthy, short, broad-headed immigrants, “beaten men from beaten 
races,” in Walker’s phrase, supplanting the Teutonic and Anglo-Saxon core of 
United States was terrifying. Their strategies were driven by discretion and tact; 
their motivations were driven by racism. In this context, classic racialism, because 
it was based on scientific principles and a language of biology and heredity, was 
able to unify both strategy and motivation. With the establishment of the United 
States Immigration Commission in 1907, the League made a concerted effort to 
use the classic racialism to influence the immigration policy of the national 
government.14  
The Commission, which was charged with conducting a “full inquiry, 
examination, and investigation…into the subject of immigration” was made up on 
nine members: three Senators, three Representatives, and three Presidential 
appointees.15 In addition to Vermont Senator William Dillingham, who chaired the 
                                                
14 In one of their first circular letters, Hall, acting as the League’s secretary, compiled a list of 
twenty reasons why immigration to the United States had to be further restricted. The “quantity of 
our immigration has been increasing and its quality decreasing,” and American character, as a 
result, was being threatened. Immigrants because of “their foreign language, habits, customs and 
political beliefs” were undermining American institutions, morals, and standards of living. This 
was the tactful approach. The threatening approach can be seen in a survey of the eleven members 
of the League’s executive committee, conducted by Lee around 1906, which showed the 
tendencies of the League to carry “exclusion [of certain immigrants] considerably further.” Seven 
of the members, Lee’s survey found, “believe that there are races which, whether or not inferior to 
the preset American race, are not adapted by their ideals and traditions to combine with [the 
American] race in building up a better national ideal and national life, and that such races should 
accordingly be excluded.” “Publications of the Immigration Restriction League, no. 4” n.d. [ca. 
1894], Lee papers, box 3; “Report of the Committee on Immigration” n.d. [ca. 1906], Lee Papers, 
box 1. 
 
15 The Commission, which was referred to as the “Dillingham Commission” after its chairman, 
Senator William Dillingham, was created by the Immigration Act of 20 February 1907 (34 
Statutes-at-Large 898). Quote from United States Immigration Commission, Reports of the 
Immigration Commission v. 1 “Abstracts of Reports” (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1911), Senate Document 747/1, 61st Congress, 3rd Session, ii.  
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commission, Massachusetts Senator Henry Cabot Lodge and Democratic Senator 
Le Roy Percy from Mississippi served with Representatives Benjamin Howell, 
William Bennet, John Burnett and the three Presidential appointees, Charles Neill, 
Jeremiah Jenks and William Wheeler. Zeidel describes how opponents of 
immigration realized they “would need to use more progressive approaches, not 
just emphasize immigrants’ alleged differences from natives” to justify their 
exclusion. “Even passionate xenophobes,” he points out, “were coming to realize 
that they needed more convincing ways to make their arguments.”16 The 
Immigration Restriction League’s interest in the Immigration Commission’s work 
was not limited its “full inquiry” into immigration. They used political 
connections and influence to help direct the Commission to a recommendation 
favorable to restriction, and worked hard for an explicit endorsement of the 
literacy test. The selection of their senator from Massachusetts to serve on the 
Commission – Joseph Lee’s cousin Henry Cabot Lodge – gave them a powerful 
reach into the heart of the Commission’s investigations. 
The League used a variety of strategies to gather support for restriction, 
and one of their most successful was the exploitation of their political ties. The 
IRL had forged close relationships with several other members of the United 
States Congress in addition to Lodge. Dillingham was already meeting with the 
League’s paid lobbyist James H. Patten in 1906. (Hall in fact tried to get Patten 
                                                                                                                                
 
16 Robert F. Zeidel, Immigrants, Progressives, and Exclusion Politics, 26; 20.  
 
 Chapter 3  165 
appointed to the Commission.17) New York Representative William S. Bennet, 
who opposed restriction and authored the Commission’s dissenting minority 
report, took note of the IRL’s influence in his dissent. He pointed out that all 
testimony from professionals involved in immigration matters before the House 
Committee in 1905 was opposed to the literacy test. But one group outside 
Congress was particularly active in overcoming opposition to the reading test, an 
organization represented by “Mr. Patten, who is the secretary [sic] of the 
Immigration Restriction League of Boston.”18 Bennet correctly noted the political 
influence the League exercised, and he felt that that influence jeopardized the 
objective investigation the commissioners tried to conduct. The League was 
active in trying to influence the recommendations of the commissioners because 
they knew that its support for a literacy test might help encourage Congress to 
pass another bill containing a literacy requirement. So they worried about its final 
recommendations.  
For Lee, restriction was justified partly on the grounds that it was 
necessary to preserve American democratic institutions. Although statistics had 
become highly important in the movement, providing an empirical demonstration 
of the threat immigrants posed to Anglo-Saxon American civilization, Lee argued 
                                                
17 Hall informed Patten that he had written to Lodge and Representative Gardner to “use their 
influence with the President to have you appointed…. I can think of no more valuable work you 
can do for the U.S.A.…Most of such bodies bring in fool reports, and you will have a chance to 
see a lot on our side & get it in.” Hall to Patten, 4 February 1907, Lee papers, box 1; William 
Dillingham to James H. Patten, 5 January 1906, box 1, IRL papers.  
 
18 “Immigration of Aliens into the United States” House Report n. 3021, part 2, “Views of the 
Minority” 59th Congress, 1st Session, 27 April 1906, p. 3. Hall was the League’s secretary; Patten 
was its congressional lobbyist.  
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that statistics omitted the political capacity of immigrants, which could not be 
reduced to mere figures. In this situation, literacy became increasingly important, 
as it indicated their unsuitability to perform their duties as American citizens. 
Illiterate immigrants were dangerous to admit because they were intellectually 
unprepared for – if not incapable of – the political responsibilities of American 
citizenship. As Lee had explained to Jeremiah Jenks, one of President Roosevelt’s 
appointees to the Immigration Commission, “The facts most relevant to the 
question [of immigration] seem to me to be those indicating the capacity of these 
races for self-government in those countries where these races are predominant.” 
He suggested that political self-government was a racial attribute, and 
monarchical or autocratic governments were best suited for less civilized 
peoples.19  
Lee felt that the question of immigrants’ suitability for political freedom 
must be carefully examined. Once again relying on Francis Walker’s replacement 
thesis, the Boston philanthropist explained that “If upon the whole such a study 
[as the Commission’s] shows that the Italian and Slavic races are superior to the 
Anglo-Saxon in carrying on a democratic government, then the present 
immigration must be considered a great benefit to mankind. If, however, these 
races are less successful than ours, then such immigration must be considered the 
greatest misfortune the world has ever suffered.”20 This alarmism became a staple 
in the League’s campaign for restriction, with the statistical proofs supplied by 
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General Walker, the Census and federal statistics on immigration. But since they 
began with the conviction that the Italian and Slavic races were not superior to the 
Anglo-Saxon in carrying on a democratic government, the League’s leaders 
worked zealously to secure a final report from the Dillingham Commission that 
agreed with them.  
That Lee singled out the political behavior of Southern Italians 
demonstrates the impact that classic racialism had on North American 
restrictionists. The biological and racial differences between southern and 
northern Italian were also visible in their cultural characteristics, a theme 
Lombroso, Sergi, and Alfredo Niceforo had been making for decades. Lee 
explained in a letter that his support for restriction originated in a fear that if the 
influx of the new immigrants continued, “together with the decreasing birth rate 
of the old American stock,” in a few years the effect would be to “make our 
country predominantly of the Alpine (roughly of the Slavic) and the 
Mediterranean—chiefly South Italian—races.” This substitution of racial stocks 
would be ruinous to American democracy. Urban political corruption – a special 
target of progressive reform – was, as Lee saw it, a function of the corruption of 
the voters, not the political boss. “If a hundred Italian votes, for instance, are 
bought by an American boss, the evil is sometimes attributed to the American 
boss rather than to the one hundred Italians. But where the [United States] is 
predominantly South Italian, as is true of South Italy and Sicily,” he explained, 
“there the conditions of politics must be attributed chiefly to the kind of people.”21 
                                                
21 Ibid.  
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Lee showed a solid grasp of the ideas of the Italian racialists, while showing 
himself completely ignorant of the complex history and scholarship of Italian 
scientists who disputed the determinist arguments of Lombroso and Sergi. It 
would not be the first time they would selectively choose scientific studies to 
buttress their arguments.  
While the Dillingham Commission was studying immigration, League 
members reached out nationally to try to influence the Commission. 
Correspondence between Hall and Alexander Graham Bell linked the 
Immigration Restriction League with the emerging field of eugenics. William 
Ripley, whose book The Races of Europe was profoundly influential for Anglo-
Saxonists and the members of the Dillingham Commission, replied to a letter 
from Hall with the suggestion that the League use an economic argument for 
restriction, not a racial one, as economic security was much more tangible to the 
average American. Ripley also cautioned Hall about utilizing “scientific” works 
whose quality was questionable. Hall had asked Ripley’s opinion on Alfred 
Schultz’s book Race or Mongrel (1908), and Ripley explained that though he had 
not seen the volume in question, he was confident that it was unreliable. A 
member of the Florida Supreme Court and a judge from the Supreme Court of 
Idaho wrote the secretary of the League supporting efforts to tighten immigration 
regulations. David Starr Jordan, President of Stanford University, conveyed his 
support for restriction. Dr. John D. Adams, a Boston charity worker, advocated 
restriction, which must have been particularly gratifying for the League since they 
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typically had a difficult time attracting the support of social and settlement house 
workers.22  
The League’s attitude toward using the Commission to support their own 
attitudes and policies began with the composition of the Commission itself. With 
the study underway in 1908, Hall wrote a letter to President Roosevelt implicitly 
questioning the qualifications of some of the Commission’s appointed members.23 
Hall complained that New York Congressman William Bennet “represents a 
foreign-born district and is the spokesman of the National Liberal Immigration 
League, a society started by certain Jews in New York to oppose restrictive 
laws.”24 How, Hall wondered, could such a man serve on such an important 
governmental body? League activists found much more favorable the 
appointment of Alabama representative John Burnett, who was outspoken in his 
restrictionist views. Burnett made statement before the House Committee on 
Immigration and Naturalization in 1908 that reflected the American incorporation 
of Italian arguments of two racially distinct Italies. There was one cause that best 
                                                
22 Prescott Hall to Alexander G. Bell, 31 March 1908; Bell to Hall, 28 May 1908; Hall to Bell, 1 
June 1908, all box 1, Immigration Restriction League papers; William Ripley to Prescott Hall, 16 
February 1909, box 3; R. F. Taylor to Hall, 24 March 1910, box 3; James F. Ailshie to Hall, 8 
April 1910, box 1; David S. Jordan to Hall, 28 February 1910, box 2, all in IRL papers. In 1915, 
during more Congressional hearings on restriction, Hall wrote to Louis Brandeis complaining of 
his testimony, which opposed restriction. “It is very unfortunate the prominent Jews like yourself 
should take this attitude, as it is the Jews of all people, it seems to me, who should be on the side 
of progress and eugenic selection of immigrants.” Hall to Louis Brandeis, 7 April 1915; Brandeis 
to Hall, 8 April 1915, both box 1, IRL papers. 
 
23 Prescott Hall to Theodore Roosevelt, 27 June 1908, box 3, IRL papers. Roosevelt frequently 
talked about the perils of “race suicide.” A particularly thoughtful treatment of Roosevelt is Gail 
Bederman, Manliness and Civilization: A Cultural History of Gender and Race in the United 
States, 1880-1917 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), chapter 5. 
 
24 Hall to Roosevelt, 27 June 1908, IRL papers. 
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explained the Italian government’s difficulties trying to improve the conditions in 
southern Italy, Burnett announced at a House Committee hearing. “They have the 
same King, the same Parliament, the same laws,” he explained, “and yet the man 
north of the mountains is of the Caucasian, the white race, and the other is of the 
mixed race.” His authority for such a declaration was a conversation he had with 
Egisto Rossi, the Italian Commissioner of Emigration. Burnett told the committee 
that the literacy test under debate would have the effect of reducing by more than 
50% the number of Southern Italians eligible to land in the United States, but 
would only impact 10% of North Italians.25  For a society acutely aware of racial 
mixing, to allow the entrance into the United States of a mixed race of people – 
who had no inherent claim to admission anyway – was unthinkable.26  
Fear that the Anglo-Saxon stock of the American population would 
subsumed by a mass of racially inferior immigration was the essence of the 
League’s motivations, and reflects the way the language and epistemology of 
classic racialism had significant purchase. Immigration was a biological threat. 
Historian Matthew Jacobsen describes this general process of “racial refinement 
from ‘white’ to ‘Anglo-Saxon’” that created a hierarchy of distinct white races.27 
When coupled with statistical evidence of the decline of the Anglo-Saxon 
                                                
25 “Hearings before the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, House of Representatives” 
60th Congress, 1st Session, Hearings on HR 11326, 18 February 1908, p. 7. Burnett never clarified 
what “mountains” drew the dividing line between north and south Italy. The Alps mountain range 
would limit the number of “north Italians” to a number so relatively small as to be almost 
insignificant; the path of the Apennines down the peninsula would have a similar effect. Effects of 
literacy test from p. 8.  
 
26 Useful here are Guglielmo, White on Arrival; Jacobsen, Whiteness of a Different Color.  
 
27 Jacobsen, Whiteness of a Different Color, 41-3.  
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birthrate, the mental inferiority of the new immigrant races that high rates of 
illiteracy seemed to demonstrate, and the persuasive biological determinism of 
classic racialism, the dangers of unrestricted immigration seemed clear to 
members of the League. Convincing the Congressional investigators and securing 
a favorable report of the Commission became imperative. 
As the Commission began writing its report in 1910, the Immigration 
Restriction League’s leadership concentrated their activities to secure a report that 
would recommend the literacy test to reduce southern and eastern European 
immigration. What is particularly striking about this period is how the League 
behaved, leaving no stone unturned. League members requested friends write to 
Commission members to pressure them to favor the “illiteracy test.” The IRL’s 
leadership shifted political alliances in an effort to get what they wanted out of the 
report. Restrictionists like these were not simply trying to ensure that immigrants 
to the United States would be able to get jobs and assimilate; they were crusading 
to preserve what they perceived as the Anglo-Saxon character of the country.  
Writing a letter to new Harvard President A. Lawrence Lowell in 1910, 
Joseph Lee requested that he write to Senator Lodge, urging him to make sure the 
Commission favored the literacy test. Lee argued that, “If their report is negative, 
it will hurt us for many years whereas a positive report, favoring especially the 
illiteracy test, would be a considerable help. Lodge, though our professed 
champion, has shown a tendency to wobble…and thereby needs stiffening of the 
backbone.” Lowell not only complied, but sent a draft of the letter for Lee’s 
approval before he sent it off to the Senator. Three months later, Lee wrote to 
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Lowell again, addressing him informally as “Dear Lawrence,” asking him to now 
write to President Taft to impress upon the President the danger of immigration. 
Lee offered some “suggestions” on things the League would favor, and hoped that 
Lowell could work them into the letter and thereby encourage the President to 
support the policies regardless of the Commission’s findings. Lee couched his 
suggestions in careful terms (for example, that a democracy can only work in a 
largely homogeneous society), but made it clear that a literacy test was an 
essential element of immigration policy. Taft’s brief, handwritten reply explained 
that although he had initially favored a literacy test, “after hearing pro and con in 
the Congressional debates, I am not quite so clear in my mind now.”28 
The League threatened to oppose Lodge’s reelection if their senator did 
not deliver a report that was friendly to their goals. With Taft’s uncertainty, it 
became imperative for the League to get a report from the Immigration 
Commission in support of the literacy test. League leaders pressured Lodge to 
secure it. James Bronson Reynolds, Assistant District Attorney for New York 
County, wrote to Lee in November 1910 (shortly before Lodge was to face re-
election in the Massachusetts legislature), stating, “I have just seen Patten who 
has told me that you and others connected with the Immigration Restriction 
League are considering your attitude towards the re-election of Senator Lodge.” 
Reynolds embarked on a 3-page critique of Lodge’s actions, and his unsuitability 
for re-election. “I regard him as a weak friend of our cause, and am unable to 
                                                
28 Joseph Lee to A. Lawrence Lowell, 4 August 1910; Lee to Lowell, 3 November 1910, both box 
1, Lee papers. Lowell’s note to Taft and Taft’s reply were undated, and are placed with Lee’s 
November 3 letter to Lowell.  
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place my finger on a single strong measure which he has advocated. I therefore 
personally believe that his removal from the Senate would be a victory for good 
government, and a gain rather than a loss to restriction,” he closed. Lee was less 
aggressive in his attitude towards his cousin, replying that “we shall know better 
what his real usefulness is when the commission makes its decision, as he can 
pretty nearly swing it. Anyway his own vote will be seen.”29 The League’s leaders 
regarded Lodge’s usefulness as reducible solely to his position on immigration, 
and his ability to advance their interests. 
To the leadership of the IRL, political influence was a means to an end, 
just like scientific investigations were. They adopted a wait-and-see attitude 
towards Lodge’s reelection; if he supported the literacy test, they would support 
Lodge. If he did not, Lee wrote to Patten, the League would “soak him. Anyway, I 
think he realizes we have our eye on him, and I don’t know any way to make that 
more evident than it is.” When the Immigration Commission endorsed the 
principle of restriction, and suggested that the literacy test be enacted in the next 
immigration bill sent to the President (Bennet was the sole dissenter of this 
recommendation), the attitude of the League towards Senator Lodge changed 
dramatically. Patten wrote to Lee on December 11, “WE MUST do everything we 
can for Senator Lodge.…It is simply up to every one of us to get into the game 
and see if we cannot show some political influence. The Senator did the 
Commission trick.” With this fine news, Lee wrote to “Cousin Lodge” expressing 
                                                
29 James Bronson Reynolds to Joseph Lee, 19 November 1910; Lee to Reynolds, 22 November 
1910, both box 1, Lee papers. See also Zeidel, Immigrants, Progressives and Exclusion Politics 
for a solid treatment of the Commission’s work and the League’s involvement with Lodge.  
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his appreciation, and wishing him luck in the election.30 Lodge had proven his 
usefulness.  
Lodge not only prodded the Commission to unanimous endorsement of 
restriction – as Lee wrote to Lowell, he “made good from Goodville” – he 
couched restriction in non-racialized terms. That is, he guided the Commissioners 
to support the position that immigration restriction should be American policy, 
but not because of biological theories of inferiority or classic racialist ideas. 
Instead, restriction was supported, as Lee explained, “on the popular basis of 
labor and industrial effects rather than on the unpopular one of race 
discrimination.”31  This suggests that the members were concerned about how the 
League was perceived, that they did listen to criticisms by non-members like 
Eliot, and they made efforts to temper their rhetoric and strategies at times, 
though their ultimate goal always remained unchanged.  
The Dillingham Commission’s final report, issued in 1911, was a triumph 
for the IRL. The Commissioners endorsed the principle of restriction, advocating 
“the reading and writing test as the most feasible single method of restricting 
undesirable immigrants.” The report also suggested a method of excluding what 
they called “birds of passage,” and endorsed a long-term policy goal of limiting 
“the number of each race…to a certain percentage of the average of that race 
                                                
30 Lee to Patten, 28 November 1910; Patten to Lee, 11 December 1910; Lee to Lodge, 13 
December 1910, all box 1, Lee papers. Emphasis in original.  
  
31 Lee to Lowell, 13 December 1910, box 1, Lee papers. Emphasis added. 
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arriving during a given period of years.”32 Founded to “arouse public opinion to 
the necessity of a further exclusion of elements undesirable for citizenship 
injurious to our national character,” the League’s goal of immigration restriction 
was given federal support by the Dillingham Commission.33 League leaders had 
had private access to members of the Commission, and were able to exercise 
influence on the final report, although they were not able to prevent the 
publication of a minority report that opposed the literacy test. Their views were 
printed, along with many other “patriotic” organizations, in the final volume of 
the reports, which suggests that their views were mainstream.34  
In Italy, the contents of the report were related to the Bolletino’s readers in 
a special volume published in 1911. The subjects that received special attention in 
the Italian journal of immigration involved the commissioners’ reports on 
immigrant banks and the history of steerage and transportation legislation, and the 
endorsement of the literacy test. The Italian Commissariato was well informed on 
Congressional debates leading up to the creation of the Dillingham Commission, 
                                                
32 United States Immigration Commission, Reports of the Immigration Commission v. 1, 
“Abstracts of Reports” (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1911), Senate document 
747/1, 61st Congress, 3rd Session, pp. 48, 47. The sole dissent from the endorsement of the literacy 
test came from New York Congressman William Bennett, although he found “a slowing down of 
the present rate of the immigration of unskilled labor” to be “justified by the report.” Ibid., 49. 
 
33 “Constitution of the Immigration Restriction League,” box 3, Joseph Lee Papers. See also “The 
educational test as a means of further restricting immigration, 1895” Publications of the 
Immigration Restriction League, n. 6, IRL papers; Higham, Strangers in the Land; Jacobsen, 
Whiteness of a Different Color.  
 
34 United States Immigration Commission, “Abstracts of Reports,” 45-48 for recommendations; 49 
for opposition of Rep. Bennet. United States Immigration Commission, Reports of the 
Immigration Commission v. 41, “Statements and Recommendations Submitted by Societies and 
Organizations Interested in the Subject of Immigration,” Senate Doc. 764, 61st Congress, 3rd 
Session (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1911). The League’s recommendations 
and the petitions of other groups in favor of restriction are discussed further below.  
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and the legislation that had been proposed in the years before the passage of the 
1907 Immigration Act. But the Bolletino offered no real editorial comment, nor 
did it express any reaction to the Commission’s report. The Commissariato’s 
writers explained that Franz Boas’s investigations had provoked great interest in 
scientific circles, both in America and abroad, although the Commission did not 
declare Boas’s findings to be definitive. Bennet’s dissent from the final 
recommendation of the literacy test was also noted.35 But there was simply 
nothing for the Italian government to do. Immigration regulation was strictly a 
sovereign issue, and the Royal government made great efforts to abide by the 
letter of the American laws so that American legislators, policy makers, and 
foreign diplomats would have no complaints.  
As the Immigration Commission’s members compiled the data to fulfill 
their charge under the 1907 act, they and their staff relied heavily on statistics to 
depict the immigration situation in the United States. The majority of the 41 
published volumes were heavily statistical; besides volume three (“Statistical 
Review of Immigration”), volumes six through twenty-five statistically depicted, 
in twenty-five parts, the role of immigrants in industries. Tables were broken 
down by nativity, emphasizing the tendency of certain immigrant groups to 
concentrate in specific kinds of production and in certain geographic areas.36 
Advocates of restriction, however, did not emphasize this statistical data to 
                                                
 
35 “Lavori della Commissione federale per l’immigrazione negli Stati Uniti” Bolletino 
dell’Emigrazione Doc. 527, n. 4 (1912). Boas’s study described on 55-6.  
 
36 The series of “Immigrants in Industries” officially comprises one lengthy document: Senate 
Document 633, 61st Congress, 2nd Session.  
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support their policy goals. Restrictionists most effectively used three particular 
volumes of the Reports to portray the undesirability of the “new” immigration: 
“Emigration Conditions in Europe” (volume 4), the “Dictionary of Races or 
Peoples” (volume 5), and “Immigration and Crime” (volume 36). Collectively, 
these three volumes portrayed the new immigration as racially incapable of 
assimilating into the “Anglo-Saxon” population of the United States and partially 
responsible for increases in crime, poverty and social disorder. The unmistakable 
policy prescription of these volumes for the IRL was a policy of restriction.  
In the summer of 1907, six of the nine members of the United States 
Immigration Commission spent the summer in Europe studying the natural and 
artificial causes of emigration, the class and character of emigrants, as well as the 
attitudes of, and impact on, the respective countries of emigration. Senators 
Latimer and Dillingham, Representatives Howell, Bennet and Burnett, and 
William Wheeler, one of the Presidential appointees, departed Boston for Naples 
on the 18th of May. Dillingham, Howell and Wheeler were dispatched to Rome to 
meet with representatives of the Royal government while the rest began collecting 
information about Italian immigration from the south of Italy. The six 
commissioners spent about two and a half weeks in Italy, and then dispersed to 
other parts of Europe.37 Zeidel notes that the trip was undertaken to ensure that the 
investigations of the commission were comprehensive, to test allegations of abuse 
                                                
 
37 United States Immigration Commission, Reports of the United States Immigration Commission, 
vol. 4, “Emigration Conditions in Europe” (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
1911), Sen. Doc. 748, 61st Congress, 3rd Session, 3-4; Zeidel, Immigrants, Progressives, and 
Exclusion Politics, ch. 3.   
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of steamship and local officials, and to confront prejudices at the source. But 
despite the time the members spent in Italy, he notes, they could find no empirical 
support of Italian criminality, and that several of the commission’s members saw 
that southern Italians were industrious, but just unfortunate to live in an 
impoverished region.38 
The first part of volume 4 was a general survey of immigration drawn in 
part from statistics provided by these countries of emigration and which included 
a yearly breakdown of alien arrivals over the previous 90 years. These statistics 
demonstrated the shift in the origins of immigrants and drew an explicit difference 
between the “old and new European immigration.” “In studying the emigration 
situation in Europe,” the report noted, “the Commission was not unmindful of the 
fact that the widespread apprehension in the United States relative to immigration 
is chiefly due to this change in the character of the movement of population from 
Europe in recent years.”39 The greatest difference Commission members found 
between the old and new immigrants was the degree of education. One table early 
in the volume demonstrated what the members of the Immigration Restriction 
League had been claiming for over a decade: a literacy test would exclude a 
sizable number of the “new” immigrants. Later in Part II of “Emigration 
Conditions,” the report stated, “if illiterates, without exceptions, were denied 
admission Italian immigration undoubtedly would be reduced to about one-half its 
                                                
 
38 Zeidel, Immigrants, Progressives, and Exclusion Politics, 51-68 for the European investigations 
of the Commission.  
 
39 United States Immigration Commission, “Emigration Conditions,” 12. 
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present volume.”40 Achieving this reduction was what the League had long been 
advocating.  
“Emigration Conditions in Europe” highlighted the four specific European 
countries that were furnishing the bulk of the immigrants to the United States: 
Italy, Russia, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and Greece. The Commission’s 
report reinforced many of the perceptions of the undesirability of Italian 
immigration. In discussing the character of Italian immigration, Commission 
members followed what they described as the “practice of ethnologists” in 
examining the characteristics of south Italians. The fourth volume of the report 
explained, “It is generally accepted that the North Italians make the most 
desirable class of immigrants. They are more progressive, enlightened, and it is 
claimed are more easily assimilated than their southern countrymen, who, because 
of their ignorance, low standards of living, and the supposedly great criminal 
tendencies among them are regarded by many as racially undesirable.”41 Instead of 
examining, as Napoleone Colajanni and others did, the root causes of the 
allegedly high incidence of criminality in the mezzogiorno, the Commissioners 
attributed it to an inherent biological disposition. The report on European 
conditions was influenced strongly by classic racialist ideas; its principal sources 
for the racial definition of “Southern immigrants” was the Italian determinist 
                                                
40 The table noted, for instance, that only 1.1% of the 302,657 English immigrants over the age of 
fourteen that had arrived in the United States between 1899 and 1909 were incapable of reading or 
writing. The comparable figure for German immigration at the same time was 5.1%; French 5.4%; 
Dutch and Flemish 4.7%; and Scotch .4%. The 1,517,768 arriving “South Italians” however, had 
an illiteracy rate of 54.2%. “Emigration Conditions in Europe,” Ibid., Table 15, p. 30; quote on 
192.  
 
41 Ibid., 177-78.  
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Giuseppe Sergi.42 The report explained that the “prevailing alarm” created by the 
high number of southern Italian immigrants was “not occasioned entirely by the 
fact that a good many actual criminals come to the United States from Italy, but 
also by the not unfounded belief that certain kinds of criminality are inherent in 
the Italian race.”43 It was precisely this “not unfounded belief” that Colajanni had 
sought to combat in his essays. Furthermore, while Colajanni had criticized the 
Italian government’s inadequate attention to educational opportunities as the 
cause of Southern Italian criminality, the American report instead declared that 
“under the enlightened government” of the Italian state, conditions had 
sufficiently improved in the South, and “the people are said to be slowly losing 
the old characteristics of lawlessness which have made members of the race so 
conspicuous in the criminal element of the United States during recent years.”44 
The apparent contradiction in the two statements above – that criminality 
was inherent in Southern Italians, but they were slowly losing their natural 
proclivity to crime – reflects one of the fundamental tensions in scientific 
arguments favoring immigration restriction. Certain qualities like skin, eye, or 
                                                
 
42 The section detailing the “Character of Italian immigration” (177ff) referred readers to the 
“Dictionary of Races or Peoples,” which as discussed below, drew heavily on the work of 
Giuseppe Sergi. It explained: “It is said that the people of Piedmont have the largest admixture of 
Celtic blood, and that they resemble the French in many respects. The Lombards have both 
Teutonic and Celtic strains and consequently the men are generally tall and of a powerful build as 
compared with most other Italians, while fair hair and blue eyes frequently occur. A different type 
occurs in the Sicilians, who are said to be largely a mixture of Italian, Greek, Spanish, and Arab 
with some infusion of Teutonic blood. Sardinians have a considerable infusion of Spanish blood, 
while the Neopolitans [sic] are said to incline slightly toward the African or negro type.” United 
States Immigration Commission, “Emigration Conditions,” 177. Emphasis added.  
 
43 Ibid., 209. Emphasis added. 
 
44 Ibid., 209.  
 
 Chapter 3  181 
hair color were easily visible and seemingly hereditary. But it was harder to assess 
the inheritability of other qualities like intelligence and predisposition to crime or 
delinquency, and indeed, to even measure them accurately. And these aspects 
were more socially significant than physical characteristics.  It was difficult to 
determine where “nature” ended and “nurture” began; the complexity of the 
hereditary patterns made it problematic to implement policy, and often led, as will 
be shown with mental testing, to exaggerated claims of scientific knowledge. On 
balance, the reports of the Dillingham Commission tended toward accepting a 
major role for hereditary influence, and a diminished role for socialization and 
environmental influence (though Boas’s report on descendants of immigrants was 
a notable and important exception).  
Ultimately, it was the thirty-sixth volume of the reports, “Immigration and 
Crime” that most explicitly argued that the southern Italian immigrant was an 
undesirable addition to the country’s population. The report did note that 
immigrants were statistically less prone to commit crime than native-born 
Americans. But using court reports, records of penal institutions and police 
records, the Commission found that immigrants committed crimes against persons 
in greater proportion than native-born persons. Italian immigrants in particular, it 
reported, deserved special attention in that category. Immigrant children however, 
were more criminally inclined than the children of native-born Americans – the 
Commission’s report suggested that this could be attributed to the 
disproportionate concentration of immigrants in the cities of the North Atlantic 
states, so “the criminality of the children of immigrants is largely a product of the 
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city.”45 Again, the confusing roles of nature and nurture complicated a solid 
understanding of human development.  
The Commission decided to single out Italian immigrants because “of the 
popular opinion, voiced in the press, that large numbers of Italians having 
criminal records in Italy come to the United States, and that Italian crimes of 
violence in this country are in large measure due to them…”46 Here the 
Commissioners themselves fell prey to popular prejudice and the association in 
the public’s mind of Italians with organized crime. Spectacular events like the 
lynching of eleven Italians in New Orleans in 1891, the murder of New York 
Police Lieutenant Joseph Petrosino in Sicily in 1909, and the assassination of the 
Italian King Umberto I in 1901 had created a perception in the United States of 
southern Italian immigrants as wildly violent. The thrust of the investigation of 
crime and emigration in Italy, however, was limited to uncovering what role, if 
any, the Royal Government played in allowing criminals to emigrate. It found that 
the Italian government largely abided by American immigration law. As 
“Emigration Conditions in Europe” had noted, the Italian government had enacted 
specific regulations to prevent the emigration of convicted criminals – intending 
emigrants were required to obtain a certificato penale declaring that they had 
                                                
45 United States Immigration Commission, Reports of the Immigration Commission, vol. 36, 
“Immigration and Crime,” (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1911), Senate Doc. 
750, 61st Congress, 3rd Session, p. 1. 
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committed no crimes to be able to obtain their passport to leave Italy.47 These 
aspects of American immigration law were also discussed in the Bolletino.48  
Commissioners feared, though, that this did not restrain criminals from 
embarking from other ports within Europe. While American immigration law 
prohibited the entry of one of the classes of criminal Italians – those convicted in 
Italy who had served their sentence – it did not prohibit the entry of those 
convicted in absentia, those tried in Italy but not convicted, or those under 
surveillance in Italy. The Commission members struggled to suggest changes to 
the laws that would protect Americans and “the great majority of the Italians in 
this country [who] are law-abiding and industrious” from the “small proportion of 
[Italian] criminals.” While the Italian government was helping limit the 
emigration of criminals to the United States as best it could, the Commission 
concluded that these efforts were insufficient: “the Italian criminals are largest in 
numbers and create [the] most alarm by the violent character of their offenses in 
this country.”49 Such a class of immigrants would certainly be an undesirable 
addition to the American population. The hand of the IRL in favor of restriction 
strengthened. 
The League was even included in the Commission’s reports. The final 
volume, “Statements and Recommendations Submitted by Societies and 
                                                
47 “Emigration Conditions in Europe,” 67. A copy of a Certificato Penale is in Record Group 233, 
HR 66A – D 10, HR 12320, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C.  
 
48 “Lavori della Commissione federale per l’immigrazione negli Stati Uniti” Bolletino 
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49 “Immigration and Crime,” 286; 278.  
 
 Chapter 3  184 
Organizations Interested in the Subject of Immigration” featured a wide variety of 
opinions on immigration, including the League’s. Their statement to the 
Dillingham Commission included attitudes of their members who had responded 
to a survey the League had sent around in 1910. The League’s position was “that 
the present laws are inadequate and that further selection of immigration is 
necessary and desirable from (a) the social and moral standpoint, (b) the 
economic standpoint, (c) the eugenic standpoint.”50 They endorsed passage of a 
literacy test, an increase in the head tax on immigrants to at least $10, an 
unlimited period for deportation, and racial selection of immigrants so that 
kindred racial stocks from the north of Europe were admitted, and the races of the 
south of Europe excluded. They explained, “we should do as we do in breeding 
any other species than the human, viz., secure the best specimens to breed from.” 
Southern Italians and other “new” immigrants were not the best specimens.51 
Other organizations advocated similar restrictive policies; the Junior Order of the 
United American Mechanics (who also favored a “money test” that required that 
immigrants must arrive with at least $25) made the most explicitly classic racialist 
argument, demanding that “Our grand Anglo-Saxon character must be preserved 
and the pure, unmixed blood flowing down from our Aryan progenitors must not 
be mingled with the Iberic race…”52 The American Jewish Committee, the 
Immigrants Protective League, the Young Men’s Christian Association and the 
                                                
50 United States Immigration Commission, Reports of the Immigration Commission v. 41, 
“Statements and Recommendations Submitted by Societies,” 103, emphasis added.  
 
51 Ibid., quote from 106; statement and recommendations 103-06.  
 
52 Ibid., quote from 24; statement and recommendations 16-26.  
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National Liberal Immigration League all presented statements that opposed 
restriction. But their opposition would be ignored.53  
The influence of classic racialism can be seen most clearly and explicitly 
in the Dillingham Commission’s fifth volume, the “Dictionary of Races or 
Peoples.” On the first page of the “Dictionary,” the Commissioners declared that 
caution must be used in describing ethnological attributes of the newer 
immigrants, because “the true racial status of many of them was imperfectly 
understood even in communities where they were most numerous….”54 The 
purpose of the Dictionary was to clarify the ethnological and racial differences 
between the population groups that the Bureau of Immigration had been using for 
record-keeping since 1899. To accomplish this, it relied chiefly on the works of 
William Ripley, Daniel Brinton, Joseph Deniker, and Giuseppe Sergi. For 
compiling statistics to empirically demonstrate the effects of immigrants and 
immigration on the U.S., its sources were Prescott Hall, Richmond Mayo-Smith 
and John Commons, odd choices considering that all three dealt more with the 
social, political and economic impacts of immigration than compiling statistics. 
Nearly every one of the works the Commission relied on for its explication of 
races and ethnicities began with an assumption of fixed racial identities, and the 
                                                
 
53 Ibid. See 15-26 for the JOUAM, 55 for the position of the IPL, 83 for the YMCA, 103-07 for 
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54 United States Immigration Commission, Reports of the Immigration Commission, vol. 5, 
“Dictionary of Races or Peoples,” (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1911), Senate 
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sources of their statistics – particularly Prescott Hall – were biased against the 
“new” immigrants.55  
In his paper for the Royal Anthropological Institute’s Huxley Memorial 
Lecture in 1908, William Ripley had revisited his work on European population 
groups, despite the shift in his professional interests to economics after publishing 
The Races of Europe.56 Ripley had been cautious of declaring the existence of 
fixed and immutable races in his 1899 book. Now, less than ten years later, his 
cautiousness increased. He was turning away from certainty over racial 
definitions and identities. Although the Commissioners used The Races of Europe 
as a key source in compiling an ethnological and anthropological guide, they did 
not use Ripley’s more recent investigation of the European races.  
Ripley’s essay showed a reversal of his earlier position on race as a fixed 
or easily identifiable category. His work had a significant impact on the 
Commission’s report on race and peoples, but his new attitude was an 
unwillingness to declare the existence of fixed, immutable racial types that 
eugenicists and restrictionists argued so heavily in favor of. Ripley’s essay 
presented some distinct difficulties in precise classification because of 
environmental influences on human bodies and human evolution. Perhaps that is 
why the Commissioners, in compiling the “Dictionary,” did not utilize this more 
recent work. 
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In fact, the Dillingham Commission’s decision to use Ripley, Deniker 
(who had died in 1899) and Brinton for ethnological classifications was 
extraordinary considering that, working with the Commission on a study of the 
descendants of immigrants, was Franz Boas, one of the most respected – and 
controversial – anthropologists in the United States. Although his best work was 
still to come, Boas had already delivered a paper on “Human Faculty as 
Determined by Race” at the American Association for the Advancement of 
Science in 1894, lectured on the “History of Anthropology” at the International 
Congress of Arts and Science in 1904, and had, with the aid of Jeremiah Jenks, 
secured significant funding for his anthropometric studies from a reluctant 
Immigration Commission based largely on the basis of his professional standing 
as an ethnologist. 
In the final analysis, all four of the principal authors that the members of 
the Immigration Commission relied on simply to classify and codify the 
anthropological races of immigrants offered incredibly complicated schemes of 
racial anthropology that featured divergent metrics for racial classification. Ripley 
used the cephalic index to associate racial types into three categories, although he 
cautioned that no pure racial types existed, and that environmental influences on 
physical form could be pronounced. Brinton’s three books noted that other 
skeletal features, like jaw and facial angles, were the essential markers of the four 
racial types that he described. Deniker used hair type as an organizing principle, 
which generated six large “types” of human populations, which were then broken 
down further into by eye and skin color and cranial measurement. Sergi’s system, 
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which the Commissioners also relied heavily upon, outlined only two major types 
– the Eurafrican and the Eurastiatic – that were differentiated by interior skeletal 
structure. There was no consensus on what constituted an appropriate scheme of 
racial classification. Six of the nine members of the Commission charged with 
devising the “Dictionary of Races and Peoples” were politicians, and the 
remaining three members were not anthropologists.57 Yet these men were given 
the Herculean task of sifting through these highly complicated and contested 
schemes of racial anthropology to compile a definitive list of the immigrant races 
that were arriving in the United States. The simpler theories of group and racial 
identities thus became the most appealing, regardless of the genuine scientific 
accuracy. As Franz Boas would discover after he submitted his report on 
“Changes in the Bodily Form of the Descendants of Immigrants,” the 
Commission’s members lacked the scientific knowledge to sift through these 
divergent systems of racial organization. The “Dictionary,” then, ended up simply 
recapitulating, uncritically, the dominant perceptions of racial identity, regardless 
of its accuracy. To compile the “Dictionary,” simplicity worked best.  
For at least some Commission members, Boas’s work was of sufficient 
quality that he was asked to consult on the “Dictionary of Races or Peoples.” 
Executive Secretary William W. Husband asked Boas to examine an early draft of 
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Dictionary of American Biography.  
 
 Chapter 3  189 
the Dictionary to ensure “its accuracy and scientific value from an ethnological 
standpoint.” Husband recognized that there was considerable disagreement on 
various racial classifications, and that ethnologists might not agree on every detail 
or group, but he still desired the document be as accurate and scientific as 
possible, and anticipated that Boas’s input, considering his reputation, would 
make it so. But Boas was skeptical of universally declaring and defining racial 
identity. He sent the draft of the “Dictionary” to an associate, Dr. Sinkhovitch, for 
comment on the entry for Ruthenians, which Boas then forwarded to Husband. 
Husband answered Boas in a note a few days later that said, “Although Dr. 
Sinkhovitch’s letter is one of condemnation rather than criticism, still I am 
exceedingly glad to have it.” He assured Boas of his own commitment to 
accuracy, as he continued, “of course the Commission would not authorize the 
publication of inaccurate and unscientific material upon this or any other subject.” 
Yet this is largely what it seemed to do.58 
When it came to describing particular immigrant groups, the 
Commissioners’ classification of Italian immigrants repeated many of Sergi’s and 
Niceforo’s assertions of fundamental racial differences in the Italian peninsula. It 
reported that Sergi, “the foremost Italian ethnologist” had traced the origins of 
southern Italians to the Hamitic stock of North Africa.59 For the Commission, 
Southern Italy started south of the Po River, and excluded only the compartamenti 
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of Piedmont, Lombardy, Venetia, and Emilia (almost exactly the same regions 
that Hall had laid out in Immigration). Everything south of the Po, the 
Commission said, was southern. Florence, Genoa, Bologna – any part of the 
actual Italian peninsula – was defined as southern, and by extension, of the Iberic 
or Mediterranean race, making them racially separate from and inferior to the 
Anglo-Saxon and Teutonic population in the United States. The “Melting Pot” of 
American society would be unable to assimilate such fundamentally different 
racial stocks into an “American” race. Yet no mention was made of the hostility 
and opposition previously directed toward Irish immigrants when they began 
arriving in the United States in the mid-nineteenth century, nor how they had been 
considered racially inferior to the Teutonic or Anglo-Saxon but had somehow 
later proven themselves to be eminently desirable additions. In fact, by 1911, the 
Irish had become welcome immigrants; the “Dictionary” noted that, “Like the 
English, the Irish come to the United States speaking our own language and 
imbued with sympathy for our ideals and our democratic institutions.”60 This 
fluidity of prejudice – first the Irish need not apply for admission, then their 
cultural and political experiences as part of the United Kingdom suited them 
perfectly to be beneficial members of American society – reflects the ambiguity 
of racial science in the early 1900s.  
The final version of the “Dictionary,” in dividing up the “great races” of 
mankind, used Johann Blumenbach’s five categories of Caucasian, Ethiopian, 
Mongolian, Malay, and American – the white, black, yellow, brown and red 
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races.61 Italians clearly fit into the Caucasian category, but the “racial” attributes 
of southern Italian immigrants were, when juxtaposed to those of the “English or 
Anglo-Saxon,” undesirable. Describing the English, the “Dictionary” stated “there 
is no necessity…for discussion of a subject so well understood by all as [to] the 
character, social institutions, and other qualities of the English as an immigrant 
people.”62 In the minds of restrictionists, the original English settlers of North 
America embodied all the characteristics – “intelligence, manliness, cooperation” 
– that made the United States strong.63 Southern Italians, on the other hand, were 
described as “excitable, impulsive, highly imaginative, and impracticable; as an 
individualist having little adaptability to highly organized society.” In drawing a 
stark distinction between the Southern and Northern Italian – the latter were 
“cool, deliberate, patient, practical, and as capable of great progress in the 
political and social organization of modern civilization” – the Commission 
articulated the risks the country ran by not restricting this undesirable, “excitable” 
immigrant stream.64  
Using Darwinian language, the entry on the Italians closed by warning of 
their great fecundity and high birth rate. The prodigious reproductive capacity of 
Italians had enabled them to outnumber the “Spanish race in Spanish Argentina 
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and the Portuguese race in Brazil, a ‘Portuguese’ country.”65 Unlike the Irish, who 
depleted their island’s population as their men and women left for America, the 
Italians’ fecundity constantly replenished the peninsula, creating a never-ending 
pool of potential emigrants. An opponent of unrestricted immigration would 
immediately see the implications of Walker’s replacement thesis: a perpetual 
stream of Southern Italian immigration would eventually overwhelm the “English 
or Anglo-Saxon” stock of the United States.  
Italians were not the only immigrant group that received extensive 
attention from the writers of the “Dictionary of Races or Peoples,” of course. The 
entry for Jews, while explicating their distinct racial character and composition, 
explained that Jewish immigration need not concern Americans, since the total 
Jewish population in the world was relatively small. Italian immigration received 
the most attention because of its volume, and their alleged criminality, high 
illiteracy, fecundity and non-Anglo-Saxon racial identity. There were also the 35 
million Italians who remained in Europe who may in the future emigrate to the 
United States.66 
To gauge the impact of immigrants on the United States, the members of 
the Dillingham Commission turned to statistics. In addition to Prescott Hall’s 
1906 book Immigration, the two books Commissioners used to create the 
“Dictionary” were works of economists, not statisticians: John Commons and 
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Richmond Mayo-Smith. Commons had trained at Johns Hopkins University with 
the noted economist Richard T. Ely. As he worked with the United States 
Industrial Commission around the turn of the century, Commons came upon a 
wealth of statistical data that he used for his book Races and Immigrants in 
America. Races and Immigrants was suffused with a theoretical foundation of 
classic racialism. But Commons viewed “race” in a unique way that escaped the 
attention of all of the members of the IRL in the books they published in the 
1900s and 1910s. Commons included southern African-Americans in his 
discussion of race, which was rare in the writings of advocates of restriction. His 
book was laced with the standard racialized dogma about the delinquency and 
inferiority of non-whites, particularly regarding African-Americans, whose 
alleged sexual depravity and cultural backwardness he emphasized.67 Still, 
Commons noted immediately in the first chapter, “Race differences are 
established in the very blood and physical constitution” of population groups.68 
Regarding immigrants, Commons ruminated on the essential economic 
contribution of the various immigrant races, declaring that immigrants were “the 
hardest, if not the most intelligent worker in our industries.”69 But racially they 
were fundamentally different. And this racial difference, compounded by the 
tendency of immigrant laborers to lower wages, concentrate in cities, and fall prey 
to corrupt political machines in urban areas led Commons to the same conclusion 
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that Hall reached: immigration must be either improved in quality or restricted.70 
It was only in their utilization of the sophisticated and cosmopolitan work of 
Columbia professor Richmond Mayo-Smith that the Commission’s report on race 
provided any semblance of balance to the statistical data the commissioners relied 
on. 
Ultimately Franz Boas’s final report on the descendants of immigrants 
suggested that there was really very credibility to fears that immigrants were 
ruining the quality of American racial stock. Although body form seemed to be 
the most stable element of racial identification, and this belief was at the heart of 
the “Dictionary of Races and Peoples,” Boas argued that his research on the 
children of immigrants in the United States had shown that “There are not only 
decided changes in the rate of development, but there is also a far-reaching 
change in type – a change which can not be ascribed to selection or mixture, but 
which can only be explained as due directly to the influence of the 
environment.… The adaptability of the immigrants seems to be very much greater 
than we had a right to suppose before our investigations were instituted.”71 By 
examining stature, weight, physiological development, the length and width of the 
head and face, Boas had found that American-born children of immigrants had a 
marked divergence from the body type of their parents.  
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The extent of change in physical structure was a direct function of the 
length of time that the immigrant parents resided in the United States, and pointed 
to a dramatic anthropological fluidity in all population groups, an argument 
clearly at odds with classic racialist ideas. Southern Italian immigrants, Boas 
found, tended to improve the least physically in the congested urban areas of the 
United States, but children of Jewish immigrants tended to develop better. He 
stated that the measurements of children taken at public schools showed “a great 
plasticity of human types, and permanence of types in new surroundings appears 
rather as the exception than as the rule.”72 But the cause of these improvements 
could not be precisely documented; the influence of the environment could not be 
positively demonstrated. Was the change attributable to heredity? Boas examined 
this possibility, noting that the characteristics of parents seemed to not be blended 
or averaged in their offspring, so were perhaps a function of some alternative that 
could be a result of dominant or recessive characters. The Columbia 
anthropologist noted that man’s understanding of heredity was inadequate at the 
moment to state with certainty how it affected the development of the children of 
immigrants.73 
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For opponents of immigration, Boas undermined their simplistic argument 
that like created like. If the bodies of descendants of immigrants were highly 
variable, how could one speak of the perils that immigration presented for 
America’s Anglo-Saxon stock? Boas included over 400 pages of statistical tables 
in his appendix to provide specific empirical support for his argument of elastic 
human body form. This proved to be important for the professional reception of 
Boas’s report. A reviewer in the Journal of the Royal Statistical Society called 
Boas’s findings “distinctly remarkable” and explained that the statistical evidence 
contained in the appendix was critical for verifying his conclusions. Another 
review pointed out that the “enormous mass of figures” Boas provided to support 
his argument, “if accepted and developed, would make a considerable differences 
[sic] in our anthropological outlook.” The reviewer also commended Boas’s 
position, which was “wise in its moderation,” but despite the application with 
“evident care and manifest anxiety to avoid influences of preconceived notions,” 
felt that his chosen statistical method and tables were perhaps not best adapted for 
his purposes. Still, Boas’s contribution to scientific knowledge was important and 
impressive.74 The American press also favorably covered Boas’s study, giving 
him a wide popular audience.75  
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Not all of the American professional community was convinced of Boas’s 
findings, however. After the Immigration Commission’s reports were printed in 
1911, Henry Fairfield Osborn, President of the New York Museum of Natural 
History, wrote to Boas’s fellow anthropologist Ales Hrdlicka at the Smithsonian 
Institution, to determine how other anthropologists judged the work of the 
Columbia professor. Osborn found particularly troubling the suggestion that head 
form, which Osborn previously thought to be an highly stable physical feature, 
was in fact changeable. Osborn asked if Hrdlicka would agree that head-form was 
a stable or “unit” character that would thus be inherited by offspring, or if it was 
an unstable physical feature. Hrdlicka’s perspective on anthropology was similar 
to Boas’s, in that the research he had done on primitive peoples suggested to 
him—as it did to Boas—that physical structure was fluid. Compelling proof of 
this fluidity would greatly damage the argument of restrictionists, who claimed 
that the inability of immigrants to physically and culturally assimilate necessitated 
their exclusion. Hrdlicka’s reply to Osborn on Boas’s work was somewhat 
guarded. He declined to comment on the relative “proof” that the immigrant study 
had provided, because there were several defects in the study, Hrdlicka explained, 
resulting in uncertainty as to what, if anything, Boas’s project proved.76  
Regarding the “stability” of head form, however, Hrdlicka was more 
helpful. He preferred “persistence” as a term for describing head form, but 
insisted that persistence must be qualified to include “‘under no greatly differing 
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environmental conditions.’” He added, “there can be no doubt but that much 
differing environments such as will induce important physical modification in 
stature, strength and especially in the development of organs of mastication, will 
also secondarily affect the form of the skull.” Hrdlicka explained that he had 
clearly seen this plasticity in his research on Eskimos. Regarding the inheritance 
of head shape, he said that it was not a particular “unit character” – such as eye 
color might be – that was unchanging, and found arguments of generational 
stability to be a highly suspicious claim. The complexity of the subject, the 
Smithsonian curator argued, made it impossible to say with any certainty if there 
was continuity in head form, and the exact truth could only be known after 
“considerable investigation in different localities and with different peoples.” 
Certainly this would be outside the scope of the Dillingham Commission, or any 
other modestly sized research group.77 Notwithstanding these cautions, though, 
Hrdlicka sided with Boas against classic racialism. 
Hrdlicka’s caution reflected partly his professional position at the 
Smithsonian, but it also resulted from several extended sojourns among aboriginal 
people in North and South America. Hrdlicka had emigrated from Bohemia when 
he was thirteen, and trained in American medical colleges until 1896 when he 
traveled to Paris to study with French anthropologist Leon Manouvrier.78 Hrdlicka 
consistently maintained high levels of proof for scientific knowledge, and insisted 
that both observed and theoretical phenomena must agree for a scientific claim to 
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have validity. In a lengthy paper for the journal American Anthropologist in 1914, 
Hrdlicka noted that in the recent development of the discipline, through the 
“systematic training and regulation of methods,” and cooperation “with closely 
allied branches of science” anthropology had finally made some secure advances 
in providing evidence for the cultural and biological development of population 
groups.79 Physical and cultural anthropology were developing as coherent 
scientific disciplines.80  
This emergent consensus predisposed Boas and Hrdlicka to expect 
agreement among scientific investigators, since proper scientific research would 
generate agreement on empirical and scientific truths. Yet they were not surprised 
when they did not get agreement, as letters between Hrdlicka and Davenport 
show. Hrdlicka wrote to Davenport in 1915 to request some scientific instruction 
on hereditary mechanisms. Hrdlicka noted that ordinary Mendelian patterns may 
hold true for some specific characteristics, but “it certainly does not in its simple 
form rule the transmission of…the color of the skin, color, nature and quantity of 
hair, and the color of the eyes, gums and other special parts of the body.” Hrdlicka 
needed to be able to explain the inheritance of these physical characteristics in his 
work, but was unclear on the mechanism of transmission. He hoped Davenport 
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could help him understand how inheritance may work in these and other cases. 
Davenport replied that through his experience, he was convinced that hereditary 
traits “which have been applied so successfully to plants and animals apply just 
exactly as well to man.” He assured Hrdlicka that he had come to the right man 
with his questions, as the eugenicist corrected him that the inheritance patterns of 
eye color, skin color, hair color and pigmentation were all, in fact, quite well 
understood.81 
Davenport’s position on inheritance in 1915 was substantially what it was 
when he published Heredity in Relation to Eugenics in 1911, the same year that 
Boas’s report on immigrant body form was printed. The thesis of Davenport’s 
book was summed up quite easily: “all men are bound by their protoplasmic 
makeup and unequal in their powers and responsibilities.”82 Hrdlicka, however, 
was not convinced. He could not share Davenport’s certainty on the inheritance of 
eye and skin color, he explained, because “I constantly meet with cases which 
elude satisfactory explanation.” Hrdlicka’s fieldwork—by definition the practical 
application of theoretical knowledge—proved far more complex than the theory 
permitted. Replying to Davenport’s criticism of anthropologists in his previous 
letter, where Davenport attacked the anthropological profession’s unwillingness 
to use new hereditarian hypotheses on physical form, Hrdlicka defended his 
discipline. He told Davenport that perhaps anthropologists had good reason to be 
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reluctant to adopt the strict Mendelian inheritance patterns that Davenport was 
“sure” were proven. In the course of field work, Hrdlicka explained, an 
anthropologist “finds so little [in the theory] that agrees with his more general 
observations…”83 These differences suggest a fundamental problem: if two men 
in related disciplines could not agree on a principle, who was right? Here the 
reputation of the researcher became important: wild generalizations based on non-
empirical evidence threatened the accumulation of scientific knowledge—it 
misdirected efforts and retarded genuine intellectual advance. On the contrary, 
careful measurement and experimentation enabled scientific knowledge to 
advance because it could be tested and verified. It could, as Jennings had pointed 
out, be shown to be true. 
Hereditarian theory based on Mendelian principles was useful only to the 
extent that observed phenomena supported it. Some scientists, who approached 
research with an open mind and a willingness to temper theory with observation, 
saw that predicting inheritance was a highly complex problem. For others, like 
Davenport, theory was, ipso facto, the theory: it had withstood tests and 
replication, and would not need to be changed. Davenport’s inability to recognize 
the importance of this alternative approach to scientific knowledge, however, 
would not hinder the success of movements that he supported. When Davenport’s 
interests began to include the eugenical qualities of immigrants (already apparent 
in Heredity in Relation to Eugenics), he made sure that the theory could be used 
to support his position.  
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As Congress acted upon the recommendations of the Dillingham 
Commission, and passed an immigration bill featuring a literacy test, the IRL’s 
leaders discussed a range of strategies for gaining President Taft’s support. In the 
end, they settled on attempting intimidation. On April 15, 1912 Patten wrote a 
furious letter to Prescott Hall from D.C.  “Taft has lied to us. He has had senators 
lie to us. He has not said a word, even though the Commission has reported. He 
slipped off to New York and has members of his Cabinet slip off and lolly-gag the 
foreigners and certain religious influences that ought to stay out of politics.” 
Patten’s note reflected the objections Hall had made about the selection of 
Commissioners that were more loyal to the immigrant communities in their 
districts instead of the best interests of the country. The dissenting minority report 
proved this, in their minds. And Taft too, League members felt, was pandering to 
the interests of alien communities in the United States, and not protecting the best 
interests of Americans. The IRL’s lobbyist fulminated that, “In all his speaking 
Teddy [Roosevelt] has not pandered or cattered [sic] or stooped to any such 
palavering and un-American foreign slobbering.” For Patten, there was only one 
solution: “to hammer the life out of Taft, Taft senators, and those in opposition to 
this legislation, regardless, I say, of other issues.” But Patten’s attempt at 
intimidation failed.  
 On February 14, 1913, President Taft vetoed the bill specifically because 
of the literacy provision it contained. The President explained that, although he 
vetoed the bill with “great reluctance,” the bill’s literacy provision “violates a 
principle that ought, in my opinion, to be upheld in dealing with our 
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immigration.”84 Although the vote to override the veto passed the Senate by a 
large margin, it failed by three votes in the House. Madison Grant, a League vice-
president, would later suggest that Taft vetoed the bill because he “did not 
understand the issues involved, and was confused by conflicting advisors.”85 In 
Grant’s mind, had Taft appreciated and understood the danger the alien 
immigrants posed to the country, he would have acted to save the nation’s racial 
homogeneity and signed the bill. 
Along with their intense efforts to influence the final report of the 
Dillingham Commission, the League’s leaders cultivated alliances among 
sympathizers who might later be useful all the time. Even before the Washington 
state newspaperman Albert Johnson began serving in the House of 
Representatives in the sixty-third Congress in March 1913, Prescott Hall wrote to 
him as a potential supporter of restriction. Hall approached Johnson hoping that 
the west coast resident would join the League and help spread its geographical 
reach beyond the east coast. Although Johnson was not really familiar with the 
League, he told Hall that his own thoughts on immigration “are exactly in line 
with the basic arguments” of the League and its supporters. Offering to send a 
separate letter with his membership fee, and a promise to send future copies of his 
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monthly paper, The Home Defender, Johnson closed his letter with a declaration 
that  “I shall proceed along the lines marked out [i.e. to favor immigration 
restriction and a literacy test] and do all I can for the restriction of undesirable 
immigration.”86  
Just as the League leaders had done with President Lowell of Harvard, a 
sympathetic person might one day be useful in one day achieving restriction. As 
they left no stone unturned in pressuring the members of the Dillingham 
Commission to endorse their policy goals, they reached out to broaden support for 
the movement. But when Hall wrote Johnson, he likely had no inkling as to how 
useful Johnson would prove to be. Johnson would later chair the House 
Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, and author several bills that the 
Immigration Restriction League favored, including the 1921 and 1924 
Immigration Acts that effectively ended the open-gate policy of the United States. 
Cultivating his friendship was time well spent, and demonstrates the devotion 
these men had to restricting the flow of immigration into the U.S., and the 
powerful political alliances they forged to achieve that goal. 
Having stamped its imprimatur on the forty-one volumes of the 
Immigration Commission’s reports, the United States Congress provided 
American restrictionists with a wealth of evidence that supported their assertions 
that the “new” immigrants arriving on American shores were undesirable. The 
particular attention the Commissioners gave to southern Italian immigration 
reflected the anxieties of the American public. Throughout the 1910s and 1920s, 
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members of the Immigration Restriction League would use the statistics from the 
reports, as well as the racial definitions and criminal findings, to urge members of 
Congress to prohibit the entry of undesirable aliens. In publications, magazines, 
private correspondence and Congressional testimony, the League utilized the 
Dillingham reports to garner additional public support for restriction. The 
importance of immigration restriction to them was plainly clear. Now, with 
Congressional endorsement of their principles, they aimed to secure the passage 
of restrictive legislation by making the importance of restriction plainly clear to 
the rest of the country. 
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Chapter 4: The Immutable Basis of Science? 
 
After the Dillingham Commission endorsed the literacy test to restrict 
immigration to the United States, anti-immigration groups like the Immigration 
Restriction League increased pressure on Congress to pass a bill featuring it. The 
arguments the League made in support of the reading requirement show two 
significant components of restriction arguments: the continued emphasis on the 
racial or biological inferiority of the “new” immigrants to the “old” immigration 
(of which illiteracy was only one manifestation), and the importance of statistical 
or empirical proof provided by “experts” to demonstrate this assertion. Since this 
method of exclusion now had the sanction of an “expert” governmental body, 
other academics and authors joined in support of the League’s preferred method 
in the 1910s. Despite the affirmation of a policy of restriction by a governmental 
committee of investigators, however, the legitimacy of a policy of restriction 
remained contested in the ensuing years. This would be particularly apparent 
when supporters of restriction tried to add dubious scientific claims to support the 
change in policy. 
Congressional action on the recommendations of the Dillingham 
Commission began in January 1911 when the House Committee on Immigration 
and Naturalization favorably reported on an immigration bill (H.R. 15413). The 
majority of the House committee had declared the “illiteracy test” to be the most 
“complete method for sifting out undesirable immigrants…” and the bill 
contained a provision requiring admissible immigrants to be able to read a brief 
passage in a language of their choosing. On page three of the House Report, a 
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“racial” ranking of illiteracy among adult aliens demonstrated the outcome the bill 
would have in restricting immigration: large numbers of immigrants from 
southern and eastern Europe would be effectively excluded by the literacy test; 
immigrants from northern and western Europe would not. The report specifically 
linked the literacy and desirability of immigrants by asking, “Is it probable that 
1,000,000 men who can not read will make as good citizens as 1,000,000 men 
who are able to do so?”1 The majority of committee members felt that the answer 
was certainly “no,” and used the statistical evidence to document the larger 
implications of illiteracy on the desirability and suitability for citizenship. 
Southern Italian immigrants topped the list of illiterate immigrants, as 51% of all 
adult males from the mezzogiorno were unable to read any language and they 
were also, as the “Dictionary of Races or  Peoples” had shown, racially different 
from the American Anglo-Saxon stock. Their countrymen from the north were 
much further down the list, with only 12% of northern Italian immigrants 
registering as illiterate, and they were, therefore, more desirable to admit. They 
were also, according to the “Dictionary,” of a “Keltic” racial stock.2 
Unfortunately, the bulk of immigration from Italy was coming from the southern 
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immoral, diseased, criminal or vicious immigrants. The minority view was also recognition of the 
inadequate resources and infrastructure that some nations had to devote to education, and not a 
sign of racial inferiority. House Report n. 1956, Part 2, “Immigration of Aliens into the United 
States, Views of the Minority,” 61st Congress, 3rd Session, p. 1. The four members were Gustav 
Küstermann, a Republican from Wisconsin who had emigrated from Germany in 1868, Adolph 
Sabath, an Illinois Democrat who emigrated from Bohemia in 1891, and Henry Mayer Goldfogle, 
Democrat from New York, with William Bennet from New York presenting the dissenting report.  
 
2 United States Immigration Commission, “Dictionary of Races or Peoples,” 82. 
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part of the peninsula, not the northern part. Restrictionists took this high level of 
illiteracy in the south of Italy as proof of the racial inferiority of southern Italians, 
which made them undesirable additions to the American population.3 Colajanni 
had tried to emphasize in the first decades of the twentieth-century that the logical 
association of illiteracy with racial inferiority was highly problematic, and in 
reality was due to complex causes (a theme that Jennings and other critics of 
classical racialism would pick up on later). But the simplicity of the argument that 
illiteracy was a manifestation of the backwardness of a “race” of peoples was 
compelling.  
Despite the Commission’s recommendation, and the position of the House 
Immigration and Naturalization Committee, immigration legislation stalled in the 
61st Congress and no significant action was taken in the third session. John 
Higham suggests that this was due to the presidential election of 1912: because of 
the emergence of Teddy Roosevelt’s Progressive Party as a viable third party, 
immigrant voters became key to an electoral victory. It was, he explains, “no time 
to antagonize the foreign vote,” so national politicians took pains to not alienate 
them by classifying certain groups of them as undesirable or inferior.4 This left it 
to the men outside Washington, D.C. to press home the importance of the literacy 
test as a restrictive mechanism. The members of the Immigration Restriction 
League, maintaining their long-standing position favoring the “illiteracy test” as 
                                                
 
3 House Report n. 1956, “Immigration of Aliens into the United States,” 3.  
 
4 Higham, Strangers in the Land, 189-90.  
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the most effective method of restriction, issued a flurry of publications laying out 
the positive impact the literacy test would have if it were enacted into law. In a 
newsletter issued in late 1912, the League’s secretary provided immigration 
figures for fiscal years 1911 and 1912 and reprinted the Commissioner-General’s 
1912 report on immigration, in which the Commissioner-General endorsed a 
policy of immigration restriction. Hall quoted the government bureaucrat 
explaining that the “literate alien” was “better qualified than the illiterate to 
acquire a knowledge of and respect for our political and social institutions, and 
may, therefore, be more readily assimilated.” The League’s pamphlet reiterated 
the arguments of the House committee’s report and noted that restriction based on 
literacy would not impact the races from northern and western Europe – which 
included Northern Italians – but that the number of immigrants from southern and 
eastern Europe, who were “Chiefly Slavic and Iberic,” would be dramatically 
reduced.5 League members tried to make clear the fact that enacting the literacy 
clause would restrict racially undesirable immigrants efficiently and effectively.  
Leaders of the League pressed this issue energetically in the early 1910s, 
driven by the belief that certain immigrants were biologically and permanently 
inferior, and that an immigrant’s inability to read was a quick, simple illustration 
of that inferiority. The League’s tactic of endorsing the literacy test enabled it to 
avoid making these racial claims explicit: by requiring immigrants to have 
                                                
 
5 Publications of the Immigration Restriction League No. 60, n.d., box 3, Lee papers, n.p. (third 
page of document for Commissioner-General’s statements, fourth page for illiteracy rates by race). 
The statistical reports date the publication to the second half of 1912. 
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reading skills, supporters of restriction could plausibly argue that their opposition 
to certain immigrants was objective and had nothing to do with their race. But 
when Joseph Lee drafted a paper for publication in late 1912, he had great 
difficulty in making this rhetorical trick work. A year earlier, the League’s 
Treasurer Richards M. Bradley had written to Lee from his office on Boston’s 
State Street expressing his great fear of making “race” too prominent an element 
for advocating restriction. Bradley worried that Prescott Hall’s recent writings 
were making a “tactical mistake, and a serious one [at that],” by using the “race 
issue” to justify restriction. “This immediately and necessarily ranges against us 
the races involved, who are becoming numerous and influential in the pivotal 
states,” Bradley wrote, and negated the help from the Dillingham Commissioners 
“who have put the thing on economic and sociological grounds…which seems to 
be much better for all purposes, including fighting purposes.”6 Like Hall, Lee was 
unable to completely divorce himself from utilizing the racial arguments in favor 
of restriction. He believed that this was ultimately the most important reason to 
restrict immigration. Lee’s draft of “The Illiteracy Test” shows the difficulty the 
League’s members had resisting the arguments of classic racialism.  
Lee tried to write an article that engaged opponents of restriction. Most 
objections to the literacy test, he pointed out in the draft, were that “It would 
exclude the countrymen of Dante, Columbus, Michael Angelo [sic], Cavour, 
Garibaldi, Mazzini, etc.” This was wrong, Lee explained, because southern 
                                                
6 Richards M. Bradley to Joseph Lee, 16 March 1911, box 1, Lee papers.  
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Italians may be “Countrymen, yes, but [are] not those of the same race, namely, 
that of North Italy.” Northern Italians, he claimed, reaching back to Ripley’s The 
Races of Europe, were of the better Alpine race, whereas southern immigrants 
were Mediterranean or Latin. Lee’s argument also remained tautological: north 
Italians were racially superior because the race of Dante, Michelangelo and 
Columbus had produced these great artists, statesmen and explorers; but these 
men were exceptional because of their race.7 The north Italian race, Lee wrote, 
was literate and desirable, but “It is in South Italy[,] whence none of these great 
men came[,] that illiteracy is 56.9%.” Lee tried to make this issue of desirability 
not a racial issue – he printed a marginal note that admitted: “(This point not to be 
used unless in repartee with somebody.)”8 When Lee published his drafted essay 
in The Survey in January 1913, he softened his criticism of the southern Italian 
race slightly, but maintained the essence of his argument that northern Italians 
were desirable immigrants and southern Italians were undesirable immigrants.  
Lee tried to sidestep racial issues in the published article by coupling 
reading ability with democratic values, and arguing that illiterate citizens could 
not sustain a democracy. He cautioned that the total exclusion of all European 
races was a poor method of restriction because “there is no European race of 
                                                
7 Joseph Lee, “The Illiteracy Test” n.d., box 3, Lee papers, folder: “The Illiteracy Test” ms. note, 
typescript, 2. There was some irony in making Columbus a North Italian – although he was 
Genoese – because he sailed and claimed the New World for the Spanish, whom the “Dictionary 
of Races and Peoples” described as very physically similar to southern Italians and were part of 
the “Iberic” race. United States Immigration Commission, “Dictionary of Races or Peoples,” 136-
7. See also Alfredo Niceforo, Italiani del nord e italiani del sud (Torino: Fratelli Bocca, 1901).  
 
8 Joseph Lee, “The Illiteracy Test” 2.   
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which the best [members] are not desirable.” Using Italy as an illustration, Lee 
explained the race of northern Italians – “the race that produced Columbus, Dante, 
Michael Angelo [sic], Garibaldi, Mazzini and Cavour” – was desirable because 
their low level of illiteracy (5.6%) showed them to have the potential to be good 
democrats. Enacting the literacy test as a restrictive mechanism would exclude 
42.8% “of the very different race of southern Italy, the race…whose most notable 
political and social institution of the present day is the Camorra…”9 Lee asked, 
“Which of these two classes would the reader choose if he were starting out to 
select material for a democracy, the people of Florence, Genoa and Lombardy, or 
those of Sicily and Naples; the German burgher or the Russian peasant?”10 
Although the Bostonian believed that Italians not belonging to the race of Dante 
were racially inferior and would make poor specimens to build or sustain a 
republic, he was able to make the issue of desirability a function of political 
capacity and not racial identity. 
Other articles published by restrictionists in the period emphasized these 
aspects of the literacy test. Henry Pratt Fairchild, a sociologist at Yale University, 
used the pages of The American Journal of Sociology to express support for the 
Dillingham Commission’s final recommendations. Fairchild, who had grown up 
in the Midwest, became affiliated with the IRL after the publication of his book 
Immigration in 1913. Fairchild felt that it was the duty of academics, social 
                                                
9 Joseph Lee, “Democracy and the Illiteracy Test” The Survey 18 January 1913, 497-99; 498.  
 
10 Ibid, 498. 
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scientists, and experts to make a persuasive case to the public in favor of 
immigration restriction. He feared that if social scientists would “hold aloof” on 
immigration legislation, restriction would be pushed by “selfish interest[s] and 
quack politicians.” Fairchild listed several “evils” of immigration: there were too 
many immigrants arriving in the United States, and they concentrated in cities, 
which retarded their successful assimilation, lowered the standard of living, and 
increased crime. The Dillingham Commission’s recommendation of the literacy 
test as a method of restricting immigration was good, he wrote, because at least 
25% of all arriving immigrants over the age of fourteen could not read or write. 
Passing a law with a literacy clause would immediate cut the volume of 
immigration by one-quarter. But the Yale sociologist felt that none of the methods 
under Congressional consideration were perfect. The government should do more 
about the problem of immigration. Administratively, he argued that the federal 
government should take a more active role in distributing and spreading 
immigrants throughout the country, although this was a suggestion that the IRL 
consistently opposed.11 Advocates of “distribution” felt that spreading immigrants 
out geographically would ameliorate several of the problems with immigration 
                                                
11 Henry Pratt Fairchild, “Restriction of Immigration” The American Journal of Sociology v. 17, n. 
5 (March 1912), 637-46; 637 for quack politicians, 638-9 for “evils” of immigration and benefits 
of literacy test; 643 for increased federal intervention; idem., Immigration: A World Movement 
and its American Significance (New York: MacMillan Co., 1913). Regarding the distribution of 
immigrants, Prescott Hall had previously informed a correspondent that the League “has always 
opposed” such a provision, and that personally, Hall viewed it as “mostly a bluff of the Jews and 
steamship companies who throw dust in the eyes of the ignorant and prevent proper legislation; 
while those who have not thought much about the matter say ‘of course, that is the very thing to 
do.’” Prescott F. Hall to Maxwell F. Beals, 14 February 1910, IRL papers, box 2; see also Hall’s 
book Immigration and Its Effects Upon the United States. 
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that Fairchild had pointed out. The League’s opposition to such a program 
suggests an inflexibility on immigration matters, and their distinct antipathy to 
immigrants, regardless of where they were located, that were racially inferior.  
As a sociologist, Fairchild did not place great emphasis on the blood and 
race of immigrants. As a student of society, he instead saw the negative 
consequences of unrestricted immigration on crime, urban disorder and degraded 
labor conditions. Advocating restriction was partly a reflection of cultural and 
social anxieties, but it also demonstrated a humanitarian interest as well. 
Fairchild’s support for distribution shows that he was not motivated solely by 
racial fears, and that he believed that environmental and educational influences 
could be effective assimilating agents if the total numbers of immigrants were 
limited and their distribution better controlled.12  
Fairchild’s nuanced position was a minority one, though. The University 
of Wisconsin sociologist Edward A. Ross maintained a different attitude on 
immigration that manifested the influence of classic racialism. Historian John 
Higham calls Ross “one of the most race conscious of American social 
scientists.”13 Ross’s 1914 book, The Old World in the New was one of the last 
publications to deal with immigration before the war, and despite the relative 
sophistication of the book, it maintained strict allegiance to the primacy of nature 
over nurture, of biology over culture. Ross opened the book with a commentary 
                                                
12 Fairchild, “Restriction of Immigration.”  
 
13 Higham, Strangers in the Land, 109.  
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on the original composition of the American people, and the positive impact of 
the virgin environment on all the early settlers, the religious dissenters and the 
other less savory elements. “The regenerative stimulus of opportunity” he 
explained, had the remarkable effect of regenerating the positive characteristics of 
the settlers, effacing the moral taint of the relatively few convicts that were 
banished from Great Britain. In the New World, Ross claimed (with little 
supporting evidence), this settler population was reformed into good racial stock. 
The English criminals that arrived were either redeemed or, for those that were 
incurably lazy and shiftless, they became the progenitors of what Ross called the 
“poor whites,” “crackers” and “sandhillers” of southern Appalachia. French 
Huguenots, Germans, and the Scotch-Irish joined the British, the criminal and 
innocent alike, to forge a hardy nexus of population that would create the 
American republic.14 And each settler group had unique and particular 
characteristics that they contributed to the developing “American” population. 
Celtic Irish immigrants contributed poetry and eloquence, courage and loyalty, 
along with an unfortunate propensity to drink; German immigrants throughout the 
Midwest contributed conservative, sober, and respectful values. Scandinavians 
                                                
14 Edward Alsworth Ross, The Old World in the New: The Significance of Past and Present 
Immigration to the American People (New York: The Century Co., 1914), 9 for stimulus; 10-13 
for population attributes. The French Huguenots contributed a “sensibility, a fervor, and an artistic 
endowment all their own,” the Germans fantastic economic virtues, and the Scotch-Irish an iron 
will. English criminals, 9. Once the war began, restrictionists’ books became increasingly alarmist, 
and the “scientific” basis of it more spurious. 
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were desirable immigrants because they were highly literate and assimilated with 
speed, although they were prone to melancholy and insanity.15 
For the Wisconsin sociologist, these contributions to the American 
population were good. The Italians, Slavs and “East European Hebrews,” 
however, were a mixed addition to the American population.  Ross’s racial 
description of the Italian immigrants reflected the heavy influence of William 
Ripley. Ross drew a distinction between populations on the Italian peninsula, 
describing how the compartamenti of Lombardy, Venetia, and the Piedmont 
provided emigrants with “Celtic, Gothic, Lombard, and German” blood, while 
emigrants of the “Mediterranean race” in the south only added to America a dark-
skinned population that contained in it vestiges of Greek, Saracen, and African 
blood.16 Ross pointed out in his book that the Italian anthropologist Alfredo 
Niceforo himself deplored the inferiority of southern Italians. These swarthy, 
illiterate, undesirable immigrants, Ross declared, disembarked from steerage 
holds with low foreheads, open mouths, weak chins and skew faces, physical 
features that obviously showed an inability to “take rational care of themselves.”17  
But despite the southern Italian immigrants’ obvious racial inferiority, 
Ross found Jewish immigrants to the United States far more dangerous. The cause 
                                                
15 Ross, The Old World in the New, ch. 2 for Irish, ch. 3 for Germans, and ch. 4 for Scandinavians.  
 
16 Ibid., 97.  
 
17 Ibid., 8, 113. Ross also alarmingly saw southern Italian immigrants breaking down color 
distinctions in the South, where farmers welcomed them as replacements for troublesome black 
laborers. “A fear has sprung up,” he noted, “lest the Italians, being without the southern white 
man’s strong race feeling, should mix with the negroes and create a hybrid.” 104. Niceforo in 
Italiani del nord e italiani del sud provided anthropological support for this distinction as well.  
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of alarm was the economic and political power the Hebrews wielded. Jews in 
America, one-fifth of the world’s total population of Jews when Ross wrote, were 
the sole source of opposition to immigration restriction, he claimed. “The 
systematic campaign in newspapers and magazines to break down all arguments 
for restriction and to calm nativist fears is waged by and for one race,” the Jews. 
Ross accused all of the Jews in New York City, who allegedly controlled New 
York’s Congressional delegation, of opposing the passage of a literacy test. 
Ross’s Jews had a “herding instinct” from centuries of enforced ghetto life.18 But 
the professor maintained he was not an anti-Semite, because what he disliked 
about the Jews had nothing to do with their religion, but was the “certain ways 
and manners” of “the vulgar upstart parvenus…”19 These attitudes and his 
descriptions of the racial background of the old and new immigrants echoed the 
findings of the United States Immigration Commission, and the long reach of 
classic racialism. Ross argued that these undesirable groups – in particular the 
southern Italians, Slavs, and Jews – carried the racial inferiority in their 
bloodstream. Ripley had made the point that differences in racial groups were 
physical or anthropological. Ross, like Prescott Hall and Madison Grant after him, 
transmuted this physical difference to an evaluation of quality. Because they were 
different, they were undesirable and inferior, since they differed from what was 
regarded as the best or highest quality stock.  
                                                
18 Ibid., 143-45.  
 
19 Ibid., 165.  
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Ross’s book was significant because he was a sociologist, not an 
anthropologist, but was nonetheless heavily influenced by classic racialism. In the 
second part of his book, the professor turned to the social, political, economic and 
racial effects of immigration. The mere presence of inferior immigrants in the 
United States lowered the “general plane” of intelligence, self-restraint, 
refinement, orderliness, and efficiency. Immigrants, he believed, raised the levels 
of illiteracy, urban crime and poverty, and degraded the general position of 
women. Ross also predicted “Not until the twenty-first century will the 
philosophic historian be able to declare with scientific certitude that the cause of 
the mysterious decline that came upon the American people early in the twentieth 
century was the deterioration of popular intelligence by the admission of great 
numbers of backward immigrants.”20 When Ross turned the discussion to the 
effect of immigration on American racial stock and the descendants of the 
“pioneering breed,” the deep influence of classic racialism became clear. Ross 
explained how he stood in Union Square one afternoon at about the time the Fifth 
Avenue garment workers left work, and observed 368 people pass by. He 
maintained that a practiced eye – as many before had testified to the efficacy of 
experts – could immediately identify the undesirables among the crowd. Of all the 
workers on the street, only thirty-eight of them had what he considered to be an 
American visage. Twenty-percent of the total group were “hirsute, low-browed, 
                                                
20 Ibid., 228 for plane of intelligence; 230 for illiteracy; 235 for women; 239-40 for urban 
congestion and pauperism; twenty-first century 256.  
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big-faced persons of obviously low mentality.”21 Ross had also fallen under the 
sway of Walker’s demographic arguments: “William does not leave as many 
children as ‘Tonio because [William] will not huddle his family into one room, 
eat macaroni off a bare board, work his wife barefoot in the field, and keep his 
children weeding onions instead of at school.”22 A reader of Professor Ross’s 
book could only arrive at the conclusion that unrestricted immigration to the 
United States was a bane to the country. It was generating very few positive 
contributions while dramatically eroding the quality, stability, and promise of 
American life.  
These arguments and the recommendations of the Immigration 
Commission were, however, unable to compel presidential support to make 
immigration policy more restrictive. Under the Wilson administration, in early 
1913 the IRL had begun to consider reorganizing, in an effort to make the League 
less likely to “offend many otherwise friendly people,” hoping that a “positive 
name” would be better suited to garner support for restriction than a “negative 
name.” The suggestion of Robert DeCourcy Ward to rename the League as the 
“National Committee for Regulating Immigration” would enable the members to 
attract more people, and as Ward noted to Lee (a point that he obviously knew 
would garner Lee’s support) it would help convince “more people to give 
                                                
21 Ibid., 285-86.  
 
22 Ibid., 303. Ross’s book could be comical and perplexing. While discussing the physiognomy of 
immigrant types, Ross decried that foreigners were decreasing the “good looks” of the American 
race. (293) His veneration for the American race could also manifest itself in a cryptic, obscure 
manner: “Among all nationalities the Americans bear the palm for coolness, orderly saving of life, 
and consideration for the weak in shipwreck.” (295) 
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money.” Lee replied that he supported reorganization because it would give the 
Immigration Restriction League a chance for “roping in new people,” and he 
suggested specifically trying to recruit Ross and Commons, because they were 
successful in couching restriction in academic terms rather than on the basis of the 
immigrants’ alleged racial inferiority.23  
Hall joined the public debate over immigration policy with an article in the 
Journal of Political Economy in late 1913, just before Ross’s book was published. 
A new bill that Congress was considering in 1913, introduced by Senator 
Dillingham, used a different strategy to achieve immigration restriction. The bill 
replaced the literacy test with a method of numerical restriction, in the hope that 
some method of restriction would finally meet with Presidential approval. Despite 
this tactical shift Hall saw numerical restriction as inadequate to the task, as it 
“might not curtail immigration from southeastern Europe and Asia to any 
considerable extent, and it is therefore inferior to the reading test as a means of 
restriction….”24 Having seized upon the literacy test as the most desirable, 
effective, and simple method of restricting southern and eastern European 
                                                
 
23 Ward to Lee, 27 February 1913; Lee to Ward, 3 March 1913, both in box 1, Lee papers. 
Emphasis in original note. From Washington, D.C., the League’s Congressional lobbyist James H. 
Patten wrote to the Executive Committee to inform them that in his opinion, Albert Johnson, the 
League’s closest Congressional ally “is against us” because, although he publicly opposed 
immigration to his constituents, his objections were pragmatic, local, and particular. Patten began 
regarding Johnson as “a wolf in sheep’s clothing” because Johnson did not support restriction on 
fundamental principles, such as their impact on American racial characters. See James H. Patten to 
the Executive Committee of the Immigration Restriction League, 10 December 1913, box 3, IRL 
papers. Johnson maintained a complicated attitude toward immigration, particularly in regard to 
National Origins.  
 
 24 Prescott F. Hall, “The Recent History of Immigration and Immigration Restriction” Journal of 
Political Economy v. 21, n. 8 (October 1913), 735-51; 744-45.  
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immigration, League members supported it above all other methods. The literacy 
test would have the effect of immediately lowering, by a significant number, the 
volume of immigration from these undesirable areas, but it would not affect, as a 
numerical limit would, desirable immigration from the north and west of the 
continent. The League’s members did not mind how many of these “good” 
European immigrants might come, only how many of the bad Europeans came. 
The IRL’s leadership did not oppose immigration per se, but only certain types of 
immigration. If the numerical quotas would not limit the overall numbers of 
undesirable immigrants, it would be useless. The literacy test, because it would 
effect largely only southern and eastern European immigrants, was therefore more 
desirable a policy initiative, at least until the public’s attitude could be changed to 
think more like the IRL in excluding specific population groups that were 
biologically or eugenically dangerous, and the public would not change positions, 
Hall felt, until scientific evidence of the differences of the new immigrants could 
be provided. Eugenic science was to provide this evidence.  
But eugenics lacked a consensus of its laws and principles. The theoretical 
foundation of eugenics, that human organisms could be improved with careful 
breeding, lacked viable, experimental laboratory results to demonstrate that this 
improvement was possible. It could not, practically, be tried out and proven with 
human beings. Charles Rosenberg, a historian of American medical science, 
explains that, “Unfortunately, human beings are not so easily studied as garden 
peas or drosophila.” This difficulty did not prevent Davenport and his eugenic and 
restrictionist friends from maintaining “a rigid biological mechanis[m]” and 
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insisting “Every aspect of human behavior had its origins in definite physiological 
and anatomical mechanisms.”25 Because of the difficulty in proving the laws of 
inheritance and heredity in human beings, the focus of early eugenics occurred in 
several broad areas: animal breeding, race betterment and human sterilization, and 
pedigree analysis. Rich with possibilities for alleviating human afflictions, 
eugenics attracted a great deal of attention and enthusiasm from both professional 
scientists and untrained laypersons. But ironically, as historian Philip Pauly 
observes, “what is notable” about American eugenic biologists was “how little 
eugenics research they did.”26 One of the ways advocates of eugenics popularized 
and explained the movement’s goals, aside from the work that Davenport and the 
Eugenics Record Office conducted, was through educational seminars and public 
events. The movement’s close ties with the American Breeders’ Association 
presented opportunities for discussions of eugenics at state and county fairs, and 
exemplified breeding and good heredity through “Better Baby” contests. With the 
creation of the Race Betterment Foundation in the early 1910s, a partner 
organization for eugenics, with the specific goal of educating the public on the 
methods of racial improvement, was born. The members of the Immigration 
Restriction League would work closely with the Foundation to both prove the 
                                                
 
25 Rosenberg, No Other Gods, peas from 91; mechanisms from 93. Drosophila were the fruit flies 
on which Thomas Hunt Morgan made his extraordinary discoveries of chromosomes and genetics. 
For an essential introduction, see Garland Allen, Thomas Hunt Morgan: The Man and His Science 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978).  
 
26 Pauly, Biologists and the Promise of American Life, 225. 
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efficacy of eugenics and to educate the public about the connection between 
eugenics and immigration. 
The Race Betterment Foundation had difficulty in maintaining the 
scientific integrity of its meetings though. The First National Conference on Race 
Betterment was held in January 1914, at the Battle Creek Sanitarium in Battle 
Creek, Michigan. The director of the Sanitarium, John Harvey Kellogg, served on 
the Executive Committee, along with Irving Fisher, Rev. Newell Hillis, Sir 
Horace Plunkett, and Jacob Riis. Fisher was a political economist from Yale with 
restrictionist interests, Hillis was a pastor at a Brooklyn church, Plunkett an 
agricultural minister for the Irish territories, and Riis was associated with New 
York’s Henry Street Settlement, and was also the author of How the Other Half 
Lives (1890). The disparate interests and backgrounds of the Executive 
Committee reflected the various tensions within the Race Betterment Foundation; 
the goal of the Conference was “To assemble evidence as to the extent to which 
degenerative tendencies are actively at work in America, and to promote agencies 
for Race Betterment,” but it gave no concrete or effective strategies to achieve 
this. As presented at the conference, “Race Betterment” seemed to include just 
about every type of reform, regulation, and recommendation.27 From the varied 
                                                
 
27 Race Betterment Foundation, Proceedings of the First National Conference on Race Betterment 
(Battle Creek: The Race Betterment Foundation, 1914), xi (hereafter First Conference 
Proceedings). Riis’s book How the Other Half Lives was a shocking portrayal of the 
predominantly immigrant slums in New York City. His camera captured the despair, plight, 
poverty – and for nativists, the danger – of the immigrant classes in and around the city.  
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associations at the upper levels of the Foundation’s Executive Committee, the 
methods of racial improvement splintered almost uncontrollably.  
The organization and interests represented in Battle Creek were almost 
chaotic. The program of the conference was divided into several categories: 
Statistical Studies; General Individual Hygiene; Alcohol and Tobacco; Child Life; 
Sex Questions; School and Industrial Hygiene; City, State and National Hygiene; 
and Eugenics and Immigration.28  The last set of papers listed in the program was 
of critical importance for advocates of immigration restriction, and the papers 
presented there constituted one of the first large public forums after the 
Dillingham Commission’s report for restrictionists to make the case for changing 
American immigration policies. Four of the speakers for that segment of the 
Conference were deeply involved in the restriction movement until the 1930s. The 
essential difficulty of the conference, however, was made clear in the opening 
address of Stephen Smith, the president of the conference. A medical doctor, 
Smith was also a vice president of the New York State Board of Charities, and he 
came to race betterment with a decidedly environmentalist approach, which at its 
core opposed classic racialist principles. Although the doctor suggested to his 
audience that an important goal of the movement was to prevent the birth of 
“degenerates,” he also insisted that there was an obligation to improve the living 
conditions and environment of people. For Smith, the environment was the most 
important facet of racial uplift and one of the principal causes of degeneration. 
While this might have rankled some of the attendees like Charles Davenport, 
                                                
28  Ibid, v-x.  
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Harry H. Laughlin, and Robert DeCourcy Ward, all of whom spoke on 
“Immigration and Eugenics,” Smith insisted that race betterment could only work 
if rooted in the “immutable basis of science.”29 For Davenport, Laughlin and 
Ward, Smith’s recommendation was highly dubious, since in their minds, the 
environmental influence on personal physical development was minimal at best.  
The presentations of several of the speakers at the conference raised 
troubling questions of just how immutable the basis science was. Scientific 
knowledge seemed, in fact, to be unclear. For instance, Walter Wilcox, a 
professor of Political Economy and Statistics at Cornell University pointed out 
that the proportion of sterile marriages was highest among marriages where the 
wives were born in the United States. This provided additional statistical evidence 
for Walker’s replacement thesis, although Wilcox did not offer an explanation as 
to why these women became infertile.30 Several of the speakers offered positive 
solutions for racial improvement, particularly those who spoke on “School and 
Industrial Hygiene” and “City, State, and National Hygiene.”31 Yet the majority of 
the papers dealt in some way with the specter of racial degeneration in the United 
States. In particular, connections between degeneration and immigration were 
                                                
 
29 Stephen Smith, “The Basic Principles of Race Betterment” First Conference Proceedings, 5-22.  
 
30 Walter Wilcox, “Differential Fecundity” First Conference Proceedings, 79-89.  
 
31 See, for instance, F. O. Clements, “Industrial Welfare” First Conference Proceedings, 356-64; 
Stephen Smith, “The National Department of Health” ibid., 376-79; S. S. McClure, “Government” 
ibid., 393-400. One of the more interesting panelists for “City, State and National Hygiene,” 
which lies beyond the scope of this paper, was Booker T. Washington’s lecture on “The Negro 
Race.” See also the discussion of “positive” and “negative” eugenics in Ludmerer, Genetics and 
American Society.  
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made throughout the entire conference. Dr. H. W. Austin, who worked for the 
United States Public Health Service (USPHS) at the Detroit-Windsor border, 
explained that the USPHS was involved not only with problems of disease 
outbreaks, water pollution, and milk cleanliness throughout the country. One of 
the most important tasks of the Service was the exclusion of diseased, insane, or 
physically disabled immigrants.32 Exclusion of immigrants of this type was key 
for preventing the further racial deterioration of the country. 
The medical inspection of immigrants was an important concern for 
restrictionists. It served a critical function of protecting the health of the American 
population by preventing the landing of diseased and contagious immigrants on 
the shores on the United States. Western scientists had gradually developed a 
chemical and bacteriological understanding of disease and contamination, 
replacing the older language of miasmatic contamination. Historian Amy Lauren 
Fairchild points out that this new language reinforced the perception of 
immigrants as pathogenic threats.33 In 1892, the United States Secretary of the 
Treasury, Charles Foster, explained to Congress, “Every serious epidemic that 
this country has ever known has been traced to the immigrant and it must be 
apparent that the same authority that controls immigration should control 
                                                
32 H.W. Austin, “What the United States Public Health Service is doing for Race Betterment” First 
Conference Proceedings, 385-90.  
 
33 Amy Lauren Fairchild, “Science at the Borders: Immigrant Medical Inspection and Defense of 
the Nation, 1891 to 1930” (Ph.D. Diss., Columbia University, 1997), 33, 38; idem., Science at the 
Borders: Immigrant Medical Inspection and the Shaping of the Modern Industrial Labor Force 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003). 
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quarantine.”34 As medical science became more advanced and sophisticated at 
understanding the origin of diseases, there grew alongside it a language that 
associated immigrants specifically with disease, what the medical historian Alan 
Kraut calls “medicalized nativism.”35 
Medicalized nativism reflected genuine and legitimate concerns for the 
public health with increasing immigration at the end of the 1800s. Beginning in 
1891, the federal government mandated that immigrants with “loathsome and 
dangerous diseases,” such as trachoma, favus, cholera, venereal disease, insanity, 
feeble-mindedness and epilepsy be excluded from entry. In the early twentieth 
century, provisions extending exclusion to include diseases that rendered the 
immigrant likely to be a public charge – heart disease, poor eyesight, senility, 
poor physique and others – were also put in place. Fairchild notes that the effect 
of these clauses reinforced the fears that immigrants were dangerous threats to the 
United States; she explains, “when groups of immigrants failed to conform to 
societal expectations about the industrial worker, the [medical] examination 
worked to exclude those groups at the nation’s borders on the understanding that 
they were not racially fit for industrial labor.” Science and medicine played a key 
role, she suggests, “in rationalizing these exclusions, and the medical examination 
served as a flexible tool to achieve higher exclusion rates in regions of the country 
                                                
34 Bess Furman, A Profile of the United States Public Health Service, 1798-1948 (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973), quoted on 210-11.  
 
35 Alan Kraut, Silent Travelers: Germs, Genes, and the ‘Immigrant Menace’ (New York: Basic 
Books, 1994), 4.  
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receiving greater shares of ‘undesirable’ immigrants.”36 The Immigration 
Restriction League in fact frequently targeted the inspection facilities at Ellis 
Island and in Boston as places where political pressure displaced expert medical 
knowledge to admit immigrants who otherwise would be inadmissible because of 
their physical or medical conditions.37 
The role that medical doctors played in protecting the public health from 
diseased immigrants provides another instance of the increasing role that 
professionals and experts played in immigration policy. Like the Dillingham 
Commission, which the American Genetics Association had called “an 
unprejudiced and competent body of experts” in 1914, the bodies and health of 
immigrants became subject to the examination of trained medical experts. Alan 
Kraut describes the professionalism of the medical examiners, who “were acutely 
aware of refusing to permit an ever-louder chorus of restrictionists from 
influencing their medical diagnoses, even if those diagnoses were from time to 
time unconsciously shaped by their own ethnic biases.”38 Two physicians who 
                                                
36 Amy Lauren Fairchild, “Policies of Inclusion: Immigrants, Disease, Dependence, and American 
Immigration Policy at the Dawn and Dusk of the 20th Century” American Journal of Public Health 
v. 94, n. 4 (April 2004), 528-39; quote from 532; classes of exclusion from 531.  
 
37 For instance, see Joseph Lee to Mr. Crane, 9 December 1912, Lee papers, box 1; M. Victor 
Safford to Prescott Hall, 2 April 1912, IRL papers, box 3; Lodge to Lee, 9 April 1921 and Lee to 
Lodge, 12 April 1921, both Lee papers box 3.  
 
38 “Second Report of the Committee on Immigration of the Eugenics Section of the American 
Genetic Association” Journal of Heredity v. 5, n. 7 (July 1914), 297; Kraut, Silent Travelers, 57. 
Also helpful are Elizabeth Yew, “Medical Inspection of Immigrants at Ellis Island, 1891-1924” 
The Bulletin of the New York Academy of Medicine v. 56, n. 5 (June 1980), 488-510; Anne-
Emanuelle Birn, “Six Seconds Per Eyelid: The Medical Inspection of Immigrants at Ellis Island, 
1892-1914” Dynamis v. 17 (1997), 281-316; Howard Markel, “‘The Eyes Have It’: Trachoma, the 
Perception of Disease, the United States Public Health Service, and the American Jewish 
Immigration Experience, 1897-1924” Bulletin of the History of Medicine v. 74, n. 3 (2000), 525-
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were engaged in the medical inspection of immigrants talked about their 
experiences and made this point explicitly. Doctor E. H. Mullan argued that the 
expertise of medical doctors enabled them to not only assess the physical fitness 
of an immigrant, but also insisted “Experience enables the inspecting officer to 
tell at a glance the race of an alien.”39 Mullan’s training and expertise, the 
immutable scientific basis for his decisions to admit or exclude immigrants, 
suggested that policy or politicians could not overrule the doctor’s opinions. 
Victor Safford, who worked in both Boston and Ellis Island, similarly insisted that 
a glance enabled the trained expert to recognize the physical ailments, race, and 
desirability of the immigrant. Safford explained that the danger of not excluding 
these “defective or inferior types” was because they would replicate the 
conditions of their homeland in the United States, and further endanger the public 
health of their new country.40 They threatened the racial progress and 
improvement of the country.  
                                                                                                                                
60; Nayan Shah, Contagious Divides: Epidemics and Race in San Francisco’s Chinatown 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); Alan M. Kraut, “Southern Italian Immigration to 
the United States at the Turn of the Century and the Perennial Problem of Medicalised Prejudice” 
in Lara Marks, Michael Worboys, eds. Migrants, Minorities and Health: Historical and 
Contemporary Studies (NY: Routledge, 1997), 228-46. 
 
39 E. H. Mullan, “Mental Examination of Immigrants” Public Health Reports n. 398 (18 May 
1917), 733-46; 737. Mullan noted that “After constantly observing the passing of thousands of 
immigrants the experienced eye of an examiner will quickly detect the slightest irregularity in 
gait.” 735. He also provided a list of the markings that immigrants suspected of being medically 
inadmissible received while undergoing cursory medical inspection – which happened to roughly 
15-20% of arriving aliens. 736. 
 
40 Victor Safford, Immigration Problems: Personal Experiences of an Official (New York: Dodd, 
Mead ad Co., 1925), 15; 238 for replicating conditions. Also, Fairchild, Science at the Borders.  
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Outbreaks of contagious diseases, such as the severe cholera epidemics in 
Italy in 1884 and 1911, also reflected poorly on the characteristics of the 
European nations that sent immigrants to the United States and raised significant 
worries about the safety of public health in America. The historian Frank 
Snowden’s study of cholera epidemics in Naples argues that the persistence of 
this disease of poverty – spread by poor sanitation, housing and sewer systems – 
served to reinforce perceptions of southern Italians as different from the 
northerners. “Cholera crystallized the political and cultural current known as the 
‘Southern Question,’” he writes, explaining that the political problems in the 
Kingdom were compounded by the alleged neglect of the liberal state to 
improving the environmental and economic conditions in the mezzogiorno. After 
the 1884 epidemic the Kingdom of Italy began a large-scale urban renewal 
program that tried to modernize the infrastructure of Italy’s largest city. But when 
another outbreak hit the city in 1911, the Italian government concealed it from the 
international community, fearing that the failure of public health reforms would 
reflect poorly on the character and quality of Neapolitan immigrants.41 Combined 
with the anthropological descriptions of southern Italians as “Mediterranean” or 
“Latin,” and thus different from the Nordic or Anglo-Saxon population base of 
the United States and its “old” immigrants, concerns over medicine played 
                                                
41 Frank Snowden, Naples in the Time of Cholera, 1884-1911 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995), quote from 5; see Part IV for the “secret epidemic”; Part III for the risanamento 
program.  
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another important role in rationalizing, on a scientific basis, the exclusion of 
certain races of immigrants.  
If the medical fitness of immigrants was an important axis for justifying 
restriction, the association between immigration and eugenics was even more 
important. The argument in this case concerned the role of immigrants as future 
parents of native-born Americans. At the First Race Betterment Conference in 
Battle Creek, Michigan, a panel on Eugenics and Immigration had tried to provide 
reassurance that the eugenic quality of immigrants was being taken seriously by 
advocates of restriction. Men like Harry H. Laughlin who had absolute confidence 
in the scientific basis for studying and improving the American racial stock, gave 
lectures about the progress of eugenics in the United States. Since 1910 Laughlin 
had been Superintendent of the Eugenics Record Office at Davenport’s Cold 
Spring Harbor facilities, and he described the success of sterilization legislation 
like the one passed by Indiana in 1907. Laughlin detailed other methods that 
could be used to design more effective programs for preventing undesirable 
parents from producing undesirable offspring. Another medical doctor, C. W. 
Saleeby, who discussed methods of racial regeneration, followed Laughlin’s talk. 
Two of the panelists on Eugenics and Immigration explained ways to determine 
and encourage “sound” marriages – by which both meant fruitful marriages 
between persons of good stock.42 While some of these presentations were 
                                                
42 H. H. Laughlin, “Calculations on the Working Out of a Proposed Program of Sterilization” First 
Conference Proceedings, 478-94; C. W. Saleeby, “The Methods of Race Regeneration” ibid., 476-
77; Rev. Walter Taylor Sumner, “The Health Certificate—A Safeguard Against Vicious Selection 
in Marriage” ibid., 509-13; Roswell Johnson, “Marriage Selection” ibid., 515-32. One of 
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optimistic, many told of impending ruin for the United States. When Robert 
DeCourcy Ward took the podium to speak on “Race Betterment and Our 
Immigration Laws,” he made the connection between immigration restriction, 
eugenics and classic racialism clear by attributing American racial degeneration to 
the “new” immigration.  
Racial improvement must mean more than preventing unfit native-born 
persons from breeding, Ward cautioned. It must also mean selecting immigrants 
of only the highest quality for admission. It was the prerogative of the United 
States, he insisted, to determine which immigrant types should be admitted, and 
which immigrants should not: “We can decide upon what merits—physical, 
mental, moral—these incoming aliens shall be selected.” Failing to do so, he 
warned, would adulterate the pure lines of old stock Americans, and lower the 
physical and mental standards of the country. “The real wealth of a nation,” he 
explained, “is the quality of its people.”43 As policy makers and the American 
                                                                                                                                
Laughlin’s suggestions, which was adopted as a resolution, was for the forced sterilization of 
degenerate stocks after a process of “racial” segregation. “Resolutions” First Conference 
Proceedings, 592. On sterilization laws, see Philip Reilly, The Surgical Solution: A History of 
Involuntary Sterilization in the United States (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991); 
Mark Largent, Breeding Contempt: The History of Coerced Sterilization in the United States (New 
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2008). 
 
43 Robert DeCourcy Ward, “Race Betterment and Our Immigration Laws” First Conference 
Proceedings, 542-46. “Merits” from 542; “Wealth of a nation” from 546. In Davenport’s 
discussion on “The Relative Effects of Heredity and Environment” (ibid., 471-72), he applauded 
the previous lecturer’s admission that psychological defects seem, in many cases, to be inherited 
(the lecture was by a sociologist, Herbert Adolphus Miller, “The Psychological Limits of 
Eugenics” ibid., 456-64). But he then proceeded to use the example of the Kallikak family to 
prove, even more forcefully—and frighteningly—the “fact” that feeble-mindedness, as was shown 
in the two branches of the Kallikak family, was inherited, and was predetermined by the mental 
quality of only one of the parents. See Herbert Henry Goddard, The Kallikak Family: A Study in 
the Heredity of Feeble-Mindedness (New  York: The Macmillan Company, 1912); Leila 
Zenderland, Measuring Minds: Herbert Henry Goddard and the Origins of American Intelligence 
Testing (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), esp. chap. 5.  
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public began paying more attention to conservation of forests, parks, and open-
space, they were missing the most important conservation of all: that of the pure 
racial blood of America.  
But the scientific character of some of the papers at the conference was 
spurious even by the standards of the time. Shortly after its conclusion Irving 
Fisher sent out a questionnaire to attendees to get their reactions and thoughts on 
the conference. Davenport replied in early March and suggested that he was not 
overly impressed with many of the papers. The value of the papers “and [their] 
contributions to knowledge” was decidedly varied. This was to be expected, the 
eugenicist noted, “owing to the fact that a good many who spoke were not at all 
men of science, merely expressing very emphatically their opinion.” Should there 
be another conference, he told Fisher that he leaned toward making the program a 
little more scientific. Davenport did concede, though, the importance of keeping 
the conference intellectually accessible to the public, and keeping the papers from 
being so esoteric as to be incomprehensible to non-experts. As an example of the 
type of papers that he had in mind, Davenport pointed to J. McKeen Cattell’s 
statistical paper on “The Causes of the Declining Birth Rate” which was 
empirically rigorous but also easily understood.44 Making their complex scientific 
theories easily accessible to the lay public was one of the key obstacles that men 
like Jennings and Boas faced in combating classic racialist ideas.  
                                                
 
44 Charles Davenport to Irving Fisher, 3 March 1914, Davenport papers; J. McKeen Cattell, “The 
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At the time he made these observations, Davenport was rather sensitive 
about the quality of scientific work coming from the eugenics movement. Because 
there was no scientific consensus on what the mechanism or vector of inheritance 
was, a number of ideas were circulating that purported to explain it. As Davenport 
had noted about the Battle Creek conference, some of these explanations were not 
scientific at all, but were merely strenuous assertions of opinion. But Davenport 
was equally guilty of this. Although Thomas Hunt Morgan and others were 
putting the final touches on what the historian Stephen Brush refers to as 
“Morgan’s Chromosome Theory of Heredity” at the time the Race Betterment 
Foundation was meeting, the chasm between the quality of Morgan’s research 
work and Davenport’s was tremendous.45 
Davenport had recently published two books that were, in some circles, 
very critically reviewed. David Heron, who worked at the Galton Laboratory at 
University College London, the source of Anglo-American eugenics work, 
attacked Davenport’s work publicly in The New York Times in late 1913.46 Two of 
                                                
45 Stephen Brush, “How Theories became Knowledge: Morgan’s Chromosome Theory of Heredity 
in America and Britain” Jl Hist Bio v. 35, n. 3 (Fall 2002), 471-535. Morgan and his coauthors 
explained that “every character is the realized result of the reaction of hereditary factors with each 
other and with their environment.” T. H. Morgan, A. H. Sturtevant, H. J. Muller, C. B. Bridges, 
The Mechanism of Mendelian Heredity rev. ed (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1922 [orig. 
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Davenport’s professional friends, Jennings and Pearl, were becoming increasingly 
suspicious of the quality of the work coming out of Cold Spring Harbor under 
Davenport’s name.47 Fisher’s elevated position as a vice president and member of 
the Executive Committee of the First National Conference on Race Betterment 
should have given Davenport pause as well, since Fisher—whose native 
discipline was political economy—had become interested in eugenics only in 
1911. His knowledge of the principal ideas and theories behind eugenics was 
superficial.48 Davenport should have been cautious with Fisher regardless, because 
of the attitudes toward popularizing eugenics that Fisher expressed to Davenport 
in December 1913.  
But Davenport and eugenics supporters were in a bind. They needed to 
inform and educate the public about the main ideas of eugenics in an accessible 
language, but this tended to flatten out the genuine scientific complexity of 
heredity, which they evidently did not fully understand themselves. Throughout 
the summer of 1913, Davenport and Fisher discussed these difficulties. By 
December, Davenport wrote to unequivocally decline a role in propagandizing the 
movement. As he explained that the public’s perception of eugenics was that it 
was synonymous with sex hygiene, Davenport began distancing himself from 
                                                
47 Discussing some of Karl Pearson’s recent critiques of Mendelists, Pearl described the “horrible 
drubbing” that Heron gave Davenport’s work on canaries. “It brings out in brutal fashion what I 
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1910, Jennings papers, emphasis original. See also Mezzano, “The Progressive Origins of 
Eugenics Critics.”  
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public statements in favor of the movement. “If it becomes clear,” he wrote, “that 
the Eugenics Record Office must go into propaganda that means that I have to 
part company with it.…I have been close enough to the whirling maelstrom in 
eugenics to want to keep as far away from it as possible.” Fisher was undeterred, 
and insisted to his associate that one could not have it both ways, so to speak: one 
could not expect the scientific aspect of eugenics to be understood by the public, 
which is what the ultimate goal of eugenics required, without dealing in 
propaganda. Fisher felt himself being drawn more and more into propaganda 
work, because it was an essential component of the movement. Knowing 
Davenport’s affinity for the Austrian monk whose breakthrough research on peas 
had languished in obscurity for over forty years, Fisher closed the letter with his 
trump card: “Mendel gives an excellent example of how the practical value of 
scientific work may be overlooked and its utilization deferred for lack of 
machinery ready [at] hand to convey the result of such researches as Mendel’s to 
the people and places where it can be made use of.”49 Despite Fisher’s use of one 
of Davenport’s great intellectual heroes, Davenport remained steadfast; he would 
continue, for the most part, to leave much of the work of popularizing eugenics to 
others. When the Second National Conference on Race Betterment was held 
eighteen moths later in San Francisco, Davenport did not give a paper.50 
                                                
49 Davenport to Fisher, 16 December 1913; Fisher to Davenport, 18 December 1913, both 
Davenport papers. 
 
50 Official Proceedings of the Second National Conference on Race Betterment (Battle Creek, MI: 
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When men of the biological sciences spoke in public about the 
possibilities of scientific knowledge, even if they spoke inaccurately, their 
scientific credentials and standing would at least give the impression of scientific 
truth. But who would perform this popularizing role? Davenport may have 
wavered, but he recognized the risk when “men of science” did not get involved. 
He would witness these difficulties in the 1920s in the work of Albert Wiggam, 
who was not a scientist, but who advanced extravagant claims of what eugenics 
could do. Controlling the information that was spread about eugenics became 
almost as important as conducting research in its constituent fields.   
The allure of the eugenics movement was its promise, as Davenport 
explained, to improve the quality of human existence. Yet the non-scientific 
followers of the movement misrepresented – sometimes inadvertently, sometimes 
intentionally – what eugenics was able to prove. Occasionally, the efforts of 
eugenic propagandists met with swift criticism from the actual scientific 
practitioners. Intellectual leaders of eugenics were aware of these fringe 
followers, and tried to constrain how they represented eugenics to the public. This 
was not always an easy feat. With the work of propagandists like Madison Grant, 
Albert Earnest Wiggam, and Lothrop Stoddard, all of whom raised the shrill cry 
of racial degeneration, the dissemination of eugenic ideas and precepts reached a 
                                                                                                                                
Masque”—a play in two acts performed by over 200 students from the University of California 
designed to be a “dramatic representation of the Great Truths for which the National Conference 
on Race Betterment Stands”—made the whole conference seem like a farce. The conference was 
held in San Francisco to coincide with the Panama-Pacific International Exposition held in August 
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large audience. But the scientific accuracy of their claims was very problematic. 
Davenport and other researchers in eugenics faced a double-edged sword.  
Davenport had great difficulty trying to manage these two competing 
impulses. His position on immigration shows some of the obstacles he and other 
eugenicists faced. They needed scientific proof in support of eugenics, but had 
little idea of what that scientific proof might be. When Henry H. Goddard went 
out on a research trip in 1909, Davenport instructed him “to collect facts 
supporting the conclusion that the offspring of two imbecile parents are all 
imbecile.” Although science was supposed to be a cautious empirical study, 
Davenport wanted to deduce facts that fit his a priori beliefs. Goddard was just 
beginning his career in eugenics, and was appreciative of Davenport’s help. “I 
must depend on you for much guidance. I have much more zeal than knowledge 
in this field, tho [sic] I hope to practically remedy that in time.” The following 
spring, after Goddard had collected some information on feeblemindedness and 
its hereditary lineage in a rural New Jersey family, he expressed concern to 
Davenport that publishing the material might allow opponents of eugenics to 
“queer” the whole country against the movement. Davenport’s reply to Laughlin 
is significant, in that it explains the basic position of the former Harvard professor 
on propaganda and scientific knowledge. “There is no use in collecting facts,” he 
told Laughlin, “unless they can be put before at least the scientific public to form 
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the basis of eventual action.”51 For Davenport, knowledge was a means to an end, 
not an end in itself. 
This attitude had gotten Davenport into trouble before. Jennings had 
noticed it privately back in 1896 when he studied with Davenport in Cambridge, 
but he was not the only one to do so. Karl Pearson, one of England’s most gifted 
mathematicians, was one of the first academics to roundly criticize Davenport’s 
scientific work. Davenport and Pearson had a stormy correspondence in the early 
century that foreshadowed many of the problems scientists would have with 
Davenport’s work. In the first years of the twentieth century, Pearson had turned 
to Davenport to recommend American students to study biometry in London, with 
Pearson. The English mathematician hoped the students would then return to the 
United States to spread the new science of biometrics throughout North 
America.52 In October 1902, Pearson wrote a testimonial in support of 
Davenport’s application for funding from the Carnegie Institute in Washington, in 
which he praised Davenport’s “résumé of recent statistical theory.”53 In the 
following spring, however, Pearson’s attitude began to change. Responding to a 
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request from the American eugenicist to cooperate on a book of statistical 
methodology, Pearson refused, since Pearson felt that his own biometrical 
methods were far in advance of what Davenport would be relating to American 
pupils. The Englishman also warned Davenport of a trend that he perceived in the 
American scientific community that often led scientific men “to accept 
incautiously and without due criticism results which will not really bear 
investigation.” In particular, Pearson singled out the privileged role that 
Americans gave to Mendel’s theories without proper scientific verification.54 In a 
telling commentary on a paper that Davenport submitted to Pearson’s journal 
Biometrika in 1903, Pearson crisply summarized the difficulties Davenport had 
throughout his career of over-drawing conclusions: “The opinions you give there 
in no way follow from your measurements, in fact have nothing whatever to do 
with them. There is no objection to a contributor drawing conclusions from the 
results of his investigations, but we have in the interests of the journal set our face 
against mere expression of opinions.”55 This submission by Davenport was not 
published.  
But these remained private rebukes. Public criticism of Davenport’s work 
did not begin until A. Rudolf Galloway, a researcher based in Aberdeen, 
published his research on canaries in Biometrika in late 1909. In 1908 the 
Carnegie Institution of Washington published some of Davenport’s research on 
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canaries, which was the principal source of financial support for the Eugenics 
Research Office at Cold Spring Harbor. Davenport’s paper was an attempt to 
examine the rules of inheritance in canaries of certain physical attributes like 
plumage, coloring, feather distribution, and the shape or form of crests on the 
breast of the small birds.56 The certainty with which Davenport believed rules of 
inheritance could be precisely documented – which he insisted followed strict 
Mendelian patterns of dominant and recessive inheritance – was misplaced, and 
his a priori method of scientific investigation sparked criticism from the scientific 
community on both sides of the Atlantic.  
Davenport’s sloppy research generated a specific investigation to refute it; 
Galloway began his study in response to serious flaws that he found in 
Davenport’s research sample in Inheritance in Canaries. The British researcher 
explained that, “Most of the original birds used [by Davenport] were of the Hartz 
mountain variety…bred purely for song quite regardless of colour and crest, the 
two points concerning which the author wished to test Mendel’s theories…” So 
the inheritance patterns that Davenport was trying to prove were not likely to be 
shown in the species that Davenport had selected for study. But the poor choice of 
experimental subject was the least of the problems Galloway found with 
Davenport’s work. The British researcher refuted many of the claims that 
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Davenport advanced by noting the American’s statistical sloppiness, careless 
classifications, and general mathematical errors. He found little scientific value in 
Davenport’s paper.57  
In spite of this harsh rebuke, Biometrika was good enough to allow 
Davenport to respond to Galloway’s criticisms, and printed Davenport’s self-
defense in the April issue, along with further rebuttals from Galloway. The 
American eugenicist maintained that his specimen sample was carefully chosen, 
because he was interested in obtaining the evidence for the inheritance of color. 
To Davenport, Galloway’s criticisms were like those of a bird fancier who was 
objecting to the imprecise use of terminology by a scientist. Davenport defended 
his claims, stating “I know more about [the canaries’] germ plasm than most 
punctilious fanciers do about that of their pure breeds. And a knowledge of 
performance of germ plasm, not capacity for satisfying the conditions of the 
‘Standard’ is what I have worked for.” Writing for an international scientific 
community, Davenport viewed his work as far more important than utilizing the 
precise vernacular of bird watchers and hobbyists.58 He reacted defensively to this 
                                                
 
57 A. Rudolf Galloway, “Canary Breeding: A Partial Analysis of Records from 1891-1901” 
Biometrika v. 7, n. 1/2 (July – October, 1909), 1-42. Quote from p. 2. 
 
58 Charles Benedict Davenport, “Dr. Galloway’s ‘Canary Breeding’” Biometrika v. 7, n. 3 (April 
1910), 398-400. Davenport also included at the conclusion a jibe at editorial staff at Biometrika, 
which included Karl Pearson. Galloway’s negative reaction in the 1909 article surprised him, as it 
showed the author failed to understand the Mendelian laws in a scholarly journal where, 
Davenport sarcastically noted, “the Mendelian theory is so often appreciated and supported.” 
Seeing his Mendelian paper on canaries in print in Biometrika gave him satisfaction, as it showed 
“the increasing catholicity” of the editors to publish Mendelian papers. This elicited a harsh 
editorial rebuke from Pearson, who wrote in a footnote at the conclusion of the paper that “No 
paper dealing with heredity from the Mendelian standpoint has ever been refused by this journal, 
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criticism because of the importance of maintaining scientific authority for his 
work at Cold Spring Harbor.  
Galloway was not swayed by this defense. Scientifically, in “all 
probability” Davenport’s statements were “valueless” and his interpretations 
“extremely faulty.” Davenport’s essay had argued that his findings overturned 
previous conclusions regarding the inheritance of plumage and crest color, despite 
the fact that these older conclusions were based on a specific sample of pure-bred 
birds, and a similarly carefully chosen sample would be necessary to verify the 
inheritance. “From his assumptions both in the matter of crest, and plumage-
color,” Galloway wrote, “it is quite impossible for [Davenport] to arrive at any 
scientifically correct, or practically useful conclusion.”59 Not only was the 
scientific contribution of Davenport’s work suspect, it also began a thunderous 
dispute with David Heron – another Englishman who worked with Karl Pearson – 
that would last for almost five years.  
Heron jumped on Davenport’s research in the same issue of Biometrika, 
and like Galloway, Heron provided significant criticisms of Davenport’s sloppy 
research on canaries. Heron’s criticism was limited to the specific arguments of 
inheritance of crests and lists of matings that Davenport made, in order to 
“measure the scientific weight of [Davenport’s] paper.” He found it significantly 
                                                                                                                                
although such papers would be declined if they were considered inadequate experimentally or 
theoretically.” 400. These were precisely the problems that Davenport’s work often had.  
 
59 A. Rudolf Galloway, “Canary Breeding. A Rejoinder to C. B. Davenport” Biometrika v. 7, n. 3 
(April 1910), 401-03, quotes from 403.  
 
 Chapter 4 244 
  
lacking in any scientific weight at all. The presentation of the material itself was 
“very defective,” and many of the statistical tables were “self-contradictory.” 
Heron pointed out instances where Davenport’s conclusions could not possibly be 
supported from the evidence he provided. He expressed a tone of exasperation at 
the terrible quality of work that Davenport published, and insisted that the 
publication of material like Davenport’s canary work was retarding the scientific 
verification of the Mendelian theory.60 The Englishman’s campaign against 
Davenport’s work peaked in late 1913, when Heron voiced his criticisms in the 
pages of The New York Times.  
Davenport’s sloppy work risked discrediting all of the research being done 
on Long Island under his guidance. So in January 1913, The New York Times 
interviewed Davenport for a story defending Cold Spring Harbor’s research 
projects, calling the complex “the country’s clearing house for scientific race 
investigations.” The entire purpose of the Eugenics Record Office and the Station 
for Experimental Evolution, the newspaper reported, was to collect data to prove 
the possibility of bringing about “race progress” and combating  “race 
deficiency.” The article explained that one of the ERO’s current investigations 
involved the inheritance of musical talent. Following Galton’s work in the 1860s 
and 1870s on inheritance of ability, Davenport declared in the interview that the 
history of North America proved that “like marries like,” which had the beneficial 
effect of keeping hereditary strains pure in respect to certain characters. The old 
                                                
60 David Heron, “Inheritance in Canaries: A Study in Mendelism” Biometrika v. 7, n. 3 (April 
1910), 403-410.  
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families that settled the Massachusetts Bay Colony and the Virginia Colony, 
Davenport told the interviewer, “constituted nearly pure strains of scholarship and 
social leadership respectively. And the characteristics of these strains are 
inheritable.”61 But in 1913, Davenport still lacked, as Galton did, a vector for 
transmission. His assumption reflected not cautious or thoughtful scientific 
research, but Davenport’s commitment to classic racialist principles, and the 
certainty that these characteristics were biologically inevitable given the high 
quality of the early settler stock. Recent advances in genetics and additional 
experiments in Mendelism, however, had disproved Galton’s findings from the 
nineteenth century. Pearl’s work on chickens in Orono, Maine was providing 
ample proof that inheritance of characteristics was far more complex than the 
simple Mendelian recessive-dominant pattern that Davenport believed in. Yet the 
Times article expressed Davenport’s inflexible belief in the veracity of Mendelian 
inheritance. The continued sloppiness of Davenport’s scientific approach and the 
claims he made in the newspaper prompted Heron to move his criticism from a 
professional journal to denounce him publicly.  
Heron prepared for the denunciation of Davenport’s work for months, 
carefully examining it through the Carnegie Institution of Washington’s 
publications. Ten months after the Times first introduced Davenport’s work at 
Cold Spring Harbor to the American public, Heron submitted his criticisms. 
When Davenport retrieved his Sunday New York Times on the morning of 
                                                
61 “Social Problems have Proven Basis of Heredity” The New York Times 12 January 1913, p. 
SM10.  
 
 Chapter 4 246 
  
November 9, the Sunday Magazine featured Heron’s blistering criticism of the 
ERO, and Davenport’s own defense of his cherished institution. The editorial 
introduction the paper gave to the two contributions prepared a casual reader for 
the acrimonious scientific dispute that followed. 
Heron made the accusation that Davenport’s work, which he had already 
characterized as very defective in scientific value, was misrepresenting the facts 
of Mendelism to the lay public. Heron began his article by ridiculing the meeting, 
in the summer of 1912, of the First International Eugenics Congress, which the 
University College of London had hosted. Heron felt that the importance the 
public attached to racial improvement and deterioration necessitated that work in 
eugenics be conducted with great care and caution, and the quality of the papers 
was so poor that the biggest detriment to the advance of scientific eugenics was 
the work of the Congress itself. The lay public, “who have no means of 
ascertaining whether a given statement is or is not a great scientific verity” was 
done a tremendous disservice by the Congress, Heron explained, which gave a 
forum to many scientists whose grasp of heredity and inheritance was feeble and 
problematic.62 Despite the shortcomings of the Congress’s papers, Heron’s wrath 
was particularly focused on Davenport’s institution:  
                                                
62 David Heron, “English Expert Attacks American Eugenic Work” The New York Times 9 
November 1913, SM2. The papers presented at the International Eugenics Congress were 
published by the London-based Eugenics Education Society under the title Problems in Eugenics: 
Papers Communicated to the First International Eugenics Congress (London: Eugenics Education 
Society, 1912). Davenport, who was a Vice President of the Congress, a member of the 
Consultative Committee and the General Committee, gave a paper titled “Marriage Laws and 
Customs” (pp. 151-155). Giuseppe Sergi and Alfredo Niceforo were also Vice Presidents of the 
Congress; Niceforo was on the General Committee with Davenport. Both Italians also gave papers 
at the Congress, which were also translated into English: Sergi, “Varazione e eredità nell-uomo” 
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“The Eugenics Research [sic] Office has issued a series of bulletins 
and memoirs, and we shall now proceed to show that the material 
on which these papers are based has been collected with a decided 
bias in favor of a particular theory of heredity; that it is presented 
with extraordinary carelessness; that it is, on internal evidence, 
repeatedly contradictory; that it is not treated in any adequate 
statistical manner, and that the conclusions reached are not 
justified by the data.”63 
 
Heron pointed to two problematic bulletins from the Eugenics Record 
Office [ERO] in particular, “The Study of Human Heredity” and “The Trait 
Book,” which were guides written to provide instructions to ERO field workers. 
“The Study of Human Heredity” was instruction for conducting personal 
interviews with subjects to determine the familial inheritance of characters like 
neuroticism, sexual immorality, vagrancy, criminality, eccentricity, and 
shiftlessness, as well as the background of family members that were “decidedly 
intemperate.” The “research” conducted was not scientific, but was instead the 
results of assorted interviews with subjects who were “encouraged to talk freely 
while the field worker records the essential points in the description.” Had Heron 
known the intended audience for “The Study of Human Heredity” he would have 
had an even stronger case for demonstrating the carelessness of the work being 
conducted under Davenport. The researchers of these family traits tended to be 
younger, unmarried women that Davenport would employ for no more than three 
                                                                                                                                
and Niceforo, “La cause de l’infèriorité des characters psycho-phsiologiques des class inferieurs.” 
Sergi’s paper is of particular interest, as he claimed to disprove Boas’s recently published work on 
the body form of immigrants for the United States Immigration Commission.  
 
63 Heron, “English Expert Attacks American Eugenic Work” The New York Times 9 November 
1913, SM2. Emphasis added. 
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years. As Davenport explained to his colleague Herbert H. Goddard, “tho [sic] the 
work may suffer the loss of experience [due to this policy], yet we hope that this 
loss will be compensated in other directions.”64 They should go forth from Cold 
Spring Harbor, marry, and breed.  
The “Trait Book” represented a different magnitude of incautious and 
careless science. It was an attempt to categorize certain human characteristics for 
the field workers in order to detail their inheritance. Although Heron took 
particular exception to Davenport’s use of terms like “impracticalness,” 
“inadventuresomeness,” “disheartedness,” “unconversationableness,” and 
“unanecdoteness,” in truth he could have used any number of examples.65 For 
Heron, the work conducted at Cold Spring Harbor was doing a “disservice to 
knowledge,” and committing “a serious offense against the infant science of 
eugenics. Every piece of unthorough work ‘dominates’ in research, for it begets 
its like; others find it equally easy to reach similar spectacular conclusions by 
loose methods applied to inadequate data.”66 Criticizing Davenport’s scientifically 
                                                
64 Charles Davenport, Henry H. Laughlin, Herbert H. Goddard et al., “The Study of Human 
Heredity: Methods of Collecting, Charting and Analyzing Data” Bulletin #2 of the Eugenics 
Record Office (New York: Cold Spring Harbor, 1911); Charles Davenport to Herbert H. Goddard, 
29 July, 1912, Davenport Papers. The reason female field workers were employed for only three 
years was that discontinuing the financial support would encourage the woman to marry, and “thus 
the Eugenics Record Office can not be charged with working cacogenically in inducing the 
excellent field workers whom we have secured to neglect more important social duties.”  
 
65 Heron, “English Expert Attacks American Eugenic Work” NYT, 9 November 1913, p. SM2. 
Charles B. Davenport, “The Trait Book” Bulletin #6 of the Eugenics Record Office (New York: 
Cold Spring Harbor, 1912).  
 
66 Heron, “English Expert Attacks American Eugenic Work,” SM2. See also Hamish Spencer and 
Diane B. Paul, “The Failure of a Scientific Critique: David Heron, Karl Pearson and Mendelian 
Genetics” The British Journal for the History of Science v. 31 (1998), 441-52. Spencer and Paul 
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sloppy work was, for Heron, the only sure way to keep scientific knowledge 
advancing.  
The methodological flaws in his approach to research were the essential 
difficulties Davenport faced in conducting eugenics research. Men like Heron, 
Pearson, Pearl and Jennings, wanted science to be advanced cautiously and 
carefully by indisputable experimental accuracy. A scientific theory had to match 
the experimental results for it to be considered true. Davenport, on the other hand, 
aimed to provide practical advice and easily comprehensible rules and guidelines 
for a wide audience of non-scientists. In carrying out Galton’s admonition that the 
science of eugenics could only succeed when it was internalized like a religion, 
Davenport loosened the standards of scientific knowledge to enable the public’s 
understanding of highly complex biological and genetic associations. His defense 
against Heron’s attack reflected this. “There has been a concerted effort,” he 
explained, “to make the work of the Eugenics Record Office accessible for every 
one, not for scholars and scientists alone. We have tried to place our findings at 
the disposal of the people who need them, the people who know the least about 
things biological.”67 Here was the problem of establishing the “immutable basis of 
science.” Heron, Pearl, Jennings and other experimental researchers were trying 
to advance scientific knowledge. Davenport, Laughlin, and other eugenicists 
wanted the ideas to be accessible and useful to the lay public, even if that meant 
                                                                                                                                
suggest that the ineffectiveness of Heron’s critique undermines the conventional causal link 
between the progress of genetics and the decline of eugenics. 452. 
 
67 Charles B. Davenport, “American Work Strongly Defended” The New York Times 9 November, 
1913, SM2-3. Emphasis added. 
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the scientific complexity had to be flattened out or ignored. Two historians that 
have examined this particular split between Heron and Davenport suggest that 
Heron’s difficulty was that “even the soundest scientific arguments will fail to 
convince in the absence of a suitable culture in which the argument can take 
root.”68 American culture was amenable to classic racialist arguments in part 
because the ideas were practical and accessible. This easily understood, 
superficial knowledge of genuinely complex biological principles was the 
elemental difficulty that critics of eugenics and classic racialism faced into the 
1920s.  
Ultimately, The New York Times ended up siding with Davenport in this 
dispute with Heron, and in doing so provided him and his work with public 
legitimacy. Heron’s attack was bitter and unfair, an editorial reported, and was the 
result of the intellectual inadequacies of the current crop of British biometricians. 
British researchers, the Times reported, had spent years collecting “a vast amount 
of material, and they have an easily explicable reluctance for confessing that it is 
almost worthless, and that they have been wasting their time and toil.”69 The 
genesis of Heron’s harsh attack on Davenport’s work, the editorial explained, was 
not because research at the ERO itself was inaccurate, but because the British 
                                                
 
68 Spencer and Paul, “The Failure of a Scientific Critique,” 452. 
 
69 “Topics of the Times” The New York Times 11 November 1913, p. 12. In the final analysis, the 
charges the editorial levied against Heron, Pearson, and the British biometricians would ultimately 
– and accurately – be directed at the American eugenicists in the coming decades. The Eugenics 
Record Office’s collection of pedigree cards was equally worthless. See Allen, “The Eugenics 
Record Office,” 243. 
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biometricians felt insecure about the quality of their own work. In this case the 
Times did a tremendous disservice its readers. For a public reading this spirited 
scientific exchange, the judgment of the editorial staff of a major American 
newspaper in support of American eugenicists would surely have encouraged 
many of them to believe and accept fundamentally incorrect scientific ideas. 
When these spurious eugenic claims were being allied to very serious and weighty 
public debates like the regulation of immigration into the United States, the 
paper’s endorsement of Davenport’s inaccuracies seems reckless by the standards 
of the time. As his difficulties with Biometrika show, Davenport had increasing 
problems publishing his work in reputable academic journals. The New York 
Times, however, gave Davenport what he wanted most: publicity about the work 
being conducted in eugenics to a large, non-scientific community who neither 
understood nor cared to follow complex and esoteric scientific disputes.   
Davenport remained popular with the New York newspaper. Not only did 
it side with him in the public exchange with Heron, it published Davenport’s 
review of Frederick Adams Woods’s book The Influence of Monarchs later in the 
month. Woods’s book was very much in line with the problematic studies of 
inheritance conducted by Galton, Lodge, Lombroso, and others. It also, not 
coincidentally, affirmed many of the arguments about inheritance of family traits 
that Davenport made in 1911 in his book Heredity in Relation to Eugenics.70 
                                                
70 Charles Davenport, “Eugenics” The New York Times 30 November 1913, BR662. It was not a 
coincidence, as Woods was an ardent supporter of eugenics. For the First International Eugenics 
Congress, Woods sat on the board of the Consultative Committee with Davenport, and gave a 
paper titled “Some Interrelations between Eugenics and Historical Research.” Problems in 
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Woods’s argument was simple: royal families produced illustrious and eminent 
offspring because of their superior germ plasm. Davenport described the book as 
“objective and [as] free from bias as possible,” and endorsed Woods’s conclusion 
that royalty was superior because of its innate, natural qualities. From the 
endorsement of the book’s thesis, Davenport moved quickly to connect eugenics 
and immigration restriction. A nation’s principal concern should be the 
multiplication of the strong and gifted stock, he opined. Those of weak and 
inferior stock should be prevented from increasing. Considering demographic and 
statistical trends, immigration was nearly as important as reproduction, and the 
imperative for the United States was “securing a relatively greater fecundity of the 
best stock already in the country and a relatively greater migration of the better 
strains into the country.”71 He invoked, once again, Walker’s replacement thesis.  
                                                                                                                                
Eugenics: Papers Communicated to the First International Eugenics Congress (London: Eugenics 
Education Society, 1912). Woods was also a member of the American Eugenics Society Advisory 
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71 Davenport, “Eugenics” The New York Times 30 November 1913, BR662. Six weeks later Heron 
would again denounce Davenport’s endorsement of the book and his eugenic contributions in the 
newspaper’s pages. He wrote, “To a great nation willing to experiment it is absolutely essential 
that its scientific knowledge should be above suspicion.” Clearly, he believed that Davenport’s 
work was not. David Heron, “English Eugenics Expert Again Attacks Davenport” The New York 
Times 4 January 1914, SM14. Davenport advanced arguments in Heredity in Relation to Eugenics 
that were identical to those Woods made. He claimed, for instance, that modern medicine had 
“forgotten the fundamental fact that all men are created bound by their protoplasmic makeup and 
unequal in their powers and responsibilities,” (iv), while also arguing the point that artistic, 
literary, and musical talents are unit characters hereditarily transmitted to offspring, although “the 
common inherited factor may be only a highly developed imagination.” (60) Davenport, Heredity 
in Relation to Eugenics, emphasis in original.  
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The difficulties that Davenport faced in publishing regularly in reputable 
scientific journals, and the public criticism leveled at him in The New York Times, 
had surprisingly little effect on his work. Advancing his mission to disseminate 
eugenic knowledge to “the people who know the least about things biological,” 
Davenport organized the publication of his own journal from Cold Spring Harbor 
in early 1916. The inaugural issue of the Eugenical News in January 1916 stated 
that its aim was to report news of the ERO’s resident and field staff, foreign and 
domestic news of eugenic studies, and “other attempts at social control of the 
selection of mates, including the growth of state institutions.” The reviews 
contained in the Eugenical News shed light on the difficulties Davenport and 
other scientific-minded eugenicists experienced in policing the borders of proper 
scientific knowledge and work.72 That the journal was published and controlled by 
Davenport gave him a forum to disseminate “good” propaganda, and to articulate 
the boundaries of what constituted “bad” propaganda.  
The Political Uses of Science 
While Davenport was consolidating eugenic knowledge in Cold Spring 
Harbor and trying to establish unimpeachable scientific credentials for eugenics, 
the IRL continued its agitation for immigration restriction. National events 
seemed to play into the League’s hand in the early 1910s, and gave them many 
opportunities to oppose immigration on the grounds that Bradley had pointed out, 
namely, using sociological and economic justifications. The League’s paid 
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lobbyist, James Horace Patten, boasted that the Lawrence strike of 1912 had 
brought the older Irish immigrants into the restrictionist camp. He claimed that 
Jewish gangsters were responsible for the Arnold Rosenthal murder in New York 
City, and highlighted the alleged criminal tendencies of New York City Jews to 
broaden the allure of restriction.73 World War I fueled American xenophobic 
tendencies against the foreign-born, and “100% Americans” kept watch over the 
loyalties of these alien, “hyphenated” Americans.74  
The outbreak of war in Europe in August 1914 was decisive for members 
of the IRL. Although immigration quickly diminished to a trickle, members 
feared that immigration would burst forth again when the war ended. They 
anticipated that the physical devastation of European lands, and the attendant 
economic dislocation of demobilization would encourage many immigrants of 
poor stock to depart Europe for America. Thus when the war in Europe began, the 
League felt a tremendous sense of urgency to secure restriction while the volume 
of immigration was low. Patten recommended a dramatic shift in tactics, since 
Congress had been consistently unable to overcome Presidential objections to the 
literacy provision. When Taft expressed his opposition to any future bill 
containing a literacy provision, Patten felt this made the League’s strategy futile 
and he began to reconsider the League’s legislative options. Additionally, anti-
restrictionists in Congress were adopting new tactics in an attempt to divide 
                                                
73 Lee to Hall, 5 September 1912, box 1; Patten to Lee, 29 September 1912, box 1, both Lee 
papers. 
 
74 Higham, Strangers in the Land has a good description of the nationalist ferment of the period.  
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restrictionist forces. The policy of “numerical limitation” that the Dillingham 
Commission had suggested as another element of immigration policy was being 
discussed by New York Representative William Bennet, who was opposed to 
restriction.75 With the anti-immigrant forces fragmenting because of these new 
alternative strategies and the general distraction of the war in Europe, Patten felt 
that if the bill that reintroduced the literacy test, which Congress was then 
considering, failed, “we cannot put any restrictive proposition across, in my 
opinion, and it would be futile and a waste of time and good money to try.”76 But 
what Patten and several others who favored restriction underestimated was the 
psychological impact of the war. As nativists and Anglo-Saxonists pondered 
potential outcomes of the Great War as it settled into static trench warfare, one 
consequence of it became apparent: the war would have tremendous racial and 
demographic implications.  
This was not an entirely new revelation. Stanford University President 
David Starr Jordan, long a supporter of immigration restriction, had discussed 
hereditary implications of warfare in 1902 and 1912. The blood of a nation, 
Jordan wrote, was its most important vital resource, and the quality of blood – and 
blood alone, since “as science knows, education and training play no part in 
                                                
 
75 James H. Patten to Joseph Lee, 29 September 1912, Lee papers. The policy of numerical 
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heredity” – was solely responsible for the fate of nations. In The Blood of the 
Nation (1902), Jordan offered a historical lesson of war, explaining that Rome had 
fallen not because of corruption, indolence, imperial overextension, Nero or 
Caligula, but because the quality of the breeding population declined. Roman 
conquests required the abilities of Vir, the real man, to go “forth to battle and to 
the work of foreign invasions; Homo, the human being, remained on the farm and 
in the workshop and begat the new generations.” Virtuous, strong men fought in 
the Roman legions and maintained control of the Empire’s vast holdings. 
Effeminate, shifty males avoided military service and remained at home to enjoy 
the sacrifices of the real men. The death of virtuous men was therefore doubly 
tragic: not only was Rome deprived of the superior characteristics from their 
superior blood, but their deaths also deprived Rome of future offspring with these 
superior characteristics.77 This echoed the idea of what could be called “settler 
selection” which Commons had alluded to: the early immigration to North 
America had been undertaken by hardy, strong, virtuous souls, and the conquest 
of the New World had made them even stronger. Once the difficult work of 
subduing the continent and establishing a new republic had concluded, shifty and 
worthless men, beaten men from beaten races (as Walker called them), traveled to 
the already-established United States, contributing little to the country except 
undesirable, inferior offspring. What made the present particularly alarming and 
                                                
77 David Starr Jordan, The Blood of the Nation: A Study of the Decay of Races Through the 
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terrifying for classic racialists was the casualty rate of the Great War. Artillery 
and machine guns had made it clear as early as October 1914 that industrialized 
warfare would carry off hundreds of thousands of Vir to their deaths in rapid 
fashion.  
The European war provided the backdrop for the expression of these racial 
concerns at the Second Race Betterment Conference, which opened in San 
Francisco in August 1915. The First Conference had provided a forum for a 
discussion of problems of eugenics and racial health.  Several social scientists 
used the Battle Creek meeting to urge audience members to be cautious in their 
expectations of eugenics, and even Davenport criticized some of the contributions 
of unscientific men.78 There was no such caution at the San Francisco conference. 
After the President of the Race Betterment Foundation provided some brief 
opening remarks, David Starr Jordan spoke to attendees about the eugenic 
implications of war once again. But now Jordan was not limited to ancient 
examples of the dysgenic consequences of militarism. He and all the other 
attendees had a contemporary example on the European continent, although this 
did not change his basic message from 1902. The greatest tragedy of any war, 
Jordan explained, was that it slaughtered the best breeding specimens, leaving 
“the second best” classes as the only genetic resource.  Because of this, every 
war-like nation in history became decadent in time, as the superior classes were 
                                                
78 See, e.g. Herbert A. Miller, “The Psychological Limit of Eugenics” First Conference 
Proceedings, 8-12 January 1914 (Battle Creek, MI: The Race Betterment Foundation, 1914), 464-
71; Davenport to Fisher, 16 December 1913; Fisher to Davenport, 18 December 1913, both 
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 Chapter 4 258 
  
killed and outbred by inferior classes.79 War, Jordan claimed, was “the great 
‘mollycoddle’ factory – the great producer of men that are too weak and too dull 
to think.” Not because their senses were deadened or blunted by the savagery of 
war, but because the only fathers for future generations that survived lacked all 
the vigorous qualities of the Vir. He insisted that had 500 of the most prominent 
men of British North America died in battles before American independence, 
American history would have been radically different because the country would 
have been deprived of the hereditary contributions of the blood from those 500 
men. This conception of the racial history of the United States dovetailed with 
Walker’s fears of the replacement of the Anglo-Saxon stock.80 Although his 
historical exposition was dubious, Jordan tapped into a very real anxiety that the 
war was destroying the best racial specimens of northern Europe. Those that 
survived the war, those “too weak and too dull to think” would be unable to 
replace that exceptional class in terms of leadership and hereditary gifts. But this 
message was reaching a very narrow audience. The leadership of the IRL knew 
that they needed to reach a very wide, general audience to achieve real restriction.  
For restrictionists, these public conferences, private correspondence, and 
articles published in erudite journals had their desired effect on garnering support 
for immigration restriction from a portion of the learned population. But they 
                                                
79 There is an obvious tautology in this line of thinking as well: the men who stayed at home were 
unfit for soldiering, since every fit, patriotic male would enlist, fight, and bravely die.  
 
80 David Starr Jordan, “Eugenics and War” Official Proceedings of the Second National 
Conference on Race Betterment [hereafter Second Conference Proceedings], 4-8 August 1915 
(Battle Creek, MI: Race Betterment Foundation, 1915), 13 for ‘mollycoddle’; 15 for American 
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needed different tactics to reach a wider audience. One book by an unmarried 
New York patrician helped them achieve this, and consequently had a greater 
impact on the history of American immigration: Madison Grant’s The Passing of 
the Great Race. Published in the fall of 1916, Grant’s book proposed to explain 
the wide expanse of European history through the lens of racial anthropology. 
Although his professional training in the academic field of anthropology was 
quite limited, Grant’s writing style – a biographer describes his “passages [that] 
sparkle with energy and wit” – made the book far more accessible than esoteric 
and complex scientific treatises on anthropology, biology, and heredity.81  
Grant, a “Park Avenue bachelor” and “the most lordly of Patricians” as 
John Higham describes him, was a central figure in the restriction movement. 
Grant’s definitive biography has only just been written by the historian Jonathan 
Spiro, who describes Grant’s family background as including “Dutch grandees, 
Puritan divines, colonial magistrates, revolutionary patriots, and decorated 
soldiers.” Grant spent his formative teen years in Dresden, Germany, where he 
received a classical education before returning to the United States in 1884 to 
enter Yale University where he studied under the sociologists and Social 
Darwinist William Graham Sumner. After graduating, Grant returned to New 
York, attended Columbia Law School and was admitted to the bar in 1890, after 
which he established a legal practice next to the New York Stock Exchange. He 
became a member of all the elite men’s clubs in Manhattan – the Union, 
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Knickerbocker, University, Down Town, and Tuxedo – through which he 
cultivated his interests in hunting, conservation, and immigration restriction.82  
Grant’s fundamental supposition, which Professor Henry Fairfield Osborn 
endorsed in the preface that he wrote for Grant’s book, was that heredity was all-
important in the field of human history, and that the germ plasm contained within 
each individual human being was immutable and unchanging, was the sole source 
of the individual’s potential, and determined their development. His biographer 
notes that Grant’s extraordinary contribution to eugenics was “to advance it from 
a war against individuals who were socially unfit into one against groups who 
were racially unfit.”83 Several of Grant’s arguments illustrated the central problem 
of changes in scientific paradigms and the manipulation of scientific knowledge.  
The Passing of the Great Race was the culmination of several intellectual 
trends. In its supposition of unchanging, immutable racial characters, it 
represented the quintessential classic racialist argument.  Grant’s analysis of 
differential fecundity exhibited the long reach of the nineteenth century arguments 
of Francis Walker, as well as the English sociologist Herbert Spencer’s Social 
Darwinism. The Great War raging in Europe, Grant predicted, would have 
                                                
82 Higham, Strangers in the Land, 155; Spiro, Defending the Master Race, family from 7; 8-11 for 
New York life. Spiro mentions a curious inversion: “during the course of my research, if I told 
people that I was writing a biography of a leading conservationist, they would delightfully 
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decades. Also, Madison Grant, The Passing of the Great Race, or The Racial Basis of European 
History (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1916). 
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horrible dysgenic effects, since “the loss of life now going on in Europe will fall 
much more heavily on the blond giant than on the little brunet [sic].”84 This 
combination of demographic replacement with fixed biological and 
anthropological types blended together aspects of Walker, Ripley and Galton’s 
writings.85 
Grant maintained an unshakable conviction throughout the book that the 
only element of human existence that mattered was the unchanging and 
immutable germ plasm of each individual. One of his most quoted declarations 
exemplified his approach to racial anthropology: “The cross between a white man 
and an Indian is an Indian; the cross between a white man and a Negro is a Negro; 
the cross between a white man and a Hindu is a Hindu; and the cross between any 
of the three European races and a Jew is a Jew.”86 The germ plasm of the inferior 
race – the Indian, African, Hindu or a Jew – would irrevocably contaminate and 
degrade the blood of the superior race. And the question of which race was 
superior Grant answered with total certainty. The “absolutely fair skin” of the 
pure Nordic race was zenith of human perfection, although women of fair skin 
faced constant danger from the “keen envy” of men “whose skins are black, 
yellow, or red.” Offspring of such a union would tragically contain none of the 
                                                
 
84 Grant, The Passing of the Great Race, 73-4. Also see chapter 4 for implications of Walker and 
Spencer.  
 
85 See Higham, Strangers in the Land; Spiro, “Patrician Racist”; Spiro, “Nordic vs. Anti-Nordic: 
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n. 1 (2002), 35-48. 
 
86 Grant, The Passing of the Great Race, 18. See discussions of Grant in Higham, Strangers in the 
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Nordic racial characteristics from the mother. It was therefore essential for Nordic 
elements of the European and American population to breed only with other 
Nordics, and to have them protected from contamination.87  
Grant bent history to support his assertions. As he surveyed the expanse of 
European history, he argued that nearly every notable achievement in Western 
history was the product of the Nordic race. The organization of Rome, its legal 
and military efficiency, its ideals of family life and loyalty and truth suggested a 
northern origin.88 The Mediterranean and Alpine races – whose geographic and 
anthropological descriptions he took from Ripley’s The Races of Europe – were 
extensions of “Asiatic subspecies” and therefore, non-European. Sergi had also 
suggested this, although Grant provided no footnotes for verifying his claims. But 
the Nordic race, Grant argued, was “a purely European type, in the sense that it 
has developed its physical characters and its civilization within the confines of 
that continent. It is, therefore, the Homo europeaus, the white man par 
excellence.” Although the “Nordic Fatherland” was in the forest regions of 
eastern Germany, the great Italian artists of the Renaissance – Dante, Raphael, 
Titian, Michelangelo, and da Vinci – were all Nordics, “just as in classic times 
many of the chief men and of the upper classes were Nordic.”89 Grant took the 
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superiority of the Nordic race to be a given in every field of endeavor, and every 
great achievement of civilization, by definition, was a Nordic achievement.   
But these were total fictions, a point the anonymous reviewer in The 
American Historical Review quickly pointed out. Though the book contained a 
few solid historical and scientific truths, the reviewer insisted that Grant’s 
arguments that racial identity determined the success of a civilization were 
unconvincing and overstated. The book, the reviewer felt, “can hardly be regarded 
as an important contribution to historical science. Its dogmatic assurance and its 
partisanship impair its value to learning.”90 For a proper and careful study of 
European racial history, the “solid and discriminating Races of Europe” remained 
the best source of guidance.91  
Even a sympathetic reviewer could be a bit put off by claims Grant made 
in Passing. Frederick Adams Woods, who wrote the review of the 1918 edition 
for Science, gave a cautious endorsement of the book. Woods – who admitted that 
he accepted the racial theory of European history – pointed out that Grant 
neglected to engage points of his argument that were scientifically disputed, and 
that Grant’s book featured no references or footnotes for verification. Woods 
assured the readers of his own review that in support of Grant’s argument – that 
race was immutable and all-important – “there is a mass of carefully finished 
statistical research on the problem of human heredity which tends to support the 
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91 Ibid., 844.  
 
 Chapter 4 264 
  
whole theory…”92 But heredity was not solely a statistical field. It encompassed 
anthropology, biology and sociology (among others), and was a complex concept. 
Yet Woods could not have been expected to be impartial. In addition to his classic 
racialist book on The Influence of Monarchs that Davenport reviewed, in 1912 he 
had given a paper on “Some Interrelations between Eugenics and Historical 
Research” in which he proposed a science of historiometry to “prove that heredity 
is everywhere [the] chief force in determining nations.” He also joined the 
American Eugenics Society Advisory Committee in 1923, and remained affiliated 
with the group until 1935.93  
One academic who was not confused about the role of environment versus 
race was Horace Kallen, an immigrant Jew from Germany living in New York. 
Kallen, a philosopher, shared Franz Boas’s cultural pluralism and opposition to 
classic racialism, and his review of Passing reflected that opposition. The 
transplanted German understood the lure of the simplicity of classic racialism, 
describing the ideological shift from accepting inequalities within the human 
races to accepting the superiority of one’s own race as “easy and unconscious.” 
Kallen suggested that Houston Stewart Chamberlain’s The Foundations of the 
                                                
92 Frederick Adams Woods, review of The Passing of the Great Race by Madison Grant, in 
Science n.s. vol. 48, n. 1243 (25 October 1918), 419-20; 420. Woods expressed disappointment 
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Nineteenth Century, which Kallen described divided the world into two classes – 
“the things that [Chamberlain] liked, which he called good, and the things that he 
disliked, which he called evil” – must have been an inspiration for Grant, as “his 
own book on the passing of the great race echoes the absurdities of Mr. 
Chamberlain.”94 The publicity around Passing celebrated it as a “scientific” book, 
but Kallen refused to evaluate Grant’s book on a scientific basis. It was bad 
enough to Kallen that Grant could not maintain a consistent argument: though 
Grant suggested every excellent thing in civilization was from the Nordic race, 
the philosopher pointed out that many of Grant’s statements showed that they 
originated with Alpine and Mediterranean stocks. The publisher’s notice to the 
public of the publication of Passing, Kallen pointed out, commended it as “an 
entirely new and original recasting of history on a purely scientific basis.” If that 
was true, Kallen wryly wrote, the science was so pure it was imperceptible. This 
was not science, it was fiction, and Kallen’s review reflected his dismissive 
attitude to Grant’s screed.95 That Grant invoked science to legitimize his 
arguments and that the book was pushed as a work of science rankled legitimate 
academic scientists. Yet Passing, whatever its professional or scientific 
shortcomings, was a popular book. It contained none of the tentative hypotheses, 
cautious generalizations and insecure certainties of genetic research or biological 
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laws. Grant had an audience, and he offered them easily comprehensible 
explanations using plausible or common sense proof. Clearly this was no way for 
science to be conducted, but Grant was not interested in the scientific accuracy of 
his books. He was interested in their efficacy.  
Edwin Grant Conklin, however, was interested in the scientific accuracy 
of statements as well as their efficacy. On an evening in late December 1916, in a 
speech before the American Society of Naturalists in New York City, the 
respected Princeton biologist confessed uncertainty about how inheritance worked 
and shaped the development of human organisms. Like Jennings and Pearl, 
Conklin had a favorable but skeptical attitude toward eugenics. Conklin asked his 
scientific audience, if human life depended on the quality of its crops and herds, 
why biology could not show how to make better citizens and a better state? The 
problem, as the professor saw it, was that American social institutions were based 
upon the “antiquated and wholly erroneous opinion that ‘all men are born equal,’” 
and were at risk from individuals with inferior heredity who were not equal to 
Anglo-Saxons or Nordics. Conklin suggested that although good environment and 
education were important elements of human development, good heredity was of 
far greater importance. Certain races were capable of creating sophisticated 
civilizations, but for other, presumably inferior, races, sophisticated civilizations 
were impossible because of their heredity and inherited characteristics.96 
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It was the duty of biologists, Conklin explained, to “teach the nation that 
heredity is more potent than environment or education…”97 Conklin’s talk seemed 
to provide academic credence to Grant’s ideas; he was making Grant’s claims 
scientifically legitimate. The Princeton biologist declared that the American 
experiment with immigration had been undertaken without due consideration to 
the biological consequences of admitting inferior racial stocks. Immigration 
legislation, which could obviously not undo “the evil that has been done” by the 
haphazard admission of immigrants, should now be utilized, he urged, to “exclude 
some of the worst hereditary lines.” Conklin mentioned that the immigration bill 
being finalized in Congress improved upon the mental examination of 
immigrants, and argued that although the literacy test, “upon which public 
attention has been focused…is not a very valuable one,” it was an improvement 
over existing legislation in that it at least addressed issues of mental ability. 
Conklin, like many opponents of the test, felt that literacy was not a hereditary 
quality but was a test of opportunity, and that other, more accurate tests of 
intellectual ability could be implemented. But as the subsequent mental exams of 
American army recruits showed, these were equally problematic 
methodologically and subject to misinterpretation.98 
Conklin’s address to the Naturalists exhibited other confusions about the 
role of heredity and environment, but he did try to correct certain misconceptions 
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that were circulating through the literate public, particularly via Grant’s book. 
Strictly speaking, he said that there were no “human pure breds,” but racial types 
did exist, and these types had distinct mental, social, and physiognomic 
differences. Conklin insisted that Grant’s argument that any combination of 
superior stock with inferior stock yielded inferior offspring was an overstatement. 
Combinations of the best types, even of different racial stocks, he explained, 
generated offspring with the best tendencies of both types. But generally 
speaking, assimilation created an averaging of type, which created potential 
problems in that “the lower types drag down the average.” Avoiding this decay 
was one of the great appeals of eugenics, of which “no other nation has a greater 
need” than the United States, according to Conklin.99  
In a nutshell, this was the dilemma of the experimentalist community: 
research in eugenics had to be conducted very cautiously and seriously in order to 
assess the scientific merits of its claims. But the promise of the eugenics 
movement was appealing and attracted a wide range of enthusiasts with little or 
no scientific background. Jennings, Pearl, Conklin and many other professional 
scientists who later broke with the movement were inspired in the beginning by 
the positive possibilities of genetic and eugenic science. At its heart, eugenics was 
a progressive, humane project. But the science in support of it was uncertain, and 
their attitudes toward eugenics became more critical as scientific knowledge was 
revealed to make the goals of positive eugenics impossible. Eugenics enthusiasts 
                                                
99 Ibid., 8, 10. Absolute eugenic selection, however, was undesirable for Conklin, because “who 
would dig coal and build railroads and work in factories or farms?” 9.  
 
 Chapter 4 269 
  
on the other hand, had unrealistic expectations, and no sound scientific basis for 
their claims. Trying to limit those expectations by showing the scientific difficulty 
of the eugenics movement had to be done by accurately describing the true 
complexities of inheritance and heredity, but enthusiasts had no understanding or 
appreciation of this complexity, and frequently reverted to their appealingly 
simple claim: like produces like.  
For many Congressmen who favored restriction, the coupling of literacy 
and desirability was a way to avoid becoming entangled in these complex debates 
over biological science, classic racialism, and eugenics, and to circumvent this 
esoteric scientific dispute. Literacy and desirability was a simple causal 
association. Alabama Democrat John L. Burnett, who had long supported 
excluding illiterate immigrants, used labor unrest in the American factory towns 
of Youngstown, Ohio and Lawrence, Massachusetts to garner support for the 
provision. Exclusion based on illiteracy would have kept out the strikers, seventy 
per cent of whom, he claimed, were illiterate. Burnett explained in a speech to the 
House of Representatives that the illiterate immigrant radicals, led by a small 
cadre of literate immigrants, marched behind the banner of the Industrial Workers 
of the World, which carried the words, “No God, no law, no master.”100 (He never 
explained how the illiterate immigrants would have been able to read such a 
revolutionary exhortation, but the Alabama Democrat never claimed to be 
consistent or coherent in his pro-restrictionist arguments.) Another 
Representative, John Charles McKenzie, a Republican from Illinois, likewise 
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declared that the literacy test would be the most effective method of protecting the 
standard of American labor. The “nature and characteristics” of immigrants from 
southern European and Asian races impeded their proper assimilation – in fact 
assimilation of these immigrants was a “practical impossibility” because they 
were “lacking in comprehension of the true spirit of our institutions, [and so] can 
not be elevated to the true standard of American citizenship…”101 The Illinois 
Republican expressed no hesitation or uncertainty that this was indeed a “practical 
impossibility.” McKenzie was certain that the nature and characteristics of human 
beings was unchanging and hereditary and that they would never be able to 
assimilate successfully. 
In the midst of unease about the European war, Burnett introduced in 
Congress another immigration bill with a literacy test in 1916. The intent of 
Burnett’s bill was not, he explained, in favor of “striking down the Irishman and it 
does not touch one of them. It does not touch the Scotchman or the Englishman or 
the German or the Frenchman or the Hollander or any of the Scandinavian people, 
or the Swiss up in the midst of God’s snowy mountains.” Burnett reassured his 
Congressional colleagues that these men would find, should they decide to 
emigrate to the United States, that “our doors are wide open.”102 The problem, the 
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southerner informed Congress, was that these valuable and desirable races of men 
would not emigrate. Burnett recounted a story that would have been immediately 
understood by members that were familiar with the well-rehearsed lines of 
General Francis Walker. While on the Immigration Commission, Burnett was one 
of the members who traveled to the northern European states to discuss and 
investigate immigration with European officials. Questioning a German official as 
to why Germans were not emigrating to the United States, where they would 
receive a hospitable welcome, Burnett was told, as he related to his Congressional 
colleagues, that economic prosperity was one of the reasons the Teutonic and 
Anglo-Saxon race stayed put. But it was also, he quoted the German official, a 
matter of competition: the immigrants the Germans would be competing with for 
jobs were Mediterranean in origin, and the laboring people of Germany “‘will not 
stand competition with them. We do not want our families raised in such 
surroundings and subject to such contamination.’”103 
The war in Europe began to significantly change the political calculus of 
restriction. Undesirable immigration to the United States had to be stopped, 
according to Burnett’s accounting. Not only was it inhibiting the reproduction of 
the native-born stock, it was preventing the addition of desirable Teutonic and 
northern races of immigrants too. Restrictionists hoped that the “replacement 
thesis” might help bring the older immigrant groups already in the United States 
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to support restriction, and aimed specifically at the impact these undesirable 
“new” immigrants were having on the “old” established immigrant communities. 
Patten sensed opportunity. Though President Woodrow Wilson had already 
vetoed one immigration bill because of a literacy test in 1915, Patten 
communicated to the League leadership in 1917 that the possibility of American 
involvement in the war might give the League the upper hand. President Wilson’s 
second veto of the literacy clause in January 1917 was centered upon the same 
objections he had made almost exactly two years earlier but Patten believed that 
Congressional attitudes were significantly different now. Days before the country 
broke off official relations with Germany, Wilson informed the Congress that he 
had declined to endorse Burnett’s bill because of the “radical change” the policy 
would introduce, which he felt was “not justified in principle.” The literacy test, 
the President said, “was not a test of character, of quality, or of personal fitness, 
but would operate in most cases merely as a penalty for lack of opportunity…”104 
This stood in opposition to the classic racialist position that the literacy clause 
was a test of racial or biological ability and desirability. 
As Patten intuited, the circumstances were now different. Congress 
marshaled the votes to finally override a presidential veto, and passed the 
Immigration Act of February 5, 1917, which culminated over twenty years of 
agitation by the IRL and other restrictionists.105 After this triumph, however, 
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League members did not stop. The Immigration Restriction League’s leaders 
wanted the total exclusion of non-Anglo-Saxon immigrants whether they could 
read or not. They wanted to keep out these new immigrants because of their belief 
in Walker’s replacement thesis, that these new immigrants would alter the racial 
composition of America. They wanted to retain the racial purity—their version of 
racial purity—of the country. 
Once Congress overrode Wilson’s veto, the IRL’s executive committee 
turned its attention to closing loopholes and working to further restrict 
immigration. They quickly noticed that the literacy provisions did not apply to 
immigrants within the Western hemisphere, so that “illiterate and other 
Mexicans” were now being admitted under a regulation issued by the 
Commissioner General of Immigration. The League’s leaders began to advocate 
restriction on a numerical basis, recommending to its members support for a bill 
that Massachusetts Representative Augustus P. Gardner introduced in late 1917, 
which had previously been put forth by Senator Dillingham. Representative 
Burnett, assured of the League’s continued support for restriction, wrote to Hall in 
1918 and warned of a need for “some strong restrictive legislation…against the 
flood of immigration that will try to come into this country very soon.” He 
supported basing restriction on the numerical basis that Hall had recommended he 
support.106  
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Numerical limitation became the next tool for the League’s leaders. 
Burnett soon introduced a bill with this provision, which based restriction on a 
fixed percentage of the number of a country’s naturalized citizens in the United 
States. League leaders hailed its proposal as the best legislative option, since “The 
effect of the bill will be similar to that of the reading test, in that it will 
discriminate in favor of immigrants from northern and western Europe, thus 
securing for this country aliens of kindred and homogeneous racial stocks.”107 
Congress approved this numerical principle in the emergency Immigration Act of 
May 19, 1921, which limited the number of any nationality admitted to 3% of 
immigrants from the same country that had been naturalized as U.S. citizens as of 
the 1910 census.108  
This bill, the first quota act, represented the principal thrust of the 
Immigration Restriction League’s goals. It nearly eliminated the arrival of 
immigrants who did not, in their minds, have a similar racial identity with the 
American population. But even with this success members of the League did not 
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relax. An exchange with a supporter shows the ongoing commitment of the 
League’s leadership to maintaining the racial homogeneity of the country. 
Cameron Forbes had donated $500 to support the League’s activities in 1913 and 
$100 in 1916. When Lee asked him for additional money in 1921, while the 
emergency immigration bill was being debated in Congress, Forbes explained that 
he was puzzled as to why the League was still fighting. Forbes was “pretty well 
satisfied” with the literacy test, but the “Immigration Restriction League seemed 
not to be.” He felt that the League’s leadership kept fighting for restriction 
because they did not know what else to do. He declined to contribute any more 
money to the League, though he did tell Lee that he would continue reading their 
literature if it was sent to him.109 
Lee was appalled. He could not believe that a concerned Anglo-Saxon 
American would simply consider the fight won, pack up, and go home just 
because the literacy test had finally passed. That was certainly not the intention of 
the Immigration Restriction League. Lee wrote to Hall, asking for his help in 
creating a “good answer” to Forbes. Hall’s reply, which Lee forwarded to Forbes 
with only minor corrections, showed the extent of the IRL members’ commitment 
to protecting white Anglo-Saxon America. Hall explained that the literacy test 
was only of temporary value, and the Immigration Restriction League understood 
it as such. “If we are to keep the institutions and habits built up by our ancestors 
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in this country, it is absolutely essential to limit the numbers, because the bulk of 
immigration is now Slavic, Semitic, and Mediterranean. Up to the Civil War our 
population was almost entirely Nordic. Now not more than one-half is Nordic.” 
Additionally, in a private reply to Lee, Hall noted that Forbes’s objection was 
probably due to his experience in the Philippines, where he was used to being 
surrounded by large numbers of “inferior peoples.” He concluded, “I don’t think 
any of us felt that the reading test was all we wanted or all that was needed.”110 
The large numbers of immigrants meant that not all of them could be assimilated 
and Americanized properly. So limiting the volume was also crucial. 
The attention of the League’s leaders also shifted to Asian sources of 
immigration to ensure the continuation of the policies excluding Asians from 
entering the United States, reflecting a broader concern over maintaining the color 
of the country.111 New League member Lothrop Stoddard tackled Japanese 
immigration in his 1920 book, The Rising Tide of Color. Hall spoke of Stoddard’s 
excellent potential as a member of the Executive Committee of the League, 
                                                
110 Lee to Hall, 4 April 1921; Hall to Lee, 5 April 1921, both box 2, Lee papers. The California 
sociologist Emory Bogardus proffered a similar argument in 1919. The numbers of immigrants 
had to be controlled, because they needed to be Americanized.  The emergency bill proposed to 
“allow all who wish to do so to come from the countries of Northwestern Europe whose peoples 
are most akin to us…while it will reduce to manageable proportions the Jews, Greeks, Syrians, 
South Italians and other Southern and Eastern peoples, who tend to form separatist groups, and 
have a lower standard of living.” Bogardus’s opinion of Americanization was that native-born 
Americans needed it (including the Indians, blacks, and “Appalachian mountaineers”) as much as 
the immigrants did. The four fundamental points of Americanization were teaching American 
ideals of Liberty and Self-Reliance, Union and Co-operation, Democracy and the Square Deal, and 
Internationalism and Brotherhood. Emory Bogardus, Essentials of Americanization (Los Angeles: 
University of Southern California Press, 1919),   
 
111 Two important recent works on “color” in this period are Thomas Guglielmo, White on Arrival: 
Italians, Race, Color, and Power in Chicago, 1890-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); 
Mae Ngai, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2005).  
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describing him as “just the new blood we want. He is well up on racial questions, 
and he can write.” Stoddard’s book urged the United States to stand up against the 
“Yellow races,” and protect America’s Anglo-Saxon purity. Stoddard felt that he 
had divined the imperial Japanese government’s intentions from their 
international actions and that these intentions threatened American security and 
racial homogeneity. “Japan must find lands where Japanese can breed by the tens 
of millions if she is not to be automatically overshadowed in course of time,” he 
noted. “This is the secret of her aggressive foreign policy, her chronic 
imperialism, her extravagant dreams of conquest and ‘world-domination.’” In the 
early 1920s, Stoddard came to play an increasingly prominent role in the League, 
as his books kept concerns over immigration and race prominent in the public 
mind. Though they had achieved restriction of immigration, the League 
fortunately had men like Stoddard, who “can write,” to persuade the public to 
remain vigilant, while other members lobbied politicians.112 
                                                
112 Lothrop Stoddard, The Rising Tide of Color Against White World-Supremacy (New York: 
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1920), 48-9; Prescott F. Hall to Joseph Lee, 15 October 1920, box 1, Lee 
Papers. Hall’s conference with Robert DeCourcy Ward, which was the subject of his letter to Lee, 
described two further strategies the League should embrace to achieve further restriction – 
increasing the frequency with which the League mailed short contributions to newspapers so that 
they could “comment on things while they are still fresh” and that the United States government 
“as I originally suggested when [Senator] Lodge told us to wait” should make a deal “with the 
Slope people, that we will go as far as they like on Japanese, if they will back our percentage bill 
for Europe.” Hall’s reference to “the Slope people” was apparently a witty play on anti-Asian 
slang, as he was referring to restrictionists in the western United States who were unconcerned 
with European immigration, but who consistently agitated for restrictions against Asian 
immigration.  
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Even with the passage of the heavily restrictionist Emergency Immigration 
Act of 1921, the League pressed for more restriction.113 Ward wrote to Lee in May 
1922 to discuss strategies and a “general consensus” for an upcoming article he 
was writing on immigration and future legislation. Ward hinted at the possibility 
of introducing some type of eugenic selection of aliens, and considering mental 
tests for immigrants as well. In November of the same year, Patten continued 
informing League members of the ongoing hearings for increased restrictions on 
immigration in Congress, noting that H. H. Laughlin’s testimony to the House 
Immigration and Naturalization Committee—of which Albert Johnson was still 
chairman—was a “wonderful presentation,” and a “corking study of the alien 
inmates of public institutions.”114 Laughlin’s data sample was highly problematic, 
a point that Herbert Spencer Jennings took pains to elaborate later in the 1920s, 
but which did not trouble League leaders in the least.  
As various restrictive mechanisms designed to curtail immigration 
continued coming out of Congress, Patten kept the League’s members informed 
of all the suggestions and policy possibilities. Their lobbyist was on top of the 
political discussions involving the 1890 Census as the basis for new numerical 
quotas, and the implications that would have for the flow of Anglo-Saxon 
immigrants. Patten knew which provisions would increase the percentage of 
immigrants allowed under the various numerical limitation schemes which were 
                                                
113 The first quota provision was pocket-vetoed by President Wilson in February 1921; President 
Harding signed the bill in mid-May 1921. See Hutchinson, Legislative History of Immigration.  
 
114 Patten to Ward, 21 November 1922, box 2, Lee papers.  
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designed to address economic demands for certain kinds of manual labor. As the 
House Committee was getting ready to report out a bill in 1923, Patten described 
it to his colleagues as a “splendid bill.” “The whole theory of the bill is 
scientific,” he excitedly told Lee, as the bill explained, “that we have been getting 
too many S.E. Europeans, and that S.E. European immigration is to be cut down 
as much as possible.”115 This association with science, and how it proved the 
undesirability of southern immigrants shows how effective restrictionists were at 
using classic racialist ideas. 
The League’s base of support was very broad in the 1920s, and not all of 
its political influence in Washington D.C. originated with Patten. Lee sent a letter 
to James J. Davis, the Secretary of Labor, in September 1923 to correct what Lee 
believed was a misunderstanding on the part of the Secretary.116 Davis believed 
that social workers were against immigration restriction, and Lee maintained that 
by and large, the opposite was the case. He cited personal acquaintances, like 
Edward Devine (General Secretary of the Charity Organization Society of New 
York) who was a restrictionist, and John Moors, President of the Boston Public 
School Association and the Family Welfare Society of Boston, who just happened 
to also be titular President of the Immigration Restriction League. Lee said that he 
himself, who was the President of the Playground and Recreation Association of 
                                                
 
115 Patten’s unaddressed memos to Lee from 18 December 1922; 5 January 1923; and 26 January 
1923, all from box 2, Lee papers. 
 
116 James Davis was the author Selective Immigration (St. Paul, MN: Scott-Mitchell Publishing 
Co., 1925).  
 
 Chapter 4 280 
  
America, had “always been a restrictionist.” But Lee also noted, “Of course, the 
Jews, social workers or otherwise, are against us.” In mid-October the Boston 
philanthropist wrote to Speaker of the House Frederick Gillett to oppose the 
appointment of Fiorello LaGuardia to the House Immigration Committee because 
LaGuardia was sympathetic to immigration of the wrong type.117  
Members of the Immigration Restriction League also participated in a 
number of outside concerns, most of which also added to their political influence. 
Throughout the course of the restrictionist movement, members approached labor 
organizations to join with them in excluding immigrants. They also turned to 
scientific interests to advance restriction. Hall was active on the Immigration 
Committee of the American Breeder’s Association. League members maintained 
correspondence with Charles Davenport in the 1920s, and their connections with 
other organizations continued to expand..118 
Lee became involved with organizations supporting birth control because 
he saw it as a method of demographic control: “We want birth control taught to 
the non-Nordics in the country to put them on an equal reproductive basis with the 
Nordics. Yet against the brown and yellow races, we need all the white stock we 
can get, even if some of it is second rate.” The leaders of the League made a 
concerted effort in 1922 to garner the support of women’s clubs, because “ladies 
are going to run this country during the next few years” (or at least until they got 
                                                
117 Lee to James J. Davis, 19 September 1923; Lee to Frederick Gillett, 18 October 1923, both box 
2, Lee Papers.  
 
118 E.g. Lee to John Golden [President of the United Textile Workers of America], 18 June 1912, 
box 1, Lee papers; Charles B. Davenport to Prescott Hall, 28 September 1920, box 1, IRL papers. 
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absorbed in “regular politics like men”).119 In 1925, Lee contributed $500 to the 
International Migration Service because they helped immigrants move to better 
living arrangements, but also diminished the “output of sob stuff, which is the 
principal weapon of those who want infinite cheap labor.”120 Not all outside 
affiliations were constructive. Patten’s involvement with the Junior Order of 
United American Mechanics and the World’s Purity Foundation nearly caused his 
removal as the group’s legislative lobbyist in Washington D.C. His affiliation 
with the Farmer’s National Congress, and his commission by the Secretary of 
Labor to investigate conditions in Hawaii, Guam, Japan, China and the 
Philippines in 1923 were more palatable.121  
These affiliations demonstrate the activism of members of the League, and 
their efforts to fight for restriction on multiple fronts. It also aided their efforts at 
                                                
 
119 Hall to Lee, 8 April 1921 [on the Birth Control League of Massachusetts], box 2, Lee papers; 
Lee to Patten, 29 November, 1922, box 2, Lee papers; Lee to Emma Knight [member of the 
Women’s Municipal League of Boston], 10 February, 1923, box 2, Lee papers; Lee to Mrs. Tilton, 
1 February, 1923, box 2, Lee papers. Birth control sustained Lee’s interest. In 1935, writing to 
Robert Paine, a member of the IRL’s Executive Committee, Lee said, “Pretty nearly ever since I 
can remember I have been in favor of birth control as well as any other method of lessening the 
number of undesirable people coming into this country, and I hope the Immigration Restriction 
League will soon be able to take hold of this new way of tackling the problem.” Lee to Robert 
Paine, 15 July, 1935, box 2, Lee papers. 
 
120 Lee to Miss Hurlbutt [of the International Migration Service], 8 December, 1925, box 2, Lee 
papers. 
 
121 Who Was Who in America, v. 1 (Chicago: A.N. Marquis Co., 1943). Hall and Ward published 
numerous articles relating to restriction throughout the course of the 1920s. For instance, see 
Robert DeCourcy Ward, “The New Immigration Law and Its Operation” Scientific Monthly Vol. 
21, no. 1 (July 1925), 45-53; Robert DeC. Ward, “Higher Mental and Physical Standards for 
Immigrants” Scientific Monthly, v. 19, n. 5 (Nov., 1924), 533-47; Robert DeCourcy Ward, “Some 
Thoughts on Immigration Restriction” Scientific Monthly v. 15, n. 4, (Oct. 1922), 313-19; Prescott 
F. Hall, Immigration and Other Interests of Prescott Farnsworth Hall compiled by Mrs. Prescott 
F. Hall (New York: Knickerbocker Press, 1922), among others. As its secretary, Hall also penned 
the vast majority of the Immigration Restriction League’s publications. 
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political pressure. By cooperating with groups that had similar interests, or 
through their own membership in them, League members used every conceivable 
avenue to advance restriction. Though not all of these groups demanded a large 
time commitment, the core of the Immigration Restriction League was 
extraordinarily active. As Madison Grant said of Hall after his death in 1921, Hall 
supported restriction tirelessly because he deeply believed in it. “To the day of his 
death [Hall] asked for nothing for himself and everything for his country.… If 
America goes wrong and allows our native Nordic stock to be replaced by half 
Asiatic mongrels the hope of the world is gone. This issue Prescott Hall saw and 
saw with the vision of a prophet a full generation ahead of his countrymen.… I 
know of no one of our generation to whom America owes so much.”122 In this 
regard, the scientific underpinnings of the movement, and the influence of classic 
racialism played a key role in convincing League members that they were 
working toward good ends. It helped them believe that they were acting upon 
                                                
122 Madison Grant, foreword to Hall’s Immigration and Other Interests, x. League correspondence 
shows several references to the ill health of members, some physical effects of strain, some mental 
and psychic strains. Richards Bradley, Lee, Ward, and Hall were born in 1861, 1862, 1867, and 
1868, respectively. Other members of the League were born around the same time: Madison 
Grant, 1865, John F. Moors, 1861, Charles Warren, 1868, Thornton Cooke, 1873. James Patten 
was the youngest of the group, born in Kansas in 1877. In a collection of his writings published in 
1922, shortly after he died, Hall’s wife noted that he was an insomniac, and had grown up as a 
“frail little hothouse plant.” On his death, his doctor noted that “in him was merged the analytical 
mind in a supersensitive body.” Similarly, in a memorial published shortly after Ward’s death in 
Scientific Monthly, Robert T. Jackson described him as having “a sensitive, nervous, highstrung 
temperament.” Hall, Immigration and Other Interests, 119, xviii; Robert Jackson Taylor, “Robert 
DeCourcy Ward,” The Scientific Monthly, February 1932, 192-94; on Madison Grant,  Fairfield 
Osborn, “Madison Grant” Dictionary of American Biography supplement 2, (New York: Charles 
Scribner’s Sons, 1958). Interestingly, for all Grant’s lamentations of the inability of the Nordic 
Race to reproduce, Grant never married. He was the son of a Congressional Medal of Honor 
winner in the Civil War, and his mother was from a wealthy family from Jamaica, Long Island, 
N.Y. Along with founding the N.Y. Zoological Society, Grant was also President of the Bronx 
Parkway Commission, and with Henry Fairfield Osborn (the Director of the American Museum of 
Natural History) founded the Save the Redwoods League in 1919. Spiro, “The Patrician Racist”; 
idem., Defending the Master Race.   
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scientific principles, not prejudice or discrimination. It was wholly irrelevant if 
the science was actually wrong. 
The importance of their continued activism and vigilance was clear. But 
equally clear for the IRL elite was the importance of avoiding unsavory 
entanglements and keeping restriction predicated upon a “scientific” basis. 
Richards Bradley wrote to Patten in October 1922 that he was concerned about 
groups like the Ku Klux Klan may ruin support for restriction. “Not many years 
ago we had the Know Nothing movement, which died out after being too 
intense,” Bradley explained, “and came to nothing, but is always used by the anti-
restrictionists as an awful example of restriction advocacy. Later we had the 
[American Protective Association]…and now we have the K.K.K. likely to do the 
same things.”123 By having such groups side with the Immigration Restriction 
League, League leaders feared the “noble” purpose of the organization might be 
tainted as reactionary or racist. Thus it was important to carefully guard against 
racist rhetoric and attitudes, and to be moderate in their choice of written or 
spoken language. The scientific language and epistemology of restriction was a 
critical tool for that. Thus, in the mid- to late-1920s, many of the League’s core 
members shook off their “offensive” strategy and focused on convincing the 
public of the importance of preserving restriction. Madison Grant’s collections of 
essays, The Founding Fathers of the Republic on Immigration, Naturalization, 
                                                
 
123 Richards Bradley to Patten, 11 October 1922, box 2, Lee papers. 
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and Aliens and The Alien in Our Midst attempted to ground restriction in the 
discourses of the Founding Fathers and early social leaders.124 
The education and social status of these men gave them powerful tools to 
express their racial ideologies in discrete and subtle ways. Their nativism was not 
the same kind as that expressed by other groups, a point that becomes clear when 
read against Donald Kinzer’s history of the American Protective Association.125 
The League’s sophisticated racialist epistemology gave them an edge in lobbying 
for Congressional legislation that they deemed necessary to protect Anglo-Saxon 
America from the invasion of inferior, crime-prone, feeble-minded hordes of non-
Nordic European aliens. 
The members of the Immigration Restriction League felt very deeply 
about their cause. They were middle and upper class elites who saw a dramatic 
change in society in the course of their lives. They experienced nervous tension 
and physical dis-ease partly as a function of their involvement in trying to stop the 
flow of undesirable immigrants into the United States.126 As well-educated and 
                                                
124 “Immigration Restriction League, Annual Report of the Executive Committee for 1925”; 
Transcript of “Our Immigration Problem”, delivered by Patten on 27 October 1927, both box 2, 
Lee papers; Madison Grant and Charles Stewart Davison, eds. The Founding Fathers on 
Immigration, Naturalization, and Aliens (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1928); Grant, The 
Alien in Our Midst. 
 
125 Donald Kinzer, An Episode in Anti-Catholicism: The American Protective Association (Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 1964). 
 
126 The internal correspondence of the League and the Executive Committee reports clearly show 
that legislative victories were not what stopped League activism. The old stock identity was too 
precious to these men to think that immigrant restriction itself would preserve it. Their continued 
activism after 1917, 1921, and 1924 belie the standard narrative that with legislation, groups like 
the League gave up and enjoyed their success. It was ultimately physical attrition that stopped the 
League. The generation cohort that made up its core membership simply began to die off—Ward 
in 1931, Lee in 1937, Patten in 1940, and Richards M. Bradley in 1943. 
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well-connected men, they used all the tools at their disposal to affect a dramatic 
change in American immigration policy.127 For over twenty years, they had 
advocated restricting immigration to literate immigrants because in their minds 
basic reading skills were an indicator of racial quality. It was not, however, the 
sole indicator. As the literacy clause took effect, they knew it would not limit 
numbers to the extent that they had hoped. For this purpose, the 1921 bill, limiting 
the total number of undesirable immigrants, represented a good starting point in 
their minds.  
Continued action was of paramount importance for League members 
because the first numerical quota provisions were designed to be temporary; a 
May 1922 bill extended it to 1924. The Johnson-Reed Act superseded it in 1924 
(the “National Origins Act”), which the League’s annual report described as “the 
end of one epoch and the beginning of another.” In 1924 they argued that the new 
law must be defended against repeal, and Congressional advocates must be 
supported. “Your Committee does not believe in resting on the ground already 
gained. The enemy is still very much alive, and we hope for your support in 
                                                
 
127 Without careful attention to the nuances and distinctions of immigration restriction and the 
science of eugenics, one risks collapsing an entire ideology into a monolithic and static movement. 
The most egregious example of this type of over-simplification is Allan Chase’s 600 page The 
Legacy of Malthus: The Social Costs of the New Scientific Racism (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1980). Chase accuses English political economist Robert Malthus of being the founder of over 200 
years of scientific “racists” and “quacks,” whose “useless nostrums” shows an absolute disregard 
for true Knowledge. Malthus’s Essay on the Principle of Population Chase claims, was actually 
not about demography, but was rather a tract favoring the racial status quo. Though it was Francis 
Galton—a “wealthy Victorian dilettante” who did not understand that “correlation is not 
causation”—that actually described many of the principles of eugenics, that does not seem to 
matter to Chase. Karl Marx, Francis Galton, Harold Laski, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes “were 
united in their contempt for the humanity and the gonads of the wretched of the earth,” (316) 
which led to the “Genocidal 1924 Immigration Quotas.”  
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seeing the thing through.”128 They looked to science as an essential tool for 
encouraging people to “see the thing through.”  
 
                                                
 
128 “To the Members of the Immigration Restriction League” June 14, 1924, box 2, Lee papers. 
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PART II: THE UNCERTAINTIES OF SCIENTIFIC CERTAINTY 
The four chapters in Part II examine specific disputes between 
practitioners of the methods of scientific investigation of classic racialism and the 
new forms of laboratory and experimental research. Chapter 5 analyzes the ways 
that mental and intelligence tests, which were only in their infancy, were used as 
empirical evidence of racial inferiority of immigrant groups, and how they were 
impacting the intellectual quality and character of American society. The 
influence of classic racialists (especially Harry H. Laughlin) on Congress is an 
important aspect of the ways these imperfect tests were used to generate political 
support for changes in immigration policy.  
Chapter 6 details how the slow, gradual search for a mechanism of natural 
selection by professional scientists enabled many non-academic researchers to 
make sweeping – and erroneous – claims about the processes of evolution and 
degeneration to the public. The popular propaganda of non-scientific writers like 
Albert Wiggam was important in shaping the understanding and perceptions of 
the public and their representatives in Congress.  
Chapter 7 deals specifically with the difficulties of modifying American 
immigration policy to the basis of National Origins. This problematic method of 
exclusion, which was the signal feature of the 1924 Immigration Act, generated 
significant dissent from professional biologists and statisticians who believed that 
computing quotas on the basis of the racial composition of the American 
population in 1790 was impossible. Yet these were the immigration quotas that 
went into effect in 1929 and remained American policy until the passage of the 
Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1965.  
The final chapter of the dissertation studies several debates within 
professional scientific communities in the 1920s, arguing that with a lack of 
consensus even among professional researchers (particularly in the field of 
physical anthropology) severely limited the effectiveness of scientific critiques of 
classic racialist principles. Chapter 8 considers some of the complexities of 
“scientific revolutions” and paradigmatic shifts.  
The conclusion takes the restrictionist movement forward into the 1930s, 
demonstrating that the coalition in support of immigration restriction, led by the 
IRL, did not disband after the implementation of the National Origins quotas in 
1929, but continued working throughout the decade to close policy loopholes and 
maintain the white, Anglo-Saxon character of the American population.  
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Chapter 5: The Inheritance of Intelligence 
 
In 1906, Herbert Henry Goddard, a native of Maine with roots to the 
Puritan settlers of New England, arrived at the Vineland Training School for 
Feeble-Minded Boys and Girls in New Jersey. Having trained with the American 
psychologist G. Stanley Hall at Clark University – Goddard wrote a dissertation 
analyzing the scientific basis for “faith cures” of hypnotism and the power of 
suggestion – Goddard began to introduce a system of intelligence testing to 
establish the mental ability and age of the residents of the facility. Hoping to 
establish the efficacy and utility of mental testing, his biographer notes, “Goddard 
would become America’s most avid convert to [Alfred] Binet’s ‘psychological 
method’ of classifying the feebleminded. From his position at Vineland, he would 
also be able to explain his new practices to institutional physicians.”1 Despite 
Goddard’s contribution to the establishment of mental testing in the United States, 
the key contribution the new Vineland director made was not to demonstrate how 
intelligence could be measured, but instead was to allegedly demonstrate its 
heredity. Goddard’s discovery of one particular feeble-minded young woman at 
Vineland provided an essential foundation for the dominance of classic racialist 
thought in the United States.  
Goddard argued for the hereditary basis of feeble-mindedness in his book 
The Kallikak Family, published in 1912. Deborah Kallikak, a pseudonymous 
                                                
1 Zenderland, Measuring Minds, 98; biographical information in chapters 1 and 2. See also J. 
David Smith, Minds Made Feeble: The Myth and Legacy of the Kallikaks (Rockville, MD: Aspen 
Systems Corp., 1985); Paul, Controlling Human Heredity; for G. Stanley Hall, see Bederman, 
Manliness and Civilization.  
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resident at the training center, illustrated for Goddard a few simple yet essential 
truths. She manifested how decisively heredity contributed to the perpetuation of 
feeble-minded offspring. Goddard investigated Deborah’s family background 
much like Galton had done with his Englishmen, viz., by inquiring into the mental 
conditions of Deborah’s parents and grandparents. What he found was that 
Deborah’s ancestors were disproportionately feeble-minded. Goddard believed 
that she therefore provided proof that a feeble-minded parent would always create 
feeble-minded children; like would produce like, and Deborah’s mental defects 
could never be overcome. She exemplified the need for eugenics, for had her 
parents not reproduced, they would not have contributed this burden to the state of 
New Jersey. Deborah also demonstrated how important experts were in 
recognizing what Goddard called, “the unmistakable look of the feeble-minded,” 
the vast majority of whom “are persons who would not be recognized as such by 
the untrained observer.”2 In her pedigree Deborah represented a critical danger to 
the United States, and Goddard meant to use her as an example of how to stop it.  
Her biography was essential in demonstrating what Goddard believed was 
the Mendelian inheritance of feeble-mindedness. Using an elaborate system of 
charts that graphically represented Deborah’s ancestry – the genealogical research 
into Deborah’s background was performed by Elizabeth Kite, a field worker that 
Goddard employed to trace Deborah’s lineage through interviews with neighbors 
of Deborah’s ancestors – Goddard traced to a Revolutionary War soldier, Martin 
                                                
 
2 Henry Herbert Goddard, The Kallikak Family: A Study in the Heredity of Feeble-Mindedness 
(New York: MacMillan Co., 1912), 77 for look; 104 for observer.  
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Kallikak, the origin of an entire family tree of feeble-minded, criminally inclined, 
and socially inadequate people that culminated in Deborah. Martin had had a brief 
liaison with a nameless feeble-minded girl who bore him an illegitimate son, who 
was named for his father. Martin Sr. later married a proper, upright female, and 
with her had a long line of legitimate descendents in which there was, Goddard 
wrote, no trace of degeneracy or feeble-mindedness. But from this first union, 
Goddard and his field worker traced 480 direct descendants, for 143 of whom he 
had “conclusive proof” of hereditary feeblemindedness. These direct descendants 
in turn married into other families, and produced an additional 1146 offspring, of 
whom 246 were feebleminded. Deborah, who had arrived at Vineland at age 8, 
had shown no capacity to improve her mental ability. Photographs that he 
included of Deborah and her ancestors – doctored to accent their threatening 
defectiveness – functioned in Goddard’s mind, along with this complex 
genealogical history, to prove his conclusion that “all this degeneracy has come as 
the result of the defective mentality and bad blood having been brought into the 
normal family, first from the nameless feeble-minded girl and later by additional 
contaminations from other sources.” Goddard’s study became wildly popular and 
persuasive in terms of rationalizing a greater control over the reproduction of 
these mental defectives, at the same time that it helped propel the legitimacy of 
restrictionist’s literacy tests and examinations of mental ability. It was also 
entirely wrong.3  
                                                
3 Goddard, The Kallikak Family, quote 69; family data of Martin Sr. and Martin Jr. from 18-20; 
charts take up pages 33-50. On the doctoring of the photographs of Deborah and her ancestors, see 
William Grazter, The Undergrowth of Science: Delusion, Self-Deception, and Human Frailty 
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It was not only the physical or biological aspects of immigrants that made 
them seem threatening to nativist-minded Anglo-Saxons. While a trained medical 
expert might be able to detect diseases or abnormalities of immigrants at medical 
inspection stations like Ellis Island, not every disability or undesirable quality was 
easily perceived. Their mental characteristics also made them undesirable – their 
inability to read demonstrated their mental inferiority, which was now taken to be 
hereditary. As the Kallikaks showed, however, not all undesirable population 
groups were alien. Mental testing and psychological exams came of age during 
World War I when millions of American draftees were required to take mental 
exams to determine their best and most effective function for the Army. These 
tests provided an additional metric for assessing the desirability of immigrant 
groups, as native-born Americans performed much better on the tests than 
immigrants. As Galton’s work with the inheritance of talent demonstrated, 
though, the scientific quality of mental testing remained suspect in the immediate 
post-war period.  
                                                                                                                                
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 288. Gratzer also makes the link with the “propensity 
towards criminal or other antisocial behavior…[which] dated back to the writings of Cesare 
Lombroso.” 288; also, Gould, The Mismeasure of Man, esp. chapter 5 where Gould notes that 
Goddard’s work on associating immigrant races and their intelligence, which followed from his 
Kallikak studies, were “little more than guesswork rooted in conclusions set from the start.” On 
188. Zenderland, Measuring Minds is similarly critical of Goddard’s research, and Diane Paul 
explains that the “real menace” of the feeble-minded was the heterozygous Mendelian population 
that carried the genes but did not manifest the feeble-minded mental defects. They lurked instead 
as silent vectors for future generations. See Paul, Human Heredity, chapter 4, esp. 68-70. Nicole 
Hahn Rafter suggests that Goddard’s contribution to the heredity of the feeble-minded was to 
supplant Lombroso’s criminal anthropology of the born criminal a psychological definition of the 
moron and criminal. See Nicole Hahn Rafter, Creating Born Criminals (Urbana, IL: University of 
Illinois Press, 1997), 137. Smith points out two key aspects of Deborah’s story: she most likely 
had a basic learning disability, and was not feeble-minded; and that the lure of Goddard’s Kallikak 
family study was that it provided a “simplistic explanation that social ills like poverty, 
prostitution, crime, and alcoholism were the result of  feeblemindedness—specifically the high-
grade, moron type—was appealing to the spirit of the time.” Smith, Minds Made Feeble, disability 
from 23; quote from 61, emphasis added.  
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There were competing agendas and plans for restriction that complicated 
the movement’s goals for protecting the American people; there was not a 
monolithic nativist movement. Some restrictionists favored using mental tests on 
immigrants as another mechanism of restriction, believing that it would provide 
further proof of the undesirability of certain “races” of immigrants. Others began 
to favor a process of biological or eugenic selection of immigrants that 
investigated the genealogical and racial background of immigrants so that only 
Nordic or Alpine races were admitted, in their minds thus preserving America’s 
racial homogeneity. Despite these differences, however, the restrictionist 
movement in the 1920s began to use effective tactics to achieve its aims. Nativists 
utilized evidence from the army mental tests to “prove” the intellectual inferiority 
of immigrants, and made their findings available to wide segments of the public. 
They combined the infant science of psychology with a popularizing thrust that 
described the dangers of hereditary inferiority, exemplified by the Kallikaks and 
the undesirable immigrants from southern and eastern Europe.  The assertions in 
favor of restriction that were based on the “restrictionist epistemology” of classic 
racialism began to take on the weight of “scientific” fact. But these assertions in 
the 1920s were increasingly refuted by professional scientists and academics who 
demanded a much higher burden of proof and accuracy than Goddard’s field 
workers could provide, or that haphazardly administered mental tests to army 
recruits would generate.  
While the restrictionist movement disagreed on some strategies, they were 
united in the way the perceived they threat. Along with the perceived racial 
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degradation that unrestricted immigration created was the fear of the mental 
degeneration of the country caused by immigrants whose psychological 
temperament and mental ability made successful assimilation impossible. The 
racial and mental dangers often worked hand in hand for restrictionist’s 
arguments, and it is worth considering the ways in which early psychological 
testing was also used as a justification for restriction. In this activity, Davenport 
and the Eugenics Record Office were again in the front lines of research, and 
many of his flawed assumptions about heredity meshed with his flawed 
assumptions about mental ability. But despite increasingly public criticism of the 
quality and standards of his work – which Heron, Galloway and Pearson had 
already demonstrated – these flaws had little real negative impact on the public’s 
reception of his work.  
The ERO’s “Trait Book,” which Heron had ridiculed in his New York 
Times review in 1913, was one of many products of research that coupled heredity 
and mental ability in the early twentieth-century. The “Trait Book” was designed 
to give eugenic field workers a precise vocabulary to classify physical, mental, 
and social attributes in families, thus providing living “breeding experiments in 
which the true units reveal themselves as relatively, if not absolutely, constant, 
unalterable, indivisible things.”4 Francis Galton, Cesare Lombroso, Henry Cabot 
Lodge, and many others had for years been making facile associations between 
heredity and “intelligence”; Davenport would make his own contribution in 1921 
                                                
 
4 Charles B. Davenport, “The Trait Book,” Bulletin no. 6 of the Eugenics Record Office (Cold 
Spring Harbor, NY: 1912), 1.  
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with Naval Officers: Their Heredity and Development.5 The “Trait Book” was a 
guide for mostly female field workers with little academic or experimental 
training in biology, to help them register attributes that could then be tabulated 
and correlated at Cold Spring Harbor. Coming up with succinct descriptions and 
symptoms was challenging, however. Describing the physical traits and 
occupations of individuals was relatively straightforward – though certainly some 
of the evaluated physical traits like “Physical Beauty” were highly subjective – 
but describing mental attributes was much more difficult. For the section of the 
brief book dealing with mental traits, Davenport modified recommendations from 
E. L. Thorndike and Robert M. Yerkes, two men closely involved with the 
emerging field of psychological testing.6 Being able to classify the mental ability 
of individuals and groups was critical for restrictionists and classic racialists. 
Davenport’s association with Goddard had frequently impressed on Davenport the 
importance of being able to precisely calculate the likelihood of mental inferiority 
developing in offspring. Additionally, federal immigration policy already 
excluded immigrants with certain physical diseases – if more mental diseases 
could be added and their detection accurately improved, the country’s racial 
quality and characteristics could be that much better protected.  
Psychological experts believed that a professional could immediately and 
easily spot some mental deficiency, just as Goddard predicted. But most mental 
characteristics were not physically apparent, and they were impossible to catalog 
                                                
5 Charles B. Davenport, Naval Officers: Their Heredity and Development.  
 
6 See, for instance, the essays in Michael Sokal, ed., Psychological Testing and American Society, 
1890-1930 (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1987); Zenderland, Measuring Minds.  
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without some master list. Such was the purpose of the “Trait Book.” Turning to 
Yerkes for assistance was an obvious solution for Davenport, since Yerkes had 
many of the same hereditary assumptions that Davenport held, and as he had 
expressed to Davenport, was “keenly interested in psychic heredity.”7 
Davenport’s hope was that a precise terminology would help illuminate the 
hereditary transmission of specific mental characteristics, and he enlisted 
Yerkes’s expertise in devising a list.   
The list of mental traits Yerkes and Thorndike provided for Davenport 
was subdivided in several broad categories. The general categories were then 
further broken down, so, for instance, Intellectual Faculties examined General 
Mental Ability, Imagination, Reasoning and Logicalness, Sense-Perception and 
Organization. Field workers recorded on an index card characteristics like 
“retentiveness,” “logicalness,” “suggestiveness,” which were then collated and 
analyzed at Cold Spring Harbor for a hereditary basis.8 As might be imagined, 
measuring mental traits regarding an individual’s “Feelings” were quite difficult 
to describe, and considering the conditions under which such questions were 
                                                
 
7 Robert Yerkes to Davenport, 17 July 1911, Davenport Papers. Around the turn of the century 
Davenport had introduced Yerkes to Galton’s work on eugenics and inheritance of certain “traits” 
in distinguished families. The two corresponded in the late summer and early fall of 1911 about 
the best way to disseminate knowledge; see in addition to above, Davenport to Yerkes 22 July 
1911; Yerkes to Davenport 16 September 1911; Davenport to Yerkes 18 September 1911; 
Davenport to Yerkes 25 September 1911, all in Davenport papers. Yerkes was a former student of 
Davenport’s, and had conducted research at Harvard’s Psychological Laboratory in the late 
nineteenth century. See Davenport to Yerkes, 1 December 1899; Davenport to Yerkes, 11 
December 1900, both in Robert M. Yerkes Papers, Professional Correspondence, Yale University 
Archives, Yale University, New Haven, CT [hereafter Yerkes papers]. 
 
8 Davenport, “The Trait Book,” 22. See also Garland Allen, “The Eugenics Record Office at Cold 
Spring Harbor, 1910-1940: An Essay in Institutional History” Osiris 2nd series, v. 2, (1986), 225-
64. 
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asked, their reliability should have been immediately suspect to any careful 
observer or empirical scientist.  
Instructions for measuring “Feelings,” under the broad category of 
“General Tastes,” presented the fieldworker with a list of oppositional binaries: 
“detail vs. generalization,” “excitement vs. quiet,” “knowledge vs. lack of 
intellectual interests,” “truth vs. deception,” and “ludicrousness vs. absence of 
sense of humor.”9 The sequence following “Special Pleasures or Passions” 
featured easily recognizable attributes like the use of tobacco, narcotics, alcohol 
or stimulants, but also listed obscure traits like “Getting Money,” “Hoarding 
Money,” “Power, social,” and “Sex Indulgence” without providing any real 
definition.10 The entire list of mental attributes was, in reality, a seemingly 
random compilation of behavioral attitudes that had little observable basis. 
Considering Davenport’s position on the longevity of female field workers, the 
women sent out to gather the information frequently lacked experience in 
assessing personality and behavioral traits, making their evaluations of subjects 
intensely problematic.11 How could they accurately determine an individual’s 
“Anger (liability to) vs. unruffledness,” “boldness vs. timidity,” their love of 
action, approbation, sympathy, or power, their “envy vs. unenviousness,” 
                                                
9 Davenport, “The Trait Book,” 23.  
 
10 Under Money, coded 4244, was listed Getting (42442) and Hoarding (42444). Davenport, “The 
Trait Book,” 24.  
 
11 Davenport explained the policy to Goddard: “We regard our appointments as temporary and 
have adopted the general principle that we shall employ a field worker for only three years…in the 
hope that she will marry…[and the ERO] can not be charged with working cacogenically…” 
Davenport to Goddard, 29 July 1912, Davenport papers. There was a profound irony that 
Davenport never had children of his own.  
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“jealousness vs. unjealousness,” “trustfulness vs. suspiciousness,” or their 
“philoprogenitiveness”?12 These “traits” were based purely on speculation and 
subject responses.  
Yet like Galton, the Eugenics Record Office regarded these records and 
replies to be indicators of hereditary mental ability, and thus an effective way to 
biologically rank inherited mental characteristics. Other behavioral attributes were 
carefully indexed to aid the field workers, including opposites like “gracefulness 
vs. awkwardness,” “stereotype vs. variableness,” as well as variations in quality 
and degree of concentration, apprehension, observation, imitation, and 
suggestibility.13 Characteristics related to egotism and temperament, self-
assertion, altruism, ethics, sexuality, and speech were all carefully named, listed, 
categorized and indexed for ease of classification. The instructions laid out to 
field workers in the May 1911 bulletin “The Study of Human Heredity” gave 
explicit instructions for conducting interviews of willing family members, and 
give a real sense of the problematic nature of the data gathered. There was no 
chemical testing; there were no long periods of observation of familial groups as 
there would be in anthropology or sociology. Recording and cataloguing family 
traits was conducted by oral conversations with not-disinterested persons (both 
the interviewer and interviewee), with the interviewer operating under the goal “to 
establishing a feeling between the family and Institution that will assure [the field 
                                                
12 Ibid., 24-5. Philoprogenitiveness would relate to an individual’s affect toward its offspring.  
 
13 Ibid., 24-25. The subdivision “Movements in Relation to Productiveness” in the subheading 
“Movement: Behavior” supposed inherited characters leading to indolence, vacillation, tardiness, 
procrastination, rashness, “coolness in emergency vs. loss of head,” “impracticalness,” 
“definiteness of purpose vs. desultoriness,” fickleness and slovenliness. Ibid., 25-26.  
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worker] of a welcome at any time…and to this end she sacrifices minor details 
that would naturally come on return visits.”14 
At this time, human understanding of the mechanisms of inheritance was 
dim at best. Confusion over terminology, inadequate methods for gathering data, 
and unwieldy statistical tools of association and deviation made even the cautious 
study of heredity problematic. In this context, it is difficult to ridicule the efforts 
that Davenport and his colleagues made to advance the study of genetics by 
recording and analyzing extended familial lines for manifestations of behavioral, 
physical, mental or moral similarity. Yet when one considers the implications that 
these studies of mental behavior had for thousands of individuals, the unwavering 
faith that Davenport and others put in their strict Mendelian determinism, and the 
way they “used” their knowledge of heredity, their efforts take on a significance 
more tragic than comic. There was never a sense of cautiousness, hesitation or 
critical examination of the results. There was only a tremendously misplaced 
certainty.  
In the realm of mental testing, one of the more significant of Davenport’s 
associates was the Director of the Vineland Training School. In their early 
interactions, Goddard turned to Davenport for instruction on heredity and 
eugenics. Both men perceived a danger to the racial character of the United States 
if mentally inferior individuals reproduced and passed their afflictions on to future 
generations; both also tended to support classic racialist axioms. Davenport’s 
                                                
 
14 Davenport et al, The Study of Human Heredity, 2.  
 
 Chapter 5 299 
certainty in the Mendelian patterns of inheritance assured Goddard that a eugenic 
solution to the problem was possible. And although Goddard confessed “much 
more zeal than knowledge in this field,” he quickly made up ground, aided by his 
discovery of the notorious Kallikak family of New Jersey.15  
While Richard Dugdale’s Jukes family was the first shocking 
manifestation of the inheritance of delinquency and degeneration in the United 
States, it was only in the first decades of the twentieth century that public 
awareness of the inheritance of feeble-mindedness began to grow rapidly.16 The 
Kallikak discovery provided what appeared to be an extraordinary example of the 
inheritance of feeble-mindedness. The family was a perfect example for the utility 
of eugenics. It was important then, that Goddard’s case study of the inheritance of 
feeble-mindedness come to the public carefully, in an unimpeachable way.17 
Goddard had to be extremely careful to not, as he put it, “queer” the country 
against eugenics by exaggerating his findings with sloppy analysis. He turned to 
Davenport for advice on how to handle the publicity regarding the study. Their 
private correspondence on this matter is worth examining closely, as it shows 
                                                
15 Goddard to Davenport, 18 July 1909, Davenport papers.  
 
16 Richard Dugdale, The Jukes: A Study in Crime, Pauperism, Disease and Heredity (New York: 
G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1877). Also Christine Rosen, Preaching Eugenics: Religious Leaders and 
the American  Eugenics Movement (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).  
 
17 When David Starr Jordan asked Goddard to take a place on the Committee on Feeble-
Mindedness of the Eugenics Committee of the American Breeders Association in 1909, Davenport 
and Goddard discussed the importance of issuing a quick preliminary report “concerning our 
knowledge of inheritance of feeble-mindedness…” Davenport to Goddard 9 July 1909; Davenport 
to Goddard, 24 May 1909; Goddard to Davenport 27  May 1909; Davenport to Goddard, 26 
October 1909, all in Davenport papers. In the October letter, Davenport told Goddard that a 
preliminary report, which they would ensure would “show the importance of blood in cases of 
defectives, delinquents and diseased…to the Sage Foundation and make a request which the 
Trustees of that Foundation will find it difficult to refuse.”  
 
 Chapter 5 300 
private hesitations about a movement for which they showed no doubts or 
uncertainty in public.  
On Wednesday April 13, 1910, with his research on the family underway, 
Goddard wrote Davenport asking about the advisability of publishing family 
charts on the feeble-mindedness of the Kallikaks and their heredity in a popular 
magazine. While the increased visibility of the early results of his hereditary study 
of the family could generate public support for mental testing, Goddard worried 
that the content could be manipulated or exploited by a writer hoping to gain a 
type of “shock” value from the story. By bowdlerizing the scientific content of the 
charts, the Vineland superintendent worried that a story by an unscrupulous writer 
“might prove greatly to the disadvantage of the world,” and “‘queer’ the whole 
country…in regard to this whole matter of Eugenics.” He felt it most important to 
protect the integrity of future investigations, whether they were conducted by 
Goddard himself, or by Davenport and his field workers at the ERO. He added a 
hand-written post-script noting that despite his inclination to withhold the letter – 
“it seems to me a needless worry” – he would send it anyway, as Davenport’s 
answer would reassure him that they were doing the right thing.18 Instead of 
reassuring him that publishing the information was advisable, Davenport wrote of 
the tremendous perils that eugenicists faced in popularizing the movement, along 
                                                
18 Goddard to Davenport, 13 April 1910, Davenport papers.  
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with a basic uncertainty of the hereditary basis of mental ability that they did not 
often make in public.19 
The importance of spreading public knowledge about eugenics was 
essential, but managing its dissemination was even more central to the success of 
the movement. “There are scores of persons in the newspaper offices with the 
power and many of them I regret to say who would not scruple to use their power 
to damage any good cause,” Davenport wrote. The risk of serious damage to “our 
whole work” was very significant, and although there was “increasing popular 
appreciation of the true worthlessness of such [critical] writings…the great 
uneducated masses are still fooled,” and the possibility of “queering” the country 
against eugenics was very real. But the eugenicist firmly believed that “our duty 
as men of science [is] to steer our course perfectly direct” and publish the charts. 
“There is no use in collecting facts unless they can be put before at least the 
scientific public to form the basis of eventual action.”20 This tension between 
controlling information about eugenics while simultaneously trying to educate the 
public about it plagued the movement throughout its history, and the precise 
definition of who constituted the “scientific public” was never clear.  
In July, Goddard and Davenport again debated the virtues of teasing out 
information about Goddard’s dysgenic discovery, this time at a child welfare 
                                                
19 They did acknowledge uncertainty as to the mechanism of inheritance – Goddard explained in 
The Kallikak Family that “We are still ignorant of the exact laws of inheritance. Just how mental 
characteristics are transmitted from parent to child is not yet definitely known.” – but he was 
relatively convinced that it was a basic Mendelian unit character, and he spent several pages after 
expressing that caution describing how it followed the laws of dominant and recessive inheritance. 
Goddard, The Kallikak Family, quote from 109; examination of Mendelian nature 110ff.  
 
20 Davenport to Goddard, 15 April 1910, Davenport papers.  
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conference that was being organized in New York City for November 1910. 
Davenport requested a photograph of an “imbecile with extreme features or 
possibly a microcephalic idiot” to use as the icon for imbecility in family 
pedigrees for an exhibit for a mental health organization. Goddard demurred, and 
his negative reply showed the efforts that eugenicists were making to impress on 
the public the horrifying truth that “the most dangerous children in a community 
are those that look entirely normal,” and were not like Lombroso’s stigmata-
scarred subjects. Goddard told Davenport that instead of using a photo of an 
obviously feeble-minded person, the movement’s goals would be better served by 
using the photograph of a “fine looking, normal appearing boy or girl and lay the 
emphasis on the fact that they are really feeble-minded and incapable of taking 
care of themselves.”21 But this did not convince Davenport. The importance of the 
work lay in eugenics’ ability to “bring home to the American people and their 
legislators the importance of heredity as a main source of the stream of 
degenerates, defectives and delinquents.” The public’s understanding at present, 
he lamented was that delinquency and defectiveness were products of 
environment.22  Visually representing the dangers, Davenport believed, would add 
urgency to the movement and assist the public’s direct association between 
heredity and feeble-mindedness.  
                                                
 
21 Davenport to Goddard, 1 July 1910; Goddard to Davenport, 4 July 1910, both Davenport 
papers.  
 
22 Davenport to Goddard, 15 September 1910, Davenport papers. Emphasis added. 
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Deborah Kallikak perfectly portrayed Goddard’s point about feeble-
minded “passing.” In most of the photographs of the book once it was published, 
she appeared as a perfectly normal looking person. Deborah arrived at Vineland 
when she was 8 years old, the daughter of a woman who had several children by 
different fathers. Goddard explained that although she had been persistently 
trained in the years she had been at the center, Deborah’s general intelligence had 
not improved. Lacking what the doctors described as the mental capacity to resist 
vice, she was consigned to be a perpetual resident at the Training School. The 
reason for her inferior mental condition, Goddard declared, was bad heredity, and 
no amount of training or education could improve her condition. But she looked 
normal. Goddard maintained that a feeble-minded person could never be made 
into a useful citizen (or parent) but only a trained professional was able to easily 
identify feeble-minded persons who seemed, to the untrained, to be normal.23  
It was this privileged position of expert authority that became highly 
significant in coupling mental deficiency with immigration restriction. Writing to 
Robert Yerkes in late 1912, Goddard declared the special province of scientific 
experts in assessing the mental capacity of individuals. Leila Zenderland, who has 
closely studied Goddard’s work on mental testing, describes his position as one 
removed from academic psychology and more a part of the medical world.24 
Using the example of medical inspections of immigrants on Ellis Island, Goddard 
                                                
 
23 Goddard, The Kallikak Family. See also Zenderland, Measuring Minds.  
 
24 Leila Zenderland, “Debate over Diagnosis: Henry Herbert Goddard and the Medical Acceptance 
of Intelligence Testing” in Michael M. Sokal, ed. Psychological Testing and American Society, 
1890-1930 (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1987) p. 50; see also James Reed, 
“Robert M. Yerkes and the Mental Testing Movement,” Ibid. 
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admitted that he was mystified when psychiatrists on the inspection line could 
look at an immigrant and know that the new arrival was an insane person. “I don’t 
understand how he does it,” he confessed to Yerkes. “I cannot believe but that he 
is guessing, nevertheless the results prove that he is accurate.… I come to 
conclude that the expert has an experience that is not understandable but whose 
results we must accept.” Addressing the work of his own field researchers, 
Goddard emphasized the same special ability, noting that they did not hunt for 
feeble-mindedness, but were carefully trained to recognize it.25  
Professional reviews of The Kallikak Family by and large validated 
Goddard’s thesis of the special skill of properly trained experts. The American 
Journal of Psychology stressed that although the book was written for a lay 
audience, the scientific evidence presented in the technical volume that was 
forthcoming would prove the conclusions Goddard drew. When this was 
published as Feeble-Mindedness: Its Causes and Consequences in 1914, the 
reviewer in International Journal of Ethics endorsed Goddard’s conclusions, and 
even included a variant of Davenport’s favorite hereditary claim: “we may say, it 
is clear that children in these cases are like their parents.”26 Even the review of an 
Oberlin College professor that was harshly critical of Davenport’s Heredity in 
Relation to Eugenics and the published papers of the first International Eugenics 
                                                
 
25 Goddard to Robert M. Yerkes, 5 November 1912, Robert Mearns Yerkes Papers, Manuscripts 
and Archives, Yale University Library, New Haven, CT.  
 
26 Review of The Kallikak Family: A Study in the Heredity of Feeble-Mindedness by H. H. 
Goddard, in The American Journal of Psychology v. 24, n. 2 (April 1913), 290-1; J.H.T., Untitled 
review of Feeble-Mindedness: Its Causes and Consequences by H. H. Goddard, in International 
Journal of Ethics v. 25, n. 3 (April 1915), 423-24, quote from 423.  
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Congress, warmly endorsed the Kallikak study. Goddard proved, he noted, the 
heritability of mental defects “beyond possibility of reasonable doubt.”27  
When the empirical evidence to support Goddard’s claims for the heredity 
of feeble-mindedness was published in a separate volume in 1914, it aimed to 
demonstrate the heritability of feeble-mindedness by sheer weight of evidence. 
Goddard performed a pedigree analysis of other Vineland residents just as he had 
with Deborah. The book contained over 400 pages of family pedigrees and charts 
to emphasize that mental defects and incapacity were confined to family lines, 
transmitted, he insisted, as a unit character by the Mendelian ratio. By this 
Goddard meant that “intelligence” was a singular quality, that the intellectual 
development and capacity of a human being was the result of one specific and 
separate part. It was believed at this time, erroneously it turned out, that things 
like eye color and hair color were “unit characters,” that were either dominant or 
recessive, so that they were transmitted by precise mathematical ratios. Jennings 
would later describe this idea as having no scientific basis even as it pertained to 
simple phenomena like eye color.28 Thomas Hunt Morgan’s research on fruit flies 
also unequivocally disproved the concept of unit characters, explaining that a 
given characteristic “is the product of a number of genetic factors and of 
                                                
27 A. B. Wolfe, review of The Kallikak Family by H. H. Goddard, in The American Economic 
Review v. 3, n. 1 (March 1913), 165-70. John Lisle, the Kallikak reviewer in the Journal of the 
American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology declared that the book’s value in the study of 
heredity could not be overestimated, and that the standing of the authority and his professional 
position “are such guarantees of the authenticity of its data and the correctness of the work as to 
make it invaluable.” John Lisle, review of The Kallikak Family by H. H. Goddard, in the Journal 
of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, v. 4, n. 3 (September 1913), 470-71. 
 
28 Henry Herbert Goddard, Feeble-Mindedness: Its Causes and Consequences (New York: The 
Macmillan Co., 1926); Herbert Spencer Jennings, “Heredity and Environment” The Scientific 
Monthly v. 19, n. 3 (September 1924), 225-38;  228.  
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environmental conditions” and that the “careless use of the term [unit character]” 
in the context of his chromosome theory “deserves the disrepute into which it is 
falling.”29 But for Goddard, Harry Laughlin and Davenport, unit characters were 
essential to the eugenic project; the movement could not function without them or 
the transmission of characteristics along readily predictable Mendelian lines. 
“Proving” the inheritance of feeble-mindedness by Mendel’s ratios was 
imperative. This was the whole function of Feeble-Mindedness: once the 
inheritance of feeble-mindedness in this fashion could be demonstrated, once it 
was proven to be a biological law, the feeble-minded could be isolated from 
society, because nothing could be done to improve their lives or their 
intelligence.30 Importantly, however, it must be pointed out that at this point that 
the eventual eugenic solutions introduced in Nazi Germany parted ways with its 
American counterpart, for Goddard, Laughlin or Davenport never took the next 
logical step of exterminating these defectives.31 
                                                
29 Thomas Hunt Morgan, A. H. Sturtevant, H. J. Muller, C. B. Bridges, The Mechanism of 
Mendelian Heredity rev. ed. (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1922 [orig. 1915]), 264.  
 
30 Goddard, Feeble-Mindedness, 556 for Goddard’s assertion that it is “transmitted in accordance 
with the Mendelian formula.” On the logical conclusion of negative eugenics – eliminating these 
members from society – Goddard wrote: “The feeble-minded person is not desirable, he is a social 
encumbrance, often a burden to himself. In short it were better both for him and for society had he 
never been born. Should we not then, in our attempt to improve the race, begin by preventing the 
birth of more feeble-minded? This is a program which is attracting much attention.” Ibid., 558, 
emphasis added.  
 
31 Stefan Kühl’s very careful analysis of Goddard’s book shows that there were significant 
connections between the American and German eugenics communities that preceded the Nazi 
party’s takeover of the German state; he notes that American eugenicists were among the strongest 
foreign supporters of Nazi racism, and that American immigration laws were viewed in Germany 
particularly well. The Nazis, Kühl points out, embraced the stories of the Jukes and Kallikaks to 
legitimize their own programs. Stefan Kühl, Eugenics, American Racism, and German National 
Socialism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), especially chapter 4. Stephen Jay Gould 
points out that the Nazis ultimately implemented the Eugenic Record Office’s Model Sterilization 
Law, written in 1922, in September 1939. Stephen Jay Gould, The Flamingo’s Smile: Reflections 
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It was not just the ominous outlook on hereditary mental defects in 
Feeble-Mindedness that made it troubling. It was also the way the evidence was 
obtained. The subjects that provided the family pedigrees that Goddard used to 
“prove” the heritability of mental defects were the young patients at the Vineland 
facility. Very often, Goddard explained, the children were admitted without full 
examinations of the family histories. The pedigrees were essential not so much for 
the care of the children – the alleged biological basis of feeble-mindedness made 
that futile. But the pedigrees were important for the establishing the proof of 
hereditary feeble-mindedness. It seems strange, then, how the data and 
information were gathered. In this respect, Goddard learned from Davenport very 
well, for the information that his researchers gathered was obtained in exactly the 
same way that Davenport’s conducted research through the ERO: by female field 
workers who conducted interviews with family members. Selected for their 
“pleasing manner and address,” which was supposed to inspire comfort in the 
subject’s family, the female researchers did not have any professional or even 
systematic training. They were given brief instruction and special training to 
conduct interviews, but they mostly lacked any knowledge of the scientific nature 
of the problems they were investigating, the alternative factors that might also 
have caused the mental defects, or any genuine ability to be critical of the 
information they gathered from family members.32 Yet these were the women that 
                                                                                                                                
in Natural History (New York: W. W. Norton, 1985). Kevles, In the Name of Eugenics, especially 
chapter 8, correctly points out that the public erosion for support in the United States was not due 
to the Nazi polices of the 1930s, but was the result of a coalition of critics, which will be discussed 
further below.  
 
32 The role of the women is from Goddard, Feeble-Mindedness, 24. 
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Goddard, like Davenport, selected to examine family histories for evidence of 
feeble-mindedness back three, four, or even six generations.33 This was science 
conducted in the quintessential classic racialist method: knowledge creation by 
virtue of social skills, not academic proficiency; examining as unit characters 
highly complex phenomena and processes; “proof” provided by anecdotal 
evidence and sheer volume rather than experimental viability; and heavily 
influenced by a priori assumptions. Surprisingly these shortcomings would not 
inhibit the success of the movement at all.  
Ultimately, the significance of The Kallikak Family was not the discovery 
of a long line of feeble-minded ancestors that consumed public resources, or the 
proof it allegedly supplied for the inheritance of feeble-mindedness. The real 
significance lay in the affirmation of the positive role that experts could play in 
discerning the mental ability of individuals. In the wake of Goddard’s book – 
much more so than after Dugdale’s or Davenport’s exposés – the practice of 
psychological testing became mainstream. And with the affirmation of the ability 
of experts to detect mental deficiencies, the coupling of mental ability to 
immigration restriction became legitimized.  
The Immigration Act of 1882 first listed psychological reasons that an 
arriving immigrant may be denied admission to the United States.34 Members of 
                                                
 
33 Goddard insisted, “The idea that it is impossible to determine the mentality of a person who is 
three or four generations back to the present is partly an ill-considered one and partly the result of 
erroneous logic.” The relatively closer family ties in defective families, and their limited 
geographical range (because of their feeble-mindedness) also improved, in his mind, the accuracy 
of these extended inquiries into family backgrounds. Ibid., 27-8.  
 
34 Hutchinson, Legislative History.  
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the Immigration Restriction League frequently used their political connections to 
influence the appointment of immigrant inspectors in eastern ports, particularly at 
Ellis Island. They viewed it as essential that officials in charge of the 
examinations follow, to the letter, the policy laid out in the various immigration 
laws. In April 1912 Prescott Hall had asked United States Public Health Service 
physician M. Victor Safford to look into cases where the Secretary of Labor, who 
had oversight over the entire immigration inspection process, had overturned 
decisions made by medical physicians and landed imbecilic or feeble-minded 
immigrants. Safford found that in multiple cases the Secretary enabled relatives of 
the excluded aliens to secure their own physician to provide medical testimony 
that under the law, the immigrant was admissible. In one case in particular, that of 
Mosche Rabinowitz, the medical doctor secured by the immigrant’s family 
succeeded in convincing Secretary Charles Nagel “that the alien was only deaf 
and dumb,” but once the he was admitted, he quickly became an inmate at the 
Kansas City, Missouri insane asylum.35 The implication Hall drew was that 
Secretary Nagel was endangering the country by disregarding the professional and 
                                                
 
35 M. Victor Safford to Prescott Hall, 2 April 1912, box 3, IRL papers. Safford’s experience in the 
Marine Hospital Service (later the United States Public Health Service) was detailed in a 1925 
book, Immigration Problems: Personal Experiences of an Official (New York: Dodd, Mead and 
Co., 1925). Safford, like many of his colleagues, believed in the ability of the expert medical 
examiner to quickly discern racial identity, mental capacity, and desirability of immigrants. The 
racial and national characters of an alien were apparent from physical appearance, difference in 
build, shape of head, and facial features. Even on his first visit to Ellis Island he noted that “A 
glance was almost always sufficient to tell that the group was composed of different varieties of 
Eastern European Slavs.… Trailing along behind was a broad-shouldered, thick-set, swarthy sun-
burned man who seemed out of place in the group. He was easily recognizable as a Dalmatian.” 5. 
Henry Cabot Lodge and Joseph Lee took interest in the appointment of Commissioner of 
Immigration in Boston, and Safford was at the top of their list. See, e.g. Lodge to Lee, 9 April 
1921; Lee to Lodge 12 April 1921, both in Lee papers.  
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unbiased expert medical testimony provided by government employees. In 1917 
Public Health Service physician E. H. Mullan published an article on “Mental 
Examination of Immigrants” in which he described the process of examining the 
mental capacity of alien arrivals, with particular reference to their physical 
appearance, to demonstrate the special skill that experts had in detecting an 
immigrant’s mental inferiority.  
In precisely the same style as Lombroso, Mullan maintained that the 
physical appearance of an individual reflected mental qualities or tendencies that 
may be grounds for exclusion. A well-practiced medical examiner could quickly 
and easily detect physical infirmities, and in many cases even the race of the alien, 
enabling the examiner to discern the difference between a northern Italian girl 
“whose appearance indicates that she has some schooling,” and an illiterate male 
from southern Italy. Physical signs of degeneration suggested to examiners that 
the alien may be psychologically inferior; many still believed physical features 
shaped the mental characteristics. Correctly diagnosing feeble-minded aliens, 
Mullan elaborated, was confirmed by “his appearance, stigmata, and physical 
signs,” just as Lombroso had predicted.36 It is apparent that six years after the 
governmental publication of Boas’s study of the malleability of immigrant body 
forms, the determinism of classic racialist thought retained great purchase in 
immigration policy. 
                                                
36 E. H. Mullan, “Mental Examination of Immigrants” Public Health Reports n. 398 (18 May 
1917) (Washington, D.C.: United States Public Health Service/Government Printing Office), 733-
46; pp. 737, 746. Cesare Lombroso, L’uomo delinquente , esp. Parte III, cap. 7, which considers 
tattoos and their links to delinquency.  
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While mental exams were being applied to immigrants with increasing 
rigor, the most important study in terms of public attention to the mental 
inferiority and undesirability of immigrants came from the army. The chief 
advocate for and the leader of mental tests was Robert M. Yerkes, the erstwhile 
correspondent of Jennings, Pearl and Davenport. When the war began, Yerkes 
resigned his chair in psychology at the University of Minnesota to work for the 
Surgeon General’s Sanitary Corps testing the intellectual abilities of army 
recruits, although his early training was in the behavioral tendencies of higher 
animals (he published The Dancing Mouse in 1907 and edited the Journal of 
Animal Behavior between 1911 and 1919). When he began working at the Boston 
Psychopathic Hospital in 1913, the young psychologist’s interests turned to 
perfecting Alfred Binet’s mental testing system. What Yerkes’s studies on human 
intelligence showed him, he explained in an article for the National Academy of 
Sciences in 1915, was that a person’s intellectual capacity, or “degree of mental 
development” could be reliably—and quickly—determined to ascertain their skill 
and ability to perform certain tasks. This seemed an essential requirement in 1916 
for a nation that was mobilizing hundreds of thousands of soldiers.37  
Yerkes’s investigations were almost compromised at the outset of his 
investigations. As Yerkes and his staff in the Sanitary Corps began testing the 
mental aptitude of soldiers, Charles Davenport approached him with a 
                                                
37 Robert M. Yerkes, “A Point Scale for Measuring Mental Ability” Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America vol. 1, no. 2 (15 February 1915), 114-17; see 
also idem, “Measuring the Mental Strength of an Army” Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences of the United States of America vol. 4, no. 10 (15 October 1918), 295-97. For Yerkes’s 
biographical information, see James W. Reed, “Yerkes, Robert Mearns” American National 
Biography Online February 2000, http://www.anb.org/articles/14/14-00861.html, Access Date: 
Tue Sept 07 2004.  
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proposition. Was it possible, he asked Yerkes, to ascertain not only the mental 
aptitude of the recruits, but also their racial identity? If information could be 
simultaneously gathered on the birthplace of the subject’s four grandparents, 
Davenport said, eugenicists in the country would finally have “adequate analytical 
data” to back up assertions that “this or that race is a good fighting race.” This did 
not seem to be Davenport’s primary concern, though. Davenport was confident 
that “very interesting results would follow [such] a study of the racial 
differences.” Davenport was hoping for racial information to provide additional 
support of the undesirability and inferiority of immigrants. In fact, he was so 
confident that these results would show this, that soon after he wrote Yerkes, he 
petitioned the Surgeon General to create a division of anthropology within the 
medical branches of the Army and Navy departments, to measure the physical 
characteristics of the recruits. Using anthropological measurements would 
unequivocally link physical stature and the mental characteristics of certain races. 
The Surgeon General already accumulated information relating to the height, 
weight, and physical fitness of recruits for the purposes of exempting or refusing 
enlisting soldiers. Davenport warned the Surgeon General, however, that the 
“Identification Records” being taken by the Adjutant General’s office were 
“untrustworthy” and inadequate. Professionally trained scientists were not 
conducting the examinations, so the results might not be conclusive. There was of 
course a certain irony in Davenport making this criticism. And, he scribbled in the 
margin that if the Surgeon General approved the new study, the new schedules 
should also include the recruit’s race, and the birthplace of both parents.  
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Davenport’s study was approved. In a memo written after the armistice, 
Davenport pleaded that the compilation of information continue, despite the end 
of hostilities. Dr. B. A. Gould had done similar measurements of soldiers after the 
American Civil War, Davenport explained, and the opportunity to “‘take stock’ of 
the racial constitution of the United States” could not be passed up.38 
After the armistice, the War Department authorized the printing of the 
results of the Army mental tests. Yerkes and Clarence Yoakum undertook the task 
of compiling the data on 1.75 million men. When it was finally published in 1920, 
it became, one historian described, the “nexus” of all future mental tests. 
Unfortunately, it also became useful empirical evidence for American 
restrictionists to use in their campaign to stop immigration.39  
Robert Yerkes’s and Clarence Yoakum’s book Army Mental Tests 
analyzed the administration of the tests to military recruits, and expressed great 
confidence in the tests’ ability to accurately segregate the mentally incompetent 
and to statistically classify men according to mental ability. Two types of exams 
were given, an Alpha and Beta, the first for literate recruits, the second for 
recruits who were wholly or partly illiterate. The results showed that mental tests 
were effective in selecting officer candidates who would succeed in the field, and 
fitting recruits to an appropriate function within the army. This led to the 
                                                
 
38 Charles Davenport to Robert Yerkes, 18 December 1917; Charles Davenport to Rupert Blue, 
Surgeon General of the United States, 2 February 1918, all Davenport papers; “Suggested Data for 
Anthropological and Ethnographic Survey of the Army,” 15 November 1918, Davenport papers - 
Lectures. The results of the Army studies will be considered more fully in the following chapter. 
Note the evidence that Davenport asks for in order to fit his hypothesis that certain races are better 
fighters than others.  
 
39 Stephen Jay Gould, The Mismeasure of Man  (New York: W. W. Norton Co., 1981), 222-33.  
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conclusion, which the authors expressed in the second chapter, that the group 
examinations were successfully designed, “and are now definitely known, to 
measure native intellectual ability. They are to some extent influenced by 
educational acquirement but in the main the soldier’s inborn intelligence and not 
the accidents of environment determines his mental rating or grade in the army.”40 
But the reprints of the exams, which the book also included, suggest a very 
different type of examination.  
As one example of what Yerkes’s examinations actually measured, the 
third test in the battery was designed to assess an examinee’s “common sense.” 
Though several questions were straightforward, many were ambiguous and 
subjective. One question asked why a man who could afford a house would 
choose to rent instead. Respondents had to choose between the following answers: 
“they don’t have to pay taxes,” “they don’t have to buy a rented house,” or “they 
can make more by investing the money the house would cost.” This seems more 
an interpretive rather than factual question, but mysteriously assessed mental 
intelligence. There are many subjective answers to this question, especially for an 
immigrant who had been in the country for a decade or less. A question asking 
why parents should send their children to school offered only the following 
answers: “it prepares them for adult life,” “it keeps them out of mischief,” or 
“they are too young to work.”41 For immigrant communities, the children were in 
                                                
 
40 Clarence S. Yoakum and Robert M. Yerkes, compilers and editors, Army Mental Tests (New 
York: Henry Holt and Co., 1920), 17. 
 
41 Ibid., Test 3, Form 6, p. 222-223. The official answers were “they can make more by investing 
the money the house would cost,” and “it prepares them for adult life”, p. 71.  
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some circumstances important economic contributors. Not being assimilated to 
American norms completely, the answers may not have seemed like common 
sense knowledge at all. When the results of the tests were discussed in 
publications after the war, John Higham points out how “eugenicists seized avidly 
on these findings as a clinching proof of the racial philosophy and of the 
inferiority of the new immigration.”42 But the questions asked were more 
questions of culture and educational background than any assessment of natural 
mental ability.  
The problem with the state of scientific knowledge in the early twentieth 
century was that it was quite uncertain. Advances in the fields of genetics and 
biology had not yet filtered through many of the disciplines that allied with 
eugenics, leaving the veracity of eugenic arguments open to debate but with no 
overwhelmingly convincing new paradigm. This was particularly true as it 
concerned mental testing, and the “intelligence” of native-born and foreign-born 
was hardly definitively or decisively established. That did not stop scientific ideas 
– whether they concerned demographics and statistics, ethnology, mental ability 
or intelligence – from being coupled to cultural fears about racial degeneration 
and the alleged inferiority of the new immigration.  
The army results were manipulated in several ways once they were 
published. Lothrop Stoddard’s The Revolt Against Civilization declared in 
alarmist tones that the tests proved that “intelligence is steadily being bred out of 
the American population,” and it was largely the fault of uneducated, mentally 
                                                                                                                                
 
42 Higham, Strangers in the Land, 275.  
 Chapter 5 316 
inferior, and highly fecund immigrants, who came from non-Nordic stocks. Some 
books, like Carl C. Brigham’s A Study of American Intelligence (1922), which 
one historian describes as “a benchmark in the history of scientific racism,” 
specifically used and manipulated the Army intelligence data to make the case 
that immigration was a detriment to the United States.43 The profusion of books 
that misused this data prompted Walter Lippmann, the editor of The New 
Republic, to write a series of articles in the fall of 1922 denouncing the faulty 
generalizations made from the Army data. It was one of the first criticisms of the 
methods of classic racialists to appear publicly. Lippmann’s first target was 
Stoddard’s Revolt Against Civilization, in which Stoddard used the Army tests to 
show that the average mental age of Americans was fourteen years.44 This was, 
Lippmann pointed out, “not inaccurate. It is not incorrect. It is nonsense.” While 
he conceded that the Binet system for measuring intelligence had real promise and 
genuine utility, the New York-born journalist decried its “gross perversion by 
muddleheaded and prejudiced men.”45 Lippmann would soon have plenty of 
examples of such “gross perversion.” 
After the first salvo at one of the most egregious examples of the 
manipulation of scientific data, Lippmann used the next issue of TNR to explain 
                                                
 
43 Carl C. Brigham, A Study of American Intelligence Introduction by Robert M. Yerkes 
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the complexity of intelligence testing and why Stoddard’s book should be 
denounced and ignored as nothing other than a useless polemic. There was no 
objective standard by which to measure intellectual ability, he explained; 
intelligence is “not an abstraction like length and weight.” The results of the 
Army’s examinations, the editor pointed out, measured the intelligence only of 
men in the Army, not the nation at large.46 Furthermore, he explained in the 
following week’s issue that the results from the tests were simply “a fair guess at 
intelligence” and were not an objective or accepted mechanism for measuring 
intelligence. Again, Lippmann conceded that intelligence testing had its proper 
place and use, like classifying the abilities of schoolchildren, but he was insistent 
in opposing the tendency to generalize overall intellectual ability and capacity 
from just one test. In an article from the November 15 issue, Lippmann took aim 
at the general eugenicist strategy of coupling heredity and ability in an effort to 
portray certain groups of people, immigrants especially, as hereditarily inferior. 
Singling out Stoddard once again, Lippmann accused the Immigration Restriction 
League member of turning intelligence tests into “an engine of cruelty” and 
lamented how easily beneficial and useful science could be perverted for 
pernicious ends “in the hands of blundering or prejudiced men.”47  The 
Immigration Restriction League had faced criticism like this before, and as they 
did with President Eliot of Harvard, they remained uncowed. In his last article on 
                                                
46 Walter Lippmann, “The Mystery of the ‘A’ Men” The New Republic vol. 32, no. 413 (1 
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47 Walter Lippmann, “The Abuse of the Tests” The New Republic vol. 32, no. 415 (15 November 
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intelligence tests, Lippmann flatly declared that the ability to measure hereditary 
intelligence “has no scientific foundation.”48 In this series of articles in a popular 
magazine over the course of a month, Lippmann tried to point out the dangerously 
false claims that were being made in the name of science. But he had little effect.  
In this public criticism of the men who utilized scientific knowledge for 
their own personal prejudices, Lippmann anticipated Jennings and Pearl, and 
likewise their ineffectiveness. Why a journalist would be among the first to 
condemn the “blundering or prejudiced men” that manipulated statistics and 
science is curious. But considering Stoddard’s own position within the scientific 
field makes the case a bit more intelligible: Stoddard had absolutely no 
professional scientific standing. Although he held advanced degrees (an M.A. and 
a Ph.D. from Harvard), they were in history, not in science. For Lippmann to 
square off against Stoddard in a public, popular journal, then, was effectively a 
battle between two like-equipped men. Lippmann was not writing his articles as a 
psychological expert, but merely as an educated person who saw the flaws in 
logic and method in the work. Seeing the ways that the data from the Army tests 
was being manipulated for a specific goal – immigration restriction – Lippmann 
merely wrote as a concerned observer.  
Lippmann’s articles prompted a response from Yerkes, who wrote to The 
New Republic’s editor mid-way through the series of articles. In his first letter, 
Yerkes politely suggested that Lippmann was damning all intelligence testing 
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because of the perversions that men like Stoddard and Brigham were making of it. 
The Yale psychologist noted that while Lippmann was preparing his TNR articles, 
Yerkes too was preparing a manuscript, which was printed in March 1923 in The 
Atlantic Monthly, “the principal purpose of which was to indicate the unreliability 
of mental age and the uselessness of letter-grade distribution as an indication of 
the status of mental alertness…”49 But while Yerkes had intended that caution be 
exercised in making conclusions from the tests, the ways the data was being 
misused required more forceful rebuttals that he was unwilling to provide. Yerkes 
had the authority of the expert – they were his tests and data, after all – yet he did 
nothing to counter the propaganda that men like Stoddard were making with 
them. Lippmann, for his part, defended his series of articles. “I was quite careful 
in the articles,” the critic countered, “to distinguish you and your work from the 
Binet-Terman business.” Lippmann offered his compliments on Yerkes’s editing 
of the army tests, saying that the work was “so admirably done that it should have 
prevented the abuse of them…” Still, the New Yorker lamented, it must be 
conceded that Terman’s works had captured the public’s attention, and “taken 
hold in practical affairs.”50 And once there, they increased in influence.  
                                                
49 Yerkes to Lippmann, 28 November 1922, box Yerkes papers. The “Binet-Terman business” that 
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With this note, Lippmann raised a fundamentally important issue, which 
would propel men like Jennings, Pearl, Boas, and Hrdlicka to action in succeeding 
years. Once a theory, a series of statistics, a hypothesis, or even a carelessly 
worded idea, had been put into the public domain, whether in a textbook, book, 
scientific journal, or popular article, it became fair game for selective quotation by 
anyone else. One had to be quite careful speaking in the name of “science,” for 
once something was published, its use (or in this case, misuse) could not be 
prevented. When Yerkes sent Lippmann an advance copy of his manuscript for 
The Atlantic Monthly in late December 1922, Lippmann pointed this out.51  
Yerkes’s article in its published form, suggested that there were indeed 
serious errors being made with the interpretations of the Army tests. He began by 
quoting an unnamed article that declared that there were roughly “forty-five 
million people in this country who have no sense.” (This at a time when the total 
population of the United States was 106 million.) The uncited article went on to 
alarmingly suggest that there were, in addition, twenty-five million that had only 
“a little sense.” These twenty-five millions had a capacity for “mental and 
spiritual growth [that] is only that of a thirteen- or fourteen-year old” child. 
Yerkes pointed out that in the unnamed article, the hysteria worsened, and it 
claimed that there were another twenty-five million in the country with only “fair-
to-middling-sense.” So as to not be entirely pessimistic and apocalyptic, the 
anonymous author explained that thankfully, there were “a few over four millions 
who have a great deal of sense. They have the thing we call ‘brains.’” The 
                                                
51 See Lippmann to Yerkes, 9 January 1923, Yerkes papers.  
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professional psychologist debunked these absurd contentions—which Yerkes 
eventually revealed were written by Albert E. Wiggam—by explaining the 
importance of both the context and specificity of the tests, which Wiggam had 
blithely ignored. Despite the fact that the Army tests gave no evidence to support 
Wiggam’s statements that only four million Americans had any intellectual 
“brains,” Yerkes concluded his article echoing by Stoddard’s fear of declining 
intelligence in the United States and also recommending immigration restriction.52 
When he could have spoken strongly against Wiggam’s careless work, he did not. 
This did not sit well with Lippmann. The New Republic’s editor responded 
to the December draft he received very harshly. Not only were Yerkes’s 
generalizations “exceedingly unfortunate,” they rested upon statistics that seemed 
reasonable, so they would likely carry great weight with the public. What Yerkes 
did not understand, Lippmann complained in a letter, was “the implied 
interpretation. You lend your name, for example, to the impression that a child 
born of Irish parents is intrinsically inferior to a child of English parents. This 
might be true. But you are in no position to prove it. You are in no position to 
assess the effects of the history of Ireland upon the Irish intellectual behavior.”53 
This was the precise point that sociologists, anthropologists, and eventually even 
biologists, geneticists, zoologists, and biometricians would make: there was a 
                                                
52 The uncited article appears in the first paragraph of Robert Yerkes, “Testing the Human Mind” 
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coequal role that environment, culture, and history play in determining the general 
behavior of groups of people and of individuals. Nature and nurture could not be 
that easily disentangled, they all declared. Science had in no way proven that 
nature was so preponderantly influential in development as to negate the influence 
of the environment and socialization. Italians like Colajanni, Sidney Sonnino, 
Leopoldo Franchetti, and Pasquale Villari, who all approached the Italian 
problems from a sociological rather than a biological perspective, had expressed 
these exact thoughts decades before in trying to solve il questione meridionale.54 
And herein lay the problem: it was much easier to communicate to the public one 
simple argument – namely, that heredity and inheritance predetermined an 
individual’s physical and mental make-up – than to give the necessary cautions 
about the significant impact of the environment, cultural and social backgrounds, 
and individual determination on a human being’s development. Nature, it seemed, 
was much easier to explain than nurture.  
Developing the Congressional Quota System 
 
After Congress passed the literacy test in the Immigration Act of 1917, 
legislators continued attempts to further restrict immigration with a variety of 
proposals that reflect the range of nativist sentiment and influence in Congress. 
Despite the cautions that writers like Lippmann offered, the fears and hysteria 
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cultivated by alarmists like Stoddard and Wiggam retained much greater public 
influence. The neat, concise arguments of classic racialism were eminently better 
as a basis for drafting legislation because they were not complex. And Harry H. 
Laughlin, the longstanding associate of Charles Davenport, proved an effective 
conduit for the influence of classic racialism on the American legislative branch. 
Representative John Burnett, a Democrat from Alabama and former member of 
the Dillingham Commission, introduced two bills in the final session of the 65th 
Congress in 1919 to totally prohibit immigration to the United States for a period 
of four years. Many of the proposals introduced by legislators were motivated by 
the fear of a return to pre-war levels of immigration that they believed demanded 
greater restriction on immigration. But the bills were unable to receive a hearing 
in the House because of other legislative issues, dealing with demobilization, war 
debts, and the Versailles Treaty, and no immigration bills were enacted.55  
In Congress’s next session, immigration remained an important legislative 
topic, and several bills were again introduced to further limit, regulate, 
temporarily suspend, or prohibit immigration altogether. The legislative tendency 
was decidedly in favor of further restriction, though one member did introduce a 
bill to repeal the literacy test (H.R. 3474).56 Representative John J. Rogers 
introduced H.R. 9782, which became law without President Wilson’s 
endorsement; the bill was a temporary measure to continue wartime regulations 
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on passport and visa control, and was referred not to Johnson’s Committee on 
Immigration and Naturalization, but to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.57 
Albert Johnson introduced three bills to temporarily suspend immigration for two 
years, and Representative Samuel Nicholls (D-SC) introduced a bill to regulate 
immigration on a percentage basis (H.R. 10837). The Immigration and 
Naturalization Committee only reported out Johnson’s bill imposing a temporary 
suspension.58  
While the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization was 
considering these new immigration laws, Harry H. Laughlin, the Superintendent 
of the Eugenics Record Office at Davenport’s New York complex, was called to 
testify before Johnson’s committee. Laughlin’s appearance was fundamentally 
important: his testimony provided the “scientific” rationale for increasing the 
restrictive measures regarding immigration to a committee already predisposed to 
enact further restrictive legislation. The literacy test, Laughlin explained, was not 
having the desired effect of preserving the biological and racial character of the 
American people because it was not excluding, and would not exclude, a 
sufficient number of immigrants. Over the course of a weekend in mid-April 
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1920, Laughlin convinced the committee to regard the hereditary and eugenic 
character of immigrants as critically important when contemplating legislation.  
Laughlin’s position as the head of the ERO vouched for his “scientific” 
credentials, although in truth he had no real scientific training. At the opening of 
the morning session on Friday, Laughlin began his testimony by beseeching the 
members of the committee to think about the “racial qualities” of immigrants in 
terms of their hereditary physical, mental, and moral traits. “It is now high time,” 
he told the Representatives, “that the eugenical element, that is the factor of 
natural hereditary qualities which will determine our future characteristics and 
safety, receive due consideration” in crafting immigration policy. To this end, 
Laughlin proposed that two policy initiatives be added to the bills before the 
committee: the overseas physical and mental examination of intending emigrants 
by the United States Public Health Service, and genealogical examinations of 
immigrants’ family backgrounds by field workers credentialed by the State 
Department to ensure “the possession…of such physical, mental, and moral 
qualities as the American people desire to be possessed inherently by its future 
citizenry.”59 The influence of classic racialism was clear: such exams could, 
Laughlin believed, discern what characteristics immigrants would contribute to 
the American population in their future offspring. In Laughlin’s eugenic world-
view, good citizens and good Americans were not born; they were bred.  
                                                
 
59 Harry H. Laughlin, “Biological Aspects of Immigration,” Hearings before the House Committee 
on Immigration and Naturalization, 66th Congress, 2nd Session, (Washington, D. C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1921), 16-17 April, 1920, pp. 3, 4.  
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Some eugenicists in the pro-restriction camp insisted that this overseas 
examination into the hereditary stock of intending immigrants was absolutely 
critical. Laughlin elaborated on why it was so important: “The importance of this 
condition of admission is driven home when we recall that immigrants are going 
to add to the breeding stock of the American people in greater proportion than 
their immigrant numbers bear to the total population, because statistics have 
shown that immigrant women are more prolific than our American women.” 
Nearly thirty years after its first iteration, Walker’s “replacement thesis” was still 
haunting old-stock Americans. Once again trotting out the social burden created 
by inferior families like the Jukes, Ishmaels, and Kallikaks, Laughlin warned the 
Committee of the imminent degeneration of the American population if 
immigrants were not carefully selected or restricted from admission.60   
Laughlin’s Saturday testimony pressed the call for investigating the 
hereditary background of immigrants. Because the “foundation stock” of the 
United States was largely from northwestern Europe, he explained, assimilation 
and Americanization were much easier for population groups from that area in 
Europe than it was for “Latin or other stocks less closely related to us….” 
Laughlin offered a eugenic utopian vision of America if only the Committee 
would follow his recommendation. By selecting immigrants on the basis of their 
hereditary background and “setting up an eugenical standard for admission 
demanding a high natural excellence of all immigrants regardless of nationality 
and past opportunities, we can enhance and improve the national stamina and 
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ability of future Americans.” He warned that the United States’ failure to sort 
immigrants at the point of European departure “on the basis of [their] natural 
worth is a very serious national menace.”61 Laughlin aimed to establish the 
necessity of scientific knowledge for formulating immigration policy and he 
largely succeeded. Months later, he bragged to Charles Davenport that the 
Committee had decided to print his “eugenical testimony,” and Laughlin declared 
that “I look upon the Committee’s newly acquired interest as an opening wedge 
for the presentation of further eugenical facts when the new hearings are held.”62 
And when they were held, Laughlin would be ready to play an even greater role in 
advising the committee on “scientific” approaches to immigration.  
All restrictionists did not, however, universally support Laughlin’s ideas. 
Shortly after the testimony of the ERO’s superintendent, Prescott Hall wrote to 
Davenport to “dissent as strongly as possible” from the endorsement given in The 
Eugenical News to overseas inspection of immigrants “to investigate the 
eugenical qualities of the stock from which the individual is derived.”63 Hall wrote 
that such a policy had been thoroughly discussed by League leaders between 1894 
and 1902, and was found to be impractical logistically and diplomatically, and 
                                                
61 Ibid., 17. Significantly, however, this provision did not meet with the support of all restrictionist 
groups.  
 
62 Laughlin to Charles B. Davenport, 8 January 1921, Davenport papers.  
 
63  Prescott Hall to the Editor of The Eugenical News, 31 July 1920, in Davenport/Hall folder, 
Davenport Papers; The Eugenical News v. 5, n. 7 (July 1920), 57. The statement under the heading 
“Regulation of Immigration” followed Laughlin’s endorsement of National Eugenics in Germany 
– “Other nations would do well to embody in their fundamental laws, and live up to, such 
provisions for their racial needs as Germany has incorporated into her new democratic 
constitution.” 56. Hall’s letter to the editor noted his position as the Chair of the Immigration 
Committee of the American Genetic Association, despite the fact that he had no professional or 
scientific training in genetics.  
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would ultimately be “destructive of any real selection of aliens” especially in the 
postwar period. Hall referred Davenport to his own 1906 book Immigration for a 
thorough analysis of the matter.64 Davenport wrote back quickly to reassure Hall 
that they both were in favor of protecting the racial quality of the American 
people, but explained his and the Eugenics Record Office’s position in better 
detail. The problem, Davenport said, was that in the past the lack of a hereditary 
history of arriving immigrants had allowed entry of “many perfectly good looking 
persons [despite their] belonging to families with high incidence of gross 
hereditary defects of a physical, mental, or temperamental sort.” Davenport’s 
statement revealed a fundamental tension behind his classic racialism: although he 
disbelieved Lombroso’s argument about stigmata and physical manifestations of 
criminality, he clung determinedly to the underlying premise of defectiveness 
being biological, something permanent in the blood. And he agreed with Goddard, 
that undesirable, inferior, or defective immigrants could pass as normal 
immigrants without an extensive investigation into their genealogy. In any event, 
Davenport noted that the House Committee expressed interest in the idea of 
selecting immigrants on the basis of their “germ plasm” and hoped that if 
restrictionists could unite behind the plan, it could make it into the immigration 
bill.65 What was needed, Davenport argued, were simply better trained U.S. 
                                                
 
64 Hall to Editor, 31 July 1920, Davenport papers; Hall, Immigration and Its Effects.  
 
65 Davenport to Hall, 7 August 1920, Davenport papers. Davenport crisply encapsulated his beliefs 
in the possibilities of eugenics in a post-war lecture. He discussed how the laws of inheritance had 
been worked out in plants, animals and man, and all functioned alike, “in the same way in rats and 
man.” The anthropological and mental assessments the army conducted on military recruits had 
demonstrated that there were far too many physically unfit males in the United States (men with 
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officials at American immigration stations, and a more thorough enforcement of 
the law. Since he was trained as a lawyer, Hall conceded that the plan might work 
in theory, but that the financial cost of getting family data made it completely 
impractical.66 
But Davenport disagreed and maintained that it was possible and feasible 
to investigate the hereditary background of emigrants, prompting a prolonged 
exchange with Hall and the IRL. The dispute raises a curious question as to the 
extent of influence the League was now exercising in Congress. Was Laughlin’s 
scientific testimony eclipsing the influence of Patten and the League at the 
Capitol? If Laughlin was wielding more influence than the League’s lobbyist, and 
the provision for overseas restriction passed, it might impair effective action on 
more feasible and practical elements of policy. Hall implored Davenport to retreat 
from this policy provision. Certainly, Hall told his old classmate, the League 
would not oppose anything designed to improve inspection of immigrants. But the 
lawyer feared that the impending volume of European immigrants would be so 
large that it was inconceivable that one American field worker attached to the 
staffs of U.S. consulates – or even ten people – could perform the necessary 
investigations. Even if they could, Hall pointed out, American agents in foreign 
                                                                                                                                
diseased lungs, bad hearts, hernias), men whom Davenport regarded as “scrubs.” Worse still, he 
told how feeble-minded persons were breeding with their like, producing feeble-minded offspring. 
He explained: “The modern science of heredity shows the cause of this wide dissemination of 
defects and the remedy. Typical feeble-mindedness is due to a defect in the germ plasm; if the 
same defect is in both germ cells that initiate the offspring that child will also be defective. So 
with melancholia and many other defects.” Charles B. Davenport, “About Eugenics” (n.d.), 
Davenport papers – Lectures. Statements like this were later refuted professional scientists, and 
used as examples of how sloppy and inaccurate was the work coming out of Cold Spring Harbor.  
 
66 Hall to Davenport, 9 August 1920, Davenport papers. 
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territories could not be trusted to maintain a vigilant guard at the gates; they 
would, because of their isolation, be vulnerable to bribery. Not even bureaucrats 
in America – he singled out the Assistant Secretary of Labor Louis F. Post – could 
be trusted to carefully and thoroughly uphold the regulations when it came to 
immigration. Davenport’s problem, Hall informed him, was that “you are looking 
at this thing from a purely laboratory point of view.” In practice, the Bostonian 
argued, Americans would prove to be “dreadfully inefficient” at carrying out such 
an enterprise. In practice, European nations like Italy, Austria, and Russia would 
not tolerate a policy that would “keep their bad people at home and let the good 
ones go. They want just the reverse.” In practice, he insisted that Davenport’s 
theoretical scheme was fundamentally unworkable, or so he argued.67 Hall 
referred to the excessive “laboratory” influence in Davenport’s policy suggestions 
again in an October letter. There was a much easier, more practical solution to 
selecting immigrants, Hall insisted: simply prohibit the entry of large numbers of 
southeastern Europeans.68 This disagreement over policy reflects a critical point 
overlooked in much of the historiography of immigration restriction: there was 
not a unified, monolithic “restrictionist” movement, but rather different 
                                                
67 Hall to Davenport, 20 August 1920, Davenport Papers; see also Davenport to Hall, 28 
September 1920, box 1, IRL papers. The League disliked Post because he had a tendency to over-
ride individual exclusions of immigrants on appeal. See, e.g. Patten to Hall, 14 March 1921, box 3, 
IRL papers.  
 
68 Hall to Davenport, 1 October 1920, Davenport papers. See also Robert DeCourcy Ward, 
“Immigration and the Three Per Cent Restrictive Law,” Journal of Heredity v. 12, no. 7 (August-
September 1921), 319-26 which describes elements of policy that the League members favored.  
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background interests that gave several anti-immigrant groups differing strategies 
to protect old stock Americans.69 
The introduction of “Emergency Immigration Legislation” in the third 
session of the 66th Congress in 1920 saw the first serious push for the “quota” 
principle in immigration legislation, an implicit recognition of Laughlin’s 
influence.70 Under this provision, immigrants must not only be literate, but could 
now only arrive in proportionate numbers to their share of the American 
population as represented in Census statistics. The Dillingham Commission had 
recommended restriction based on numerical proportion, but it conceded that in 
1911 such regulations were not practicable.71 H.R. 14461, introduced in the House 
by Albert Johnson and referred to his Immigration and Naturalization Committee, 
proposed to temporarily suspend immigration “for the protection of the citizens of 
the United States.”72 When it arrived in the Senate, the bill was referred to the 
                                                
69 See Higham, Strangers in the Land; Jacobsen, Whiteness of a Different Color; Ngai, Impossible 
Subjects. This is only to point out the different strategies of restriction, and not to suggest these 
works are problematic. Restrictionists were unified on their goal: prohibit undesirable alien 
immigration. But examining in greater detail the intellectual rationales they provided yields a more 
nuanced picture.  
 
70 The goal of Laughlin’s testimony in “Biological Aspects of Immigration” was to convince the 
Committee on Immigration and Naturalization to “prevent any deterioration of the American 
people due to the immigration of inferior stock.” The quota provision, because it would 
“eugenically” pre-select its immigrant population from northwestern Europe would stem the 
deterioration of the American people by maintaining a consistent racial base (of superior character, 
of course, over the non-northwestern immigrant) to the population.  
 
71 Restriction was recommended on a literacy test, exclusion of ‘birds of passage,’ and limiting 
“the number of each race…to a certain percentage of the average of that race arriving during a 
given period of years.” United States Immigration Commission, Reports of the Immigration 
Commission, v. 1, “Abstracts” (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1911), 48. 
Dillingham had proposed legislation containing a quota provision in 1916, but as the war had shut 
off most immigration, it received little attention. See Hutchinson, Legislative History, 166.  
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Committee on Immigration where it was dramatically reshaped. Chairman 
William Dillingham revived the quota idea, and replaced the bill with one that 
limited the number of “aliens” admitted to five percent of the number of “foreign 
born persons of such nationality resident in the United States as determined by the 
United States Census.” The Secretaries of State, Commerce, and Labor were 
directed to publish, as soon as feasible, the 5% quotas based on the census of 
1910. The substitution presented the League leaders with a dilemma. This version 
would have been more palatable, because it did not contain any provisions for the 
overseas examinations that Hall and the IRL opposed, but the bill was still less 
acceptable because the original version of H.R. 14461 would have prohibited all 
immigration into the United States for fourteen months. Yet in either event, the 
League was nearing the success of their ultimate goal of restricting non Anglo-
Saxon immigrants.  
Dillingham stated that the key issue for supporting the quota bill was 
whether an emergency existed regarding immigration that would require such a 
dramatic change in policy as the complete suspension of all immigration. Relying 
on protracted hearings and testimony from “various interests,” as well as the 41 
volumes of the Reports of the Immigration Commission, the Senate committee 
decided, Dillingham explained, that “no emergency exists at this time to warrant 
the adoption of the House bill…” prohibiting all immigration. At the same time, 
his report belabored the point that the new immigrants who were arriving, those 
                                                                                                                                
72 House Report no. 1109 parts I and II, “Temporary Suspension of Immigration,” 66th Congress, 
3rd Session, 6 December 1920; House Conference Report no. 1351, “Temporary Suspension of 
Immigration,” 66th Congress, 3rd Session, 22 February 1921.  
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whom the legislation was aimed at excluding, were fundamentally different in 
kind from the “old immigration” that “consisted almost wholly of families who 
came to this country with the full intention of making it their home and becoming 
American citizens.” For Dillingham, it was this immigrant stock that was 
responsible for the successful development of agriculture in the “great Central 
West,” and the “construction of our incomparable transportation system.”73 If 
immigrants of this type – families or pioneers, northern in European origin – 
could be induced to come, Congress was willing to let them in. Under the 5% 
quota regime, these families would have gotten the bulk of the quota. 
The Senate Committee’s report included three tables that dramatically 
depicted the shift from “old” to “new” immigration that the Dillingham 
Commission had been so central in making. The principal character of the new 
immigration, Senator Dillingham explained, was that it consisted mostly of 
young, single males who came “to seek profitable employment,” and not to make 
homes and become citizens. While there was at present no emergency that would 
necessitate total prohibition of immigration, Dillingham reported that committee 
members felt that one was imminent, as many Europeans sought escape from the 
war-ravaged continent. Once business revived in the United States, the Vermont 
senator warned, immigration would likely exceed one million annually.74  
                                                
 
73 Senate Report no. 789, 66th Congress, 3rd Session, “Emergency Immigration Legislation,” 14 
February 1921 (Calendar day 15 February), 3 for “no emergency” and “wholly of families.”  
 
74 Senate Committee on Immigration, “Emergency Immigration Legislation,” 3-4 for tables; 
economics aspects discussed 5-6; 1 million immigrants from 7.  
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With this level of potential immigration in mind, returning to the quota 
principle was essential, Dillingham’s Senate Report declared, because the 1910 
census “afforded a new and more equitable basis for the purpose, and the plan 
was accordingly revised so as to limit immigration to a fixed percentage of the 
foreign born of each nationality resident in the United States.”75 Again, statistical 
data was of paramount importance. It provided a clear rationale and basis for 
restriction, since it was limited to proportionate population, and it sidestepped 
issues of quality and desirability that the literacy provision raised. The Senate 
Committee, with this allegedly more precise method in mind, recommended their 
bill be substituted for the House bill, while emphasizing that it would still have 
the effect of reversing the preponderance of southern and eastern European 
immigrants arriving in the United States. Northwestern European immigration 
averaged 182,850 per year between 1910 and 1914. During the same period, 
southeastern immigration averaged 738,612. With the Senate Committee’s five 
percent plan, the number of northern immigrants that could be admitted was 
337,020; the quota for southern immigrants was only 255,416. After being passed 
in the Senate, the lower chamber assented to the substitution after a conference 
committee recommended the Senate bill. Yet when it arrived at the White House 
on 28 February, President Wilson, incapacitated and a week from leaving office, 
refused to sign or veto the bill, and so the restrictionists waited for President-elect 
Harding to take office.76  
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In the opening session of the subsequent Congress, Johnson tried again 
and introduced a nearly identical percentage bill. It was again referred to his 
Committee on Immigration and Naturalization. The new bill reduced the 
percentage limit from five to three, but still used the 1910 census as the basis for 
quotas (the 1920 census remained in preparation). Johnson also explained that the 
need to use the older Census was a result of the war: the changes in geographical 
boundaries of European nations would, Johnson believed, render the 1920 census 
returns highly problematic in terms of determining nationality. The 1910 census 
also had the added advantage of giving a more substantial representation to the 
old immigration, which was more permanently settled than the transient “new” 
immigration during the same period, a point that Johnson made explicit in the 
report. Under the new percentages, 202,212 immigrants would be allowed from 
northwestern Europe, but only 153,249 from all areas “outside northwestern 
Europe.” The report justified this move by citing the lack of housing in urban 
areas where the new immigrants tended to settle, high American unemployment, 
the presence of large numbers of unnaturalized southern immigrants, increased 
dangers of communicable disease (an acutely sensitive issue in the wake of the 
influenza epidemic), and difficulties with assimilation to American values as 
reasons that immigration should be restricted more severely. Restricting the flow 
of immigration by the new quota system provided an essential appeal for eugenic-
                                                                                                                                
76 Ibid., 9. Italian immigration under this formula would go from an annual average of 220,967 
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minded nativists. “Any measure which checks the flow of immigration generally,” 
the report stated, “must necessarily result in the admission of fewer mentally and 
physically undesirable immigrants.”77 The association was simple, if circular: by 
drastically reducing immigration from southeastern Europe, mentally and 
physically undesirable immigrants would be curtailed as well, because most 
immigrants from southeastern Europe were mentally and physically undesirable.  
The competing plans to address immigration represented a wide 
divergence of Congressional opinion, although there was a decidedly pro-
restrictionist sentiment in Congress. Johnson’s quota plan in the House was a 
compromise to the Senate plan that had failed to gain President Wilson’s 
approval. But when the House quota bill arrived in the Senate, members of the 
Committee on Immigration in the upper chamber performed an unusual about-
face. Now the Senate, which in the previous session had substituted the House’s 
temporary prohibition on all immigration in favor of quotas, proposed a 
temporary prohibition on immigration, and substituted a bill to that effect for the 
House quota principle. The resulting conference between House and Senate 
members restored the quotas from the House bill and modified a few particular 
clauses dealing with aliens returning from visits to Europe. The House managers 
reported that the bill with these changes “makes H. R. 4075 more rigid in its 
restrictive effect than when it left the House.”78 Passing the House and Senate, and 
                                                
77 House Report no. 4, “Restriction of Immigration,”  67th Congress, 1st Session, 19 April 1921, 
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78 House Conference Report, no. 62, 67th Congress, 1st Session, 12 May 1921, 5; Senate 
Committee on Immigration, “Immigration of Aliens,” Senate Report no. 17, 67th Congress, 1st 
Session.  
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no longer impeded by an anti-restrictionist Wilson, President Warren Harding 
signed the bill into law on 19 May 1921. American immigration policy had 
decisively changed. No longer were immigrants being screened or prohibited for 
particular deficiencies of quality (literacy, disease or poverty). Immigrants were 
now simply restricted because of their geographical origin or national identity, 
which were understood to be indicators of their racial character. In the ensuing 
years, the racial element of restriction would become less subtle and more drastic. 
Laughlin played an important role in this gradual policy shift. After his 
weekend appearance before the House Committee on Immigration and 
Naturalization in 1920, Albert Johnson appointed Harry Laughlin the “expert 
eugenics agent” of the Committee, gave him Congressional franking privileges, 
and charged Laughlin with the task of conducting “further scientific studies” into 
immigration matters. When summoned before the Committee in November 1922, 
Laughlin presented some preliminary “scientific” findings to members, data that 
was sufficiently compelling to influence bills in the final session of the 67th 
Congress and the 68th Congress as well. Laughlin explained that the immigration 
act of 1921 and those proposed in 1922 had several promising features: the bills 
effectively limited total immigration to less than 400,000, they endeavored to 
geographically distribute immigrants so that they did not congregate in urban 
areas, and they contained regulations designed to select immigrants based on the 
“potentiality of the immigrant as a parent of desirable Americans of the future.” 
But all the bills introduced were temporary, and Laughlin insisted that a 
permanent, scientific solution needed to be found. After receiving a hearty 
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endorsement of his work by the Committee’s chair – Johnson described 
Laughlin’s data as “both biologically and statistical thorough” – Laughlin quickly 
moved to the crux of his policy suggestions.79 
Laughlin used statistical data to shore up support for his exclusionary 
suggestions. In the policy provisions he presented to the Committee, the expert 
eugenical agent invented his own quota to assess the “comparative degeneracy” 
and “the relative soundness of recent and older immigrant stocks.” Compiling 
statistics of nativity from the 1910 census, Laughlin computed the relative 
proportion of foreign-born residents in public custodial institutions. Using Italian 
immigrants as an illustration, Laughlin explained that Italian-born immigrants to 
the United States numbered 1,343,123 in the 1910 Census, which was 1.46% of 
the entire American population. By his computation, Italians should thus only 
represent 1.46% of the population in custodial institutions, which would be 100% 
of their quota. Instead, in the 93 institutions he surveyed, out of 84,106 total 
inmates there were 1,938 Italians – 157.53% of their quota.80 Laughlin also used 
results from the Army intelligence tests as further evidence of the mental 
inferiority and undesirability of the new immigrant groups, and thus emphasized 
the threat they posed to the United States. But first, to justify greater exclusionary 
policies, he turned to an examination of the literacy rates of the new immigration, 
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Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, 67th Congress, 3rd session, 21 November 1922 
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and to justify more exclusionary policies, analyzed the impact the 1917 
Immigration Act was having on improving the quality of immigration to the 
United States.  
If the goal of immigration policy was to exclude undesirable immigrants, 
Laughlin testified, the policy was failing. The literacy provision was not having 
its desired effect. Literacy represented only “a partial, occasional, and indirect 
criterion of inborn mental capacity of a rather low level.” It was ultimately “more 
an examination of opportunity…than it is into native inborn and hereditary mental 
ability.” (Ironically, this was precisely the point that Colajanni and the American 
presidents had been making against the literacy test.) Many immigrants, Laughlin 
suggested, were carefully coached to read the few printed words required to 
demonstrate literacy, and were therefore circumventing the intent of the 1917 bill. 
When Representative John Cable (R-OH) asked if there might be a superior 
method of assessing the intellectual abilities of immigrants, Laughlin answered 
affirmatively, quickly suggesting an adaptation of the Army Alpha and Beta tests 
to be administered at immigration stations. These tests would definitively 
determine the mental capability of immigrants. If intelligence tests were applied 
to immigrants, he suggested, and the line for exclusion drawn between “low 
average (C-)” and “inferior (D),” 6,347,835 aliens would have been refused 
admission to the United States since 1917. “Native intelligence,” he informed the 
members, “does not depend upon opportunity or education. It is inborn; 
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consequently, it is transmitted from generation to generation.”81 Literacy was a 
test of opportunity; “intelligence” was a biological characteristic, something that 
was unchanging. Again, the paramount importance of hereditary ability, adhering 
to the lines laid out by Galton and Lodge in the late nineteenth century, and 
reiterated by Davenport’s Naval Officers (1919), was the principal thrust of the 
restrictionist rationale for exclusion. Immigrants were not only laborers and 
residents; they were also the parents of future generations of Americans. And, 
limited by low hereditary mental ability, future American generations from this 
inferior immigrant stock posed a considerable danger to the United States by 
reducing its intellectual quality.82  
Johnson pressed this line of questioning to get a better sense of the 
eugenic dangers of immigration into the record. He asked Laughlin to comment 
on the “biological or racial value of, or rather, the damage wrought by this type of 
[new] immigrant?” The Congressman feared that although individual feeble-
minded aliens might be kept out by an intelligence or literacy test, lurking beneath 
the surface of every immigrant with normal intelligence that passed the tests could 
be a recessive trait that would produce degenerates in future generations. Laughlin 
answered that Americans looked past the inherent biological danger of 
immigrants because most of the public believed in the natural equality of all men, 
something that both Laughlin and Johnson believed that science and heredity 
                                                
81 Ibid., 736. This connection between heredity and intelligence – still heavily disputed at present – 
was one of the anchors of the classic racialist position, going back to Galton’s work on genius and 
talent.  
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disproved. Rather, they believed that all men were not created equal; some were 
biologically better than others. Laughlin cited as statistical proof of his argument 
the high proportion of the foreign-born insane in state and federal hospitals – they 
were 2.85 times more populous than the native-born population. He pointed out 
that although there was to some extent, a psychological and cultural adjustment 
and assimilation that did take place over time, the American-born children of 
foreign-born parents still had an incidence of insanity twice as high as the 
children of older immigration stocks. The criminality of alien stocks was also a 
pressing concern, which Laughlin suggested in a slight modification of Lombroso, 
was also inherited. The collective weight of the “expert” eugenical agent’s 
testimony was to impress on congressmen the extreme biological danger of 
inferior immigration to the nation – they could produce hereditary criminals or 
feeble-minded or insane offspring, which would burden the United States and 
lower the capability and quality of the American population.83 
Laughlin wrapped up his testimony by insisting that his research had 
proven the biological mental and physical inferiority of the “new” immigration. 
The institutional population of foreign-born aliens spoke to real differences in 
social values, “which represented, in turn, real differences in the inborn values of 
the family stocks from which the particular inmates have sprung. These 
degeneracies and hereditary handicaps are inherent in the blood.”84 When asked 
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by a committee member if he had any policy suggestions, Laughlin obliged by 
endorsing increased restriction, improved latitude for American officials to deport 
aliens, a system of universal registration of the foreign-born, and Davenport’s 
suggestion of overseas inspection of immigrant’s family lines. “The conclusions 
which one may logically find at the termination of a research,” he testified, “are 
those which are based upon data and conditions; they should not be influenced by 
sentiment or previous attitude.”85 Laughlin believed that he had demonstrated 
unequivocally the biological danger that immigration posed to the United States. 
If this new and undesirable immigration were not effectively excluded, he argued, 
the consequences to the American population would be grave. He believed these 
new immigrants were hereditarily inferior and irredeemably inadequate, and 
scientific knowledge and statistical evidence had proved this beyond a shadow of 
a doubt. But Laughlin, Davenport, Grant, Stoddard and a host of others were 
obviously influenced by sentiment or previous attitude. They intentionally 
selected certain types of evidence that would “prove” their claims, a point that 
professional academics would point out in the coming years. Real biologists and 
scientists knew that science and heredity had proven no such thing. Laughlin’s 
disingenuous testimony drove one thoughtful biologist, Herbert Spencer Jennings, 
to re-examine Laughlin’s Congressional data with a critical and scientific eye, and 
publish an opposing interpretation. 
In addition to securing Laughlin’s “expert” scientific testimony, Albert 
Johnson sought to influence immigration legislation in the 1920s in other ways. 
                                                
85 Ibid., 755. 
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To secure more drastic limits on immigration, Johnson began packing his House 
Committee on Immigration and Naturalization with restrictionists. In previous 
sessions of Congress, the Democratic party had been demanding additional 
representation for two members from large east coast cities who would 
presumably be opposed to restriction, and Johnson had to oblige. Still, the 
Committee chair could secure ten restrictionist votes on a committee made up of 
seventeen members. As he recast the Committee’s membership, Johnson 
informed Robert DeCourcy Ward, the two additional Democratic seats would 
probably have to go to anti-restrictionists, “in order that it may not be charged that 
the Committee is absolutely packed.” Securing membership on the committee 
favorable to restriction was crucial for opponents of immigration since the 1921 
bill was only an emergency measure that had to be re-authorized every fiscal year. 
So a majority vote from the Immigration and Naturalization Committee in favor 
of reversing the emergency bill was critical. But while preserving this significant 
gain for restriction was important, the long-term plan of Johnson was to secure 
something much more far-reaching and permanent. He needed sympathetic minds 
on his committee. And he worked to make sure that the 68th Congress would 
deliver.86 
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First, however, the members of the House Committee on Immigration and 
Naturalization had to sort out desirable elements from bills proposed in the 67th 
Congress, and unify behind one policy. The various political approaches to 
immigration left many options. Although the 3% quota provision from the 1921 
bill had a significant impact on reducing the total number of European 
immigrants, its statistical foundation on the population from the 1910 census 
meant that large numbers of undesirable European immigrants were still to be 
admitted. Because of the large volume of southern and eastern European 
immigration that arrived after 1880, when the census basis moved to more recent 
enumerations, southern European immigrants would be accorded, based on their 
statistical representation in the population at large, a greater proportion of the 
quotas. Thus, a quota based on the 1900 census would allow a smaller proportion 
of southern immigrants than one based on the 1920 census because of the smaller 
statistical representation of these populations in the older Census. This would 
come to be of paramount importance in the 68th Congress.  
Advocates of further limits on immigration reached out to Johnson as he 
sifted through the various proposals to ensure that he selected a mechanism that 
would be sufficiently restrictive. Madison Grant, who had become close to 
Johnson, used the winter of 1923 to try to influence Johnson’s actions on the 
upcoming legislative agenda and to encourage politicians to pass a law that would 
save the racial basis of the American population. As he reviewed the immigration 
bills that had been introduced in the House and Senate, Grant found a particularly 
troubling clause in a bill offered by Pennsylvania Senator David Reed. Grant 
 Chapter 5 345 
believed that basing an immigration quota on the percentage of the rates of 
naturalization by immigrants – as Reed’s bill proposed – was counter-intuitive. 
Race was a biological category and could not be changed by adopting American 
citizenship; simply because an immigrant had become a naturalized citizen did 
not, in Grant’s mind, make the immigrant an “American.” “From the scientific 
point of view,” Grant explained, “this basis is a thoroughly wrong one and does 
not give us racial selection which, after all, is what we are after and is our 
strongest card.” The right to vote, a privilege of a naturalized citizen, he told 
Johnson, did not bring immigrants “any nearer in sympathy with our institutions 
and methods of thought.” Careful selection of which immigrant groups would be 
admitted was absolutely crucial to ensure that immigrants had the same 
philosophical outlook, which in Grant’s mind was inextricably related to their 
racial identity. Even granting Ireland a separate quota from the British Isles would 
be dangerous; Grant worriedly pointed out the shaky performance of the Irish on 
the Army Intelligence Tests, and Laughlin’s study of the racial background of 
immigrants in custodial institutions had shown the Irish “in a very undesirable 
light.” They tested poorly and made up a disproportionate share of the population 
of custodial institutions, two empirical “proofs” of their inferiority in Grant’s 
mind.87  
The IRL members understood the appeal of quotas too. In several of their 
mailings and popular articles, they favored the census of 1890 as a baseline for 
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computing immigrant quotas, since the number of immigrants from the south and 
east of Europe was, in that enumeration, comparatively small. Correspondence 
between Johnson and League members in the spring of 1924 made the concerns 
of the League explicit, but also showed their policy flexibility along with the 
tenacity of the League’s leadership. “The whole controversy,” Richards Bradley 
pointed out to the Washington congressman, “is over which quota, and what 
percent.” For Bradley, choosing the 1890 or 1910 census was irrelevant; he felt no 
“strong preference” for either basis provided, as he emphasized, “the percentage 
in either can be kept down.”88 The League’s leaders were willing to be flexible as 
to which census was used to calculate the quota, so long as the total number of 
immigration was kept as low as possible. The League membership’s ultimate 
desire was not to ensure a higher quality of all immigrants, which is what the 
literacy test tried to establish, but to exclude, to the greatest extent possible, non 
Anglo-Saxon races from entering the country (though these mechanisms were not 
mutually exclusive). Six weeks later Bradley again wrote Johnson imploring him 
to have the final conference bill provide “as good a fighting position for the future 
as possible.” While this encompassed a combination of the literacy test and strict 
quotas, Bradley mentioned a better strategy that the League’s leaders were now 
considering. Bradley endorsed a “Racial Origin Provision” – which would 
eventually culminate in the National Origins quotas – since it would make “very 
superior fighting ground.…It effectively knocks the ground from under those who 
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have attacked the 1890 apportionment as discriminatory even though it is less 
favorable to what they want.”89 On this basis, quotas would not be determined 
“nationally,” based on the number of immigrants from European countries that 
were counted in any given census, but would instead be based on preserving 
determine the racial composition of the population already in the United States. 
“Racial Origins” would restrict immigration to the United States to those races 
that were similar in character to the American population.  
This was recognition of Grant’s critique that rates of naturalization had 
nothing to do with biological or racial identity. This was a plan that explicitly 
attempted to preserve the racial homogeneity of the United States’ population as 
nativists imagined it. Classic racialism in this case would come to the aid of 
legislators to help them craft an ostensibly objective, non-discriminatory system 
of immigration regulations – it would be objective and non-discriminatory 
because it was to be based upon scientific principles of racial biology. But there 
was no actual science of racial biology. Biologists and geneticists were slowly 
discovering that physical and mental characteristics were not “racial” but were 
instead the complex results of chemical interactions of genes and chromosomes. 
Professional scientists understood that it was almost impossible to predict a 
person’s development or characteristics by examining their ancestors or 
geographic origins alone. Heredity was vastly more complicated than the simple, 
flat axioms of classic racialism that like produced like, and that blood and race 
were immutable, unchanging characteristics. Restrictionists and nativists were 
                                                
89 Bradley to Johnson, 20 April 1924, RG 233, box 262, NARA. Emphasis original.  
 
 Chapter 5 348 
proposing to devise immigration policy on wholly incorrect understandings of 
biological theories, and actual biological researchers finally began to push back. 
As later chapters will demonstrate, however, this resistance had no effect. The 
erroneous claims of classic racialism would instead become the foundation for 
immigration policy. 
Nationally, restriction was gaining support. As Bradley was laying out 
potential legislative strategies, the House Committee was inundated with petitions 
from organizations and individuals seconding the IRL’s agitation for increased 
restriction. John A. Jeffrey, the Exalted Cyclops of the Seattle Ku Klux Klan, 
dispatched a telegram to his Congressional representative, Albert Johnson, 
informing him of the unanimous support of the Seattle Klan for the 1890 census 
as the basis for an immigration quota. The Klansman also voiced the concern of 
his hooded-brethren that the complex issue of Asian immigration also had to be 
addressed in future legislation. “The safety of the most treasured ideals and 
institutions of the white race,” he wrote,  “as well as the purity of the same are at 
stake.”90 Restrictionists tried to avoid having policy based on emotional or 
visceral appeals to racial prejudice, so they consistently pushed the “scientific” 
claims and evidence that they believed biology provided. They could more easily 
avoid charges of racial discrimination by opponents if restriction was not 
attributed to emotion, but to objective, rational “science” instead. The great appeal 
of using statistical calculations as a basis for restriction was that it bypassed 
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discussions of race, quality, and desirability with a simple statistical 
representation that could be presented as unbiased and non-discriminatory 
because it was statistical.  
Laughlin again played a key role in providing evidence in support of 
further restriction even after the first quota acts went into effect. After his 
presentation before the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization in 1922, 
Johnson secured government credentials for the eugenicist to travel to Europe as a 
U.S. “immigration agent.” For six months, Laughlin met with European policy 
makers, diplomats, and parties concerned with immigration. As the Dillingham 
Commission had done, Laughlin tried to gain first-hand knowledge of the realities 
of the immigration situation in Europe, and to gauge the attitudes of European 
nations to potential American policy changes. But Laughlin’s trip was not 
necessarily a fact-finding mission so much as it was a chance for him to secure 
information to justify the positions restrictionists like Albert Johnson wanted. 
When Laughlin was invited to provide a preliminary report after six months in 
Europe in March 1924, Johnson introduced Laughlin by laying great importance 
on the “value of [Laughlin’s] first hand field-data skillfully collected and 
scientifically analyzed…” Laughlin began his presentation with an overview of 
the historical immigration policies in America, beginning with the asylum ideal, 
economic migration and finally, the most important immigration policy, the 
biological or eugenical basis. By now his lines were well rehearsed. 
Laughlin argued that American immigration policy should be 
fundamentally selective. “Whenever a person who is a potential parent is admitted 
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to the country,” he said of immigrants, “and this person is not a member of the 
racial groups already established, then this new arrival, in order to compensate for 
the racial differences, should possess inborn and hereditary traits of most superior 
value.”91 Laughlin laid out the character traits that he believed were most 
desirable for parents of future Americans: “truthfulness, inventiveness, initiative, 
dependability, altruism, honesty, religious feeling, artistic sense…the bases of 
which are inborn in the individual and which vary greatly in family strains, can be 
determined by field studies of individuals and families.” There were also physical 
qualities of comeliness, longevity, strength and stature, and immunity to disease 
that would be desirable characteristics for immigrants. Laughlin explained that 
with all of these qualities, an immigrant’s “hereditary aspect can be located and 
measured not so well by clinical examination in a strange laboratory as by such 
examinations when supplemented strongly by field investigations.”92 It had 
worked with the Kallikaks and the Jukes, and Laughlin believed investigations 
into immigrant genealogies would work in a similar way. Immigrants with 
undesirable characteristics in their families would be excluded, on the basis of 
“expert” investigators.  
This was the basis of the work being conducted by Laughlin’s home 
institution, the Eugenics Record Office, which correlated and sorted genealogical 
                                                
91 Harry H. Laughlin, “Europe as an Emigrant-Exporting Continent and the United States as an 
Immigrant-Receiving Nation,” Hearings before the House Committee on Immigration and 
Naturalization, 68th Congress, 1st Session, 8 March 1924 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1924), 1260, 
1236-37. This eugenic ideal of breeding a population with superior characteristics was to be, of 
course, mirrored in the Nazi regime in Germany, which ardent American eugenicists closely 
followed. See Stephan Kühl, The Nazi Connection: Eugenics, American Racism, and German 
National Socialism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). 
 
92 Ibid., 1277. 
 Chapter 5 351 
data into familial lines, which proved, in Laughlin’s mind, the immutability of 
degenerate and inferior stocks. To demonstrate the potential dangers of not 
selecting immigrants with these superior qualities in the way he recommended, 
Laughlin again turned to population statistics and Walker’s law, which he noted, 
“has never been disproven….”93  
Laughlin consistently mishandled and misused scientific evidence to 
support his policy goal of the eugenic selection of immigrants. He had no genuine 
scientific training, no research experience in modern laboratories, and no grasp of 
modern methods of scientific investigation. Convinced of classic racialist notions 
that liked always produced like, Laughlin flattened out significant complexities in 
scientific information and knowledge to advocate for and influence Congressional 
support for greater immigration restriction. He regarded science as a tool, an 
implement, that could – and should – be used to guide policies toward 
immigration. Laughlin was not interested in scientific knowledge for its own sake. 
Jennings, however, was. Going back to his early training, Jennings understood the 
importance of experimental research to obtain knowledge of scientific principles, 
and the necessity of using precise, modern scientific methods to carefully build up 
the edifice of biological and genetic knowledge. That was the goal of scientific 
research. For Laughlin to misrepresent and misconstrue what truths and proof 
scientific research had established drove Jennings to action.  
Laughlin’s “expert” testimony and the forum that Johnson gave him 
before the House Committee was intended to demonstrate their scientific 
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arguments in favor of restriction. While before the Committee, Johnson also 
provided Laughlin the opportunity to refute criticism of his previous testimony 
from actual professional scientists. “Let me say,” Laughlin declared, “that my 
studies were made with no preselected theory or policy to support. There were no 
conclusions drawn before the data were in hand and analyzed, and the conclusions 
were in sound keeping with the first-hand facts.” Most critics of his previous 
testimony (and there were several), Laughlin noted, had done no research in the 
field, and future critics should be expected to disprove his assertions not by 
“badgering or guesses,” but by assembling facts derived from first hand research. 
“A critic who had made no field studies of the sort could hardly be taken seriously 
when he advises what might have been found had studies been made under 
different conditions. He should, by all means, proceed to make studies under 
those conditions.”94 There was only one critic, Laughlin felt, whose dissent should 
be taken seriously: the biologist Herbert Spencer Jennings.  
In 1923, Jennings wrote an article for The Survey in which he challenged 
the findings and evidence that Laughlin had presented to the House Committee in 
1922 as Expert Eugenical Agent. When Laughlin described Jennings’s Survey 
article to the Committee, he insisted that Jennings had not challenged the 
“honesty of the survey nor the representative nature of the population studied.” 
Before the Committee, Laughlin twisted and misrepresented Jennings’s paper to 
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suggest that the biologist was actually in agreement with Laughlin’s findings, 
which Jennings was not. “In the end Professor Jennings comes to the same main 
biological conclusion…namely, that taking into consideration the racial 
distribution of the inmate populations of our present institutions for the socially 
inadequate, it would probably be necessary for our future immigration policy to 
consider the matter of family stocks in admitting immigrants.” This was a gross 
distortion of Jennings’s paper. But, as was so often the case for Laughlin and his 
eugenicist cohorts, facts and reality could not be allowed to interfere with their 
mission of protecting the Anglo-Saxon racial stock in the United States. When 
Representative Samuel Dickstein (D-NY) asked him if “the immigrant from 
northern Europe is more desirable than from southern and eastern Europe?” 
Laughlin avoided answering, although the whole of his testimony had implicitly 
argued in the affirmative. “Desirability,” he tactfully stated, “is a matter of policy. 
The races of northern and western Europe, more closely than the races of southern 
and eastern Europe, resemble the main body of the American people. I made this 
biological investigation and put the facts on record here for the benefit of the 
committee, which must draw its own conclusion. I am not here as an advocate for 
or against any race.” But he was an advocate. He advocated using eugenical and 
class racialist principles, which were disputed in the professional scientific 
community, as a basis for immigration restriction. His recommendations were 
before the Committee: immigrants should “possess inborn and hereditary traits of 
most superior value.” He may have denied having any special interest, or being “a 
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special pleader,” but the classic racialist ideas that he believed confined those 
superior traits only to the northern and especially Anglo-Saxon races.95 
In an attempt to seem objective, and perhaps to placate the anti-
restrictionists on the Committee like Dickstein, Jennings was called to offer 
testimony in January 1924. The biologist, however, was only allotted a short 
amount of time to present his evaluation of Laughlin’s evidence and to correct 
Laughlin’s interpretations of his work.96 After making his public critique of 
Laughlin’s research in The Survey, Jennings had prepared additional statistical 
evidence for the committee members that analyzed the implications of shifting the 
census base for computing quotas from 1910 to 1890. Changing the quota basis 
from 1910 to 1890 would decrease the number of criminal, tuberculous-infected, 
and feeble-minded immigrants, Jennings demonstrated, but the number of insane, 
epileptic, and dependent immigrants would proportionately increase. These 
defects were not due to racial failings of immigrant groups, but were instead to be 
attributed to environmental, cultural and contextual issues that all immigrants 
faced. The net effect of moving the census basis, he suggested, would be that 
“these various increases and decreases would offset one another, so that the total 
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number of defectives would remain practically the same.” To move the quota’s 
foundation from the 1910 to the 1890 census would not limit the aggregate 
number of defectives. This substantially undermined a justification for the shift in 
the census. Moving the census base had only one real reason behind it, namely 
that it would limit the number of non-Anglo-Saxon immigrants. Yet Jennings 
remained cautious, unlike Laughlin, of making sweeping declarations. He 
recognized that compiling statistical data on immigration and the mental and 
physical characters of immigrants contained many uncertainties.97  
Jennings’s hesitations reflected a professional recognition of the 
uncertainties of biological laws of heredity and genetics. Scientists did not yet 
know specifically how chromosomes and genetics worked on a cellular level, so 
their understanding of hereditary transmission remained hazy and tentative. But 
how could uncertainties and ambiguities help in crafting policy? If genuine 
“experts” could present no consensus or authoritative conclusions, what was the 
use of enlisting their help? Laughlin was created an expert by the chair of the 
Committee despite no actual professional training in experimental methods, 
biology, zoology or genetics. Eugenics was not an established or really viable 
field of scientific research, as Morgan’s results on chromosomes were gradually 
making clear. He was willing to help by declaring certainties regarding biological 
development of human beings. Jennings was an expert by training and 
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temperament. He understood that experimentation and careful observation were 
the key components of legitimate scientific knowledge. But Laughlin afforded 
certainty, and Jennings did not. Laughlin was not committed to high standards for 
scientific knowledge and research so he could manipulate or misrepresent what 
science proved. Jennings could not.  
Jennings was not the only one to criticize the methodology and assertions 
that Laughlin had made in his “Melting Pot” testimony. At hearings before the 
Committee in December and January, Rufus R. Lutz declared that the sample 
Laughlin used resulted in findings that are “manifestly erroneous.” As Jennings 
also pointed out, Lutz demonstrated that Laughlin’s selection of state and federal 
custodial institutions neglected private custodial institutions, where more affluent 
and established “defectives” could take refuge. Laughlin, Lutz charged, was 
cherry-picking information to support Laughlin’s a priori conclusion that 
immigrants were undesirable because so many of them became public burdens. 
“This fundamental mistake,” he insisted, “affects the accuracy of every quota 
fulfillment figure in the report.” Johnson tried to deflect Lutz’s criticism by 
insisting that limitations of time precluded calculations involving anything more 
than county institutions and asylums, poorhouses, minor jails and tuberculosis 
asylums. This was unacceptable, Lutz maintained. “I take the point of view of the 
scientist in these matters, that after all, if we are going to think about this, let us 
get our figures right. Do not use statistics that will not stand careful scientific 
examination.” Laughlin’s facile manipulation of statistical data to support further 
restriction of immigration was particularly egregious, according to Lutz. After he 
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pointed out some glaring inaccuracies in the Army mental tests and in Laughlin’s 
computation of quota-fulfillment of inadequacies and inferiority, Committee 
member John Box (D-TX) attacked the personal credibility of Lutz in an attempt 
to undermine his criticism.98 
Not all of the debate on the legislation that was pending in the Sixty-
Eighth Congress’s first session took place in the chambers of the House 
Committee on Immigration and Naturalization. In late 1923, the Committee on 
Selective Immigration of the Eugenics Committee of the United States of 
America – of which Albert Johnson was a member, Madison Grant the Chairman, 
Robert DeCourcy Ward the Vice-Chairman and Laughlin the Secretary – issued a 
draft report on immigration legislation before Congress. The report endorsed 
using the 1890 census as the basis for quota computations and provided for the 
overseas inspection of intending emigrants, acting on Laughlin’s suggestions to 
Johnson’s Committee in 1921. The draft report justified the shift from 1910 to 
1890 specifically because using 1890 “would decidedly cut down on the numbers 
of [southeastern] immigrants. This provision would change the character of 
immigration, and hence our future population, by bringing about a preponderance 
of immigration of the stock which originally settled this country.” Statistics, 
immutable racial characteristics, the paramount role of biology and heredity in 
shaping human development – the Committee on Selective Immigration’s report 
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brought all these facets together to justify more drastic exclusion. Aided by 
classic racialist ideals, the Committee on Selective Immigration declared that 
changing the character of immigration was especially desirable since “immigrants 
from northwestern Europe furnish us the best material for American citizenship 
and for the future upbuilding of the American race.” These immigrants, the report 
noted, had higher standards of living, “are of a higher grade of intelligence,” were 
skilled in trades, and “better able to understand, appreciate, and support our form 
of government.” The members also cited the work of Robert M. Yerkes and Carl 
C. Brigham on intelligence in army recruits, as well as Laughlin’s testimony 
before the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization on “The Melting 
Pot.”99 When the Smithsonian Institution’s Ales Hrdlicka received a copy of the 
draft from Yale professor Irving Fisher, both of whom were members of the 
Selective Immigration Committee, he scribbled several marginal notes in the 
sections where the “scientific” arguments were most spurious. These the 
anthropologist passed back to Fisher in November 1923.  
As a member of the Committee on Selective Immigration, Hrdlicka had 
initially accepted the position “with the hope that it would lead to a thoroughly 
unbiased scientific research in the field of the many serious problems that relate to 
the future development and betterment of the American people.” While some of 
the material in the report was good, Hrdlicka felt that “the recommendations are 
more of a political than scientific nature.” Especially troubling was the 
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“particularly unfortunate” utilization of Brigham’s work, which the anthropologist 
noted was “imperfect and already rather discredited.” The political use of 
questionable scientific claims to influence the public and Congress led Hrdlicka to 
request that his name be removed from the membership roll of the Committee.100  
Before the Committee on Selective Immigration circulated the draft report, 
Hrdlicka had warned Fisher of the fundamental uncertainties at the heart of 
eugenic claims that the group was using to justify their positions. Eugenicists 
should not be interested in influencing legislation, Hrdlicka said, but should rather 
earnestly investigate the nature of the germ plasm, the natural and environmental 
influences that influence it, and the mechanisms of transmission of hereditary 
qualities. These advances in knowledge, the anthropologist insisted, could only be 
gained by “continued research surpassing in quality and intensiveness everything 
done before.” Convinced of the superiority of work conducted in this way, 
Hrdlicka told Fisher that he could not help but disapprove of the preliminary 
report that was based on faulty and deductive reasoning, and urged care in dealing 
with immigration matters from a eugenic standpoint, singling out in particular 
Grant’s Passing of the Great Race as a major source of misinformation about 
eugenics and its possibilities. Bristling at the accusation that the Selective 
Immigration committee was manipulating scientific knowledge, Fisher replied 
that Hrdlicka was mistaken in his perception: “it is the object of our Committee to 
secure as thoroughly unbiased a scientific research and action in all eugenic fields 
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as we can get and not to pursue political purposes.” It was essential for 
eugenicists to assist Johnson in making “his bill as eugenical as possible,” and 
Fisher declared that Johnson would introduce the legislation with or without the 
support of the eugenical movement. A bit of bias and race prejudice, Fisher felt, 
was unavoidable when it came to the practical application of eugenic principles. 
All the more important, he felt, to have properly scientific men assist in the 
creation of legislation.101 
Hrdlicka found Fisher’s position to be absurd on many levels. The 
purported neutrality of the committee’s leadership was especially farcical, 
considering the composition of the Committee; there were very few professional 
scientists on it. Particularly egregious was the appointment of Madison Grant to 
be the Committee’s chair. Hrdlicka pointed out that Grant’s “widely known” bias 
in favor of “the northern peoples” would completely undermine the objectivity of 
the Committee and raise “much deserved antagonism and create suspicion as to 
the true aims of the Committee.” Johnson’s position on the Committee was 
equally problematic – the Congressman had attended a series of Hrdlicka’s 
lectures two years before and “showed that he held strong pre-formed opinions.” 
Of course, this was exactly the reason that restrictionists worked with the House 
Committee on Immigration and Naturalization. The only thing the Committee on 
Selective Immigration should do, Hrdlicka said, was admit that “we have thus far 
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no certain knowledge about the mental superiority or inferiority of any branch or 
branches of white people.” To assume that the geographic origins of a people 
consigned them to permanent racial inferiority was ridiculous and untenable 
because there was no scientific evidence, anthropological, biological or genetic, 
that could compellingly prove “that any one group has superior or inferior 
endowments mentally or even physically.” If the Committee were to issue a 
genuinely scientific report, they would have to respect the limitations of scientific 
knowledge.102  
Hrdlicka’s criticisms highlight the key elements of the emerging chasm 
between classic racialism and experimentalist methods. The importance of 
objectivity in light of the problematic testimony given by Laughlin and 
popularized in Grant’s polemical books undermined any scientific value of the 
comments or arguments they made. There was a pronounced difference between 
following data and manipulating or perverting data, and objectivity remained the 
key aspiration in the new methodologies. Advances in knowledge of genetics in 
this period was unstable and complex, there was a lack of consensus in 
anthropology as to how stable and unchanging psychical body form was, and 
biologists still did not fully understand the relative influences of the environment 
on the development of organisms. To speak of scientific knowledge as 
establishing or proving the biological inferiority of certain population groups 
undermined the slow process research was making. Hrdlicka’s hesitancy to 
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ascribe characteristics to a purely biological origin, to privilege nature over 
nurture, reflected the increasing appreciation of professional scientists had for the 
complexity of development. With all these things in mind, it is no wonder 
Hrdlicka began to untangle himself from the Selective Immigration Committee. 
But the unwillingness of the Yale professor to follow suit shows that Hrdlicka’s 
criticisms lacked any real impact, a problem critics of classic racialism would 
continue to have.  
When the Committee on Selective Immigration finalized its report, 
members tried to keep it confidential so as to maximize its political impact. The 
hope was that it would help consolidate public opinion behind the 1890 census 
proposal and thus justify a more severe level of restriction for the “new” 
immigration.103 Keeping the report under wraps was important, since at the same 
time that it was being prepared, Johnson’s congressional committee was holding 
hearings on immigration restriction, and petitions from pro- and anti-immigrant 
forces were flooding into Congress. Since Johnson was on the Selective 
Immigration Committee, it was important to maintain the appearance of open-
mindedness on the part of legislators. A sample of the petitions shows that anti-
immigrant forces consumed, completely and uncritically, the determinist logic of 
classic racialism, and pro-immigrant forces tended to the environmentalist side. 
For instance, a petition to Johnson in January 1924 from the Napoleone Colajanni 
Lodge of the Order of the Sons of Italy despaired of being able to correct 
Johnson’s preconceptions. “Prejudice has moved the framing of your bill,” its 
                                                
103 Robert DeCourcy Ward to Albert Johnson, 17 December 1923, RG 233, box 267, HR 68A – F 
18.1, NARA.  
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secretary declared, “poor data and perverted statistics have given it shape and a 
misconception of ideals and of human wisdom shall attempt to have it passed.… 
We cannot urge the remodeling of a fixed idea, we can only hope that your bill 
shall not pass, and we wait to prove that our hopes will not have been in vain.”104 
An Italian aid society from Youngstown, Ohio appealed to Johnson to use the 
1920 census as the basis for computing quotas, which the group felt would be 
more impartial and fair because it was simply the most recent and accurate 
accounting; the group felt that the movement to the 1890 enumeration was being 
facilitated by the use of misleading propaganda.105  
At the other end of the spectrum, petitioners in favor of exclusion trotted 
out classic racialist orthodoxy to insist that draconian immigration restriction be 
placed on a permanent basis, and admit as few immigrants as possible. The 
Spokane, Washington chapter of the Daughters of the American Revolution wrote 
to Johnson expressing their full support of his bill. Some petitioners wrote 
missives that made little sense logically: the editor of the Shelby, North Carolina 
newspaper insisted that if immigration were not curtailed, the United States would 
go the way of Ancient Greece and Rome. These illustrious civilizations, he 
explained, “were the homes of greatness only so long as the Nordic strains of 
blood survived in the blood of their peoples. In a very few centuries 
                                                
 
104 Samuel Albo to Albert Johnson, 26 January 1924, RG 233, box 264, HR 68 A – F 18.1, NARA.  
 
105 Michele Colomma to Albert Johnson, 4 February 1924, RG 233, HR 68 A – F 18.1, box 263, 
NARA. Johnson replied that once the restrictive quotas were enacted, Italians already present in 
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increased prosperity, “In my opinion, the children of the Italians now in the United States will 
wish that a restrictive immigration law had been passed earlier.” Johnson to Colomma, 9 February 
1924, ibid.  
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MONGRELISM did its deadly work and destroyed their greatness.”106 Grant had 
made this case, with no evidence in support of it, that ancient Rome was a Nordic 
civilization. Jordan had attributed the decline of Rome to the absence of the Vir. 
Although completely spurious arguments from a historical perspective, they were 
influential.  
Johnson and his Congressional committee continued drafting a bill as 
these petitions arrived in D.C. When H.R. 7995 was reported out of the House 
Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, the confusion in racial thinking 
followed the bill to the floor of the House and the Senate. Just as it was being 
played out in the private meetings of the Galton Society in New York, in the 
Committee on Selective Immigration of the Eugenics Committee of the United 
States of America, and in Congress, uncertainty over what role heredity and 
environment played in human development impaired action on the bill. The 
House Report attached to the bill contained a strong minority report that disagreed 
with major provisions in the bill, particularly the shift from the 1910 Census to 
the 1890 Census which the minority hinted was undertaken for no legitimate 
reason other than the nativist and restrictionist agenda.107 Immediately upon its 
reception in the House chamber, members began tensely arguing about the shift 
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107  House Report no. 350, Part 2, “Restriction of Immigration: Minority Report” submitted by 
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It is to admit a minimum of immigrants from eastern and southern Europe and a maximum from 
northern and western Europe.” 3.  
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from 1910 to 1890, and others pointed out that the quota provisions left a gaping 
hole in the western hemisphere, where migration from Canada, Mexico and the 
Caribbean were not restricted at all.  
Illinois Representative Adolph Sabath, an opponent of restriction who co-
wrote the minority report, decried the false racial anthropology that supported the 
claims of restrictionists. Sabath was himself an immigrant from Bohemia, settling 
in Chicago after his arrival in the United States in 1881. He curtly pointed out that 
the immigrants whose racial inferiority now deemed them undesirable had been 
very desirable allies in the war against Germany. But this hypocrisy, he noted, 
was minor compared to the “unfounded anthropological theory” that underlay the 
antipathies toward southern and eastern European immigrants, and that venerated 
the Nordic race as the highest point of human development. “No scientific 
evidence worthy of consideration,” Sabath criticized, “was introduced to 
substantiate this pseudoscientific proposition.” The Illinois Democrat declared to 
members that he found it “amusing” to see the majority report declare northern 
immigrants so superior, when anyone with knowledge of immigration would have 
seen Americans fulminating in the last 100 years against Irish, German, Austrian 
and Scandinavian immigrants who were now lumped in with the Nordic races.108 
With that opening salvo fired against the restrictionist camp in Congress, debate 
in the chamber over the next few days became increasingly contentious.  
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Debate on the morning of the 5th of April featured statistical data from the 
United States census again being manipulated. Speaking in favor of the 1890 
census bill, Representative William Vaile (R-CO) dismissed the Polish 
government’s complaints of discrimination against Polish immigrants that would 
result from Congress using the 1890 census as the quota base. Vaile declared that 
Buffalo, New York, was an excellent example of the need to restrict the new 
immigration, as recently arrived Polish immigrants outnumbered the native stock 
by 20,000, although he never stated which census he took the information from, 
nor how he was knowledgeable about conditions in a Congressional district on the 
opposite side of the country. Representative Clarence MacGregor (R-NY) 
immediately rose to challenge the accuracy of Vaile’s claim. The Colorado 
representative invoked what he thought was the unimpeachable authority of 
statistical evidence, mocking MacGregor by declaring, “Then the gentleman does 
not agree with the census.” He continued, to the applause of members, to reiterate 
that the “greedy complaints” by national governments about the alleged 
discrimination in using the 1890 census was, “when it is remembered that no one 
is entitled to enter the United States at all to become a part of our permanent 
population except at the will and pleasure of the United States…particularly bad 
grace.”109 That Vaile felt so confident in the empirical evidence of the United 
States Census to stifle any debate in favor of open immigration shows the power 
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that statistical data held. And that Vaile grossly perverted the evidence in favor of 
his argument shows how vulnerable statistical data was to distortion.110 
MacGregor was not the only Representative to point out how 
restrictionists manipulated data and scientific theories to advance their legislative 
agenda. As soon as the Colorado Republican yielded the floor, John Joseph 
O’Connor (D-NY) rose to denounce the discrimination that he perceived in the 
bill “in favor of blonds against brunettes.” If the Johnson bill was not designed to 
discriminate against southern and eastern European immigrants, he asked, “why 
the report of Doctor Laughlin, why all the scientific investigation under the 
Carnegie Foundation to prove that those races were inferior, socially and 
nationally; that they were inferior stock?” The New Yorker then launched a 
personal attack against Laughlin – “and the first syllable is spelled L-a-u-g-h” – 
and his “so-called scientific study,” declaring the eugenicist’s report to the 
Immigration and Naturalization Committee “the greatest joke book that has been 
published during this session of Congress. It is founded on fallacies from 
                                                
 
110 There is zero evidence to support Vaile’s claim based on census returns for Buffalo; like 
Laughlin and many others before him, he invented the assertion out of whole cloth. The 1890 
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Eleventh Census of the United States, 1890, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
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region (vol. 1, pp. 192-3), United States Census Bureau, Thirteenth Census of the United States, 
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(Washington, D.C: Government Printing Office, 1921-1922).  
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beginning to end.”111 Although this was largely true, based on the current 
knowledge of the science of genetics, Johnson immediately sprang to Laughlin’s 
defense, declaring that any bias toward the blond race was “all in your eye. Your 
committee,” he disingenuously stated, “is not the author of these books on the so-
called Nordic race.”112 Midway through the day’s debate, Jasper Napoleon 
Tincher (R-KS) rose to ask Sabath, who now controlled the floor, why Sabath’s 
colleagues on the committee wanted to keep out the “new” immigrants? 
“Because,” the Czech immigrant replied, “they believe these people are inferior. 
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Humphrey’s The Racial Prospect, A. E. Wiggam’s books, The Fruit of the Family Tree and The 
New Decalogue of Science, Michael Guyer’s The Importance of Being Well-Born, Clark Wissler’s 
Mind and Culture, Ripley’s The Races of Europe, Alfred P. Schultz’s Race or Mongrel, Prescott 
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Immigration complied by Madison Grant for the Immigration Committee of the American 
Defense Society, Inc.” in RG 233, HR 68 A – F 18.1, box 264; Johnson to Grant 30 January 1925, 
ibid. Two weeks earlier, Johnson told Grant that he intended to use the list of books to send to 
teachers. Johnson to Grant, 13 January 1925, RG 233, HR 68 A – D 11, box 262. Excepting 
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based on accurate empirical or experimental data. Nearly all hewed, in some fashion, to the classic 
racialist orthodoxy.  
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They have been fed by misinformation; they have been fed by new dope, as I may 
term it, by unreliable statisticians, and by Professor Laughlin’s eugenic and 
anthropological false tests, until they themselves believe that there is some 
foundation for the unjustifiable conclusions in the so-called Laughlin report.”113 
Here, on the floor of the House, the Illinois Democrat called out the House 
members strung out on the dope of classic racialism. And it had no effect. 
One problem in Sabath’s assessment of the situation was that it implied 
some degree of collusion or mendacity that does not seem to have existed. The 
great power of classic racialism was that it was derived, albeit loosely, from 
scientific principles. It was scientifically plausible, especially to persons who 
lacked sophisticated intellectual and professional training in scientific methods.114 
The “new dope” was also not “new” at all; it had been around for fifty years. 
Restrictionists believed that it was true, that science did suggest that biology was 
destiny and that like produced like. The alluring simplicity of this claim was the 
central problem with scientific knowledge in the 1920s. Within the professional 
community of scientists, academics and researchers, it had become clear that 
heredity, inheritance and the way genes and chromosomes functioned and 
interacted were far more complex than was previously understood. But without 
being able to explain exactly how these complex processes unfolded – which was 
partly due to the infancy of genetic science and partly to technological limitations 
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– they could provide no definitive “proof” that they were right and the classic 
racialists wrong. 
While Laughlin, Davenport, Johnson, Grant and others may have had their 
prejudices against certain groups of people and exaggerated the accomplishments 
of other groups, in their minds the sciences of classic racialism had established 
that like invariably produced like, and that the blood of an individual shaped and 
determined its development over the course of its life. New methods of scientific 
investigation may have been exposing weaknesses in the accuracy of this belief, 
but they had not decisively and absolutely demolished it. Anthropology could 
explain why different population groups were identifiable and had different 
cultural values, but even with Hrdlicka’s Eskimos or Boas’s American Indians, 
the fact was that they were still different. So how to explain that difference, with 
no compelling or clear scientific explanation? Men like Johnson, Laughlin and the 
IRL leaders were motivated by genuine concern for the quality of life of native-
born Americans, and they feared the effects of large pockets of alien population in 
the country. Lee’s longstanding financial commitment to the organization 
suggests the seriousness with which the League’s elites viewed restriction. While 
scientists and restrictionists may not have understood hereditary mechanisms or 
how characteristics developed, one group admitted uncertainty because they 
lacked proof, and one group assumed, without any proof, that there were certain, 
definite answers.  
The difficulty in managing this transition from classic racialism to modern 
experimentalism was also not particularly novel, as can be seen in the persistence 
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of Lamarckian explanations of evolution even after Darwin published The Origin 
of Species in 1859 and The Descent of Man in 1871. Thomas Kuhn later modified 
his theory of revolutionary paradigmatic shifts in structures of scientific 
knowledge to be more closely aligned with gradual evolutionary change rather 
than punctuated revolutions, citing the persistence of Lamarckism after Darwin’s 
evolutionary theory was published in 1859. Darwin’s theory of evolution by 
natural selection was not a decisive or revolutionary mutation, Kuhn argued, but 
was more a process of speciation, of gradual, evolutionary adaptation.115 In this 
sense, opponents of classical racialism, or of the claims in favor of immigration 
restriction that were made in its name, could not point to radical, decisive 
experiments that disproved the axiom that “like produces like.” Instead they had 
to point out inconsistencies in that premise, and flaws in the understandings of 
heredity that only gradually became clear. And without this decisive “proof,” the 
explanatory power of classic racialism remained superior for its simplicity as a 
basis of devising policy.  
The rancorous debate in Congress that continued in early April 1924 
reflects this difficulty of assessing scientific truth claims. With the new, more 
restrictive bill gaining support in the House, a group opposed to the perceived 
discrimination written into the bill began to consolidate. While restrictionists 
continued to utilize census data to illustrate the myriad problems that they 
associated with the new immigration, deploying statistics to bolster their 
arguments, the misuse of this data continued to be hotly contested and debated. 
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For instance, when Meyer Jacobstein (D-NY) took the floor to contest one of the 
restrictionists’ favorite arguments about immigrants concentrating in urban areas 
and creating problems of crime, poverty, overcrowding and disease, 
Representative John Cable (D-OH), interrupted to ask what was the total 
percentage of immigrants living in cities in 1860? Cable was hoping to 
demonstrate that the urban proportion of the foreign-born from the 1920 census – 
which he believed was much higher than 1860 – would prove this tendency of 
immigrants to settle in ethnic neighborhoods, which ultimately retarded their 
assimilation and thus may suggest a causal link between the immigrant 
communities and a rise in urban crime rates.116  
Jacobstein answered that the census returns for the foreign-born 
population in urban areas in 1860 was 30% of the total population of urban areas. 
In 1920, he continued, the proportion was only 24%. Jacobstein’s figures 
demonstrated that Cable’s argument had no statistical basis – immigrants could 
not be the sole cause of these urban problems if they constituted a smaller 
proportion of the urban population; it was, rather, the general population growth 
in the cities. Incredulous, Cable denounced Jacobstein, insisting, “To-day [the 
proportion] is 75 per cent in cities of 2,500 or more.” “The gentleman asked me 
for the facts,” the erstwhile economics professor from New York retorted, “and 
those are the facts as given by the census for the principal cities listed in the 
census of 1860 (pages 31 and 32), and the cities listed in the 1920 census having a 
population of 100,000 and over.” When Cable tried to defend his claim, New 
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York Representative Fiorello La Guardia joined the fray, declaring, “The 
gentleman from New York [Jacobstein] takes his figures from the United States 
census and not from [Houston Stewart] Chamberlain or [John B.] Trevor.”117 The 
“Little Flower” touched upon an essential element of the debates in Congress as 
they would play out until 1929: statistics were a highly problematic basis upon 
which to base policy, because data sets could be easily manipulated.  
Statistical data was slippery, so when Johnson took the floor shortly after 
this exchange, he tried to move the debate back to the problem of assimilation and 
the failures of the melting pot. Making a joke at anthropology’s expense, Johnson 
articulated the desire of nativists in Congress to act for – and only for – the 
interests of the United States, declaring that, “we do not care whether they are 
round heads, longheads, or bone heads. We are going to cut down the number that 
come here.” Not desiring to be an obstructionist, Jacobstein retook the floor to 
offer a compromise: using the 1890 census was unsatisfactory to the “new” 
immigrants, 1920 unsatisfactory for old-stock Americans, so an equitable solution 
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would be to take the total number of foreign-born residents (i.e. naturalized 
immigrants) in the United States in the census of 1890 and 1920 and average the 
two to arrive at an equitable quota basis for immigration.118 
Instead of placating both groups, Jacobstein’s solution enflamed the 
nativists. Representative Walter F. Lineberger (R-CA) dismissed the statistical 
compromise, asking if it was not better to be unfair to statistics than to the 
American people? When Jacobstein replied that one cannot violate a fundamental 
thing like arithmetic, New Jersey Republican Randolph Perkins recommended 
cutting off all immigration so that aliens already resident in the United States 
could be safely and properly assimilated. Jacobstein replied that Perkins was 
assuming that there were already too many foreigners in the country to safely 
assimilate, and that he simply did not agree with that assumption. “I am working 
on the assumption of America for Americans,” Perkins shot back. “So am I,” 
Jacobstein testily replied. Born and raised in New York, Jacobstein bristled at the 
implication that he was operating in the interests of the immigrants. He set off a 
fascinating exchange of race pride and racial identity:  
Jacobstein: “But what is an American? How long do men 
have to be here to be Americans? How long has the 
gentleman been here?”  
Perkins:  “Since I was born, and my forefathers had been 
here for 260 years.”  
Jacobstein: “Does the gentleman think for that reason he is 
better than one whose ancestors did not come over in the 
Mayflower?  
Perkins: “I can lick them.”  
Jacobstein: “Then the gentleman must be Irish.” 
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[Adolph] Sabath (D-IL): “There may be some the 
gentleman can not lick.”  
Perkins: “I will take on anyone who is not an American.”119  
 
Perkins’s implication was that anyone who was opposed to restriction was 
not an American. But Jacobstein and LaGuardia were Americans too, both born 
and raised in the United States. Perkins’s objection was ultimately not about 
nativity; it was, as for Johnson, Cable, and others, a matter of race.  
When Maine Republican Ira Greenlief Hersey took the floor and brought 
race openly into the debate, tensions in the House chamber escalated further. 
Hersey’s diatribe against immigrants neatly encapsulated several crucial elements 
of the nativist position. Though one had to concede that the Pilgrim Fathers 
arrived in the New World only to find the “red race” holding claims to the land, 
Hersey insisted that the Indian “cared nothing for civilization. He gave freely of 
his land to the white man for trinkets to adorn his person…” Like Robert L. 
O’Sullivan and a long list of nationalist writers before him, Hersey spewed forth 
the rhetoric of Manifest Destiny. It was imperative to preserve the racial heritage 
of the United States, which he thought was “God-intended, I believe, to be the 
home of a great people. English-speaking—a white race with great ideals, the 
Christian religion, one race, one country, and one destiny.” In his narrative, North 
America was “a mighty land settled by northern Europe from the United 
Kingdom, the Norsemen, and the Saxon, the peoples of a mixed blood. The 
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African, the orientals, the Mongolians, and all the yellow races of Europe, Asia, 
and Africa should never been allowed to people this great land.”120 Hersey thus 
articulated one of the core fantasies of nativists and classic racialists, namely that 
the United States was purely Anglo-Saxon at its founding, and only with the new 
immigrants that began arriving in the 1880s was the North American Eden 
contaminated. He urged his Congressional colleagues to stem the contamination 
before it was too late.  
Members also used statistics to expose nativist prejudice. When James 
Willis Taylor (R-TN) took the floor to argue against the admission of inferior 
southern immigrants who were all, in his mind, poor and illiterate, LaGuardia 
interjected to ask about illiteracy rates in the southern states. Taylor confidently 
replied, “We have no illiteracy in Tennessee and Kentucky.” When LaGuardia 
skeptically pressed the Tennessean, Johnson came to his nativist colleague’s aid, 
insisting that the illiteracy rates in the south were not as high as those in New 
York City. Taylor and Johnson were both wrong, as LaGuardia knew. The census 
of 1920 showed that the illiteracy rate of adults over 21 in Tennessee was 12.6%, 
and in Kentucky 10.6%. The comparable figure for New York in the same census 
was 6.4%. LaGuardia was making the point that with the illiteracy provision of 
the 1917 Immigration Act, illiterate immigrants were excluded from coming in 
despite the fact that illiteracy was prevalent in the United States in poorer and 
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less-developed regions, just as it was in Europe; illiteracy therefore had nothing to 
do with the “racial” character of the population.121 Again, the manipulation of 
statistical data to support their agenda did not trouble congressional nativists. And 
although opponents of restriction took pains to demonstrate the inaccurate 
statistical associations that their restrictionist colleagues made, their corrections 
had little effect.  
When LaGuardia finally took the floor, he addressed this issue of 
statistical manipulation by restrictionists. Pointing out that Vaile supported his 
restrictionist claims with statistical evidence not from the census but from John 
Trevor’s [sic] A Century of Population Growth, LaGuardia mocked “Trevor’s 
figures! Oh, yes, figures do not lie, but liars figure. This House is entitled to a 
more accurate basis than figures taken from a semifiction, semiscientific private 
publication.” Feeling that the opponents of restriction were gaining momentum, 
LaGuardia laid bare the prejudice that the House was attempting to enshrine into 
law: “I charge that your basis of 1890 is absolutely and intentionally 
discriminatory against the immigrants of Jewish faith and against the immigrants 
from Italy, Greece, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Russia, Hungary, and Austria, and I 
do not qualify that charge one bit. The basis of 1890 was taken only because it 
was the only census that would lend itself to the dirty work that is attempted to be 
done by the secret influences [in] back of this bill.”122 But while demonstrating 
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that the inaccurate use of statistics was one method pro-immigrant forces used to 
undercut the momentum of the restrictionist camp, the spurious scientific claims 
that lay at the heart of racial nativism were far more dangerous. Peter Francis 
Tague (D-MA) decried the “effort on the part of unscientific men to solve the 
problems of immigration by scientific method” and failed to find that the “pseudo 
scientific [sic] claims of the sponsors of the bill have been substantiated from any 
scientific source.”123 This was the core of the debate over not only restriction, but 
also one that was occurring in science generally: who was able to properly speak 
in the name of science?  
When the House reconvened for its evening session on the 8th, Ohio 
Democrat Charles Mooney attempted to redirect members’ attention back to the 
fundamentally flawed anthropological assumptions of superior and inferior races 
that the restrictive laws were based upon. A new word had infiltrated the English 
language, Mooney declared, that empowered the pseudoscientific basis for 
restriction. The venerated “Nordic” was suddenly appearing everywhere, and 
                                                                                                                                
not come out in the open, by the influences who have no intelligent information of conditions, but 
who have a fixed obsession on Anglo-Saxon superiority…” Ibid., 5887. A Century of Population 
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there was not “a fifth-rate extension lecturer” – perhaps a jibe at A. E. Wiggam –  
“[who] does not speak of it with scientific exactness.” And yet the hearings of the 
Immigration and Naturalization Committee had “established beyond a doubt that 
this word ‘Nordic’ is an invention of the anti-Semite [Houston Stewart] 
Chamberlain, an English subject who expatriated himself at the time of his 
country’s need. He went so far in his rabid anti-Semitism as to make of the Christ 
a ‘Nordic.’”124 Mooney wondered if a Nordic race even existed, and exactly how 
its superiority – or that of any race – was established? Franz Boas, America’s 
leading authority on anthropology as Mooney called him, had declared in The 
Mind of Primitive Man back in 1911 that all races were equal in gifts and 
potential, but some simply lacked opportunity. Mooney asked why Boas was not 
called before the Committee? Johnson rose and, perhaps tongue in cheek, insisted, 
“through the strenuous times of the hearings this committee undertook not to 
discuss the Nordic proposition or racial matters.”125 This was again entirely 
                                                
124 Ibid., 5910. Chamberlain’s two-volume The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century was 
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being born in Hampshire, England) in 1915. The accusation that Chamberlain abandoned his 
country was a reference to Chamberlain’s ex-patriot status in Germany during World War I. See 
Geoffrey Field, Evangelist of Race: The Germanic Vision of Houston Stewart Chamberlain (New 
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Commission, “The Dictionary of Races and Peoples.” 
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disingenuous: the fundamental point of the bill was to preserve the Anglo-Saxon 
or Nordic character of the American population. Johnson avowed this goal as a 
member of the Committee on Selective Immigration of the Eugenics Committee 
of America, which had declared its intent to preserve the Anglo-Saxon or Nordic 
character of the American population.126 
Emmanuel Celler (D-NY), Mooney’s colleague who also an ardent 
opponent of restriction, continued to press Johnson on this critical issue of the 
proof of the inferiority of the new immigration. Celler described Laughlin’s 
testimony before the committee as “redolent with downright and deliberate 
falsehoods. The gentleman from Washington [Johnson] admitted to me that it 
contained certain inaccuracies, yet he has made no attempt to check its 
circulation.” In Celler’s mind, Laughlin’s project was pre-determined to show the 
supremacy of the Nordic race, and the researcher “hoodwinked” Johnson and the 
Committee. Celler feigned surprise that Grant – whose work was “dogmatic 
piffle” – and Stoddard (“a sort of ‘Saturday Evening Post’ scientist”) were 
summoned to the Committee, but not someone like Boas or Hrdlicka. Ultimately 
Celler knew why: “the committee only wanted those who believed in ‘Nordic’ 
                                                                                                                                
125 Mooney backtracked and paid deference to Johnson, telling the Committee’s Chair that he was 
criticizing “the propagandist” and not the Committee. Congressional Record, House of 
Representatives, 8 April, 1924, 5910-11. Historian Vernon Williams has called The Mind of 
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His Contemporaries (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1996), 22.  
 
126 Committee on Selective Immigration of the Eugenics Committee of the United States of 
America, “Report of the Committee on Selective Immigration,” [n.d. but ca. late 1923], Jennings 
Papers.  
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superiority; men who deal in buncombe, like Grant and Stoddard.”127 But these 
criticisms were not enough to stop the influence of classic racialist “piffle,” and in 
a Saturday session, the House of Representatives passed H. R. 7995 by a vote of 
323 to 71.128 The Senate, however, had its own ideas on how to proceed to 
improve immigration restriction.  
The senators considered a bill that was more exclusionary than the House 
bill. As they considered a bill introduced by David Reed (R-PA), Senator 
LeBaron Colt (R-RI) spoke out that he saw an intentional act of discrimination 
against southern and eastern European immigrants. Reed’s bill moved the Census 
basis for quota calculations back to 1890, and after two years, the system would 
be replaced by a “national origins” system of determining immigration quotas. 
The quota law already in effect – 3% of the number of immigrants enumerated in 
1910 – had decreased immigration from southern and eastern Europe from 
915,754 in 1913-1914 to 159,646 in 1923. Colt believed that “this 3 per cent has 
solved the problem of any menace of immigration.”129 Reed’s proposal to move 
the quota to the 1890 census was an attempt to create a minimum number of 
southern immigrants, who were regarded as inferior, and a maximum number of 
northern immigrants, which was precisely “what one class of restrictionists 
wants.” But declaring the various countrymen of the 6,000,000 immigrants from 
southeastern Europe already in the United States to be “undesirable” was a great 
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injustice and discrimination against them, the Rhode Islander argued. And Colt 
argued that Reed’s provision to eventually compute quotas on the basis of 
national origins was futile: “It can not be done.”130 
The national origins provision proposed to calculate the racial composition 
of the whole population of the United States by analyzing the origins of the 
population enumerated in the first census of 1790 and then calculate quotas for 
immigration upon that computation. This was a highly difficult endeavor, since 
the census made no inquiry of nativity until 1840.131 On Friday April 3, Senator 
Reed rose to defend his proposal to base quotas on national origins by describing 
how it could be effectively implemented. The Pennsylvania senator conceded that 
it was impractical to question “the individuals who are here to-day of the origin of 
their ancestors who first immigrated to this country,” but utilizing the census 
returns from 1790 would provide a clear picture of the original national and racial 
composition of the American population. Restrictionists freely moved the census 
basis for calculating quotas to achieve their goal of preserving the racial 
homogeneity of the United States. Reed informed his colleagues that, “all the 
methods of ascertaining racial origins and national origins that have been used 
check with a surprising degree of accuracy.” For advocates of additional 
restriction, the National Origins provision promised to eliminate accusations of 
discrimination and bias against certain population groups of immigrants arriving 
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131 See also Ngai, “The Architecture of Race in American Immigration Law”; idem., Impossible 
Subjects, 22-37. 
 
 Chapter 5 383 
in the United States. Because the principle would establish quotas for immigration 
based on the nativity of the American population at its founding, it had the 
appearance of not being directed against any particular group of immigrants and 
used the language of nationality and not race. Except that it was intentionally 
directed at those not present in 1790 – the “new” immigrants. But it projected an 
image of fairness. As Massachusetts Senator Henry Cabot Lodge explained, the 
national origins quotas may not be precise in their ethnic divisions, “but as far as 
what are called scientific races, the races created by history, it comes pretty near 
to being exact—for all practical purposes sufficiently exact.”132 But Lodge’s 
statements on the Senate floor reflected major confusion in drawing this 
distinction between scientific, historical, national and racial identity that was 
never really resolved. 
The 1921 quota act had the effect of collapsing the racial boundaries in 
Italy by subsuming the alleged racial differences between north and south into one 
national quota. When the quotas were announced, there was no distinction 
between the amount of northern and southern Italians that would be admitted. It 
was simply “Italian.”133 But the debates in the Senate over national origins show 
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the persistence of thinking in terms of race. Another significant aspect of the 
Senate’s proposed legislation for 1924 was the rhetorical gymnastics the national 
origins provision enabled. As several critics had pointed out regarding the quotas 
that were established in 1921, the limits on immigration were surreptitiously 
discriminatory against southern and eastern immigrants. National origins inverted 
these charges – restrictionists suggested that the volume of immigration from non-
northern areas of Europe actually discriminated against the “American” race, 
which was chiefly English in origin. On the third of April, Reed explained this 
more fully. Selective immigration policy, he explained, was not about the 
“relative merits of this race and that,” or claiming that any nation produces better 
emigrants than others. Every immigrant was “the equivalent of myself in general 
desirability.” But in fixing the quotas under the 1921 law, immigrants received 
“two or three times the consideration we have been giving to our own American 
stock, which is not fair, which is a discrimination against us.” Reed reiterated the 
advantages of the National Origins provisions again on April 9, insisting to his 
Senate colleagues that establishing restriction on this basis would obviate “the 
slightest accusation of discrimination,” and encouraged the support of the Senate 
for a proposal that would “make our immigration an exact cross section of our 
present population.”134 The assumption at the heart of the National Origins 
principle, however, was that the national background of the “present population” 
of the United States could be determined, despite the fact that no evidence of its 
composition existed in the census data from 1790 or 1800. 
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But before the national origins quotas would go into effect, Reed’s bill 
changed the census base for the calculation of the existing quotas back from 1910 
to 1890, a move that some senators charged manifested a malevolent intent to 
discriminate against the “new” immigration (the national origins provision would 
restrict the volume of “new” immigrants even further). Massachusetts’s freshman 
senator David Walsh decried the “very apparent discrimination against 
immigrants of certain nationalities” that would result from using the 1890 census 
instead of the 1910 census that was currently used. Walsh decried the “popular 
and pseudoscientific propaganda” restrictionist congressmen introduced to justify 
the shift to 1890. Some senate members who supported Reed’s bill denied 
believing that some races were inferior to others.135 The appeal of national origins 
was to make this criticism a moot point: there was no particular justification for 
selecting either 1910 or 1890 as the census basis to compute quotas. To use 
national origins, however, one could argue that the goal of preserving the racial 
homogeneity of America was based upon an exact calculation of what the racial 
composition of the country actually was. Quotas and restriction would no longer 
be based on the census at all. And whenever critics denounced the national origins 
system as impossible, supporters nearly always referred to short studies written by 
a man named John B. Trevor (“A Preliminary Study of the Immigration Problem” 
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and “A Study of the Population of the United States”), both of which confidently 
declared the viability of computing the national origins of the population from the 
census returns of 1790, and insisted that accurate quotas could be made upon this 
population base with precision.136 
National origins proposed was to discern the racial composition of the 
United States in its first statistical accounting, the original census of the 
population in 1790. As A. Warner Parker, a member of the District of Columbia 
Bar Association, explained, the intent was to achieve “a sufficient reduction in the 
volume of immigration to give assurance that the country will not admit more 
annually than it can accommodate; and… making the reduction fall most heavily 
on the “new immigration” countries (of southern and eastern Europe)…” The 
stated appeal of national origins was that “instead of arbitrarily reducing the 
volume of immigration…it is a scientific plan for keeping America 
American…”137 Once this racial composition was determined, the proportion of 
immigration permitted to enter the United States would conform directly to that 
composition. So if it was discerned (“divined” may be a more appropriate phrase) 
that the American population in 1790 was 80% Anglo-Saxon, 15% Alpine, and 
5% Latin, the quotas for admissible immigrants would reflect those proportions. 
Anglo-Saxon races would get 80% of the quota, Alpine races 15%, and Latin or 
Mediterranean races 5% in proportion to a maximum limit of around 150,000 
                                                
136 In the Senate, it appeared in the debate on April 3, 1924 (Congressional Record, Senate, 3 
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immigrants. And from the Dillingham Commission’s “Dictionary of Races or 
Peoples” the federal government now knew “definitively” which races came from 
which European countries. There was only one problem – the racial information 
was not contained in the 1790 census. There were no questions of nativity or 
country of origin or ancestry listed in the 1790 census – just six categories: family 
surname, number of free white males over 16 years of age, free white males under 
16, free white females, free blacks, and slaves.138 This shortcoming would almost 
defeat the entire restrictionist campaign, and is discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter 7.  
Reassured by the practicality of this new national origins system, when the 
House bill (which passed the lower chamber on the 12th of April) arrived in the 
Senate, it was substituted for the Senate Immigration Committee’s draft of 
legislation (S. 2576), which eliminated all quota exemptions for immigrants from 
the House bill and contained a provision for the gradual enactment of national 
origins quotas. Thus amended, it was passed in the Senate by a substantial margin, 
62 in favor, 6 opposed (28 members did not vote).139 The resulting conference 
between the two chambers generated a bill that established immigration quotas 
based upon 2% of the number of foreign-born aliens resident in the United States 
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in 1890 as enumerated in the census until 1 July 1927, at which time the National 
Origins plan would take effect. The bill also contained, in section 13, an 
exemption for Japanese nationals, continuing to honor the “Gentleman’s 
Agreement,” until the President and Secretary of State could properly abrogate the 
agreement.140 As the bill was reintroduced to the House, pro-immigration forces, 
who were vastly outnumbered in both chambers, tried one last time to refute the 
possibility of accurately computing the quotas based on national origin. 
Representative Sabath informed his colleagues that both “the Director of the 
Census, Mr. Steuart, and Doctor Hill, his first assistant…declared they would be 
obliged to adopt arbitrary methods to arrive at the proper basis upon which the 
allocation will be raised.”141 On May 9, LaGuardia rose to dispute the 
mathematics of both types of quotas, which he believed were “worked out in 
order to discriminate against certain races.”142 Ultimately it was not the statistical 
calculations but the complex international and diplomatic issues of Japanese 
immigration that proved a sticking point in the bill; by a narrow vote (192 to 171, 
69 not voting), the bill was recommitted to conference, where the provision 
exempting Japanese immigration was stripped.143 
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Improved in this way, H. R. 7995 came before the House of 
Representatives on Thursday May 15, and it was again handily passed, 308 to 62 
(63 members not voting). Representatives Celler, Dickstein, LaGuardia, 
O’Connell and Sabath maintained their opposition to the bill.144 The vote in the 
Senate on the same day passed by an equally large margin, 69 to 9, with 18 
members not voting.145 Sent to President Coolidge on the May 19, it received his 
endorsement and became law on May 26, 1924. Pursuant to subdivision (e) of § 
11, a team was assembled to begin computing the new quota, on the basis of 
national origin, which the quotas based on 2% of the 1890 census went into effect.  
At the conclusion of the Great War, the attention of many American 
congressmen had returned to immigration. Most members, representing 
constituents aroused by “100 per cent Americanism,” supported greater 
restrictions on immigration. It was not only this feeling or sentiment that drove 
them to close the gates further, however. A significant base of empirical support 
emerged in the immediate post-war years from the Army mental tests. Now it 
appeared that a scientific field provided a means to assess and determine the 
intellectual desirability of immigrants too. Policy recommendations from outside 
groups also included pedigree analysis of European immigrants to ensure the 
proper detection of feeble-mindedness, imbecility or other mental defects. The 
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categories for immigrant admission were slowly being tightened. Literacy tests 
were not keeping enough people out, so quotas were introduced, although as the 
debates in Congress showed, they could appear to be arbitrarily selected and 
computed, whether based on the censuses of 1920, 1910,1890, or by the 
percentage admitted. These were contentious, so assigning quotas by national 
origin was introduced as a policy provision. This had the advantage of 
purportedly preserving the racial character and composition of the United States, 
which for racial nativists like the IRL, was what they had favored all along. 
Always, the goal was the same – to protect the Anglo-Saxon population of 
America from being overwhelmed by inferior and undesirable immigrants. 
Whether the undesirability was justified by intelligence, racial characteristics or 
national identity was not important. It simply needed to be justified somehow. 
While Congress debated these bills to further restrict immigration, outside 
Congress a powerful propaganda movement emerged to help justify restriction to 
the public.  
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Chapter 6: “There is no science of propaganda” 
 
In the early 1920s, as political support for immigration restriction grew, 
other developments threatened to derail some of the carefully constructed 
justifications for the anti-immigrant laws of 1917, 1921 and 1924. The classic 
racialist ideas were increasingly vulnerable as the science of genetics and 
Morgan’s chromosome theory of heredity began to diffuse throughout the 
academic and scientific communities. Morgan’s work on fruit flies in particular 
was instrumental in propelling further experimental and laboratory investigations 
into heredity.1 Significantly, however, this knowledge of the complexity of 
chromosomes and heredity remained very isolated and enclosed within a small 
community of practitioners. When the professional scientists did reach out to the 
larger public, as Franz Boas tried to in the mid-1920s, the complexity of scientific 
knowledge was very difficult to explain.  
This created a significant disadvantage for professional scientists who 
tried to educate the public about recent discoveries and advances in knowledge 
about heredity and genetics. Their disadvantage lay in the genuine uncertainty and 
ambiguity of the processes they studied. When non-scientists, men who had no 
professional training in zoology, biology or any of the experimental sciences, 
described science, they expressed no uncertainty because they believed that none 
existed. As they deductively reasoned, and as they assumed correlations for 
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movement and the I.Q. testing movement,” both of which came under sustained fire in the 1920s. 
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causation, men like Madison Grant, Charles Davenport and Lothrop Stoddard and 
others who hewed to the classic racialist orthodoxy that like produced like, 
convinced the public and policy makers that there was no complexity, ambiguity 
or uncertainty.  
At one extreme of how superficially the public understood scientific 
principles was the Scopes trial in Tennessee in 1925. Although William Jennings 
Bryan’s defense of the Biblical interpretation of man’s origins was well beyond 
the pale even of the inaccurate orthodoxy of classic racialism, the trial itself 
presents a useful example of the dangers of controlling scientific knowledge and 
propaganda. Bryan’s work for the prosecution crystallized the dangers of letting 
laypersons (in this case those without scientific credentials) speak to the public on 
scientific matters. Bryan saw the trial as a showdown between faith and salvation 
and godless Reason. For professional scientists, though, if Bryan’s argument 
carried the day, the unfettered development of scientific knowledge in the country 
would be imperiled.2  
The contours of the conflict between the religious fundamentalists and 
professional scientists had actually been laid out years before the trial began. In 
1922 William Jennings Bryan was offered column space by The New York Times 
to comment on evolution, which Bryan denounced as only “a guess.” Bryan 
claimed that this was the scientific consensus – that evolution was a hazardous 
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guess.3 The opportunity the Times afforded to Bryan to comment on a scientific 
theory appears to have been, in some manner, a publicity stunt. The paper issued a 
quarter-page advertisement a week before that cautioned readers to order their 
papers in advance, as “Mr. Bryan’s extraordinary explanation of his stand on 
evolution will create an unusual demand for the Sunday edition.”4 The 
advertisement itself provoked reactions from readers, some of whom angrily 
wrote the editor of the Times, criticizing such vulgar commercialism. One reader, 
a Congregational minister from Akron, Ohio, actually anticipated the criticisms of 
Bryan’s piece that Edwin Conklin and Henry Fairfield Osborn would make in the 
following weeks (which the Times also advertised in advance, though less 
conspicuously).5 Bryan, Reverend Lloyd Douglas pointed out, “has not standing 
either as a theologian or a biologist,” but despite this the former presidential 
nominee still “raced across the country perspiringly endeavoring to protect a 
sixteenth century ultra-orthodoxy from the subversive influences of latter-day 
science.” Douglas closed his acidic letter by declaring “Because he has willfully 
refused to inform himself on a subject of which he presumes to speak in tones of 
authority, Mr. Bryan is intellectually immoral, and the people who provide him a 
platform for the spread of his misinformation are rendering their patrons a 
disservice.”6 Bryan had no justification to speak on any aspect of scientific 
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authority. Douglas, in a few brief sentences, provided a crisp and effective 
critique of Bryan’s pretended scientific authority. Conklin and Osborn, who 
responded with columns of their own, would be hard-pressed to put their 
objections to Bryan’s piece as succinctly or powerfully with their professional and 
academic credentials.  
When the anticipated Sunday arrived, Bryan’s article thundered that the 
idea of evolution was harmful because it destroyed man’s family tree as taught by 
the Bible. Bryan declared that scientists scandalously accepted man’s descent 
from lower organisms “without any explanation whatever to support it.” Darwin’s 
theory of evolution, the Great Commoner insisted, “is only a guess and was never 
anything more.” As if this were not damning enough, the second (and for Bryan, 
the most horrifying) objection was that evolution “has not one syllable in the 
Bible to support it.…The Bible not only describes man’s creation, but gives a 
reason for it; man is a part of God’s plan and is placed on earth for a purpose.” 
There had never been one instance of one species changing into another, which, 
Darwin’s “guess” posited, was how better adapted species evolved. In fact, Bryan 
declared, Darwinian evolution requires believers to accept absurd, irrational 
explanations for man’s existence. It is “harmful, as well as groundless.” The 
Presbyterian populist anticipated the Scopes case, arguing that, “If the Bible 
cannot be taught [in public schools], why should Christian taxpayers permit the 
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teaching of guesses that make the Bible a lie?”7 But the theory of evolution was 
not a lie – most professional scientists believed that there was plenty of evidence 
to prove that evolution occurred. The difficulty remained the same that Galton 
had faced: they had no tangible proof of how it occurred.  
Darwin’s theory of natural selection still seemed to provide the most 
compelling explanation for how evolution occurred, but it was very difficult to 
explain exactly how the mechanism worked. As Jennings intuited, scientists must 
be able to demonstrate processes to convincingly prove biological theories. But 
how did one show the process of natural selection in action? Without compelling 
proof, it was difficult to decisively and forcefully repudiate people like Bryan, 
who extrapolated from this lack of proof of natural selection occurring that the 
whole principle of evolution was wrong. This was a recurrent problem for 
scientists, whether they were describing the process of evolution, the existence of 
chromosomes, or the influence of environmental factors on the development of 
organisms. They lacked specific, tangible, direct proof of natural selection 
occurring. They could offer no detailed explanation of how the environment 
modified an organism’s development; as Pearl had learned with his chick 
blastoderms, it was still unknown how the organs developed in just the right way. 
They could only suggest that it was true. Morgan’s introduction of chromosomes 
went some way to providing direct evidence that evolution or nurture were true. 
But publicly, or at least for the readers of The New York Times, Bryan presented 
                                                
7 William Jennings Bryan, “God and Evolution” The New York Times 26 February 1922, Section 
7, pages 1, 11. Emphasis original.  
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reasonable doubts that evolution had any real merit because natural selection 
could not be “shown.”  
To refute these accusations, the Times kindly offered two professional 
scientists, Henry F. Osborn and Edwin Conklin, equivalent space to respond to 
Bryan’s allegations in the following Sunday’s issue. Osborn, as President of the 
American Museum of Natural History in New York City and the Vertebrate 
Paleontologist of the United States Geological Survey, was an obvious choice to 
comment of evolution; Conklin’s selection was a bit more puzzling, as he was 
principally a biologist, though he had a very strong religious background.8 Osborn 
opened his rebuttal on a friendly note (which, as Osborn and Bryan continued to 
spar over the coming years, would degenerate into outright hostility), expressing 
admiration for Bryan’s familiarity with some of Darwin’s more complex 
arguments, like Sexual Selection. Again, it must be remembered that Bryan’s 
objections to Davenport’s theories originated from a specific theological or 
cosmological perspective. He was not a scientific expert. But, Osborn insisted, 
twenty-one years of research in the U.S. Geological Survey had convinced him 
that “Natural Selection is the only cause of evolution that has thus far been 
discovered and demonstrated.… No living naturalist, however, so far as I know, 
differs as to the immutable truth of evolution in the sense of the continuous fitness 
of plants and animals to their environment…” Bryan’s objection to evolution, that 
                                                
8 Osborn biographical information from his byline for “Evolution and Religion” The New York 
Times 5 March 1922, Section 7, p. 2; for Conklin, see Jane Mainschein, “Conklin, Edwin Grant” 
American National Biography Online Feb. 2000. http://www.anb.org/articles/13/13-00331.html 
Access Date: Tue Nov 11 17:15:56 EST 2003. Conklin is treated with great sophistication in Jane 
Maienschein, Transforming Traditions in American Biology, 1880-1915 (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1991).  
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it removed the necessity of Divine involvement, or otherwise inclined believers to 
atheism, Osborn insisted, was simply not true. Citing St. Augustine’s respect for 
natural mysteries as a sign of God’s power, Osborn tried to defuse the anti-
religious tone that Bryan believed he saw in evolutionary theory.9 But Osborn 
insisted that there was scientific proof demonstrating the fact of evolution, and 
more importantly, Osborn invoked his professional scientific position to lend 
credence to evolution.  
Conklin’s article addressed the religious aspect of evolution more directly, 
although he also questioned Bryan’s capacity to speak on scientific matters. The 
complexity of evolution, his article explained, did indeed lead to uncertainty 
among scientists as to the mechanism of evolution, which Bryan had correctly 
pointed out. This did not, however, cast doubt upon the truth of evolution, as 
many non-scientific persons like Bryan claimed. “One who desires to know the 
truth about this or any other subject,” wrote Conklin, “should inquire as to the 
competence of a witness, his impartiality, the truthfulness of his testimony, and 
whether he has any new evidence to offer.” Bryan lacked any competency to 
evaluate the scientific evidence in favor of evolution. Conklin criticized Bryan’s 
lack of impartiality, a key requirement for accurate scientific knowledge, because 
the former Secretary of State “frankly confesses that his motives are not to find 
the truth,” and so his explanation of scientific theories must be disregarded. To 
demonstrate the truth of evolution, Conklin laid out the scientific fields that 
                                                
 
9 Henry Fairfield Osborn, “Evolution and Religion” The New York Times 5 March 1922, Section 7, 
p. 2. 
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provided strong evidence in favor of the theory – in addition to the fossil remains 
that Osborn primarily studied, morphology, physiology, embryology and genetics 
all provided compelling proofs of the truth of evolution. This was an 
overwhelming consensus, but it was inadequate for Bryan and “his kind,” who 
hurled their “medieval theology” of creationism against “the ramparts of science,” 
and broadly established scientific theories.10 
Gauging the responses that the Times received following Bryan’s first 
essay from other scientists, one could hardly question how strong the “ramparts of 
science” actually were in terms of the consensus in favor of evolution. There was 
a broad accord with Darwin’s great theory, and the confidence in the ramparts 
was quite strong. Davenport gave a series of lectures in the early spring of 1922 
with the aim of popularizing support for evolution that he titled “Population and 
W.J. Bryan.” In this address, Davenport railed against Bryan’s assertion that “all 
knowledge that is of value is intuitive; that one person’s knowledge is as good as 
another’s…” For the director of the Eugenics Record Office and the Station for 
Experimental Evolution, this was ridiculous. Bryan’s article was most upsetting to 
Davenport because Bryan had dismissed the specialized knowledge that scientists 
had. Davenport denounced this notion, insisting that the thirty-five years he had 
spent in professional study of scientific knowledge did give him a right to speak 
on scientific truth, particularly in opposition to one who “has obviously not spent 
35 hours of critical observation in this field.” But this also forced Davenport to 
                                                
 
10 Edwin Grant Conklin, “Bryan and Evolution” The New York Times 5 March, 1922, Section 7, p. 
14.  
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confront the long-standing problem that scientists had, and one of the reasons that 
he recommended popular articles and books by Albert Wiggam, Madison Grant, 
and Lothrop Stoddard in his lecture: the esoteric knowledge of professional 
scientists was hard to communicate to the general, lay public.11  
If scientists had special truth claims by virtue of their professional training 
and expert knowledge, their opinions might carry more weight in policy 
approaches and attitudes to issues related to their fields, whether or not this 
involved matters of immigration, feeble-mindedness and sterilization or the 
teaching of evolution. Thus, when the young biology teacher John Scopes was 
charged with violating the Butler Act in Tennessee in 1925, the trajectory of the 
trial was already in a sense laid out. Osborn and Conklin were both approached by 
the defense team to testify on behalf of Scopes and explain the theory of evolution 
to the jury, to demonstrate that it was not “a guess,” as Bryan had asserted in 
1922. If the scientific truth of evolution could be established, any religious 
objection to the teaching of evolution in public schools might violate the First 
Amendment and secure an acquittal for Scopes.  
Conklin’s religious background made him a particularly desirable witness 
for the defense team. Forrest Bailey, the Associate Director of the American Civil 
Liberties Union [ACLU], asked Conklin at the end of May to “serve the cause of 
science” on behalf of Scopes. Conklin, despite being “intensely interested” in the 
                                                
 
11 Charles B. Davenport, Lecture “Population and W. J. Bryan, 1922” in Davenport papers. See 
also Davenport’s letter to the Editor of The New York Times [n.d., ca. 19 March 1922], also in the 
Davenport Papers. 
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trial, informed Bailey that he had already committed himself to a summer 
research program, and would not be able to appear in Dayton. Bailey refused to 
accept Conklin’s negative reply, writing him two letters in June beseeching him to 
come south for Scopes. The attorney shrewdly put his plea in terms that he knew 
would resonate with Conklin: “The important thing is that the interests of science 
should be adequately protected by the presence of men who are competent for that 
purpose.”12  The historian Ray Ginger describes among the ACLU’s goals in the 
trial as educating the public on evolution, to demonstrate the necessity of having 
education unfettered by laws based on religious faith, and to show that religion 
and science were not incompatible.13 Having a scientific man familiar with the 
theological issues, another historian has suggested, was a critical strategy for 
swaying the rural Rhea County jurors.14 Considering Conklin’s 1922 article in The 
New York Times, his appearance before the jury would have been a tremendous 
asset for the ACLU. But appearing for Clarence Darrow raised significant 
complications. The historian Edward Larson explains that many of the academics 
and professional scientists that were approached by the defense team – Osborn, 
Conklin, Davenport, Luther Burbank, David Starr Jordan and J. McKeen Cattell – 
were reluctant to appear opposite a “showman” and radical agnostic like Darrow. 
And the support these six potential witnesses had for eugenic plans and policies, 
                                                
12 Forrest Bailey to Edwin Conklin, 29 May 1925; Conklin to Bailey 2 June 1925; Bailey to 
Conklin, 4 June 1925, all box 1, Professional Papers, Conklin Papers.  
 
13 Ray Ginger, Six Days or Forever? Tennessee  v. John Thomas Scopes (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1958), 78.  
 
14 Edward J. Larson, Summer for the Gods: The Scopes Trial and America’s Continuing Debate 
over Science and Religion (New York: Basic Books, 1997), 135. 
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Larson suggests, was anathema to Darrow’s own conception of universal human 
rights.15 So professional academics and researchers would only go so far in their 
defense and protection of academic freedom and scientific inquiry.  
Conklin was tempted to assist the defense; despite his arrangements for a 
research trip to Woods Hole, he wrote to Osborn that his interests and the 
ACLU’s overlapped to a great extent. The Princeton biologist had just given a 
commencement address at Ohio Wesleyan University, and found the university 
audience, and most of the people he encountered on his trip, to be deeply 
interested in the defense of scientific inquiry and academic freedom. For these 
northern audiences, he told Osborn in a private letter, Tennessee, and the south in 
general, appeared as backward states that are “trying to repeal laws of nature by 
the laws of the legislature.” When Osborn replied, three weeks before the trial 
opened, he told Conklin that in recent, lengthy conferences with the Scopes’s 
defense team in New York, Osborn argued that the best course for Darrow would 
be to argue that religion and evolution were “not in any way inconsistent.” If this 
could be achieved, Osborn hoped, the lay public could obtain a broad 
understanding of what evolution really meant.16  
Although neither man participated on behalf of the defense (Judge John 
Raulston ruled on July 17 that the defense would not be allowed to call scientists 
to testify on behalf of Scopes), they actively participated in the public debate 
                                                
 
15 Ibid., 135.  
 
16 Conklin to Osborn, 19 June 1925; Osborn to Conklin 22 June 1925, both Conklin Papers, 
Princeton.  
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before, during and after the trial.17 Educating the public about the scientific merits 
of evolution was of paramount importance. Osborn was the first to strike in print, 
with an article in The Forum before the trial even began. In “The Earth Speaks to 
Bryan,” Osborn claimed that the importance of refuting Bryan’s dismissal of 
evolution was based on the arguments the Great Commoner made to thousands of 
Americans in his sermons. When Bryan preached that there existed some 
antagonism between the Creator and His Creation, between God and Nature, 
Osborn argued that Bryan corrupted true religion, morals and education. Science 
may not be incompatible with theological beliefs, but scientific inquiry had to be 
guided by secular investigators and methods. Osborn also defended educational 
freedoms, suggesting that Tennessee’s actions in determining what could and 
could not be taught in its schools and universities “puts the State back exactly four 
centuries to the inquisitorial period of Spanish history.”18 Neither the Tennessee 
school board nor Bryan could determine the intellectual merit of evolution, 
because the board members and Bryan were not professional scientists capable of 
                                                
 
17 Before the trial started, Conklin wrote to a friend in the Geology Department at the University 
of Kentucky of his relief that he decided to remain in Woods Hole and not go to Tennessee: “I 
have been more or less disgusted by the comic aspects of the whole case as it has been reported in 
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proceeding which looks as if it were intended to advertise Dayton, Bryan, Darrow et al.” Conklin 
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The Scopes Trial: A Brief History with Documents (Boston: Bedford St. Martin’s, 2002); Larson, 
Summer for the Gods.  
 
18 Henry Fairfield Osborn, “The Earth Speaks to Bryan” The Forum v. 73, n. 6 (June 1925), 796-
804. Osborn also noted that “one of the leading American anthropologists, Dr. Ales Hrdlicka” 
recently posited Europe, and not Asia, as the cradle of the human race based upon recent fossil 
discoveries (p. 802).  
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evaluating that. Scientific inquiry had to be protected and defended from political 
or theological influence.  
But Bryan was not swayed by the argument that scientific knowledge was 
the exclusive preserve of professional scientists. In a reply in The Forum, he again 
reverted to dismissing evolution by invoking the Biblical accounts of man’s 
creation and simple common sense. To suggest that evolution was an established 
fact, like the law of gravity or the “roundness of the earth,” Bryan complained, 
was presumptuous; the laws of gravity and the spherical shape of the earth could 
be witnessed by all. How could a person believe in evolution, Bryan asked, when 
it could not be demonstrably proven? In this regard, Bryan meant to point out that, 
because its mechanism of natural selection in man lacked demonstrable proof, 
evolution had to be accepted on faith. But how was this faith in natural selection, 
Bryan wondered, any different from faith in the Divine creation of Man? 
Osborn’s rush to defend man’s “brute ancestry” meant, the Commoner argued, 
that the New Yorker accepted as “proof” of evolution “the most absurd stories.” 
Bryan then shifted his attack from Osborn, in particular, to “evolutionists” in 
general. They built up a philosophy of life, he explained, based on “a brute 
hypothesis, wholly unproved,” and they eliminated all need of the Bible and 
religious faith because these were inconsistent with their hypothesis that man 
evolved over centuries from lower organisms.19 Without proof, how was this 
theory of man’s animal origins any more plausible than the Bible’s account? 
Although it brought to the public’s attention the issue of evolution, Darwin’s 
                                                
19 William Jennings Bryan, “Mr. Bryan Speaks to Darwin” The Forum v. 74, n. 1 (July 1925), 
101-08.  
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theory was not very effectively defended by Osborn because he lacked the genetic 
evidence of similarity in human beings that DNA would later provide. But it was 
critical for the public to understand and appreciate evolution, because it was key 
for classic racialist arguments in support of restriction.  
Perhaps the most salient statement of the stakes in the creation/evolution 
argument occurred in an exchange between Bryan and lead defense attorney 
Clarence Darrow on the last day of the trial, though the printed arguments in favor 
of evolution from Osborn and other scientists continued for the remainder of the 
decade (including Osborn’s collection of essays in defense of evolution, The 
Earth Speaks to Bryan, which he dedicated to Scopes). On the stand, Bryan 
declared that the strategy of the ACLU was not to defend the freedom of teaching, 
or to instruct the public on the “guess” of evolution. Rather, he claimed, “the 
purpose is to cast ridicule on everybody who believes in the Bible…” Bryan 
maintained that religion, as a source of knowledge, ought to be privileged over all 
other forms of knowledge. Darrow refused to let this comment stand, and 
countered that the defense team, and the scientists who wrote briefs for the 
defense and published articles in journals and magazines, had a much more 
important purpose: “We have the purpose of preventing bigots and ignoramuses 
from controlling the education of the United States and you know it, and that is 
all.”20 In this endeavor, Darrow, Osborn and Conklin were of one mind: scientists 
did have a special role to play in advancing scientific knowledge because of their 
                                                
20 Moran, The Scopes Trial, quoted on 156; Henry Fairfield Osborn, The Earth Speaks to Bryan 
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professional training. They were qualified to speak definitively about theories of 
knowledge, not Bryan. 
Darrow had captured a complex situation in a pithy statement with more 
significance than even he perhaps knew. It was not only the members of the 
ACLU and certain groups of esoteric scientists that were trying to prevent “bigots 
and ignoramuses” in Tennessee from controlling American education. Large 
numbers of academics and scientists who were concerned over the ways that 
scientific knowledge was being popularized, misrepresented and exploited 
throughout the country. It was not the propagandizing itself that rankled; it was 
that in communicating the principles of scientific investigation, whether of 
evolution, racial science, feeble-mindedness or intelligence testing, to a non-
scientific public, popularizers exaggerated and in some cases, baldly misstated the 
factual scientific content. Jennings explained this fundamental problem to public 
audiences throughout the 1930s, when he argued consistently and unyieldingly for 
the empirical basis of scientific knowledge.21 When the preaching ran too far 
ahead of the empirical, experimental, and observed basis of the teachings for the 
viability of the intellectual program of scientific examination, it had to be stopped. 
Even among the adherents of classic racialism, some fringe elements needed to be 
expunged from association because they were too wild.  
“All the respectable people are besmirched by the contact”  
                                                
 
21 Herbert Spencer Jennings, Lecture 73, “Biological Recommendations for the Ills of Mankind” 
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As the restrictionists changed their tactics in the postwar decade, many 
continued to frame their strategic arguments in scientific terms. For academic 
scientists, the most troubling aspect of the manipulation of scientific knowledge 
for political ends was the way biological knowledge was presented the public. 
Immigration restrictionists continued to insist that classic racialist principles, and 
scientific evidence in support of them, proved the danger that immigration 
presented to the American racial stock, the nation’s intelligence, American 
political and social stability, and even its economic well-being. Because biology, 
demonstrated the pivotal role that heredity played in an organism’s development, 
these nativists explained, the United States was undermining its racial heritage by 
were allowing immigrants to pollute the blood stream of the nation. This was not, 
however, what scientists believed in the 1920s. Heredity was very complicated, 
and ontogeny did not recapitulate phylogeny precisely. During this crucial period, 
Pearl, Jennings, and others intensified their supervision of who claimed to speak 
with scientific authority and the claims that they made. One case in particular 
showed why this was so important. Casper Redfield, an eccentric amateur 
investigator of heredity, threatened to bring the whole scientific investigation of 
biology and heredity into disrepute.  
In the 1910s, Redfield, who had no professional scientific training, began 
making dramatic claims about inheritance that brought him to the attention of 
Stanford President David Starr Jordan, who came across some of his work in 
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1922.22 Redfield’s 1914 book, Dynamic Evolution had attempted to refute the 
evolution of man from lower organisms and retain the Mosaic account of modern 
man’s emergence. “To say that intelligence is a function of the brain, is to say that 
the brain creates something out of nothing. The brain is clearly a mechanism 
employed in the process of making intelligence out of some pre-existing thing, 
but science has indicated nothing out of which it is made, or any work involved in 
the making.” The improvement of man’s intellect and his physical strength had to 
be increased by something, he argued. The physical laws of conservation of 
energy meant that some divine form equipped man, and modern animals, with a 
surfeit of intellectual energy that then expanded and developed to form the 
modern beasts and humans that were seen in the surrounding natural world.23  
Jordan asked his friend, the Princeton biologist Edwin Conklin, if 
Redfield’s work had any scientific merit. In an essay published right after the war, 
Redfield took Galton’s and Davenport’s analysis of family pedigrees and 
genealogies of notable men to an unusual extreme, arguing that talent and 
superiority was a direct function of the time elapsed from the birth of the 
grandfather to the birth of the grandson. Conklin denounced Redfield’s work, but 
refused to get involved in any further discussion or correspondence regarding 
him. Redfield had earlier insisted to Conklin that an evil cabal of professional 
                                                
22 Among Redfield’s books: Casper L. Redfield, Control of Heredity: A Study of the Genesis of 
Evolution and Degeneracy (Philadelphia: Monarch Book Co., 1903); idem., Dynamic Evolution: A 
Study of the Causes of Evolution and Degeneracy (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1914); idem., 
Human Heredity (Chicago: Heredity Publishing Co., 1921); idem., “Great Men and How They are 
Produced” (Chicago: privately published, 1915); idem., “Descent from Educated Grandfathers” 
reprint from The Indianapolis Medical Journal (ca. 1918/1919), in box 3, Lee papers.  
 
23 Redfield, Dynamic Evolution, quote on v. 
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scientists was conspiring to suppress Redfield’s genius – “he assured me that he 
was a greater man than Sir Isaac Newton and that I was one of those responsible 
for blinding the present generation to his greatness,” Conklin told Jordan – and 
the Princeton professor wanted nothing to do with him. Redfield refused to go 
away.24 
Redfield first came to the attention of professional scientists in the early 
1910s, when he published a curious theory of heredity that Pearl harshly reviewed 
in The Journal of Heredity in 1915.25 A short pamphlet, “Great Men and How 
They are Produced,” issued a challenge to the biological and genetic community 
to refute Redfield’s argument that the production of offspring with superior 
qualities was a function of the age of the father and the rate at which the 
generations reproduced. He even offered a financial incentive for a successful 
rebuttal of his theory that “Rapid breeding inevitably and necessarily leads to the 
production of inferior stock, no matter what the original stock may be,” and that 
“Slow breeding is an essential [sic] to the production of superior stock, and, when 
properly used, inferior stock can be transformed into superior stock in about 100 
                                                
 
24 Conklin to David Starr Jordan, 14 July 1922. Edwin G. Conklin Papers, Personal 
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years, and into eminent men in less than 200 years.”26 Redfield’s method was 
argument by inference and analogy, and associations and correlations provided 
the physical and empirical proof. Moreover, the associations and correlations 
were most often gathered from correspondence from professionals, not from any 
original or institutional research that Redfield conducted.  
In this regard, his work was just like Galton’s work on English Men of 
Genius. That professional scientists in the United States now sharply criticized 
such work shows how far scientific understanding of heredity and biology had 
come in advance.27 But Redfield continued to gather data and generalize from it 
with no original effort or critical examination. While this maddened professional 
scientists, others outside of strictly academic fields did not find Redfield’s sloppy 
work troubling. In January 1925 Leon Whitney, the President of the American 
Eugenics Society wrote to Conklin suggesting that, although Redfield’s work was 
wrong, the man was expending genuine effort that if harnessed properly, could 
perhaps assist the eugenics movement. Whitney noted that “No matter if we agree 
with them or not (and I do not, from my present knowledge), we must not laugh at 
them.” Much like the way Laughlin got involved in the eugenics effort, Whitney 
felt that enthusiasm for the subject was key. Inaccurate knowledge or hazy 
misunderstanding could be remedied by training and education; the passion could 
                                                
 
26 Redfield, Great Men, 10.  
 
27 A notable exception would be Davenport’s Naval Officers.  
 Chapter 6 410 
not. Whitney hoped that the respected Princeton geneticist would assist him in 
directing Redfield to more productive and more accurate claims.28  
This was the last thing the professor wanted to hear, and in his swift reply, 
Conklin angrily refused. Redfield had no respect for the proper way to conduct 
research, and his zeal (and ego) blinded him to factual realities that were 
inconvenient to proving his assumptions. Conklin explained that Redfield had, 
over the previous four or five years, been “employing stool pigeons in all parts of 
this country and Canada” who wrote to professional biologists asking their 
opinions on Redfield’s theory. “Redfield has then taken the letters, garbled the 
replies by quoting isolated sentences and parts of sentences and thereby has 
attempted to show that the biologists of the country are fakirs,” conspiring to 
“suppress the only real genius in this country, namely [Redfield].” Conklin said 
that the fundamental problem with the amateur’s work was that he selectively 
employed statistics to demonstrate his arguments. This was, he insisted, no way to 
conduct proper research. He explained to Whitney, as Pearl and Jennings had 
thrashed out between themselves almost twenty years earlier, that only integrating 
methods of statistical analysis and the experimental method advanced scientific 
knowledge.  
Despite this harsh rebuke of Redfield’s work, Whitney persisted, 
informing Conklin that Dr. John Harvey Kellogg, the Superintendent of the Battle 
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Creek Sanitarium, had once thought that Redfield’s work was more or less solid, 
and his conclusions reasonable, although Kellogg had since changed his mind. 
Kellogg too, however, was not a scientist and his opinion was unlikely to sway 
Conklin in either direction. Whitney closed his letter by stating that he would 
search out Pearl’s article in the Journal of Heredity, because it was “the only 
published record which I know to date to disprove the assertions of Redfield.”29  
Whitney seemed to be suggesting an important and troubling matter to 
professional biologists: if Redfield was so wrong, why was there only one 
published rebuke of his theory, and that from ten years ago? Why weren’t 
professional scientists more concerned about setting the scientific record straight? 
Were Redfield’s theories legitimate? Redfield’s own letters to academics and 
professional scientists suggested one answer: the man was not only persistent, but 
so utterly certain that he was correct that he refused to listen to the criticisms that 
the actual professionals advanced. Arguing with and refuting Redfield was utterly 
pointless. But this, as Whitney hinted, lent a dangerous impression of accuracy 
and legitimacy to Redfield’s work. Exposed to this frustrating irony, Jennings and 
Pearl would later publicly clamp down on the non-scientists that purported to be 
scientific like Laughlin and Goddard while trying to ignore and avoid any 
entanglement with folks Pearl to as “cranks.”30 
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Protecting the professional integrity of scientific organizations and 
institutions from “cranks” like Redfield became especially important in the post-
war decade. When the Science League of America began soliciting membership 
amongst professional scientists to its Advisory Board, Redfield’s name appeared 
on the letterhead sent out to members. The Science League of America [SLA] was 
formed in September 1924 to help educate the public about evolution in 
particular, and scientific knowledge in general. It was “a nonsectarian and 
nonpolitical association…formed to protect the rich fruits of scientific freedom, to 
combat the attacks of so-called fundamentalists who insist on accepting the Bible 
as an authentic text-book on biology, and who would take away from thousands 
of earnest and progressive students the right to investigate the phenomena of 
nature and announce their discoveries.”31 It advocated the unfettered teaching of 
science regardless of the theological or moral implications of valid scientific 
theories.  
Davenport, Pearl, and Jennings assented to membership in the SLA, until 
they learned of Redfield’s presence on the advisory board. Pearl was furious. He 
sent a note to Conrad Biron, the Secretary of the SLA, resigning his position on 
the board. Pearl told Biron that he was resigning because he refused to serve in 
any organization that Redfield belonged to, and the Hopkins professor then 
forwarded his resignation to fellow scientists, encouraging them to follow suit. It 
worked. Jennings replied to his old friend that “I have decided to follow your lead 
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in this matter,” and he resigned too. Jennings noted that he had been 
contemplating what action to take for a few days before Pearl’s letter arrived, but 
told Pearl that he felt that being listed with someone like Redfield “is certainly too 
much to ask; they will have to take care if they expect to retain an advisory board 
of any standing.” Jennings’s note to Biron was also explicit in the reason for his 
resignation: “If you consider him the type of man for your Board, I certainly have 
no wish to be connected with it.…I object to being listed along with him.”32 The 
academic and scientific integrity of the SLA was important to maintain. Though 
both Pearl and Jennings consistently engaged in work just like the SLA undertook 
– educating the lay public about biology and heredity and describing the 
limitations and uncertainties of scientific knowledge along with its achievements 
– to be lumped together with a character like Redfield, who had no scientific 
training or any inkling of genuine scientific knowledge of heredity, genetics or 
modern scientific methods, was absolutely unacceptable.  
Several of Pearl’s and Jennings’s professional colleagues agreed with their 
sentiments, but not their action. Conklin suggested to Pearl that there were 
perhaps enough people of good scientific standing on the Board to cancel out 
Redfield’s presence, and counseled that the Hopkins biometrist should remain a 
member of the organization. Pearl would hear none of it. He told Conklin that he 
had followed Redfield’s work for twenty years, and his opinion of Redfield was 
that “He is, without any question whatever, a quack and a crook. Every decent 
                                                
 
32 Jennings to Conrad J. Biron, 26 October 1925, Jennings papers (folder 16, “Raymond Pearl”). 
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animal breeding organization in the country…have one by one kicked him out, 
and he is unable today to publish anything in any of the trade papers of these 
associations.” Pearl’s change in tone here is emblematic of a larger frustration for 
him, Boas, Jennings and others in the 1920s. Genetics, zoology, biology and other 
natural sciences were making significant strides in the range of natural 
phenomenon that they now understood. They were also acutely aware of lacunae 
in them. They admitted that there were things they did not yet know, but their 
insistent, unwavering belief in the proper way to overcome these gaps and 
uncertainties went back to Jennings’s experiments in Naples. Jennings, in a 
address at the dedication of the Whitman Lab of Experimental Zoology at the 
University of Chicago in June 1926, insisted that “We must be able to say: Such 
and such things happen under such and such conditions, and if you don’t believe 
it you may supply the conditions, you may try it for yourself, and you will find it 
to be true.”33  
Men like Redfield had nothing to show except correlations that they took 
to be causations. Redfield had nothing to say in terms of proper experimental 
results, just deductions from sloppily gathered data. Redfield had no methods or 
processes to show how he arrived at his conclusions to enable verification of 
them. It was important for scientists in the 1920s to protect and define for the 
                                                
 
33 Herbert Spencer Jennings, “Biology and Experimentation” Science n.s. v. 64, n. 1648 (30 July, 
1926), 97-105; 98. This was a published version of Jennings’s speech, and a very close copy of 
what became for him, in the mid-1920s, a “stump speech” – see Herbert Spencer Jennings, Lecture 
n. 37, “Some Unsettled and Unsettling Questions in Biological Science: An Unpopular Talk” 
delivered at the University of Pennsylvania, March 11, 1926, unpub. mss. in Jennings papers: 
Lectures.  
 
 Chapter 6 415 
public what were acceptable parameters for scientific research, and what were 
not. It was critical that Redfield be labeled a quack and a crook. Otherwise, as 
Pearl told Conklin, “all the respectable people are besmirched by the contact.”34  
But Conklin did not share this position, so the professional scientific 
community must not be regarded as having adapted and accepted universally 
these methods and cautions. Conklin needed further convincing. He wrote to 
Jennings that, despite his displeasure with some of the problematic information 
the Science League had been putting out, he had doubts as to the wisdom of 
resigning.  Jennings insisted that the placement of Redfield on the Board 
confirmed his impression that “the people who are running the League know 
nothing about science, and they are likely to let us in for other things we don’t 
wish to stand for. It seems to me, too, that they really must choose between 
scientific men and such as Redfield.” Conklin, finally convinced, then submitted 
his resignation to Biron as well.35 
If Conklin, who did take the responsibilities of accurate scientific work 
very seriously, was ultimately swayed, others were not. Davenport, perhaps not 
surprisingly, was more forgiving of associations with unscientific men. Although 
he submitted his resignation to the SLA’s President Maynard Shipley in late 
October along with Pearl, Jennings, and Conklin, Davenport’s own attempts to 
organize broad coalitions between scientists and non-scientists made him 
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sympathetic to Shipley’s dilemmas. When Shipley replied to Davenport that the 
League ideally desired “as broad a representation of the various groups of citizens 
as possible,” to combat the religious fundamentalists like Bryan, who believed the 
Bible was the source of all knowledge, Davenport’s own work in the International 
Eugenics Congresses, the Eugenics Research Association, and his other eugenic 
groups gave him first-hand experience in creating coalitions between uneasy 
partners for the goal of popularizing esoteric scientific knowledge. In the past, 
Davenport had forged many unstable associations between men of suspect 
credentials, and he would continue to do so. When Redfield was finally removed 
from the Advisory Board, only Davenport felt compelled to withdrawn his 
resignation.36  
For Davenport, Redfield posed a complicated challenge. While academic 
scientists like Pearl and Jennings absolutely refused to be associated in any way 
with him or his work, Davenport saw a degree of usefulness in Redfield’s 
publications and pronouncements. Like Albert Wiggam, Redfield was, right or 
wrong, ultimately successful in raising public awareness of the possibilities of 
eugenics and heredity. When Redfield’s book Human Heredity was published in 
1921, Davenport saw to it that the book was reviewed in The Eugenical News. 
Although critical, describing the book as mostly “expression of opinion with out 
evidence,” the reviewer described Redfield as a “trained advocate.” But Redfield 
had had no proper scientific training – the review, in fact, stated that he was a 
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patent lawyer. This was the crux of the issue for professionals like Jennings and 
Pearl. It was simply not possible that a patent lawyer could competently speak on 
the complex scientific theories of heredity.  
Garland Allen notes how Thomas Hunt Morgan in the aftermath of his 
drosophila studies in the mid-1910s began discussing on occasion his “new 
biology” and his philosophy of science. Morgan criticized the abstract idealism of 
men like Henry Fairfield Osborn in the late in 1910s, whose work he felt had little 
comprehension of genetic and embryological science. Having made tremendous 
gains as a result of carefully experimental work in the second decade of the 
twentieth-century, in the 1920s the “new” biologists were not about to be drawn 
backwards.37 Although the brief article in the Eugenical News explained, “it is true 
that others have investigated some of the same data as he and got different 
results,” it did so in such a way that it seemed that this was a basic problem in 
scientific inquiry and did not itself make the book’s conclusions problematic. The 
correspondence between Jennings and Pearl in 1908 attests to this problem. 
Davenport seems to have made a calculation that Redfield’s “Lamarkian” views 
(which were disproved by much of the then-current genetic research, as Pearl 
learned with his chickens at Orono) were an acceptable inaccuracy when in reality 
they were unequivocally wrong. As long as the public was cautioned not to 
believe everything the patent lawyer wrote—as the review in the Eugenical News 
advised—raising awareness of scientific knowledge was a worthy endeavor, even 
                                                
37 Allen, Thomas Hunt Morgan, 318ff. It is interesting to note that Morgan did not win the Nobel 
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if that knowledge was partly, or mostly, inaccurate. Propaganda, for men like 
Davenport, had its place and its utility. 
This is not to suggest that Davenport rubber-stamped any book dealing 
with eugenic or genetic claims in The Eugenical News. In an acid review in 1920, 
the Cold Spring Harbor Director had damned Ellis B. Gould’s book The Science 
and Philosophy of Eugenics, published in the same year. The book never should 
have been written, especially by an author, who “merely reveals himself as a 
person untrained in science, distorted in judgment, accepting as established the 
most questionable things…” The book, the review described, was laden with 
super-natural references to wraiths, ghosts, and the influence of signs of the 
zodiac on the development of organisms. “The pity is there are so many people 
who will think this worthless book ‘perfectly splendid’ just as they pin their faith 
to the airy nothingness of Christian Science.”38 It was this Christian Science that 
took center stage in Dayton in 1925. Davenport would employ an equally critical 
tone later in the decade when a man based in Oakland, California, R. Clay 
Jackson, attempted to secure Davenport’s endorsement for his pamphlet on the 
role of sunshine in determining the sex of offspring. Davenport functioned as a 
gatekeeper, establishing boundaries for what was acceptable scientific propaganda 
and what was not. For nearly a decade Jackson taunted Davenport, daring him to 
disprove his theory, and like Redfield, implicated a cabal of scientists that were 
suppressing marvelous scientific discoveries. When Davenport tried to close the 
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circle of scientific knowledge to this obvious outsider (Jackson’s pamphlet “Sex, 
Shelter, and Sunshine” suggested that men who worked in the evening, and had 
less exposure to sunshine, tended to produce male children), he exposed his own 
hypocrisy.39 Work by “trained” men like Albert Wiggam, Lothrop Stoddard, 
Madison Grant, and Ernest S. Cox would receive favorable reviews—the 
recommendation of Cox’s book, White America was particularly outrageous—in 
The Eugenical News despite the fact that their arguments were no more 
scientifically accurate than those of Redfield, Jackson or Gould.40 
What explains this varying approach to scientifically inaccurate books? 
Why did Davenport’s organization recommend certain arguments based loosely 
on science, and condemn others equally loose in scientific accuracy? One of the 
clearer explanations for this approach by Davenport is gained through his 
correspondence. Davenport recommended, and supported the work of, men whom 
he knew personally. It is likely that Davenport felt, because he knew them, that he 
could be confident they at least had a rudimentary understanding of heredity and 
inheritance. Davenport’s approach to science in this respect was largely 
correlative, and for Davenport, like Galton, the social position of a writer was an 
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indicator of his scientific veracity.41 Eugenics was not an particularly complex 
science as long as one assumed that heredity always operated according to the 
same principles; as long as like continued to produce like, eugenics was “proven.” 
This was the kernel of classic racialist belief, and although the true mechanisms of 
transmission were becoming better understood because of Morgan’s chromosome 
and genetic research, the similarities between parent and offspring functioned as 
suitable evidence of the truth of classic racialism and biological determinism. 
Eugenics was allegedly a science – mysticism and sunshine were not. Finally, and 
somewhat more speculatively, Davenport struck up correspondence only with 
those men who demonstrated the necessary deference to him. If Davenport had 
been involved in “training” them—and he often mentioned their “trained” or 
“untrained” status in reviews, as with Jackson and Wiggam—their work proved 
acceptable. If not, he deemed the work “worthless.” Herbert Spencer Jennings, as 
far back as 1896, had seen this closed-mindedness in Davenport. By the late 
1920s, this closed-mindedness had evolved into such self-certainty and self-
righteousness that Davenport could not feel the movement slipping away from 
him.42 The way that he responded to popularized and exaggerated accounts of 
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science is nicely embodied in the Cold Spring Harbor superintendent’s attitude 
toward the work of Albert Wiggam.  
“That article by Wiggam in the March ‘Century’ is the most important 
contribution to popular education that has been made in fifty years, ” gushed a 
Political Science professor at Columbia University to the editor of The Century 
Magazine. The author continued: “I am not speaking hastily or recklessly but after 
full consideration and weighing my words.” The article that Franklin Giddings 
referred to, “The New Decalogue of Science,” went from brief article, to book, to 
lightning rod for professional scientists who hoped to curtail the misuse of 
scientific information in the span of a few short years.43  
The article, which was reprinted as the first chapter of Wiggam’s book of 
the same title, was “An Open letter from the Biologist to the Statesman” 
encouraging political leaders to utilize the conclusions of modern scientific 
knowledge and scientific tools to recast society along rational, scientific 
principles.44 The article was wildly popular with non-biologists. As soon as the 
article appeared, Charles Davenport wrote to its author to thank him for the gratis 
copy sent to him at Cold Spring Harbor. “You have said very vigorously what I 
have often wished somebody would say,” he told the writer. Requests for reprints 
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of the article came from Davenport, who asked for “several thousand,” Franklin 
Giddings, who said he would make it required reading if he could secure the 
article “in quantity,” and even the psychologist and Clark University President G. 
Stanley Hall, who lamented that Wiggam had written what Hall had long wanted 
to.45 Wiggam was thrilled with the attention. He had, for nearly a decade, been a 
lecturer on the Chautauqua circuit where he spoke frequently on eugenics. 
Wiggam also wrote a nationally syndicated science column called “Let’s Explore 
Your Mind” for the Adams News Service for over thirty years. In 1914 he had 
struck up a correspondence with Princeton geneticist Edwin Conklin in an effort 
to stay abreast of developments in genetics and heredity.46 When Davenport, in his 
capacity as the Director of the Station of Experimental Evolution at Cold Spring 
Harbor praised Wiggam’s article, Wiggam felt that he had finally attained a 
degree of scientific legitimacy and authority. The reactions to Wiggam’s book 
from professional academic scientists, however, would prove these hopes to be 
unfounded.  
Davenport’s consistent praise of Wiggam’s writings demonstrates one of 
the essential difficulties that scientists in the period had in communicating 
complex ideas to the lay public. When the article was expanded into a book, The 
New Decalogue of Science, Wiggam continued his plea for the use of scientific 
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knowledge to stem the collapse of human civilization. Science was an inspired 
tool, he insisted, ready to be used by thoughtful statesmen to arrest the collapse of 
humanity. “[W]hen you take man out of the bloody, brutal but beneficent hand of 
natural selection,” he wrote, channeling the spirit of Herbert Spencer, “you place 
him at once in the soft, perfumed, daintily gloved…hand [of] artificial selection.” 
This was, of course, an unnatural process. Wiggam explained that reformers and 
progressives, who had sought to use their expertise to alleviate the suffering of all 
peoples, were actually destroying humankind by preventing the weak from being 
killed off. He implored his readers that “unless you call science to your aid and 
make this artificial selection as efficient as the rude methods of nature, you bungle 
the whole task.” Wiggam argued that policies designed to “nurture” human 
organisms – reforming their environment or educating them – were a catastrophe 
on an unimaginable scale, and fervently pleaded that it was not yet too late to 
abandon this coddling of inferior stocks who otherwise were consigned by nature 
to extinction. The scientific facts behind these ideas, however, were highly 
suspicious. They were so suspicious, in fact, that they prompted the otherwise 
discreet Herbert Spencer Jennings, ironically named for the founder of Social 
Darwinism, to publicly ridicule Wiggam’s writings.47 
The review for Wiggam’s second book, The Fruit of the Family Tree 
(1924) in The Eugenical News was generally positive. Fruit, which described the 
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latest theories of the heredity of disease, twins, genius and beauty, was less “pro-
science” than Decalogue, and was more in line with specific eugenic goals. The 
review emphasized that Wiggam was a lecturer, not a scientist, but praised 
Wiggam’s effective work in popularizing complex scientific theories. The brief 
notice described the book as subject to a “few lapses of memory or confusion of 
facts, [but] such is inevitable when one is digesting a great mass of them.”48 
Davenport’s praise for Wiggam extended beyond the printed word; in an undated 
lecture, the ERO Director spoke on “Albert Wiggam and Eugenics,” where he 
complimented the author for being the popular spokesman that eugenics needed. 
Francis Galton, Davenport told his crowd, was “a poor propagandist,” and Karl 
Pearson “an esoteric.” Their theories – particularly Pearson’s – were too complex 
for a lay public to understand. Therefore, all eugenic enthusiasts “must rejoice” 
that there is Albert Wiggam, who “can put the facts of heredity so forcibly and 
convincingly before the public.”49  
Despite these praises, Davenport’s association with Wiggam began on a 
rocky footing. After the 1922 Century article came out, the Adams Science 
Service for which Wiggam wrote his regular column ran a large ad mentioning 
Wiggam’s “Decalogue” article. Under a large, bold headline the advertisement 
stated “The CARNEGIE INSTITUTION puts its stamp of approval on Mr. 
Wiggam as a scientist and writer by ordering for distribution all over the world 
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5,000 reprints of his article…” This put Davenport in an awkward position: the 
Carnegie Institution never gave Wiggam any authorization to use its endorsement 
to recommend the book; indeed, never had given its endorsement to Wiggam’s 
article. Davenport’s own personal note to Wiggam, which had asked for the 
reprints, was mischievously used by the managers of the Adams syndicate to 
suggest that a notable, important institution like the Carnegie Institution had 
approved of Wiggam’s writings. The Washington, D.C.-based Carnegie 
Institution, which was one of Cold Spring Harbor’s most important sources of 
funding, came down on Davenport to force Wiggam to stop using their name in 
promoting his article. As Wiggam explained in a frantic series of letters in 
September, it was merely an oversight that this had occurred, and he quickly pled 
ignorance to the inner workings of press syndicates and how they marketed and 
advertised the articles they published. But, Wiggam explained, much of this could 
have been avoided if scientists were better at explaining their ideas to the public. 
Unfortunately, Wiggam said, “there is no science of propaganda. You and your 
assocaites [sic] find out many facts of social evolution, but in making them 
effective we can only proceed by mutual council and I might say ‘gentleman’s 
agreements.’” The problem, as he saw it, was that “the scientist is a bit likely to 
be somewhat too strict and literal in his statements to reach the public at all and 
the journalist too little regardful of fact.” 50 If the scientist, too devoted to literally 
                                                
 
50 Albert E. Wiggam to Davenport, 4 September 1922; Wiggam to Davenport, 11 September 1922; 
Wiggam to Davenport, 20 September 1922; all in Davenport papers. Davenport’s correspondence 
file with Wiggam also contains a newspaper clipping for the advertisement, which was sent to 
newspaper editors by the George Matthew Adams Service. For the Carnegie Institution, see Jane 
 Chapter 6 426 
correct and true assertions of scientific fact, did not describe to the public his 
findings, what good was the knowledge? What was needed was a journalist with a 
background in scientific training to bridge the two poles. Wiggam flattered 
himself that he could perform this task.  
Although the two patched up this misunderstanding, Davenport’s position 
and reaction are intriguing. He nearly endangered his beloved facilities by failing 
to police the boundaries of science adequately and to ensure that his reputation, 
and the reputation of his patrons, was not damaged in any way by shoddy 
scientific work. But he was conflicted by the desire – the necessity – of informing 
the public on the work that the Station for Experimental Evolution and the 
Eugenic Record Office were carrying on, a task that he himself had consistently 
been reluctant to perform. For Davenport, the preaching and teaching of scientific 
theories went hand in hand, and if the preaching sometimes outpaced the theory, it 
was a calculated risk that he was often willing to take. Wiggam was suitable for 
the job; he was an effective advocate. But the decision to not restrict the claims of 
eugenicists to their literal and factual basis (which was really nothing), proved 
fatal to his precious eugenic movement.  
 
“One of the most useful citizens in the United States” 
The complications that Davenport experienced trying to manage and 
police the boundaries of scientific knowledge can also be seen in his associations 
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with Madison Grant. Grant embodied many of the correlative methodological 
approaches to scientific investigation, and like Wiggam, relied on his social 
connections to legitimize his “scientific” credentials. The increasing influence that 
Grant wielded over the direction of the nativist movement in the 1920s, and his 
adherence to classic racialist orthodoxy that was no longer scientifically tenable, 
led professional academics to confront Grant’s mischievous misrepresentations of 
the scientific basis of race. Though rarely mentioning heredity and genetics in his 
writings, the New York patrician emerged as one of the most vocal, strident, and 
effective nativists during the early twentieth-century push for immigration 
restriction. Lacking any professional scientific training, or any genuine grasp of 
the complexities of heredity and genetics, Grant nonetheless became one of the 
most prominent names of the immigration restriction movement. His connections 
with scientists like Davenport and Henry Fairfield Osborn, policy-makers like 
Congressman Albert Johnson, and institutions like the New York Zoological 
Society ultimately made him a well-connected advocate. As restrictionists began 
to secure favorable legislation, and shifted tactics to barring immigrants based 
upon their “racial” identity, backers of legitimate scientific knowledge were 
forced into a showdown with the movement. For much of the elite public, this 
showdown between methods and content occurred in 1925 in the pages of The 
Nation and The Forum magazines.  
Grant and Davenport had an association going back to 1908 when Grant 
received some of Davenport’s writings.51 Their association was strengthened in 
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1914 when a Philadelphia doctor, J. Madison Taylor, forwarded to Davenport a 
letter that Grant had sent to Taylor. Grant wrote the physician questioning the 
validity of some of Davenport’s claims in Heredity in Relation to Eugenics. 
Davenport responded directly to Grant, in an attempt to clear up some of the 
confusion about eugenics. Davenport expressed confidence in the veracity of 
eugenic claims that he made in his book. In the note’s certainty that like produced 
like, that biology was destiny and that body forms reflected the unchanging racial 
typology of an individual were the seeds for the future of Davenport’s eugenics 
movement. And Jennings, Pearl, Boas and Hrdlicka would later challenge the 
certainty with which Davenport conveyed these alleged truths to Grant.  
In response to Grant’s criticisms to Taylor, Davenport made some curious 
confessions. He admitted to Grant that “I know full well the book is not as good 
as it might have been, as I could have made it, if I had been willing to spend more 
time.” As he addressed Grant’s criticisms on the racial mixing described in the 
book, the biologist said that as far as he was concerned, all humanity came from 
ancestors with dark skin, and it was white skin that was, evolutionarily speaking, 
highly abnormal. To suggest that whiteness was abnormal was a politically 
charged statement, but it was true—and the consequences of a scientifically true 
statement, Davenport insisted, “are the last things in the mind of a scientific 
writer.” Scientific inquiry had to proceed, in Davenport’s mind, regardless of the 
consequences. But for someone like Grant, who believed vehemently in the 
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supremacy of the white race, and who thought the Nordic branch of that race was 
the pinnacle of all human development, Davenport’s statement should have been 
horrifying. Surprisingly, Grant’s reply was actually tame. White skin is certainly 
abnormal, the New Yorker agreed, “but I doubt very much whether we ever had 
any direct negro blood in our ancestry.” In fact, this would be impossible for 
Grant to believe; he was writing at this time The Passing of the Great Race, in 
which he declared that any mixture of a white and a non-white resulted in a non-
white. The implication of his statement was that even over the course of 
thousands of years the taint of “negro” blood could never be effaced.52 
This frank discussion of an evolutionary hypothesis brought Grant and 
Davenport closer together. This closeness became key for validating Grant’s 
scientific credentials. When The Passing was published, Grant had an advance 
copy sent to Long Island for Davenport to read. Davenport quickly sent his 
approval of the work, which, as was so often the case, meant a great deal to a 
layman. Expressing his appreciation, Grant wrote back, “I must say that it has 
really given me a great deal of pleasure because I have been greatly disappointed 
in the failure of American biologists to support me, as they all seem to be either 
afraid of Boas or else impregnated with Socialism.”53 In Grant’s mind, a 
scientist’s opposition or criticism of his work did not stem from the dubious 
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scientific arguments he made in his polemical writings. Grant believed that the 
criticism came from personal animus, intimidation, or political radicalism. He felt 
that his arguments were scientifically accurate, and Davenport’s affirmation 
merely reinforced that. As he prepared the second edition of the book in 1917, he 
wrote to Davenport, who was then serving in the Surgeon General’s Sanitary 
Corps, for constructive criticism of the first edition. “As we are all working for 
the same causes, I want to make this second edition fool-proof, so that it can be 
used and quoted without hesitation by those of us, who have the courage to 
remain [restrictionists].” What Grant feared was that American biologists would 
oppose and criticize the new edition, because they were Socialists or they “appear 
to be of an ethnic strain, which precludes the admission of the existence of any 
stock or race gifted with superior attributes.”54 Grant remained convinced in the 
correctness of his scientific arguments. Only injured race pride or un-American 
political ideologies could explain hostility to his work. He shared Davenport’s 
self-certainty and self-righteousness too.  
These shared sentiments, and their common lackadaisical approach to 
accurate scientific knowledge, ultimately made the two men close allies in the 
movement to protect the Anglo-Saxon race in America. Classic racialism served 
as cement for their bonds of friendship and collaboration throughout the 1920s. 
When Grant needed to recover from a persistent and bothersome inflammation in 
his knees in 1923, Davenport reached out to the Director of the Battle Creek 
Sanitarium—with whom Davenport had become acquainted through the Race 
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Betterment Foundation—to introduce Grant before he arrived. “In receiving Mr. 
Madison Grant you will receive one of the most useful citizens of the United 
States,” Davenport informed John Harvey Kellogg. “A lawyer by vocation he is a 
traveler, hunter, explorer by avocation but, best of all, he has been instrumental in 
getting thru the legislature some of the most useful legislation.” Grant was a 
prominent conservationist, and the Director of the Station for Experimental 
Evolution elaborated on Grant’s success in securing reservations for western 
bison, securing protected status for western lands including the California Red 
Woods, and in New York, establishing the Bronx Park, the Bronx River Park, and 
the New York Zoological Society’s Zoological Park and Aquarium. But the 
“useful legislation” Grant was instrumental in passing was the immigration 
restriction laws of the early 1920s. The New York lawyer was an important 
resource for fanning the flames of Anglo-Saxon racial insecurity. Davenport 
pointed out these common interests between Grant and Kellogg. Not only was 
Grant “largely instrumental” in securing the immigration legislation, he was also 
the Treasurer of the Second International Eugenics Congress that was held in New 
York City in 1921. With an endorsement like this to recommend him, Grant 
received the greatest hospitality that Kellogg could offer.55 
When others heard of Grant’s ailments, however, they were not so 
sympathetic. Kellogg extended a similar recuperative invitation to Ales Hrdlicka 
in October 1923—while Grant was still in Battle Creek—but Hrdlicka declined. 
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Kellogg and Hrdlicka knew each other moderately well, and Kellogg was one of 
the early financial backers to Hrdlicka’s American Journal of Physical 
Anthropology in the late 1910s. But there was no way that the D.C-based 
anthropologist would consider being in the same facility as Grant: “Madison 
Grant ought to be afflicted with everlasting rheumatism of all his writing organs, 
for he has done a great deal of mischief with his ‘Nordicism,’” he wrote in 
declining the invitation.56 Hrdlicka refused to associate with such a disagreeable 
person. Not only was Grant creating mischief with his classic racialist 
“Nordicism,” but by invoking totally inaccurate science to justify his racial 
prejudice, he was having real-world impacts on the lives of Europeans trying to 
emigrate to America. Grant slandered the people of southern and eastern Europe – 
people from his own background whom Hrdlicka knew well – and dressed up his 
slanders in the garb of scientific objectivity. His rheumatoid afflictions, in 
Hrdlicka’s mind, were just retribution.  
Boas’s opinion of Grant was no better. For highly respected professional 
anthropologists like Boas and Hrdlicka, Grant’s work and the influence it had was 
tremendously frustrating. It compelled them to try to demolish the claims that 
issued forth from “the Charlatan Grant,” as Boas called him in private, in 
published essays, book reviews, and even, as Hrdlicka’s note to Kellogg shows, in 
private correspondence. As Grant’s work became increasingly influential to the 
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public, and as he published more and more of his inaccurate scientific musings, 
the two anthropologists tried any method they could to discredit him.57 
But they faced a significant dilemma in trying to correct the inaccurate 
claims that non-scientists like Wiggam and Grant were making. The New 
Republic offered Boas one of the first public forums to critique Grant’s work 
when The Passing of the Great Race was first published in 1916. Boas’s review 
was severely critical, although he tried to maintain an amicable and professional 
tone. He opened the review by explaining that citizens of New York, of whom 
Boas was one, owed Grant a great debt for his work at the Zoological Garden and 
the American Museum of Natural History. But this debt, and Grant’s scientific 
associations, must not cloud readers of Passing from recognizing the serious 
errors at the heart of the book. The Columbia anthropologist placed Grant’s work 
squarely in the camp of reactionary, white-supremacist amateurs like Arthur 
Comte de Gobineau and Houston Stewart Chamberlain, describing Grant’s book 
as “a Cassandric prophecy of all the ills that will befall us on account of the 
increase of dark-eyed types.” Boas then proceeded to dismiss every argument 
Grant tried to make in the book, demonstrating that Grant’s understanding of the 
way heredity functioned was extremely faulty. Citing Hrdlicka’s and his own 
work on the malleability of human forms, and the influence of the environment on 
physical stature, Boas denied Grant a hereditary basis for his arguments of pure, 
unchanging types. In several paragraphs, Boas pointed to arguments that Grant 
had fashioned out of thin air. Concluding his dismissive review, Boas noted that 
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the kind of “race aristocracy of which Mr. Grant is dreaming is unreal.”58  He and 
Hrdlicka hoped this critical review in a popular magazine like The New Republic 
would suppress the popularity of the book and caution readers of the significant 
uncertainty in anthropological and racial sciences. They did this not out of malice, 
but because Grant’s work was scientifically wrong. They did not succeed.  
When The Passing of the Great Race was issued in a second edition 
Hrdlicka noted that “in some respects is even worse than the first,” and offered 
Boas his American Journal of Physical Anthropology as a forum to try again to 
combat the erroneous arguments of the “Charlatan Grant.” Although he judged 
Science the best place for a review, as it would reach a wider audience, Hrdlicka 
earnestly wanted Boas to write another for any journal. “I do not remember 
having ever seen a book either more pretentious or more biased,” he lamented. 
Hrdlicka also saw a greater danger in not trying to demonstrate the erroneous 
scientific claims in the book, since “unless promptly shown exactly what it is, [the 
book] may be used to influence men in important positions who are now trying to 
get all possible data on the European nationalities in the way of preparation for 
eventual [peace] negotiations.” Not only were Grant’s classic racialist ideas 
threatening the hopes of European emigrants and cultivating racial prejudice, but 
Passing could also be used as support for making racial divisions and invidious 
distinctions during the peace negotiations. He feared the book could even be used 
as leverage to establish a separate committee on “Race” in the Peace Council, that 
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could, like the Dillingham Commission had tried, devise a universal statement of 
racial differences and a hierarchy of superior races. Grant might be made manager 
of such a committee. Considering Grant’s views on the Anglo-Saxon race, this 
could not be allowed to happen.59 
Boas was not able to review the new edition for Science; Frederick Adams 
Woods secured the privilege, and he gave it a rather positive review, explaining 
“there is a mass of carefully furnished statistical research on the problem of 
human heredity which tends to support the whole theory of race as against 
environment.”60 This was a highly contentious claim, and precisely the type that 
Hrdlicka and Boas were trying to prevent. The mischief that would come of the 
book – now reviewed favorably in a widely-read scientific journal – bothered 
Boas, but he had reviewed each edition, and did not know what else to do. The 
use of the book to influence the public was hard to combat “when scientists who 
have a reputation [Woods was a geneticist at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology] will lend themselves to support views of this sort.” Woods was, in 
fact, sympathetic to Grant’s views; he was on the Advisory Council of the 
American Eugenics Society, and his own work, like the Heredity of Monarchs, 
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was equally scientifically dubious. If Woods’s understanding of heredity was so 
faulty, he certainly could not be expected to point out Grant’s inconsistencies.61  
Having previously been unsuccessful at dissuading the public from 
lending credence to Grant’s writings, Boas leapt at the chance to pen the first 
entry when The Nation dedicated a series of columns on “The Nordic Myth” in 
1925. He chose for his topic “What is a Race?” and suggested that, although racial 
antagonisms obviously existed between groups, the pressing question – instead of 
“which race is better?” – was where did these antagonisms come from? Children’s 
behavior, the anthropologist pointed out, suggested that race consciousness was 
learned or socialized. The reality of race, Boas wrote, was incredibly complex, 
and the terminology used by immigration officials had only increased the 
confusion because “they designate people speaking different languages and of 
different political association as races without any regard to their biological 
characteristics.” Heredity, Boas cautioned, could be spoken of only in genotypic 
lines in immediate families. To speak of general racial characteristics, whether 
anatomical, mental, or physiological across a broad group, was arbitrary, 
misleading, and incorrect.62 Yet this was precisely what classic racialism 
proposed. 
The succeeding entries in “The Nordic Myth” series reinforced this notion 
that racial groups, as restrictionists, nativists and classic racialists used them, were 
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non-existent. There were no pure racial groups, there were no particular 
hereditary “gifts” of specific to racial groups, and the scientific underpinnings of 
such ideas were completely unfounded. When Konrad Bercovici wrote in mid-
March that only Nordics declared their superiority over all other races, he spoke a 
fundamental, if unspoken, truth. No other group claimed the intellectual, moral, 
political and racial supremacy that Nordics claimed for themselves. The entire 
foundations of religion and science, including Christianity, math, and geometry, 
Bercovici wrote, were actually laid down by non-Nordics. Yet Nordics not only 
asserted their superiority, they grounded that superiority in scientific theories, 
which they deployed to legitimize their dominance.63 
In addition to criticizing Grant’s classic racialism in The New Republic, 
Boas also used an offer from The Forum in 1925 to confront Grant directly on his 
scientific inaccuracies. In September, Grant had published “America for the 
Americans” in The Forum, explaining that the swarm of immigrants that had been 
invading the United States threatened to “submerge the native population” and 
reduce American standards of living to those in China. America, Grant argued, 
had a duty to protect itself first and foremost, and the sentimental objections of 
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pro-immigration forces, that the United States needed the labor and energy of 
immigrants, were un-American. The only immigration that should be admitted, 
the New Yorker insisted, was Nordic or Anglo-Saxon immigration. “Our 
institutions are Anglo-Saxon and can only be maintained by Anglo-Saxons and by 
other Nordic peoples in sympathy with our culture.”64 The new immigrants, for 
Grant, were fundamentally disruptive and detrimental to this culture, and should 
therefore be excluded. 
Boas’s response the following month was unyielding in its hostility to 
Grant’s understanding of race and his classic racialist science. Again lumping 
Grant with other European white supremacists like Gobineau, Chamberlain, 
Vacher de Lapouge and Hans Gunther, men who would ultimately provide Nazis 
with scientific legitimacy for the Holocaust, Boas declared this group responsible 
for “the growth in intensity of feeling and the increasing lack of scientific 
judgment” that had accompanied the increasing racial antagonisms over the 
previous decades. These men spoke not in objective, scientific ways aimed at 
advancing knowledge, but instead were “carried away by the ardent wish to 
establish the superiority of the ‘Nordic.’” Boas repeatedly argued that there were 
no pure racial types, and that one simple physical gaze at a person was not 
sufficient to determine their racial background. There was no exact understanding 
of the genetic or anthropological aspects of racial identity, and to presume so, and 
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to insist that coincidence or correlation was evidence of a scientific fact, was 
intellectually dishonest and scientifically wrong.65 
By connecting Grant’s work to “the increasing lack of scientific 
judgment,” Boas was publicly stating that the scientific validity of claims made 
by Grant was dubious, and that Grant’s assertions were not to be believed. By also 
linking Grant to noted white supremacists, Boas raised questions as to Grant’s 
prejudice and bias and his ability to be objective, a key requisite for the accurate 
evaluation of scientific claims. When immigration restrictionists and nativists 
used scientific knowledge to justify their positions, scientists were willing to 
confront them publicly and defend scientific truths.  
Unfortunately, if there was, as Wiggam described, “no science of 
propaganda,” there was also no science of combating it. As popularizers and 
amateurs spoke of scientific truths with increasing authority in the 1920s in 
service of political agendas and racial prejudice, the inability of professional 
academics and scientists to counter these erroneous assertions left the public 
under the impression that like did indeed produce like. The difficulty resided in 
both the complexity of genetics, heredity, biology and embryology, as well as in 
the cautiousness of researchers to declare exactly what these new fields proved. A 
consensus among scientists was gradually coalescing around Morgan’s 
chromosome theory of heredity, which historian Stephen Brush suggests was near 
universal among genetic researchers in 1925. But the compelling scientific 
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explanations that supported the theory were very complex.66 In 1922, Pearl wrote 
in “Trends in Modern Biology” that “ontogeny does not repeat phylogeny with 
anything like the degree of fidelity which would be required if it were to be the 
means of unraveling the tangled thread of evolutionary progress.” So the goal of 
eugenics was simply not possible, despite the certitude with which writers like 
Wiggam, Grant and others insisted that it was, and that like would produce like.67 
But demonstrating or predicting how offspring would develop was impossible, 
nor was it easy to explain in easily understandable terms, the complex genetic 
concepts of inheritance and chromosomes. Lacking an easy language to 
demonstrate scientific truths of genetics and evolution, or the unlikely hereditary 
origin for intelligence, or the basis of anthropological races, the public’s 
understanding of an organism’s development, whether shaped by their religious 
beliefs or their racial or cultural anxieties, remained driven by the work of 
propagandists, charlatans and popularizers.   
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Chapter 7: The Battle for National Origins 
 
In a speech delivered to the annual convention of the Daughters of the 
American Revolution in April 1924, after the House of Representatives passed 
H.R. 7995, Representative Albert Johnson of Washington explained his attitude 
toward immigration. “We are all the children of immigrants,” he lectured to the 
assembled ladies. He explained that the new immigration bill that Congress had 
just passed “makes it clear that it makes no difference whether our ancestors came 
on the Mayflower or whether they missed the first boat.” Now that significant 
restriction had been achieved, the Washington state Republican told the D.A.R. 
audience that the next step was a process of Americanization to ensure that the 
few aliens arriving in the country understood and adopted the Anglo-Saxon values 
of the United States. Playing to his audience’s sensibilities, he described the 1924 
Immigration Act as “America’s second Declaration of Independence.”1 And just 
as the original Declaration of Independence inaugurated a protracted struggle, so 
did the implementation of the “National-Origins” provision of the 1924 act.  
The struggle over national origins was not, like the first Declaration, a 
statement of political separation from Great Britain. On the contrary, it was, in the 
minds of its supporters, a declaration that the United States would remain an 
Anglo-Saxon nation. It declared independence from a belief that all men were 
created equal. The 1924 Immigration Act stated, in Charles Davenport’s words 
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from a decade earlier, that men were born and remained unequal in their powers, 
and the inferior European races, those of Alpine and Mediterranean stock, would 
be excluded from entering.2 Yet the debate that raged in the five years before 
national origins went into effect threw into dramatic relief the basis of the racial 
nativism that provided key intellectual support to immigration restriction. By 
1925, the professional scientific community had exposed the complex of classic 
racialist beliefs that underpinned racial nativism to be wrong. There was no basis 
in genetics, embryology, or biology for the claims that classic racialists – whether 
they were eugenicists, restrictionists or politicians – made. How, then, were the 
proponents of national origins able to win the battle for its implementation, when 
the scientific assumptions at the base of it were discredited? In large part, the 
implementation of national origins represented a failure of the scientific 
community to overcome or address the uncertainties inherent in their researches. 
The “new biology,” with its complex experimental methods and cautious 
declarations of biological and genetic knowledge, was unable to counter the 
repeated, forceful, and compelling arguments that like produced like. In the final 
analysis, the simplicity of classic racialist arguments of immutable biological and 
anthropological racial types, combined with the powerful and well-connected 
advocates that flattened out and elided scientific complexities, forestalled a 
widespread understanding of the revolution in genetic and biological sciences. 
To understand fully the nature of the clash over national origins, it is 
necessary to examine its intent. Restrictionists had long been attuned to 
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monitoring their rhetoric and arguments to mask the social, class and racial 
prejudice at the core of their long campaign to restrict what they believed was 
inferior immigration to the United States. Their essential goal was always to 
ensure that undesirable immigrants were prevented from entering the country, 
although the basis of evaluating them as “undesirable” was fluid and changing. 
Initially Asians were excluded because they were non-white; quickly after, the 
inability of immigrants to read and assimilate became the rationale for excluding 
certain groups, but this proved to be, in historian John Higham’s words, “a fairly 
coarse sieve.”3 In 1921 and 1924, “racial” identity became the focus for 
evaluating desirability, eventually to be supplanted by determining the racial 
composition of the entire American citizenry, and apportioning quotas according 
to that breakdown. But this later method was highly complicated, of questionable 
feasibility, and technically and scientifically untenable. Yet, American 
restrictionists were not deterred, and continued to insist that it was in fact simple, 
feasible, and scientifically accurate. One of the men instrumental in demonstrating 
this practicality was Captain John B. Trevor.  
On the last day of 1923, when Congress was in recess, Trevor wrote to his 
old acquaintance, Representative Albert Johnson, about the pending immigration 
bill’s quota basis. Trevor praised the bill’s “great merit” in the racial selection of 
immigration by using the 1890 census as opposed to the 1920 enumeration, which 
would have allowed the entry of a larger number of immigrants from southeastern 
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Europe. “It this way it secures, in our European Immigration,” he wrote, “the 
racial selection which is necessary to preserve the American people from 
submersion through excessive additions of widely divergent races.”4 Trevor was 
intrigued by a different element of the bill. Section 11 of Senator Reed’s bill 
contained a very promising method that Trevor regarded as far superior to a quota 
based on any census. He quickly became one of its most ardent civilian 
champions. The premise behind national origins, this mysterious provision, was 
simple: the descendants of the “original” Americans should be given primary 
consideration in any immigration quota, since they were the real Americans by 
definition. Their racial stock and composition should be preserved above other 
alien interests. The census manuscripts from 1790, the first enumeration of the 
American population, would provide a precise and exact picture of the racial basis 
of the original American population. By calculating the nativity of these 
Americans one could determine how many of the current American population 
derived from that original racial stock, and national quotas for immigration could 
then be ascertained based on the proportionate contribution to the “American 
stock” that each European country had made at the origin of the United States. 
Statistical data and analysis were essential to this determination. Trevor 
analyzed the feasibility for calculating national origins in the spring of 1924, and 
he submitted a report to the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization 
titled, “Preliminary Study of Population.” During the Congressional debate, some 
members had alleged that the shift from 1910 to the 1890 census in the 1924 bill 
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was intentionally done to discriminate against immigrants from southern and 
eastern Europe, a charge that Trevor tried to deflect. He explained, “the late 
[immigrant] arrivals are in all fairness not entitled to special privilege over those 
who have arrived at an earlier date and thereby contributed more to the 
advancement of the Nation…” Trevor’s and Senator David Reed’s plan argued 
that the most equitable solution was to examine the racial composition of the 
original population of the United States, which, although it would only 
“approximate” the truth, would be of “infinite value in demonstrating the falsity 
of the charges [of discrimination] made by those whose interest and sympathies 
lie abroad rather than in the country of their adoption.”5 The implication in 
Trevor’s opening statement was clear: only a true American would see how 
beneficial the national origins provision was; non-native “Americans,” whose 
loyalty to their adopted country he felt was suspect, would complain about the 
injustices the new quota would inflict on the countries of their birth. Trevor 
favored national origins because it was more scientific. It was based on statistical 
analysis of data from the original enumeration of the American population, rather 
than an arbitrarily chosen percentage of an arbitrarily selected census. It utilized 
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anthropological and biological categories of race to calibrate the content of the 
“American” people rather than a haphazard numerical quota that had no genuinely 
defensible explanation. National origins was precise and objective, and it struck 
Trevor and others as far superior to the seemingly random alternatives Congress 
was considering. This was exactly the point opponents of restriction were making 
– restrictionists were selecting quota percentages and censuses intentionally to cut 
down on what they deemed to be “undesirable” immigration, rather than on any 
sound scientific or practical basis. Trevor’s and Reed’s plan circumvented these 
arguments altogether. If Trevor could prove that this scientific method could be 
calculated accurately, anti-restrictionists would have no viable or legitimate basis 
for opposing it.  
Unfortunately, demonstrating how national origins could be determined 
objectively and precisely was a major challenge. Calculating precisely what the 
national origins of the American population were was difficult because there was 
no actual data to calculate this in the original census. Instead of being able to use 
the 1790 manuscript returns, Trevor’s primary sources of data for his study were a 
volume the Census Department had published in 1909 titled A Century of 
Population Growth, and the returns of the 1920 census. Trevor tried to deduce 
from these two sources how many current residents of the United States derived 
from the original population in 1790. Through some complex – and specious – 
computations, he calculated that just over 47 million white native-born Americans 
descended from the 1790 population. Northern and western European nations 
contributed 75.4% of the population of the United States as it had developed since 
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its founding. This meant, in Trevor’s mind, that any quota that did not maintain 
this proportion in the volume of immigration admitted to the country would have 
the effect of changing the fundamental racial character and composition of the 
United States.6  
These calculations enabled Trevor to determine the contribution of the 
several European races to the American population since its founding. His task, 
however, was not to determine what the actual National Origins quotas would be; 
that highly contentious analysis would not be complete until 1929 and was 
assigned to a special Quota Board. Rather, he wanted to statistically demonstrate 
that, if there was any trace of discrimination in the numerical quotas from 1910 or 
1890, it in fact discriminated against the native-born population. The historian 
Mae Ngai explains Trevor’s intent succinctly: “These quotas [from 1910 or 1890] 
were based on the number of foreign born in the population, leaving ‘native stock’ 
Americans out of the equation.” Trevor argued that the entire American 
population should be factored into devising immigrant quotas.7 To base quotas on 
the proportion of immigrants resident in the United States (regardless of which 
census was chosen as the basis) put the descendants of “real” Americans at a 
gross disadvantage, for it disregarded their existence in the population of the 
United States.  
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computations in Bureau of the Census, A Century of Population Growth. 
 
7 Ngai, Impossible Subjects, 22.  
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This is not to suggest that nativists stopped documenting the danger of the 
“new” immigration. Before Congress reconvened from its winter break in early 
1924, Trevor told Johnson of a meeting he had recently had with Lothrop 
Stoddard that had impressed on Trevor the importance of tightening restrictions 
against the new immigration. Trevor related that Stoddard had told him of 
Syrians, Greeks and “one hundred million [other] people” who were eager to flee 
Europe and the Middle East if the United States relaxed its restrictions on 
immigration. Although Stoddard painted a vivid picture of “their filth and 
disease,” Trevor recommended that Johnson should prepare Stoddard before he 
testified before the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization to keep 
Stoddard from using “specific evidence in support of his general view of the 
situation.”8 Although Trevor did not say why it would be necessary to keep 
Stoddard from using “specific evidence,” it is possible that he recognized that 
Stoddard’s classic racialism may not have the sway of the presumably better, 
more “scientific” justification that national origins provided. Stoddard also had no 
professional scientific training from which he could testify to the racial qualities 
and inferiority of these impending immigrants that might also raise objections 
from opponents of restriction.9  
                                                
8 Trevor to Johnson, 2 January 1924, box 2, Trevor Papers.  
 
9 Stoddard recognized that his lack of training as a biologist or scientist may undercut his 
credentials as an advocate for restriction (Lothrop Stoddard to Charles B. Davenport, 17 May 
1922, Davenport Papers), although this did not stop him from insisting that “Whether it be figs, 
thistles or humans, like always tends to produce like.” Lothrop Stoddard, “Worthwhile 
Americans” Saturday Evening Post v. 197, n. 29 (17 January 1924), 23, 146, 149-50; 23. Stoddard 
is briefly discussed in Barbara Solomon, Ancestors and Immigrants; John Higham, Strangers in 
the Land; and Matthew Pratt Guterl, The Color of Race in America: 1900-1940 (Cambridge: 
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For Trevor, the best “specific evidence” was, of course, statistical and 
demographic data. Walker had used them to great effect to really begin the 
restrictionist impulse and illustrate the dangers of unrestricted immigration. It 
provided a sense of objectivity, since numbers exactly represented a specific 
thing; one million foreign-born immigrants represented one million non-Anglo-
Saxons living in the United States. In February 1924, Trevor demonstrated to 
Johnson the intrinsic inferiority and undesirability of Italian immigrants by using 
a report released by the New York State Commission of Prisons, which reported 
that 80% of inmates in New York prisons were foreign-born, and of those 45% 
were Italian. Completely disregarding Jennings’s critique of Laughlin’s studies on 
criminality and inferiority for the House Committee, Trevor asserted that the 
evidence from the report confirmed Laughlin’s study, and could also “be an 
answer for the exponents of the Italian viewpoint in Congress—Mr. LaGuardia in 
particular.”10 Trevor also rehearsed his own testimony for Johnson’s committee 
with James Horace Patten, the Immigration Restriction League’s lobbyist. “In 
regard to the attitude I had better take as a witness,” Trevor told Johnson, he had 
decided that he would make “a cold presentation of the material,” relying heavily 
on statistical analysis to demonstrate the necessity of further restriction.11 Sticking 
to statistical data would, the Army captain hoped, prevent any discussion of 
discrimination.  
                                                                                                                                
Harvard University Press, 2001); see also Gene C. Fant, “Stoddard, Lothrop” American National 
Biography.  
 
10 Trevor to Johnson, 14 February 1924, box 2, Trevor Papers.  
 
11 Trevor to Johnson, 11 March 1924, ibid.  
 Chapter 7 450 
The impact of the 1924 bill on Japanese immigration was another 
complicating issue for restrictionists. The Immigration Act of 1924 breached the 
“Gentlemen’s Agreement” between President Theodore Roosevelt and Japan 
because the bill explicitly excluded any immigrant who was ineligible for 
American citizenship, which the Chinese and Japanese were. Some groups, like 
the National Committee for Constructive Immigration Legislation, supported a 
more flexible immigration policy towards Japan that might not universally 
exclude them from citizenship.12 Sidney Gulick, as Secretary of this organization, 
often discussed Asian immigration with Immigration Restriction League 
members, hoping to encourage them to change their opinions on Japanese 
restriction. They did not.  League members wanted a racially pure, Anglo-Saxon 
country.13 As Prescott Hall had told Senator Lodge when the first quota laws were 
being considered in the late 1910s, “I think we shall decide to stand with Australia 
and Canada for a white man’s country, and turn down Gulick’s request for 
cooperation, and stand for our own bill….If we are to have a war with Japan, as I 
                                                
 
12 See Ngai, Impossible Subjects, especially chapter 1.  
 
13 National Committee for Constructive Immigration Legislation, “Our Immigration and 
Naturalization Laws” (n.d.) pamphlet in box 3, Lee papers; Charles Davenport to Sidney Gulick, 
30 October 1917; Gulick to Davenport, 10 July 1918; Davenport to Gulick, 15 July 1918; 
Davenport to Gulick, 7 July 1919; Davenport to Gulick, 2 February 1920; Davenport to Gulick, 9 
February 1920; Davenport to Gulick, 21 June 1920, all in Davenport papers. In his note of 2 
February, Davenport explicitly laid out his attitude toward Asian immigration: “I am [not] in favor 
of the limitation of immigration on the grounds of percentage[,] instead of the sole and only 
ground of racial and family suitability for citizenship.” Gulick’s letter to Davenport of 10 July 
1918 was on the letterhead of the League for Constructive Immigration Legislation – precursor to 
the National Committee for Constructive Immigration Legislation [NCCIL]  – and included 
among its members Boas’s old contact Jeremiah Jenks, George Kennan, and W. W. Husband. For 
IRL contacts with Gulick and the NCCIL, see Prescott Hall to Joseph Lee, 11 March 1917, box 1, 
Lee papers; E. A. Ross to Sidney Gulick, 5 December 1918, box 2, IRL papers; E. A. Ross to 
Prescott Hall, 6 May 1917; Ross to Hall, 5 December 1918, both box 3, IRL papers.  
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believe, there’s no use sacrificing a principle for a temporary soothing of the 
feelings. What [Japan] wants is freee [sic] immigration.”14 Despite the diplomatic 
difficulties this aspect of the bill raised, it was less important than ensuring that 
the white American population conformed to the racial proportions at its 
founding.  
Maintaining his focus on the task of rhetorically shifting the perceived 
discrimination in immigration legislation to the native-born American population, 
in August 1925 Trevor submitted a letter to the editor of The New York Times. 
Trevor denied accusations of discrimination against southern and eastern 
European immigrants, specifically Italians and Jews, whose “partisans…shout 
from the housetops that restriction of immigration is tantamount to prejudice 
against nations and their religious beliefs.” In fact, he explained, “the law is based 
upon broad general principles with justice to all. It was conceived for the 
protection of our institutions and the development of American solidarity.” By 
this, Trevor meant the racial homogeneity of Anglo-Saxon America. He noted 
that because national origins took into account the contribution of every national 
population group in Europe, no one was left out. Had tens of thousands of 
Piedmontese, Florentines, Venetians and Genoese migrated to North America 
during the colonial period, Trevor pointed out, their representation in the national 
origins quotas would have been much higher. But they did not. Instead, mostly 
Britons made the journey across the Atlantic to North America. And, Trevor felt, 
                                                
 
14 Hall to Senator Lodge, May 15, 1919, box 2, IRL papers. 
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the contributions of this population group to the development of American 
politics, the economy, and culture should be recognized and protected.15 Anglo-
Saxons had founded the North American settlements, carved out an existence in 
the wilderness, and defended themselves from Native Americans; Anglo-Saxons 
of British descent broke from their homeland and declared independence. There 
were no Romans or Neapolitans who contributed to these mighty struggles, a fact 
that Trevor claimed could be proven by using the 1790 census to analyze the 
surnames and determine the national – and thus racial – stock of the nation. 
Although Trevor did cooperate with other sympathetic organizations in the 
five years between Congressional passage of the national origins provision and its 
implementation, most of his energies were devoted to defending national origins 
from critics who questions its assumptions and practicality and tried to repeal the 
provision.16 In April 1926 Trevor drafted “A Restudy of the National Origins 
Plan,” to ensure a “just and accurate appreciation” of the clauses in the 1924 Act 
“in the light of experience and mature consideration.” The dangers of unrestricted 
immigration had stalked the American population for decades, he wrote, and 
“America’s second Declaration of Independence,” a phrase borrowed from 
Johnson’s D.A.R. speech, established a precise and equitable solution to the 
immigration problem. Trevor also had to discredit the several other alternatives to 
                                                
15 John B. Trevor, “Immigration Quotas” The New York Times 14 August 1925, 12.  
 
16 Trevor had a strained relationship with the Boston-based Immigration Restriction League 
because of Patten’s opposition to national origins.  
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computing national origins that had been proposed in the intervening two years 
before the superiority of the national origins plan could be demonstrated.17 
In these intervening years, Trevor did not dwell on the “racial” aspect of 
the quotas or national origins plan, but emphasized the inability of new 
immigrants to participate in a democratic form of government, thus highlighting 
their undesirability in a more tactful manner. The fundamental shortcoming of the 
1924 immigration law – which established a quota based on 2% of the foreign-
born in the 1890 census – was that it failed to account for the inability of certain 
groups of immigrants to “conform to the basic composition of the population as a 
whole, either in race or political ideals….” The “Preliminary Study” he wrote for 
Johnson’s Immigration Committee had demonstrated just what that “basic 
composition” of the population was. The new immigrants that came from 
countries of Europe that had little experience in self-government were unable to 
appreciate the responsibilities of a democracy. Thus, large numbers of these 
immigrants would present a serious threat to the proper functioning of American 
government. Furthermore, the tendency of immigrants to “colonize and 
intermarry” within their own racial group meant that even their children, born on 
the free soil of the United States, absorbed the traditions and ideals of their 
parents, and not of their country of birth.18 Any quota based on a census after 
1880 would have the effect of favoring races not accustomed to democracy, and 
                                                
17 John B. Trevor, “A Restudy of the National Origins Plan for the Selection of Immigrants and 
Alternative Methods Recently Suggested,” 19 April 1926, box 2, Trevor Papers.  
 
18 Ibid., 2.  
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any quota based on the average of immigrants arriving between 1890 and 1920 – 
which had also been suggested as a method of computation – would have the 
same effect. Consideration needed to be given, Trevor felt, to “the vast majority 
of the American people to whom not only the restrictive features [of the 1924 
bill], but the inherent justice of the national origins plan in reality appeals.”19 And 
as he had already shown, the vast majority of the American people descended 
from four million people of Anglo-Saxon stock.  
Trevor and Johnson maintained a very close friendship throughout the 
struggle to implement the national origins quotas that enabled them to coordinate 
strategies to ensure that restrictive immigration policies were enacted.20 In 
October 1926, when a representative from the Pennsylvania League of Women 
Voters asked Johnson to recommend “some college professor who is an authority 
on the biological side of immigration” to address their Annual Convention in 
Philadelphia, the congressman turned to Trevor for suggestions. Johnson’s 
preference was for “the prof[essor] at Princeton who studied the intelligence tests 
[Robert M. Yerkes],” but Trevor’s inclination was to endorse Henry Pratt 
Fairchild, from Yale University, who had just published The Melting Pot Mistake. 
                                                
19 Ibid., 6.  
 
20 When Johnson ran for reelection in 1928, Trevor was remarkably active in helping Johnson win 
a bruising Republican primary against attorney Homer Bone. He also personally vouched for 
Johnson’s creditworthiness to the Hotel Breslin in Manhattan. Correspondence regarding 
Johnson’s primary campaign can be found in box 2, Trevor papers, and Trevor’s 30 October reply 
to the Hotel Breslin Credit Department’s letter of 29 October. Johnson had requested the 
establishment of credit at the hotel to facilitate his cashing personal checks, and the hotel asked the 
New Yorker if he had any information relevant to Johnson’s responsibility. Trevor called Johnson 
“an intimate friend of long standing.” Trevor to Johnson, 1 November 1928; Credit Department of 
the Hotel Breslin to John B. Trevor, 29 October 1928; Trevor to Hotel Breslin Credit Department 
to Trevor, 30 October 1928, all in Trevor Papers. 
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Fairchild’s book argued that immigration must be restricted because the alien 
races did not assimilate over time, but maintained their “exclusively hereditary” 
attributes in the “germ plasm,” which he insisted contained the basic elements of 
development that “are never changed.” Fairchild did make a curious admission 
about Italian immigration, however, that recognized the long-standing division of 
the peninsula into two separate groups, one of which was desirable, and one of 
which was not: “If the Italian immigration to the United States had come from 
northern Italy its racial effect on the American population would have been very 
slight.”21 Trevor replied directly to the Women Voters’ representative, and 
recommended they select Harry Laughlin to address their annual meeting in 
Pennsylvania, but he gave the organization’s chairwoman less than three weeks to 
secure Laughlin’s participation. But while Laughlin was suitable to appear before 
the assembly of Pennsylvania women, Trevor worried about the prominent role 
the eugenicist was playing for Johnson’s Immigration Committee because some 
of Laughlin’s work, as Jennings had already demonstrated, was of dubious 
scientific value. One of the pieces of what Trevor regarded as Laughlin’s dubious 
research was the latter’s study of the ancestry of delegates to the Constitutional 
Convention in 1788. Trevor understood not only political delicacies, but also 
complexities and nuances in scientific research, and he cautioned Johnson against 
                                                
21 Lucy K. Miller to Albert Johnson, 12 October 1926; Trevor to Johnson, 1 November 1928, 
Trevor papers. Henry Pratt Fairchild, The Melting Pot Mistake (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 
1926). Hereditary from 27; germ plasm from 113; Italian immigration from 109.  
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using data that Laughlin had given Johnson, which had been called into question 
when Trevor’s own associates had done further research.22  
John Trevor was not the only academic to weigh in with support for the 
new methods of restriction. Roy Garis, a Political Science and Economics 
professor at Vanderbilt University, also commented on potential “scientific” 
methods of restriction. In 1922 Garis had stated that the emergency quota act of 
1921 was a proper response to the “unfortunates of Europe” who had survived the 
war but hoped to escape Europe for the United States. This perceived rush of 
people for the United States created the necessity of quick restrictive action, but 
had left “little or no time for an intelligent, historical, and scientific study of the 
[immigration] question.” The Tennessean hewed to the orthodoxy that the 
physical and cultural differences of the “new” immigrants made them a menace to 
American institutions, and he encouraged making the temporary law permanent, 
and basing it on the 1890 census rather than 1910 or 1920.23  
Garis preferred the old, familiar quota policy to national origins. After 
passage of the 1924 Immigration Act, Garis published two articles in popular 
magazines further supporting the new policy of dramatically limiting restriction, 
and the use of the 1890 census as a base for computing the quotas. In August, 
                                                
22 Trevor to Mrs. John O. [Lucy K.] Miller, 26 October 1926, box 2, Trevor papers. Trevor 
informed Mrs. Miller that Laughlin had “a comprehensive knowledge on the subject from a 
biological standpoint and has made extensive researches in Europe on the immigration question 
also from a practical standpoint.” Trevor’s recommendation of Laughlin may have been 
disappointing to the Lucy Miller, since he had no professional scientific training on the “biological 
side of immigration,” nor any academic appointment; but he was the “Expert Eugenics Agent” of 
the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization. Trevor’s concerns of Laughlin’s work 
from Trevor to Johnson 1 November 1928, box 2, Trevor papers. 
 
23 Roy L. Garis, “The Immigration Problem: A Practical American Solution” Scribner’s Magazine 
v. 72 (19 September 1922), 364-67; 364.  
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Garis praised the “scientific manner” in which the new bill operated, and like 
Trevor dismissed the criticisms of the 1924 bill as intentionally discriminatory. 
The “new immigration,” which the bill was designed to curtail, constituted “the 
immigration problem of to-day.” Unable to easily assimilate the alien arrivals 
from southern and eastern Europe, in selecting the 1890 census Garis argued that 
Congress solved the immigration problem because it excluded significant 
numbers of these “new” immigrants. He replicated Trevor’s argument that if any 
discrimination in fact existed, it was against the original American stock, but 
Garis flatly dismissed all claims of discrimination: “Immigration is a domestic 
question to be decided in the interests of the American people and not in the 
interests of any other people or nation.” Charges of discrimination, in Garis’s 
mind, were irrelevant. “If we decided to be so arbitrary,” he wrote, “we would be 
within our rights to decide that no immigrant should be admitted unless he was six 
feet two inches tall and had red hair.” Yet Garis concluded his analysis of the 
1924 act by sharply criticizing the national origins clause of the bill as “a mere 
estimation.”24 He did not feel that it could be reasonably calculated with any 
precision. 
Garis also wrote about the importance of the “selective” aspect of the 1924 
law by arguing that restriction and selection of immigration had a long history. He 
described the attitudes of colonial leaders who had protested the dumping of 
                                                
24 Roy L. Garis, “How the New Immigration Law Works” Scribner’s Magazine v. 76 (August 
1924), 183-88; 185 for “new” immigration [emphasis in original], 186 for immigration interests. 
The other article was Roy L. Garis, “America’s Immigration Policy” North American Review v. 
220, n. 824 (September 1924), 63-77; “a mere estimation” from “How the New Immigration Law 
Works,” 187.  
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“human chaff” on the shores of the fledgling nation, although Garis had no doubt 
that “the worst felons were promptly hanged.” But environmental influences 
tripped Garis up: he suggested that the lower stratum of immigrants who arrived 
in colonial North America, once under “the regenerative stimulus of 
opportunity…[were] reformed, and…rose to places of honor and distinction.” He 
lifted this exact phrase from Commons’s book The Old World in the New, and 
like Commons, did not question why the same process could not occur for the 
current class of immigrants. One may assume, however, that the old immigrants 
excelled in the salubrious environs of the United States because of their superior 
racial ancestry, “Anglo-Saxon-Germanic in blood and Protestant in religion,” 
while the new immigrants, as Garis, Fairchild, Commons and many others had 
pointed out, were racially inferior and predominantly Jewish or Catholic.25  
His comments reflect an underlying tension among nativist and 
restrictionist groups regarding quotas. Statistics broke down, neatly and concisely, 
demographic information of the American population. The “national origins” of 
the American population was, by contrast, exceedingly difficult to compute. Garis 
told his readers that national origins “at best is a mere estimation,” and was faulty 
in its “lack of definiteness.” The census returns from 1890, which the current law 
was based on, were “scientific and automatically selective as well as numerically 
                                                
25 Garis, “America’s Immigration Policy,” 67 for hanging felons; 73 for regenerative stimulus; 74 
for Catholicism. Commons’s division of Europe into northwestern and southeastern halves – the 
former racially, culturally, and intellectually superior to the latter – was designed to separate 
Protestant Europe and Catholic Europe—Scandinavia, Britain, Germany and France from Russia, 
Austria-Hungary, Italy and Turkey. France, in the extreme west of such a geographical binary, was 
of course Catholic. See Commons, Races and Immigrants, chapters 2, 4.  
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restrictive.”26 This method, by definition was superior. It was criticisms like these, 
along with Congressional members who tried to repeal national origins – 
rationalized largely on similar claims that Garis was making – that Trevor worked 
to defuse.  
This lack of precision in the national origins model of restriction troubled 
other scientists and academics. A memorial addressed to President Coolidge and 
members of Congress in January 1927 encouraged the permanent adoption of the 
1890 quota as the method of restriction instead of national origins. Seven faculty 
members of Princeton’s biology department signed the memorial, as well as 
League member Robert DeCourcy Ward (a professor of climatology at Harvard) 
and two other Harvard professors, four professors from the University of 
Wisconsin (including Commons), Joseph Lee, League Treasurer Richards M. 
Bradley, E. A. Ross, Madison Grant, Henry Fairfield Osborn, Robert Yerkes, 
Ellsworth Huntington, Irving Fisher and Henry Pratt Fairchild, the President of 
the University of Michigan (Clarence Cook Little), Charles Davenport and Harry 
Laughlin, and the former governor of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 
Eugene N. Foss.27 Advocates of restriction worried, as Garis pointed out, that the 
methodological complexity – opponents would describe it as impossibility – of 
national origins made it an inferior method to that based on the census. It also 
shows a significant divergence among restrictionist organizations over how best 
to achieve their goals.  
                                                
26 Garis, “How the New Immigration Law Works,” 187.  
 
27 Memorial to the President, the Senate, and the House of Representatives, 4 January 1927, box 2, 
Lee papers. 
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The Immigration Restriction League’s Congressional lobbyist in fact 
opposed national origins. Patten recognized the widespread opposition from some 
Congressmen whose constituents were driving a movement to repeal national 
origins. The controversial provision had the effect of unifying opposition from all 
immigrant communities in America. The quota acts were directed specifically 
against immigrant groups from southern and eastern Europe, but did not really 
disturb the volume of immigration from Germany, Ireland or Scandinavia. 
National origins, as it computed an almost exclusively British or Anglo-Saxon 
quota, threatened some of these northern countries’ quotas as well. Patten 
suggested that the IRL support the repeal of national origins in order to at least 
protect the 1890 quota of 2%. This, Patten felt, embodied the intent and goal of 
the League’s members, and he feared that supporting national origins could 
threaten the whole restrictionist structure they had been carefully building over 
the previous decades. The National Immigration Restriction Conference, an 
organization based in New York and headed by John Trevor, was in the process 
of unifying restrictionist organizations to push hard for national origins. Trevor 
found Patten’s opposition to the provision unacceptable. On May 30, 1928, the 
Immigration Restriction League had a meeting at the Union Club in Boston, 
where the League’s leaders crystallized the following agenda: to continue to 
support immigration restriction and add the exclusion of Mexican immigrants, 
ensure adequate government appropriations for regulatory agencies, a quota 
reduction to 1%, improved legal machinery to facilitate alien deportation, and a 
tentative endorsement of National Origins. The conference also yielded “the 
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unanimous opinion that it is not better to fight for National Origins in those states 
or districts in which to do so would injure or alienate friends of restriction in the 
House or Senate.”28 The spurious and dubious calculations that national origins 
required made it unlikely to be implemented and the IRL’s leadership tried not to 
overreach and imperil restriction by supporting what they regarded as an 
unworkable scheme.  
The method of restricting immigration to the United States by national 
origins was so doubtful, so questionable and so impractical, that it split the fragile 
coalition of groups and individuals in favor of restriction. The members of the 
IRL, who had founded their organization in 1894 to achieve restriction, found 
themselves unable to support the new method. Patten actively opposed it, and his 
position in Washington D.C. was influential. The League’s leaders found the 
principle unworkable, but Trevor was not going to back down. His organization 
continued to fight for the National Origins provision, and made attempts to 
undermine Patten’s credibility with his Congressional contacts, while it 
simultaneously made overtures to some of the patriotic societies that Patten 
represented as a lobbyist, suggesting that he was not trying as hard as he could to 
preserve America’s racial integrity. Patten’s sources of funding somehow became 
an issue, and he nearly dragged the Immigration Restriction League into a 
Congressional inquiry on lobbying. When Lee asked Ward in October 1929 what 
was going on with Patten, Ward was blunt: “I have lost all my use for Patten, and 
                                                
 
28 The principles outlined in this paragraph are from an unsigned sheet titled “Conference With 
Patten”, dated May 31, 1928, box 2, Lee papers and an unsigned typewritten document (on the 
back of “Community Service” letterhead) dated December 1, 1930, box 2, Lee papers. 
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most of my interest in him.…[He] is doing us very little good.” Ward described 
how Trevor’s organization, which operated as a federation of restrictionist groups, 
rather than one group as the Immigration Restriction League did, had become “‘it’ 
almost more than we are in Washington. [And] Patten refuses to work with them.” 
Lee and Ward were both concerned about how this was affecting the goal of 
restriction and preserving the movement’s successes, and Ward felt that if the 
divisions between the restrictionist organizations persisted, “we might as well 
throw up the sponge.”29 The League had no intention of giving up even if the 
national origins provision went into effect. They continued to fight for 
enforcement and against repeal of restriction into the 1930s. But that important 
members of the League’s leadership had serious reservations about the feasibility 
of national origins suggests how unworkable the scheme seemed to many 
otherwise ardent champions of immigration restriction.  
The Importance of Blood 
The drama and tension over the implementation of national origins was 
not limited to groups and organizations that supported restriction. The most 
important arena for conflict was the United States Congress, which had the 
ultimate decision of which method of restriction would be implemented. In the 
                                                
 
29 Marion Snow [Lee’s private secretary; later his second wife] memo to Lee, May 13, 1930; Lee 
to Ward, October 4, 1929; Ward to Lee, October 5, 1929, all box 2, Lee papers. The situation was 
resolved by the League refusing Patten’s resignation in January 1930, and opting to give Patten 
very explicit instructions to cooperate and “play nice” with the restrictionist organizations 
[February 4, 1930], and Ward resigning [September 15, 1930] to work with the Committee on 
Selective Immigration of the American Eugenics Society. See: Patten to Ward, January 25, 1930; 
Ward, “Votes Passed by the Exec. Com. I.R.L., Jan. 6, 1930,” February 4, 1930; Lee to Patten, 
May 7, 1930; Ward to the Members of the Executive Committee, September 15, 1930, all box 2, 
Lee papers. 
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first session of the 69th Congress in 1926, New York Representative Samuel 
Dickstein spoke out against the national origins provision of the 1924 law during 
a debate over its enactment. His comments on the floor of the House in late June 
1926 not only reflected the tension between restrictionists and anti-restrictionists, 
but exposed emerging divisions among the Congressional restrictionists and anti-
restrictionists, over the most viable and effective method to enact or repeal 
restriction. Dickstein was clear that he did support a degree of restriction, which 
he felt would aid the successful assimilation of immigrant groups, but was 
adamantly opposed to the drastic restrictions of the quotas and national origins. 
He denounced the initial shift in the quota basis from 1910 to 1890, which he 
believed was intentionally designed to admit only “more Nordics, more people 
with blue eyes, blond hair, and long stature.” He furnished statistics on 
immigration from both census bases that showed that the effect of the shift to the 
1890 census was to severely limit the number of southeastern European 
immigrants who would be eligible to land on American shores. The 3% quota 
based on the 1910 census had permitted the entry of 42,057 Italians, 77,432 
British and Irish, and 67,609 Germans annually. The quota based on the 1890 
census for the same immigrant groups was 3,485 Italians, 62,574 British and Irish, 
and 51,227 Germans (the Irish Free State was separated from the quota of Great 
Britain/North Ireland in the 1924 bill). Of the total number of immigrants allowed 
under the 1890 quota, Dickstein pointed out that 86% were reserved for the “so-
called Nordics.”30 The New Yorker saw that this policy would exclude many 
                                                
30 Congressional Record, House of Representatives, 29 June 1926, 12280.  
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people who would be valuable and useful additions to the United States 
population simply because of their geographical, and thus, racial origin. 
Dickstein denounced the principle of national origins as completely 
arbitrary, a policy supported by paid agents of the Carnegie organization who had 
secured appointments as unpaid officials of the United States government – a 
clear reference to Harry H. Laughlin – and a total fiction. The “alleged statistics” 
to compute national origins, he told Members, “do not exist in fact…” But in this 
opposition, Dickstein was supported by an unlikely ally: Albert Johnson. When 
the House’s chair of the Immigration and Naturalization Committee printed an 
extension of his remarks on national origins in The Congressional Record, he 
began laying the groundwork for retreat on the issue. He explained that the great 
difficulties of implementing, and deep suspicions of the feasibility and practicality 
of the policy may make it necessary to repeal it in favor of the 2% quota of the 
1890 census. Although Dickstein’s proposed amendment to repeal national 
origins did not make it out of Johnson’s committee, the bill that had been reported 
out by the House and Senate conferees had conceded that the computation of 
national origins might be impossible, in which case clause (e) of Section 11 would 
remain as the current quota for restriction, which was 2% of the census of 1890.31 
When the 1924 Immigration Bill was passed, the section pertaining to 
national origins mandated that the new quotas be declared and implemented by 
                                                                                                                                
 
31 Ibid., 12299; see also House Report no. 716, 68th Congress, 1st Session, “Immigration of Aliens 
into the United States,” 12 May 1924, Conference Report to accompany H. R. 7995, submitted by 
Johnson.  
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1927. With the calculations – or even the possibility of successfully performing 
the calculations – so contested, Congress created extensions of the deadline by 
passing new bills and resolutions granting more time for the implementation. 
These extensions, in turn, generated a variety of bills on national origins. 
Throughout the first session of the 69th Congress, amendments to repeal the 
national origins provision continually sprang up, although the justifications for 
repeal varied. House Democrat John Douglass from Boston railed against the 
abdication of Congressional prerogative that national origins would require, and 
demanded repeal of the provision on that basis. Douglass pointed out that the 
establishment of the Quota Board, which was explained in Section 11 of the bill, 
left the policy of immigration restriction in the hands of government bureaucrats, 
not in the hands of Congress where it should be. The people’s representatives 
were renouncing their Constitutional duty, and for that reason alone, Douglass 
argued, the provision should be repealed. On top of this egregious abdication of 
legislative prerogative, the representative of the “City Upon a Hill” derided the 
calculation of national origins as “indefinite, uncertain, and theoretical….” Lest 
any uncertainty remain as to his position, Douglass declared, “national origins is a 
huge joke.” Nonetheless, most of the bills introduced in the first session of the 
69th Congress were concerned with mild changes to quota and non-quota 
exemptions under the 1890 census, and of the 55 bills introduced in both 
chambers relating to immigration, only one – Dickstein’s resolution to amend 
certain non-quota categories – became law. Two additional bills were reported out 
of committee and passed one chamber, but no action was taken by the second. 
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Most of the bills – 22 in the Senate, and 33 in the House – languished in 
committee.32  
During the second session of the 69th Congress, however, action on 
national origins took on a sense of urgency. Convening on December 6, members 
had 88 days before the Congress expired, and as written in the 1924 law, the 
national origins provision would automatically go into effect on July 1, 1927. 
Confusion already reigned when the session opened. Three days before the end of 
the first session, on June 29, 1926, Albert Johnson had discussed his grave doubts 
about the feasibility of national origins. Two tables entered into the Congressional 
Record gave two separate and different national quotas for Europeans under the 
origins basis. One table was submitted by the provision’s sponsor, Senator Reed, 
and another the result of Captain Trevor’s analysis of the 1920 census. Although 
most national origins quotas were roughly equivalent, the differences between the 
two suggested to thoughtful Congressional members the inherent difficulty of 
computing the quotas. Reed’s plan proposed the following quotas:  Germany: 
22,081, “Great Britain and Ireland”: 91,111, Italy: 5,878, Poland: 4,509, Russia: 
4,002, and Sweden: 3,707. Trevor’s estimates yielded slightly different 
allowances: Germany: 20,028, Great Britain and North Ireland: 85,135, the Irish 
                                                
32 Congressional Record, 69th Congress, 1st Session, Bill Index. The two other bills were Senator 
Royal Copeland’s resolution to amend a subdivision of section 4, which dealt with non-quota 
exemptions (S.J.Res. 82) Robert Bacon’s bill, H.R. 6238 passed the House, was amended and 
reported out by the Senate Committee on Immigration, but was not voted on in the full Senate. 
H.R. 6238 eventually passed by the Senate; it was concerned with providing non-quota entry to 
American-born women married to aliens who had lost their citizenship under the Cable law.  
 
 Chapter 7 467 
Free State: 8,330, Italy: 5,716, Poland: 4,535, Russia: 4,002, and Sweden: 3,072.33 
These discrepancies begged the question that, if the national origins method was 
superior because it was more scientifically and statistically accurate, why was 
there any divergence at all?  
The problems the divergence of these two national origins quotas 
presented caused the relatively orderly division of pro/anti-restrictionist sentiment 
in Congress to fragment. Restrictionists split into various camps: those who 
favored the implementation of national origins without delay on July 1, 1927, 
some that favored postponing the implementation of national origins to ensure an 
accurate and compelling analysis of the population, and others who favored 
repealing the provision because of its dubious statistical accuracy in favor of the 
much simpler quota basis of 2% of the census of 1890. Pro-immigration forces 
likewise splintered into several camps: those that demanded the repeal of national 
origins, those that favored postponing (every year if need be) its implementation, 
some who favored the 2% quota based on the 1890 census, which would allow a 
higher number of immigrants to enter, and a group that advocated compromise by 
using an average of immigration from 1880 to 1920. Also, the gaping hole left by 
the omission of the western hemisphere from any of the clauses of the 1924 
                                                
33 Congressional Record, House of Representatives, 29 June 1926, 12300. Reed’s table 
significantly demonstrated that in actuality, the battle over restriction had already been won. 
Along with listing the quota on the basis of national origins, it also listed the quotas under the two 
previous regimes, 3% of the 1910 census from 1921, and 2% of 1890 from the 1924 law. Under 
the 1921 bill, the immigration from the above countries was: Germany: 67,607, Great Britain and 
Ireland: 77,342, Italy: 42,057, Poland: 30,979, Russia: 24,405, and Sweden: 20,042. The bill 
annually admitted a total of 357,801 immigrants. For the 2% quota of 1890, the numbers were 
significantly different – as was intended: Germany: 50,129, Great Britain and Ireland: 62,458, 
Italy: 3,889, Poland: 8,872, Russia: 1,792, Sweden: 9,561. Under the national origins regime, 
immigration from Italy and Russia would actually increase.  
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Immigration Act raised concerns for many members of Congress, who decried the 
unregulated immigration from Mexico and Canada as completely undercutting the 
basic principle of restriction.34 In the 1930s, the IRL’s chief focus would in fact be 
trying to extend the restrictionist provisions of the law to Mexico and Canada.  
Senate Joint Resolution 152, introduced by Senator Hiram Johnson of 
California after the end of winter recess in early 1927 proposed to postpone for 
one year the implementation of national origins. The six-member Quota Board, 
directed under the 1924 law to oversee the computation of the quotas had 
submitted a preliminary report to the Secretaries of Commerce, State, and Labor 
in January that was forwarded to Congress and declared that “any racial 
classification based mainly upon names involves a considerable element of 
uncertainty….”35 Three days later another message arrived, this one declaring the 
serious reservations of the three Secretaries, who wished “to state that in our 
opinion the statistical and historical information available raises grave doubts as 
to the whole value of these computations as a basis for the purposes intended.” 
They closed memorandum ominously, declaring that “We therefore cannot 
assume responsibility for such conclusions under these circumstances.”36 With the 
                                                
34 Canada was problematic because of the fear that immigrants could transit through Canada and 
then enter into the United States outside of close supervision by the American government.   
 
35 Senate Document n. 190, 69th Congress, 2nd Session, “National Origin Provision of the 
Immigration Act of 1924” 7 January 1927. Since there was no information regarding ancestry or 
place of birth in the 1790 census, the quota for national origins was to be computed by examining 
the surnames of residents to derive their European origins, and then calculating, over 130 years 
later, the geographic (and thus racial) origins of the original population of the United States. This 
is discussed also in Ngai, Impossible Subjects and Ngai, “The Architecture of Race.”  
 
36 Senate Document n. 193, 69th Congress, 2nd Session, “National Origin Provision of the 
Immigration Act of 1924” 10 January 1927. Senator Reed of Pennsylvania would later claim that 
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inability of the Quota Board to confidently support the national origins quotas, the 
provision’s implementation seemed in serious doubt. 
Joseph Hill, a veteran of the U.S. Census Bureau, chaired the Quota 
Board, but despite his long tenure with the Census, and two reports that he had 
submitted for the Dillingham Commission, calculating the quotas for national 
origins was, in Mae Ngai’s words, “arguably the most difficult challenge of Hill’s 
career.” Congress twice rejected his results before finally approving them. He had 
at his disposal a very limited amount of data from which to extrapolate the racial 
composition of the United States at its founding. It had to begin by, Ngai explains, 
conceptualizing the fundamental categories that comprised the national origins 
quota system, and it used interchangeably “national origin,” “native stock,” and 
“nationality,” which did little to resolve confusion.37 But as the “Dictionary of 
Races or Peoples” showed, as it employed the contributions of the Italian 
anthropologists, nationality did not necessarily denote “race.” This is why the 
Dillingham Commission distinguished between north Italian and south Italian.38 
Several immigrant groups were also arriving in the U.S. in the 1920s who came 
from nations that did not exist in 1790 – Italy, Germany, Ireland, Poland and 
Yugoslavia to name just five. The Quota Board designated as “immigrant stock” 
                                                                                                                                
the two documents had been tampered with and altered before they were submitted to Congress to 
highlight the difficulties perceived in national origins.  
 
37 Ngai, Impossible Subjects. Hill’s background and quota rejections from 25; work for the 
Dillingham commission from 31; the conceptual formulations from 26.  
 
38 United States Immigration Commission, “Dictionary of Races or Peoples,” 81-84. The 
Commission’s dividing line for the two “races” of Italians was preposterously arbitrary, and made 
Columbus, Dante, Michelangelo and Mazzini, despite Joseph Lee’s understanding, southern 
Italians. The line was effectively the Po River basin, which included only the compartamenti of 
Piedmont, Lombardy, Venetia and Emelia-Romagna. 81.  
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any person who came into the United States after 1790, and classic racialist ideas 
infused their entire work.  
The Quota Board took national origin as a discrete, quantifiable unit, and 
as such treated it like a unit character in terms of its heredity. They presumed it 
followed precise Mendelian inheritance rations, that the national identity and 
racial characteristics were fixed, immutable, and unchanging. Ngai explains the 
Board’s assumption that “even if nationalities combined through intermarriage, 
they did not mix but remained discrete, unalloyed parts in descendants that could 
be tallied as fractional equivalents.” This conception of race by blood quantum, 
she notes, had its precedent in the “one-drop” rule that had been used to describe 
blacks in the United States, and created the ridiculous proposition that a person 
with three English grandparents and one German grandparent was the numerical 
equivalent of their ancestors: three-quarters of an English person and one-quarter 
of a German person. This reduced human beings, as Hill elaborated, to “a unit of 
measure rather than a distinct person.”39 Supporters of national origins operated 
under the assumption that characteristics did not “blend” or average, as Boas, 
Hrdlicka, and other anthropologists suggested they did. They did not incorporate 
biological or genetic definitions of race, which looked at mechanisms of heredity 
that inherited two sets of chromosomes, one from each parent, and suggested that 
organisms adapted to changes in environmental conditions and changes during the 
course of their development. In short, they approached national or racial identity 
                                                
39 Ngai, Impossible Subjects, quote on 33; see 25-37, from which this section draws extensively 
for the work of the Quota Board; Joseph Hill, “The Problem of Determining the National Origin of 
the American People” quoted in Ngai, Impossible Subjects, 33.  
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in the same way that Galton approached talent and genius or described the stick 
traveling down the stream: through generations, unbroken and unchanged. The 
Quota Board’s members subscribed to the quintessential biological determinism 
of classic racialism in order to calculate national origins.  
The difficulties in calculating national origins were legion, and the 
differences of political attitudes toward the provision were too. In February 1927 
Senator Hiram Johnson told his colleagues that it would be foolish to base the 
quotas on inadequate data, and recommended an additional year to refine the 
computations. Democratic Senator James Reed of Missouri – who opposed 
national origins – voiced his support for the resolution to postpone the activation 
of the national origins quotas, although he made clear his desire to repeal the 
whole scheme. He sensed, correctly, that the ideological premise behind national 
origins was a desire to maintain the Anglo-Saxon purity of blood in the American 
population and was motivated by racial antipathy. On the floor of the Senate 
chamber, the Missouri senator ridiculed the notion of computing the blood of the 
old native stock. The endless potential for “crosses of the blood” in North 
America meant that determining the blood of the population almost 140 years ago 
remained “an impossible task,” and national origins was an “absurd and ridiculous 
scheme.”40 Immediately, Republican Senator David Reed from Pennsylvania – the 
originator of the national origins basis of restriction – rose to defend his policy, 
and the repealers and supporters locked horns over proving the statistical accuracy 
of the national origins quotas.  
                                                
40 Congressional Record, Senate, 1 February 1927, 2678.  
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Defending national origins was complicated by the simple fact that the 
1790 census did not provide the necessary data, so supporters had to explain how 
this difficulty would be surmounted. Or they did what David Reed did: they 
changed the subject. The Republican Reed, in his defense of the calculations from 
the 1790 census, used Trevor’s defense of national origins – that neither the 
numerical quota set in 1921 nor that established in 1924 ever took into 
consideration native-born Americans in the computation of immigration quotas. 
Reed argued, “we, who were born in this country, had at least as much right to be 
reflected in the quota as had recently arrived immigrants.” One wonders if the 
Pennsylvania senator knew that, by Hill’s calculations, if his family had arrived 
after 1790, he would have been considered in the immigrant quota.41 Some 
supporters argued that in the surnames listed in the Census manuscript, the 
original census revealed the true core of the American population. But when Reed 
insisted that the best basis for quotas was the racial origins in the 1790 census, 
Senator Royal Copeland pressed him on the enumeration’s accuracy, and Reed 
had to concede that it was unreliable.42  
                                                
41 As far as can be ascertained, Reed’s family was in fact a very old and established Pennsylvania 
family. The Senator’s father, James Hay Reed, was a business associate of Andrew Carnegie and 
Philander Knox, and a director of United States Steel. James Hay, born in 1853, was the son of a 
physician, Joseph A. Reed, about whom little information can be found. But there was a Joseph 
Reed from Pennsylvania who was an early leader in the newly independent United States, and 
could perhaps be an ancestor to Dr. Joseph A. Reed. Biographical data for Senator David Aiken 
Reed from The New York Times, 11 February 1953, 29; Bruce Clayton, “Reed, David Aiken” 
American National Biography; Ari Hoogenboom, “David Aiken Reed” Dictionary of American 
Biography, Supplement 5: 1951-1955; on his father James Hay Reed, see Asher Isaacs, “James 
Hay Reed” Dictionary of American Biography; on Joseph Reed from the American Revolution, 
see G. S. Rowe, “Reed, Joseph” American National Biography.  
 
42 Ibid., 2679-85.  
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But it was not so much that the census was unreliable as that national 
origins was scientific folly, a fruitless endeavor to follow something that did not 
exist and was not true. That did not deter its supporters, however. Reed later laid 
out the exact reasons that he supported national origins as a method to restrict 
immigration. It seemed, to the Pennsylvania senator, that everyone was 
complaining about national origins – German immigrants, Scandinavian 
immigrants, Irish and Italian immigrants. The national origins provision, he 
insisted, was the only method of restricting immigration that would recognize the 
blood composition of the American population. “If some recently arrived alien 
who is not yet naturalized has a right to have his blood reflected in the quotas of 
our immigration,” he opined, “I say that we whose ancestors made this country 
and fought for it in every war have at least an equal right with that recently 
arrived, unnaturalized immigrant: and that is all that national origins does…”43 In 
this narrative, and in this justification, lay the bare essence of the immigration 
restriction movement going back to at least 1894. The racial composition of the 
American population, as the racial nativists imagined it, had to be protected. This 
was the significant shift that Higham points out in the types of nativism that 
circulated in the United States after 1860, and it was predicated upon a faulty, 
erroneous understanding of biological and genetic principles of science. But that 
did not matter. What was important was to use a seemingly objective, non-
discriminatory mechanism to achieve that goal of protecting the Anglo-Saxon 
population of the United States.  
                                                
43 Congressional Record, Senate, 6 December 1928, 137.  
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The principal source to compute the National Origins quotas was the 
Census Bureau’s 1909 publication A Century of Population Growth. It computed 
the racial origin of the population, based on surnames recorded in the 1790 
Census, and then used subsequent censuses to document the statistical patterns of 
demographic growth of that original population to arrive at the composition of the 
“blood” of the American population after 100 years. In Congressional testimony, 
however, supporters of the provision conveniently passed over the author’s 
admitted limitations of the study. S. N. D. North, one of the supervisors of the 
1900 census, forwarded the manuscript to Secretary of Labor and Commerce 
Charles Nagel highlighting the uncertainty behind the Census Bureau’s 
computations. He pointed out that even those states that had manuscript returns 
from the 1790 census were of dubious value, as the returns were prepared by 
“underpaid assistant marshals.” Further, five of the original thirteen enumerated 
states had had their schedules destroyed during the course of the War of 1812. 
Thus, at its core, the document to which the most ardent restrictionists would pin 
their strategy was, by its own admission, of highly suspect statistical value.44 
It was the compilation of surnames from the 1790 census that made A 
Century of Population Growth the essential source for national origins. Because 
of the haphazard way in which the original returns were filed by the marshals, and 
because several states’ returns had already been destroyed, the prime purpose of 
the Census Bureau’s monograph was to preserve the information from the census 
                                                
 
44 United States Department of Commerce and Labor, Bureau of the Census, A Century of 
Population Growth: From the 1st Census of the United States to the 12th, 1790-1900 (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1909), i.  
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of 1790. Extant returns listed 27,337 surnames in the manuscript returns of the 
original census, many of them the same. A Century of Population Growth grouped 
the names into broad classes based on the derivation of the familial surname:  
household and domestic items, nations and places, human characteristics, games, 
religion, music, literature, property, nature, ocean and maritime themes, war, 
death, violence, time, and “Unusual and ludicrous combinations of common 
nouns and of Christian names and surnames.” Thus surnames like Supple, 
Humble, Gaudy, Sullen, Compass, Hornbuckle, Beersticker, Cathole, Clampit, 
and Getstrap were alleged to reflect the national origin and racial identity of 
family lines in the United States. From this system of classification, the report 
drew the conclusion that at the beginning of Constitutional government in the 
United States, just 800 surnames (“practically all of which were of English or 
British origin,” the report asserted) contributed wholly one-third of the original 
population of the United States. The other 26,500 names that appeared less 
frequently in the manuscript returns demonstrated national and racial origins that 
led to the conclusion that 87% of the American population was British in origin.45 
This classification of surnames, the Census Bureau claimed, enabled a 
“reasonably accurate analysis of the nationality of the population,” but it 
conceded that the classification was only “an indication of blood, or what may be 
termed nationality strain, since it takes no account of the actual place of birth or 
                                                
 
45 Bureau of the Census, A Century of Population Growth, 111 for classes; 112-113 for surname 
examples, 115 for 800 surnames. Some of the “Striking or Ludicrous Combinations” were indeed 
amusing: Peter Wentup, Sarah Simpers, Wanton Bump, Boston Frog, Jedediah Brickhouse, 
Pleasant Basket, Hannah Cheese, Over Jordan, among many others. See p. 113; also Ngai, 
Impossible Subjects, 32. 
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parentage of the individual.” It emphasized this last point again: “it can not be 
regarded as possessing the least value from the standpoint of modern 
classification by place of birth…. [But it] possesses great value as indicating the 
proportions contributed by the different nationalities, to the population at the time 
the First Census was taken.”46 This was the fundamental objection repealers had, 
and it is telling that the Bureau’s own document conceded its impracticality.  
Critics and opponents of the national origins provision seized on this 
impracticality as a reason to oppose the new method. When Hill testified before 
the Senate Committee on Immigration, one member challenged the accuracy and 
value of the 1790 census, since it enumerated very few categories and was done 
under rudimentary statistical theories by untrained men. None of the marshals had 
any statistical training, and most of the analysts of the data lacked it as well.47 
Common sense suggested to Senator Royal Copeland that greater technological 
sophistication would make more recent censuses more accurate and useful 
measures of the demographic condition of the country. The 1790 census, in fact, 
enumerated only six categories. Hill disagreed with Copeland, and ignored the 
warnings of North that enumerators in 1790 faced “serious difficulties,” the least 
of which was the accumulation of data by the underpaid marshals. Hill argued that 
because the population in 1790 was more permanently settled, because the 
marshals were familiar with the population they counted, and because of the 
simplicity of the categories of enumeration, that the 1790 census was superior to 
                                                
 
46 Bureau of the Census, A Century of Population Growth, 116. 
 
47 See Cohen, A Calculating People; Anderson, The American Census.  
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more recent enumerations.48 Hill’s position was directly contradicted by the 
Census Bureau however, which declared that ill-defined town and county 
boundaries, the lack of statistical training for enumerators and their meager 
salaries, the basic unwillingness of people to supply information, and the distance 
between “isolated households of pioneers” made returns for the early censuses 
problematic. Furthermore, the Bureau noted that there was a total lack of 
uniformity in the way the marshals submitted their returns; some carefully 
organized and alphabetized the surnames of populations in each area, but others 
merely compiled them and submitted them with no organization.49 These 
objections did not sway Hill, who continued to insist that national origins based 
upon data from A Century of Population Growth was the most accurate and fair 
method of determining immigration quotas. 
Ultimately, A Century of Population Growth amounted to an endorsement 
– albeit a qualified one – of General Walker’s “replacement thesis.” Like many of 
the other dubious sources employed to justify restriction, though, the book itself 
was confused regarding Walker’s theory. Noting that the former Census 
Superintendent’s theory “has been opposed by many statisticians of prominence,” 
the book went on to break down the relative population contributions of the 
original settler stock and the later immigrant stock, but the chapter dealing with 
                                                
 
48 Hill’s testimony before the Senate Committee in which he claimed that the accuracy of the 1790 
census was superior to more recent enumerations was reprinted in the Congressional Record by 
Minnesota Senator Henrik Shipstead. Congressional Record, Senate, 6 December 1928, 144-47. 
See also Texas Representative John Calvin Box in the House, Congressional Record, House of 
Representatives, 3 March 1927, on 5810-11.   
 
49 Bureau of the Census, A Century of Population Growth, 45, 50.  
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the “White and Negro Population” quickly confused readers regarding the 
certainty of the demographic contribution of the original stock. The population 
growth it computed was specifically limited to the white population – it was never 
contemplated to assess the contribution of African slaves to the American 
population for the quotas. Additionally, four generations of immigrants, who had 
begun arriving in significant numbers in the 1830s, had added to the United 
States’ population before immigration statistics were efficiently kept, making it 
“impossible to determine accurately the number of persons in the United States 
who were directly descended from the population enumerated at the beginning of 
the nineteenth century.”50 But this was the entire premise behind National Origins. 
Although it pointed out that Walker’s theory had significant critics, the census 
manuscript also endorsed it. Out of the 66,809,196 whites counted in the 1900 
census, it utilized Walker’s computations to assert that the original settler 
population had contributed 35 million of that total, and the foreign stock nearly 32 
million. “It would be difficult,” the Bureau’s book read, “to suggest more vividly 
the great fecundity during the nineteenth century of the white population 
inhabiting the United States in 1800.”51 The theoretical agreement with the 
                                                
50 Ibid., 86. 
 
51 Ibid., 89-90. See also Maurice Davie, “Immigration and the Declining Birthrate” Scientific 
Monthly v. 19, n. 1 (July 1924), 68-76. Davie, a professor at Yale, wrote that Walker’s theory was 
“unsound,” since nearly every country in history had experienced a leveling off of its birthrate 
when it reached a level of mature physical and economic development (72). He also pointed out 
that the hue and cry over the decline of the native birthrate was always a reference to the decline 
of the fertility of the upper-classes (75). Davie was not pro-immigration, but rather said that 
Walker’s theory was unsound because it was based mostly on anecdotal evidence, rather than a 
statistical analysis of the differential birthrate between the native-born and foreign-born (76). 
Anecdotal evidence, from Galton to Lombroso to Lodge, was important evidence for the 
suspicious assertions of classic racialists. 
 
 Chapter 7 479 
General’s “replacement thesis” is clear, although it stopped short of endorsing 
Walker’s implication that “new” immigrants arriving after 1880 were replacing 
this original stock.  
A Century of Population Growth similarly claimed a spectacular fecundity 
for the British people that enabled them to not only repopulate the British Isles 
(from 9 million in 1712 to 16.2 million in 1801, to 41 million in 1900), but to 
furnish surplus population for the extensive settlement of “other nations” as well. 
Marveling at the robust growth of the English population, the report concluded 
that “in magnitude there appears to be no parallel in history for this population 
achievement of the British race from 1700 to 1900.” The ability to replenish the 
British Islands and populate North America and Australia was regarded as a 
testament to the superior fertility of the British race, and tacitly affirmed Walker’s 
thesis that it was not the inability to reproduce that limited the growth of the 
English stock of the American population, but as Walker said, the appearance of 
foreigners themselves.52  
Other than compiling a list of funny names in the manuscript returns of the 
first census, A Century of Population Growth was effectively useless as a source 
to compute national origins. Had there been any careful examination of its 
arguments, two glaring and fundamental problems would have immediately 
emerged. First, the presumption that nationality was some indicator of racial 
composition – the conflation of nationality with race – was simply, based on 
governmental practice, wrong. If nationality equaled race, why did the Bureau of 
                                                
52 Bureau of the Census, A Century of Population Growth, 91.  
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Immigration, the Dillingham Commission, the Immigration Restriction League 
and many others consistently distinguish between “Northern Italian” and 
“Southern Italian”? Secondly, the book itself admitted, “it can not be regarded as 
possessing the least value” to determine geographical origins of the American 
population in 1790. Nonetheless, despite these two fundamental, inescapable 
problems, the book was a central tool to construct quotas that were equally highly 
suspect and dubious. 
Into this mix, Representative Albert Johnson voiced an additional doubt 
on national origins to his House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, to 
which the Senate Joint Resolution to postpone the measure had been referred. 
Johnson substituted an amendment to repeal the provision altogether instead of 
postponing it for a year. His reasons for the substitution were a telling indictment 
on the inadequacies of national origins. Here was a man who consistently worked 
for immigration restriction yet opposed the provision because it was highly 
unreliable. Instead, Johnson was a numerical restrictionist, and he believed that 
national origins was too complicated to create policy. The 2% quota was “easily 
explained and easily understood by all.”53 It required no convoluted statistical 
computations, no investigation into the remote past of the old families of the 
nation. The complexity of national origins was, for Albert Johnson, an inadequate 
basis for legislating.  
                                                
53 House Report n. 2029, 69th Congress, 2nd Session, “Repeal of ‘National Origins’ Provisions of 
Immigration Act of 1924” 9 February 1924, 2.  
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Johnson was unable to shake his doubts about national origins. The 
Congressman from Washington state articulated his position on national origins 
before it went into effect in a series of letters to author Edward R. Lewis of 
Chicago. Lewis followed immigration matters very closely, and he frequently 
corresponded with Johnson in 1928 while Lewis was preparing his book America: 
Nation or Confusion, published in the same year.54 Lewis argued stridently for 
racial purity in the United States, suggesting that the loss of racial homogeneity 
led to the decay and degeneration of nations.55 As Lewis and Johnson discussed 
the feasibility and practicality of national origins, the Congressman persisted in 
his doubts. It was not that he was opposed to the principle of national origins, he 
told Lewis. But the “opinion prevails among many of the restrictionist members 
of the [House Immigration and Naturalization] Committee that to carry National 
Origins into effect is to add the opposition of organizations representing 
Northwestern European immigration to the continued assaults to the Southeastern 
European people, thus increasing a force that will continue to hammer away and 
                                                
54 Edward R. Lewis, America: Nation or Confusion: A Study of Our Immigration Problems (New 
York: Harper Brothers, 1928). In the book, Lewis argued that the increasing heterogeneity of 
American racial stocks was weakening the nation, and that to protect the United States only 
immigrants of the original native stock – the intent of both the national origins provision and the 
2% quota – should be admitted as immigrants. Race mixing, as Lewis called it, did not result in 
the creation of breeds of supermen, where each succeeding generation took the best elements of 
parental inheritance, but instead “may entail jarring misfits….” He singled out the population of 
South Italian where “Italians, Greeks, Saracens, negroes, Normans, Spaniards and Phoenicians 
have mixed with results so conglomerate and so unhappy that they have cursed those regions and 
their peoples to this day.” (130) But he also claimed, contra Garis, that with the original colonial 
stock there was “nothing to indicate decadence…despite all the sneers passed upon it by the 
immigrants.” (111) Lewis was also a member of the Immigration Restriction League. 
 
55 Ibid., 188.  
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ultimately break down restriction.”56 This was a key concern for many elected 
officials with restrictionist tendencies. As they had consistently argued, curtailing 
undesirable immigration was the goal of all these restrictive bills, and national 
origin’s greatest advantage – which Trevor tried to demonstrate, that it was 
“scientific” and not “discriminatory” – was also its greatest liability, in that it 
made no distinction between immigrant groups who arrived after 1790. And 
because Scandinavian and German immigrants had not settled the country in 
numbers like the Anglo-Saxon British, they too would receive very small quotas. 
Despite the ethnological classification of these groups as kindred racial stocks, 
they would not, and could not, be admitted. This placed politicians in a very 
difficult position, and was one of the key reasons that many ardent Congressional 
restrictionists opposed National Origins in favor of the numerical quotas.57  
The political situation in Congress was very complicated, but there was 
little time to openly debate the relative merits of each method. When Johnson’s 
amendment was introduced into the House, he quickly realized that repeal of 
national origins would be impossible in such a short time. The divergent views 
within both chambers on national origins made any informed debate unrealistic in 
the brief time remaining in the session. When the bill was recommitted to the 
Immigration and Naturalization Committee of the House, Johnson restored the 
original language of the Senate resolution to postpone it, since the national origins 
                                                
56 Albert Johnson to Edward Lewis, 27 January 1927, Record Group 233, HR 70A – F 14.4, box 
492, NARA.  
 
57 See for instance the petitions and telegrams sent to the Senate Committee on Immigration in 
1929, organized in Record Group 46, box 172, Sen. 71-A – J 32, NARA.   
 Chapter 7 483 
quotas would go into effect without any action in Congress to delay it. But he held 
firm in his belief that national origins was too complicated. When the Committee 
reintroduced S.J. Res. 152 to the House with a new report, it persisted in the belief 
that the preliminary national origins quotas were “unsatisfactory,” and that such a 
“momentous undertaking” as computing immigration quotas, “involving as it does 
the life currents of millions of human beings” must be “easily recognizable for 
their integrity.”58 The resolution thus endorsed the Senate’s position to postpone 
its implementation for additional study while it opposed the principle. But with 
the opposition of the Chair of the House Committee on Immigration and 
Naturalization, it seemed that the days of national origins – even though it was 
only postponed – were numbered. 
Anti-restrictionists in the House were put in a difficult position when the 
bill to postpone the implementation of national origins was brought up on the 
floor, further dividing the political coalitions over immigration. Favoring repeal of 
the provision, they were deprived of any alternative other than to support 
postponing the implementation of the new quota for one year. There was no 
option to repeal. But postponing the provision would strengthen the hands of 
supporters by providing, theoretically, a more precise and accurate computation, 
shielding the provision against criticisms of unfairness and inaccuracy. Supporters 
of national origins, however, recognized that in the terms of the 1924 Immigration 
Act, the provision would go into effect unless decisive action was taken; thus they 
                                                
 
58 House Report n. 2260, 69th Congress, 2nd Session, “Postponement of ‘National Origins’ 
Provisions of the Immigration Act of 1924” 26 February 1927, 2.  
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tried to filibuster the proposed bill. Opponents of national origins who, like 
Johnson, favored numerical restriction instead, pushed the bill forward.59 When 
Colorado Republican William Vaile, an ardent restrictionist, rose to support the 
implementation of national origins, he explicitly articulated the goal of the 
contentious provision. Deploring the limited debate the House had organized for 
the motion to postpone national origin’s enactment, Vaile pressed for extended 
debate on “a question which goes to the blood of the Nation for generations to 
come…” The new immigration “was changing the proportions of American blood 
in a degree which was undesirable,” and the purpose of national origins was 
simply “to try to continue the blood of the United States in its present mixture 
without changing its proportions, and, of course, endeavoring to protect its 
quality.”60 The bogeyman of decadent, undesirable blood in the American 
population that was given sanction in the massive Dillingham Commission 
reports, continued to haunt the minds of legislators fifteen years later, attesting to 
a deep-seated belief in classic racialism.  
Although the resolution to postpone national origins passed the House on 
March 3 by a healthy margin (234 in favor, 111 opposed, 85 not voting), it did not 
close off debate.61 Knud Wefald, a Norwegian immigrant elected to the 68th and 
                                                
59 Congressional Record, House of Representatives, 3 March 1927, 5643.  
 
60 Ibid., 5643-44.  
 
61 The recorded votes for the House on S.J.Res. 152 reflect the strange bedfellows that national 
origins created in the lower house: anti-restrictionists Jacobstein, Sabath, Dickstein, LaGuardia, 
Wefald, Rogers, and Celler allied with committed restrictionists like Johnson, Burdick and Foss in 
an attempt to preserve the numerical policy of restriction. Congressional Record, House of 
Representatives, 3 March 1927, 5650.  
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69th Congresses to represent Minnesota on the Farmer-Labor ticket, took the floor 
and assailed the underlying premise of protecting the blood and racial purity of 
the United States that national origins, as Vaile had so explicitly stated, was 
designed to do. Wefald argued that Scandinavians were just as capable as the 
British to preserve the institutions of the American government, and the quotas, 
which drastically cut down immigration from Scandinavian countries, were unfair 
to a group that in the classic racialist schema was racially equivalent to Anglo-
Saxons.62 This was what Johnson feared. 
Wefald’s comments after the postponement of national origins highlighted 
one of the essential problems that opponents of restriction faced. “The father of 
the national-origins proposal in 1924,” he explained, “was one Capt. John B. 
Trevor, of New York City, a moneyed man of leisure with strong anti-German 
sympathies.”63 Like Grant and Stoddard, Trevor was a “moneyed man of leisure,” 
                                                
62 Immigration from Norway under the various quotas had been dramatically restricted. 12,202 
were allowed annually under the first quota provision based on 1910, which was slashed almost in 
half to 6,453 under the 1890 basis, to 2,433 under the national origins regime. See table printed in 
Congressional Record, House of Representatives, 29 June 1926, 2282. Massachusetts Democrat 
John Douglass called national origins “an outrageous act of injustice” and an “eccentric 
experiment” and Illinois Democrat Adolph Sabath decried the way that “professional 
restrictionists” in Congress adopted the “McLauhlin [sic] report as an official committee report, 
which I believe is contemptible and unjustifiable.” Congressional Record, House of 
Representatives, 3 March 1927, Douglass on 5848; Sabath 5850. In the “Dictionary of Races or 
Peoples” the Norwegians, Danes, Swedes and Icelanders were grouped together under 
“Scandinavian,” which were described as the native Teutonic race of Europe, and along with the 
Germans were the most familiar of the “old” immigration. (119) The report also noted: “Nor is it 
necessary to remind the student of ethnology that the Scandinavian is considered to be the purest 
type of one of the three great races of Europe as divided from a physical point of view; that is, of 
the ‘Northern’ or ‘Teutonic’ race” as opposed to the Alpine or Mediterranean races.” The Norse 
element in the American population was so well known that it needed no description, but 
emphasized that they make ideal farmers, Americanize with great alacrity, have the lowest 
illiteracy in Europe, and are almost universally Protestant. (120). United States Immigration 
Commission, “Dictionary of Races or People.”  
 
63 Congressional Record, House of Representatives, 3 March 1927, 5661.  
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and like them had no professional scientific training. His commitment to the 
classic racialist orthodoxy, and the restriction of immigrants that he deemed to be 
inferior, were the only real qualifications he had. He was able to gather support 
for this complicated scheme of immigration restriction with no professional 
academic position or scientific credentials. Wefald’s description of him as a man 
of leisure speaks to a much larger issue of the role that amateurs and non-
scientists were able to play in the fluid field of scientific inquiry. In Kuhn’s 
scheme for understanding revolutions in scientific knowledge, the two 
communities devoted to competing scientific methods suffered from what he 
described as a problem of “local incommensurability”: the two camps used 
lexicons that in many ways were untranslatable or had significantly different 
meanings.64 So for the classic racialist community, which did not have the 
specialized training of appropriate scientific communities, “blood” and nation 
stood as an equivalent of race, as an immutable, permanent determiner of 
behavior, development, quality, and thus, desirability. But for the opposing camp, 
“blood” had come to mean very little in terms of race, and chromosomes and 
environment, which had a coequal role in determining behavior, development, 
and quality, were of paramount importance. It was ultimately the wider familiarity 
of the older lexicon in the public’s mind, that audience that men like Grant, 
                                                
64 The notion of a “lexicon” or “local incommensurability” was a refinement of an idea set forth in 
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, wherein the “revolution” of a new system or method – 
what he also termed a “gestalt switch” – is generally resolved in favor of the new paradigm. See 
Kuhn, The Road Since Structure, chapter 2 (esp. 37); Kuhn, Scientific Revolutions, esp. chapters 
10 and 12.  
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Stoddard, Trevor, Wiggam and many others aimed for, that gave the classic 
racialist camp the ability to influence the political process.  
National origins and even the policies of numerical restriction could be 
easily explained and comprehended by using the old and familiar “lexicon”: 
southeastern Europeans were racially different from the old native-born American 
stock, this difference was in their blood, this difference made them undesirable, 
and this undesirability justified their exclusion. A contrary explanation might be 
that southern and eastern Europeans were different in physical appearance, 
cultural values and characteristics, and historical development from the old-stock 
Americans, but this difference was attributable to various factors like education, 
economic and industrial development of their country of origin, opportunity, and 
heredity. “Racial” difference, to people familiar with tenets of classic racialism, 
was just much easier to understand.  
This is in some ways an inversion of Kuhn’s description of how 
“revolutionary” science displaces “normal” science. A new scientific paradigm 
will offer greater explanatory power, particularly in its ability to address and solve 
the problems and issues that the older method cannot – as Kuhn describes it, “the 
persistent failures of the puzzles of normal science to come out as they should. 
Failure of existing rules is the prelude to a search for new ones.” Yet he describes 
that converts to the new paradigm may also shift methods based on arguments, 
“rarely made entirely explicit, that appeal to the individual’s sense of the 
appropriate or the aesthetic—the new theory is said to be ‘neater,’ ‘more suitable,’ 
or ‘simpler’ than the old.” While the general application of this aesthetic neatness 
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is an important component for understanding the resolution of scientific 
revolutions (Kuhn’s frequent allusion to the Copernican revolution is an excellent 
example), in this instance the opposite seems to be the case. The simplicity of 
“like produces like” was one of the reasons that the lay community maintained its 
belief in the old theories of inheritance that the new experimentalist methods had 
demonstrated to inaccurate.65 
The success of Trevor’s activities, and how his influence extended into 
professional scientific communities, can be observed in an article IRL member 
Robert DeCourcy Ward published in the Journal of Heredity, in which the 
Harvard climatology professor explained the difference between the numerical 
quotas and the national origins quotas. Under national origins, the quotas were no 
longer to be based, “as now, upon the foreign born, those composing the ‘alien 
colonies’ and alien ‘blocs’ now in this country, ignoring the native-born, but are 
to be divided among the different nationalities according to the national origins of 
our population as a whole.”66 Ward did not in the slightest hint about the 
difficulties the provision was facing in Congress, or that many legislators felt that 
the method was too spurious. The tone of his article was that national origins was 
not only eminently fairer than the numerical quotas, but that there was unanimity 
                                                
65 Kuhn, Scientific Revolutions, failures from 68; aesthetic appeal from 155. Mae Ngai states that 
“A more honest inquiry into the matter by the Quota Board into the matter might have concluded 
that determining the national origins of the American people was theoretically suspect and 
methodologically impossible. But relentless lobbying by the restrictionists and the pedigree of the 
quotas’ authors overcame all obstacles and doubts.” Ngai, Impossible Subjects, 35. 
 
66 Robert DeCourcy Ward, “The Third year of the New Immigration Law” in box 3, Lee Papers, 
n.p. (5). This was an offprint of Ward’s article from the Journal of Heredity, v. 18, n. 1 (January 
1927). Emphasis in original. 
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in support of the feasibility of determining the stock of the total population. As 
often happened with restrictionists in trying to convince the public to support their 
view, Ward elided many of the complexities and nuances of the politics and the 
science involved. 
Congress twice rejected the national origins quotas, as members examined 
the methodology and assumptions that Hill and the Quota Board operated under 
and found errors of computation or logic. In 1928 the American Council of 
Learned Societies appointed two experts to analyze the proposed quotas – 
Howard Barker, a professional genealogist and Marcus Hansen, a historian – and 
who found that the quota for England in the first two estimates was too high 
because of the improper Anglicization of names by the Census Bureau’s marshals 
who conducted the 1790 census.67 Each time they had to be recalculated, a 
different numerical quota was returned. Herbert Hoover campaigned in 1928 on a 
platform that included repeal of both the national origins provision and the 
immigration quotas based on the 2% quota from the 1890 census that was then in 
effect. When Hill and the Quota Board submitted a third report to the Senate 
Committee on Immigration in February 1929, Hill insisted, “The present 
computations are as near as we can get on this matter of determining the national 
                                                
67 Senate Doc. n. 65, 70th Congress, 1st Session, Message from the President, “Immigration Quotas 
on the Basis of National Origin,” 27 February 1928, 4; Ngai, Impossible Subjects, 32-3. The Quota 
Board submitted three different quotas in three different years; but Trevor also submitted two 
different sets of quotas outside the Quota Board’s submissions, in his “Study of the Population of 
the United States” and “Restudy of the Plan of National Origins.” 
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origins, practically.”68 And yet Representative Johnson maintained his opposition, 
issuing from his committee a statement that “calculations based on census returns 
running from 1930 back to 1790…are impossible of explanation to the lay 
American, much less to the alien and the foreign born.”69 Despite the House 
Committee’s objection, advocates of the quotas insisted that they were as accurate 
as they would get, and the Senate Committee finally approved the Quota Board’s 
computations, which Hoover then signed into law, despite his professed 
opposition, on March 22, 1929.70 
National origins limped into effect in the final days of the 70th Congress 
when another resolution to postpone came before the House. But by this time, it 
was too late. Representative Box of Texas, who in the first session had adamantly 
insisted on the enactment of national origins, rose before the vote to demand the 
“yays” and “nays” so that the Representatives’ constituents would know their vote 
in favor of postponing the clause yet again. When the vote in the House was held 
on the last weekend of the session, opponents of national origins again carried the 
day, passing the resolution to postpone national origins until 1930 by a vote of 
192 to 152 (83 not voting).71 But because of parliamentary procedures, for 
supporters of national origins, the battle was over; they had won. Action on the 
                                                
68 Hearings before the Senate Committee on Immigration, 70th Congress, 2nd Session, “National 
Origins Provision of the Immigration Law” 4 February 1929 (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1929), 16; Ngai, 34-35 for Hoover’s position and the final Quota Board report. 
 
69 House Report n. 2811, 70th Congress, 2nd Session, “Postponement of National-Origins Provision 
of the Immigration Act of 1924” 2 March 1929, 2.  
  
70 Senate Document n. 259, 70th Congress, 2nd Session, “Immigration Quotas on the Basis of 
National Origin” Message from the President, Calendar 27 February 1929.  
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amendment had been sufficiently delayed; the amendment had passed the House 
on a Sunday, and it could not be properly considered by Senate rules, before the 
end of the session. When Senator Hiram Bingham (R-CT) rose to introduce a 
motion to consider the House Joint Resolution on the following Monday, Senator 
David Reed, knowing full well the fight over national origins was over, rose to 
challenge him. Reed pointed out Senate Rule XIV which stipulated that all bills 
received from the House must be read three times on three different days. Reed 
informed his Senate colleagues that if the opponents of national origins tried to 
hustle through the resolution, he would dispute the point of order. And that was it. 
No action having been taken, the quotas would go into effect on the day appointed 
in the previous bill delaying its enactment. With a whimper, not a bang, when the 
Senate adjourned sine die that afternoon, repealers and numerical restrictionists 
were beaten. With no action taken by Congress, on July 1, 1929, the quotas 
announced by President Hoover in March went into effect.72  
The myriad scientific criticisms of the impracticality and inherent 
methodological flaws of computing national origins had had no effect in the age 
of the Scopes trial. The perception in the public and Congress of the immutability 
of race, described and reinforced for decades by classic racialists, proved to be too 
powerful for legitimate scientific criticism to overturn. Even the conviction of 
John Scopes reinforced the perception of immutable and unchanging races, 
whether they were created by God or descended from apes. If evolution were true, 
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the scientific arguments made in favor of it in Dayton posited a geologic time-
scale, over millennia, which suggested a certain timelessness and permanence of 
racial qualities. When visual evidence confirmed this – eye color, head shape, hair 
color, stature, skin color – in the world around them, the public’s understanding 
that like produced like became more concrete and unshakeable. This can also 
partially be attributed to the complexity of experimental genetic and biological 
science. The historians Diane Paul and Hamish Spencer make this point in 
describing why earlier professional critiques of Charles Davenport’s work at Cold 
Spring Harbor were unsuccessful. They note, “even the soundest scientific 
arguments will fail to convince in the absence of a suitable culture in which the 
argument can take root.”73 The absence of such a “suitable culture” in the United 
States in the late 1920s can be seen in the 1927 Supreme Court decision to allow 
the sterilization of Carrie Buck (an inmate at a Virginia institute for feeble-
minded, who was allegedly the second of three generations of feeble-minded 
females). The Court’s decision was another illustration of the simplicity of classic 
racialism trumping a more accurate scientific paradigm and in the credence given 
to mental testing.74  
While professional scientists like Franz Boas, Ales Hrdlicka and Herbert 
Spencer Jennings could point out the more egregious inaccuracies in the claims 
made by classic racialists and their nativist associates, their ability to clearly 
explain how genes and chromosomes actually worked in organisms was itself 
                                                
73 Hamish Spencer and Diane Paul, “The failure of a scientific critique.” 452 
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highly problematic. Even when Walter Lippmann tried to reach large audiences in 
The New Republic with accessible and understandable critiques of mental testing 
in the mid-1920s, he was unsuccessful. Essentially, all these critics of classic 
racialism could say with certainty was that inheritance and heredity were far more 
complex than its adherents argued, and that predicting the development of human 
organisms was incredibly difficult due to the interaction of many different factors 
– the environment, biparental inheritance, complex Mendelian ratios, various 
chromosomal recombination, and other factors. Racialists were able to counter 
these confusing claims with an elegantly simple declaration that like produces 
like. In the hands of skilled and passionate writers like Grant, Stoddard, Wiggam 
and others, this proved to be remarkably alluring, not only for the public but 
policy makers as well. The complexity of genetic and biological science could be 
almost paralyzing – by conceding that knowledge of heredity was imperfect, it 
left no suitable ground on which to devise policy. Insisting that Carrie Buck or 
Deborah Kallikak were inferior products of inferior parents, who would certainly 
perpetuate that inferiority if allowed to reproduce, not only tapped into social 
anxieties, but also joined a very long and well-established chain that began with 
Lombroso and Galton.  
Considering the intellectual history of racial nativism alongside 
immigration restriction shows that restriction succeeded not only because of its 
persistent and well-connected advocates, but also because professional scientists 
were ineffective at opposing the inaccurate “biological” theories of race that 
supported restriction. It also complicates the Kuhnian thesis of revolutionary 
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paradigm shifts in scientific knowledge. For every Morgan, Boas or Jennings, 
who carefully and cautiously advanced scientific knowledge, there were many 
more Wiggams, Grants, Stoddards, Laughlins and Goddards. It must be 
remembered that it was precisely the instability of scientific knowledge in the 
early twentieth century that created space for the moneyed “men of leisure,” 
popularizers and partisan advocates, to gain a public forum. Despite Pearl’s and 
Jennings’s articles in popular magazines, the dominant perception into the 1930s 
of fixed, immutable and irrepressible hereditary characters could not be combated 
with any great effectiveness. 
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Chapter 8: The Futility of Criticism 
 
With the continued calls for immigration restriction on the basis of race 
gaining strength in the 1920s, Raymond Pearl’s uneasiness toward the claims of 
classic racialists increased. Writing to Robert Yerkes in late 1922, he complained 
of Charles Davenport’s recent statements on racial crosses and mixing and what 
Davenport believed to be inherently unstable and inferior offspring that resulted 
from such unions. These early investigations culminated in Davenport’s book 
Race Crossing in Jamaica, which was published in 1929, and the assumptions 
that underlay the book were manifest throughout most of the Cold Spring Harbor 
director’s work. Davenport’s work “rests upon very little except a priori 
reasoning,” Pearl told Yerkes, citing his own work on chickens at the Maine 
Agricultural Station in the 1910s to demonstrate the dangers of deductive 
approaches to science. Davenport’s thoughts on racial crossing were that unstable 
and weak offspring resulted from widely divergent racial mixing. Race crossing 
ultimately led to race enervation. As Pearl had found, unions of disparate crosses 
in poultry were not plagued by dramatic physiological imbalances because these 
were almost always naturally eliminated before birth. Yerkes replied that he too 
had often had the feeling that Davenport “was expressing wishes rather than 
facts.”1 Scientific experimentation had given the lie to simplistic claims of 
heredity and inheritance, and the important influence of biological determinism 
on government policy in the 1920s was for Pearl, as for many others, highly 
                                                
 
1 Raymond Pearl to Robert Yerkes, 29 November 1922; Yerkes to Pearl, 29 November 1922, box 
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troubling. As the decade wore on, and the claims of the superiority of certain 
races continued to resonate with the public, Pearl and these critics would be 
moved to action. Particular spurs for them were the dubious theories that Harry H. 
Laughlin was proposing to Congress as it attempted to devise American 
immigration policy.  
This community of criticism, which included Jennings, Boas and Hrdlicka, 
among others, emerged partly out of the cosmopolitan outlook and perspective the 
men obtained in their early training, and cultivated throughout their careers. 
Pearl’s skepticism was rooted in his experimental training, learned partly from 
Jennings and Reighard at the University of Michigan. His two teachers impressed 
upon him the importance of careful experimental work, which generated data 
from which cautious conclusions could be researched. His research at Orono 
exemplified this approach. Jennings’s work at Naples became a critical nexus of 
his hesitancy toward declaring universal biological laws. Boas, whose 1911 book 
The Mind of Primitive Man became one of the foundational texts for modern 
cultural anthropology and probably exceeded the influence of his Dillingham 
Commission report from the same year, was driven by the same research agenda, 
namely that the relationship between elements and wholes had to be understood in 
relation to each other and their surroundings. The historian Vernon Williams 
describes The Mind of Primitive Man as “complete in its refutation of crude racial 
determinist thinking, complete in its indictment of crude racial prejudice.” 
Hrdlicka also utilized this method of investigation among his work on Native 
American tribes in North and Central America. As he explained to the 
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Anthropology Section of the American Association for the Advancement of 
Science in December 1919, anthropology was the “science of human variation, 
both in man himself and in his activities,” and as such could only be understood 
by “careful observation and consideration.” As a curator of the physical 
anthropology collections at the Smithsonian, Hrdlicka also had a special 
responsibility to ensure that the data of the federal institution be available and 
accessible to investigators among the population. Pearl, Jennings and Boas 
worked in academic institutions continuing their experimental work, while 
teaching future students about the methods of modern scientific investigation. It 
was not the institutional setting that made these men critics of classic racialism in 
the 1920s, but was instead a methodological critique. And when sweeping, false 
claims were made in the 1920s, based very loosely and sloppily on the methods 
they worked so hard to master and practice, they acted to counter and dispute 
them.2 
One of the principal reasons these cosmopolitan critics were not successful 
was the complexity of their work. While Laughlin, Wiggam, Grant, Stoddard, 
Davenport and others flattened out the genuine complexity of scientific theories 
                                                
2 “Elements” and “wholes” in Boas’s work taken from Stocking, The Shaping of American 
Anthropology, 4-5; Williams from Rethinking Race, 22; Hrdlicka from Ales Hrdlicka, “On the 
Relations of Anthropology and Psychology” Science n.s. v. 51, n. 1313 (27 February 1920), 199-
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“Reevaluating Progressive Eugenics”; idem., The Retreat of Scientific Racism; Judith Johns 
Schloegel, “Intimate Biology: Herbert Spencer Jennings, Tracy Sonneborn, and the Career of 
American Protozoan Genetics” (Indiana University: Ph.D. Diss., 2006). On Hrdlicka’s work on 
native American groups, see Ales Hrdlicka, “Physiological and Medical Observations among the 
Indians of the Southwestern United States and Northern Mexico” Bulletins of the Smithsonian 
Institution, Bulletin n. 34 (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, Bureau of American 
Ethnology, 1908); idem., “Physician Anthropology of the Lenape or Delawares” Bulletins of the 
Smithsonian Institution, Bulletin n. 62 (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, Bureau of 
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of heredity and biological development, these men were forced, by training and 
temperament, to see vastly different conclusions. Pearl’s longtime friend, the 
British epidemiologist and medical statistician Major Greenwood, was one of the 
chief sounding boards for Pearl’s frustrations in the twenties of his inability to 
adequately defend scientific knowledge from misrepresentation. Both men had 
extensive experience working in statistics with – or more accurately, under – the 
great Karl Pearson, both rankled at the production of shoddy scientific work by 
untrained amateurs, and both had hearty, sparkling wits.3 When Pearl traveled to 
England, he never failed to look up his friend in London, where they complained, 
caroused, and pontificated over both frivolous and weighty issues. But their 
attitudes toward scientific investigation remained consistent: there were proper 
standards of experimentation and evidence that simply had to be fulfilled.4  
                                                
3 Greenwood became, after an interview with Karl Pearson in 1900, what Lancelot Hogben 
described as “a convert to the new cult of biometry, a self-dedicated pupil of the great man and 
anointed evangelist of the gospel of number.” He was also, Hogben noted, by neither choice nor 
inclination an experimentalist, but due to the fortuitous intervention of Leonard Hill remedied his 
narrow approach to statistical work in medicine. In 1919 Greenwood became a Member of the 
Royal College of Physicians, a Fellow of the same organization in 1924, the first Professor of 
Epidemiology and Medical Statistics at the London School of Hygiene, a Fellow of the Royal 
Society in 1928, and later, after a brief sojourn as a lecturer at the Johns Hopkins University with 
his old friend, was made an honorary member of the American Statistical Association. Lancelot 
Hogben, “Major Greenwood. 1880-1949” Obituary Notices of Fellows of the Royal Society v. 7, n. 
19 (November 1950), 138-54; 139 for Pearson, 141 for Hill, 142 for academic credentials. See 
also P. L. McKinlay, “Major Greenwood: 1880-1949” Biometrika v. 38, n. 1- 2, (June 1951), 1-3, 
which considers Greenwood’s role as a pioneer in the application of statistical ideas and methods 
to medical investigation as his greatest legacy. Greenwood also had experience in working with 
Italian scientists on statistical matters; in late November 1923, having recently returned a 
international conference on statistics in Paris, Greenwood expressed the hope that Niceforo – 
“who is really a decent figure juggler” – would facilitate international work on correlation tables. 
Greenwood to Pearl, 18 November 1923, Pearl papers. 
 
4 A trip to England in the summer of late 1924 allowed the two friends an opportunity to catch up 
and, for Pearl, to escape Prohibition and visit “East Anglian towns with commendable pubs.” It 
was, however, a working trip, as Greenwood arranged for Pearl to address the London School of 
Economics on “The Curve of Population Growth.” When Greenwood facetiously suggested Sir 
Arthur Newsholme be allowed to chair Pearl’s talk, the American replied that he would be 
delighted, “especially if I might be permitted to knock him down and step on his face at the end of 
 Chapter 8 499 
In September 1921 Pearl communicated his increasing skepticism of the 
scientific foundations of the eugenics movement to Greenwood after he returned 
from attending the Second International Congress of Eugenics, which was held in 
New York. Pearl and Jennings both delivered scientific papers at the six-day 
conference, and both advised exercising caution about the potential of the science 
to increase the quality of the human species. Pearl’s paper, “Some Eugenic 
Aspects of the Problem of Population,” exhibited the mathematical and statistical 
approach he took to matters of inheritance, as well as the importance of 
experimentally derived data. Eugenics was concerned with the type of human 
individuals that would inherit the earth, and it assumed that man could shape that 
type theoretically. This was certainly not practically possible, and even the 
theoretical possibility, he told the audience, was highly suspect.5 Pearl explained 
to Greenwood that he had avoided as much of the conference as possible – 
preferring instead “breaking the prohibition law with scientific friends in our 
rooms at the hotel” – because the eugenic part of the program was “deadly dull,” 
and sounded too much like the fantasy of Alice in Wonderland, although Pearl 
noted that the papers concerning genetics were rather good. The pragmatic and 
experimental approach he took to his scientific work was sorely needed in the 
                                                                                                                                
the lecture.” Pearl and Greenwood disliked Newsholme because the erstwhile Chief Medical 
Officer of England lacked a sophisticated grasp of statistics, which for his post both men felt he 
should have had. Greenwood to Pearl, 27 February 1924, for the trip’s origins and “commendable 
pubs”; on Newsholme, see Greenwood to Pearl, 19 April 1924; Pearl to Greenwood, 2 May 1924, 
all in Pearl Papers, APS. Pearl’s paper was also delivered at the American Philosophical Society in 
Philadelphia, which published his paper as “The Curve of Population Growth” in Proceedings of 
the American Philosophical Society, v. 63, n. 1 (1924), 10-17.  
 
5 Raymond Pearl, “Some Eugenic Aspects of the Problem of Population,” in Eugenics in Race and 
State: Scientific Papers of the Second International Congress of Eugenics (Baltimore: Williams 
and Wilkins Co., 1923), v. 2, 212-214; 214. In his talk Pearl laid emphasis on “theoretical.”   
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field of eugenics, which he felt had gradually become divorced from scientific 
reality.6 This divorce from scientific reality was one of the ironies of the 
increasingly successful restrictionist movement in that it achieved its greatest 
impact when it was clearly wrong. When Greenwood received a copy of Charles 
Davenport and Albert Love’s statistical book Army Anthropology, he complained 
that Davenport and his “fellow conspirators” produced a volume worse than its 
English equivalent because it was much longer, although he joked that this made 
it much more useful as a footstool or paper weight. Pearl replied that Davenport 
had made attempts to involve him in the statistical computations, but that he had 
avoided it as “it has always seemed merely a bad tabulation of bad statistics and 
nothing more.”7 Pearl had little regard for Davenport’s work in general, but his 
compilation of the Army data was particularly bad.  
The paper that Jennings delivered to the International Congress was 
similarly skeptical of the field, and mapped out the path of criticism toward 
eugenics that he would take in the coming years. The essential assumption of 
eugenics was that “like produced like,” but Jennings pointed out that man and all 
higher animals have an elemental contribution of two inheritance strains. Jennings 
                                                
6 Pearl to Greenwood, 29 September 1921, Pearl Papers. Pearl also asked his friend about rumors 
he had heard at the Congress that Pearson may step down as head of the Galton Lab and that 
Greenwood would be chosen as the most logical replacement; Greenwood replied that the Galton 
Professor in Eugenics should be interested in eugenics and not medical statistics, and that the 
Pearsonian and Leonard Darwinian model of eugenics held no interest for him, as he considered it 
“merely after dinner tosh.” Pearl to Greenwood, 29 September 1921; Greenwood to Pearl 23 
November 1921, Pearl Papers.  
 
7 Greenwood to Pearl, 21 October 1921; Pearl to Greenwood 26 October 1921, both Pearl Papers. 
Charles B. Davenport and Albert G. Love, Army Anthropology: Based on Observations made on 
Draft Recruits, 1917-1918, and on Veterans at Demobilization, 1919 (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1921). 
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discovered that in unicellular organisms, although most offspring had essentially 
the same genes, this did not preclude wide variety, and occasionally great 
diversity, in the offspring even in these simple organisms. The popular impression 
of eugenics and genetics was that human characteristics behaved as they did in 
unicellular organisms, and were predetermined in the germ plasm received at 
birth, which determined all facets of later development and made them resemble 
the parental characteristics. But Jennings, with his experimental background, 
insisted that such assumptions were not valid in simple-celled protozoa, and “I 
venture to say that there is no ground for asserting it to be true in man.”8 A great 
deal of the insights into genetics and heredity came from simple organisms for a 
variety of reasons – the environment was much easier to control, shorter gestation 
and reproduction periods enabled long ancestral lines to develop quickly, and 
experimental variables and manipulation could be used on the simple specimens 
in a way that they obviously could not on human beings. Thus, scientists with 
backgrounds in zoology like Pearl and Jennings, saw that the a priori assumptions 
at the core of eugenics did not hold true for small organisms – so how could they 
be presumed to be true in far more complex organisms like man?  
Pearl’s critiques of research in genetics and population patterns extended 
to serious scientists as well. Shortly before St. Patrick’s Day in 1923, Pearl 
criticized the noted geneticist August Weismann in a letter to Greenwood. Pearl 
                                                
8 Herbert Spencer Jennings, “Inheritance in Unicellular Organisms,” in Eugenics Genetics and the 
Family: Scientific Papers of the Second International Congress of Eugenics held at the American 
Museum of Natural History, New York City, New York, 22-28 September 1921 (Baltimore: 
Williams and Wilkins Co., 1923), v. 1, 59-64; 60.  
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felt that Weismann’s greatest contribution as a naturalist was to perceive, through 
the observation of simple-celled organisms, the mechanism of heredity that he 
laid out in The Germ Plasm in 1893.9 But when Weismann “left nature and began 
to explore his inner consciousness,” Pearl pointed out to Greenwood, “he seems to 
have become pretty stupid. The trouble with the whole natural selection game as it 
flourished in the 80’s and 90’s was that, as we now know, it was purely a priori 
reasoning which had nothing whatever really to do with the actual facts of 
nature.”10 This was the core of Pearl’s growing apprehensiveness to eugenics. 
Advocates put forth theories based on assumptions that had been experimentally 
invalidated, that were not based on actual facts of nature. The signal triumph of T. 
H. Morgan and Mendelian genetics was to make the faulty a priori assumptions 
perfectly clear and to expose them as, quite simply, wrong. The problem, 
however, was that this was clear only to a very small number of scientists. By and 
large the American public still had complete confidence in the eugenic 
implications of natural selection, and by extension, to the immutability of race 
that underpinned the restrictionist movement. 
As the strong influence of Laughlin on the United States Congress and 
immigration policy became clearer in the mid-1920s, both Pearl and Jennings 
published critiques of the sloppy statistical data the eugenicist was furnishing the 
Congressional committees, in particular Laughlin’s computation of the 
                                                
9 Carlson, Mendel’s Legacy; August Weismann, The Germ Plasm: A Theory of Heredity W. 
Newton Parker and Harriet Rönnfeldt, trans. (Bristol, U.K.: Thoemmes Press, 2003 [orig. 1892].  
 
10 Raymond Pearl to Major Greenwood, 16 March 1923, Pearl papers.  
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dependency of immigrant stocks. Laughlin’s data samples that he used as the 
basis for his testimony were highly flawed, but no one on the Committee 
possessed the scientific training to point that out. They may not have understood 
the ways Laughlin was misrepresenting heredity and biology and flattening out 
the complexities of scientific knowledge of heredity and genetics. Or, like 
Johnson, they have not have cared at all about the accuracy of the testimony 
Laughlin provided, but merely wanted the ERO director to provide them with 
information to justify their pre-determined policy provisions. Pearl and Jennings 
tried to provide professional, credible scientific information. Laughlin did not. 
But significantly, it was only Laughlin who had any effect on Congress and the 
public.  
In June 1923, Jennings received a letter from the editorial board of The 
Survey asking for a contribution to the magazine that would examine Laughlin’s 
“Analysis of America's Modern Melting Pot” that was prepared for the House 
Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, and published by the Government 
Printing Office in early 1923. “This report contains some astonishing 
generalizations,” the board’s representative Bruno Lasker noted, “and not being 
expert on this subject we do not feel sure whether the evidence bears them out or 
whether other important considerations have been neglected.…” Lasker and his 
colleagues felt constrained and confused by the conflicting evidence about 
heredity and genetics from biologists and sociologists, but they recognized the 
weight that Laughlin’s work carried in favor of “further restrictive legislation.” 
The eugenicist’s report would be “difficult to combat if true, and…will in the 
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future be thrown at us every time we pleaded for a liberal treatment of the 
immigration question.” Would Jennings not consider doing the public a service, 
and as a biologist study the matter in “a scientific, unbiased manner”? Lasker 
assured Jennings that The Survey would be able to help the general public gain a 
better understanding of the complexities of heredity and inheritance if the 
Hopkins professor would be willing to write the article.11  
Jennings not only drafted an article for publication in The Survey; when 
the school year opened he had his seminar students go over Laughlin’s data as 
well as a didactic exercise of how statistical data could be misrepresented. Geddes 
Smith, the new managing editor of the weekly publication, welcomed the 
revisions that Jennings then made to his article, and lined it up for publication in a 
mid-December issue. The article, Smith felt, “leaves the hasty advocates of 
restrictive legislation very little ground to stand on.”12 A note of encouragement to 
Jennings from Pearl around the same time echoed Smith’s fears of “the 
reactionary group” that had the ear of Congressmen and were using Laughlin’s 
data as a support for greater restrictions on immigration.13  
Although he was given an audience before the House Immigration and 
Naturalization Committee during the debate over the 1924 Immigration Act, 
Jennings was squeezed in at the end of the day’s session, and was only able to 
                                                
11 Bruno Lasker to Herbert Spencer Jennings, 12 June 1923, Jennings papers.  
 
12 Jennings to the Editor of The Survey, 24 October, 1923; Geddes Smith to Jennings, 26 
November 1923, both Jennings papers. Jennings’s discusses his classroom in the letter of 24 
October.  
 
13 Pearl to Jennings, 24 November 1923, Jennings papers.  
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speak briefly to Johnson and the other members.14 Unable to adequately point out 
problems with Laughlin’s testimony to the committee members in detail, Jennings 
used his article for The Survey to demonstrate Laughlin’s misleading and 
inaccurate data before the final vote was taken in the whole House. It was true, as 
Laughlin had testified, that the environmental pressures that immigrants faced 
were greater than those of the native born, because immigrants often lacked an 
established social network to provide for economic and social stability. But 
Jennings demonstrated a glaring problem in Laughlin’s data sample: it was drawn 
only from public institutions, which would naturally deal almost exclusively with 
the poorer classes, which recent, unestablished immigrants tended to be. It should 
not be surprising that immigrants would have a higher representation in 
governmental institutions. Jennings asked, though, if statistics from expensive 
private institutions might not show a reversal of the proportions of 
institutionalization of the native-born and the foreign-born. The only logical 
conclusion that could be drawn from Laughlin’s incomplete data sample was that 
“it cannot be held that the occurrence of defects is actually so much greater in the 
foreign-born as the face of the present statistics seem to show.” For Jennings, 
recent immigrants were not inferior in their inherited qualities, and he felt 
confident that a thorough study would show that it was the difficulties of their 
                                                
14 See “Restriction of Immigration: Hearings before the Committee on Immigration and 
Naturalization, House of Representatives” 68th Congress, 1st Session, December 26, 27, 31, 1923, 
January 2-5, 7, 8, 10, 19, 1924 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1924), Statement 
of Herbert Spencer Jennings, 510-13.  
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physical surroundings that limited the ability of the immigrants to successfully 
adapt and develop.15 
Jennings continued his critique of Laughlin’s work in the new year. In the 
March 14, 1924 issue of Science, he again sought to undermine the importance 
Congress was attaching to Laughlin’s statistical testimony. The Hopkins professor 
showed that the evidence that Laughlin provided to support his assertion that new 
immigrants were contributing an excess proportion to custodial institutions was 
wrong. Furthermore, Jennings pointed out that the shift in the census basis from 
1910 to 1890 to compute immigration quotas, which Congress was then 
considering and which supporters argued would reduce the number of 
“institutional socially inadequates,” would not have that effect at all. Though the 
races represented in custodial institutions would change – from southern to 
northern Europeans – the 1890 census would still yield essentially the same total 
number of defectives.16 This represented an essential point in Jennings’s general 
arguments against classic racialism. The immigrants represented in the 1890 
census would generate a similar number of defectives – although he explained 
that the type of defects would be slightly different – because the stresses of 
assimilation and environment were the same, regardless of the race of 
                                                
15 Herbert Spencer Jennings, “‘Undesirable Aliens’: A Biologist’s Examination of the Evidence 
Before Congress” The Survey v. 51 (15 December 1923), 309-12, 364; quote from 311.  
 
16 Herbert Spencer Jennings, “Proportions of Defectives from the Northwest and Southeast of 
Europe” Science n.s. v. 59, n. 1524 (March 14, 1924), 256-7.  
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immigrants.17 It was not simply the racial character of the immigrants that made 
them defective and undesirable – it was also the environmental context.  
Jennings’s great contribution to the classic racialist critique in the 1920s 
came in the early fall of 1924, when the popular magazine The Scientific Monthly 
published his article “Heredity and Environment.” The article showed the 
culmination of Jennings’s researches in the biological development of organisms, 
and he later expanded this brief essay into book form.18 The public’s “grotesquely 
inadequate and misleading” understanding of Mendelism, which was “still 
presented in the conventional biological gospels” and implied a “trivial role of the 
environment” compelled Jennings to write the lengthy article to correct these 
misperceptions. All organisms, he announced were subject to the limitations of 
what they were made of – their heredity – and the material conditions surrounding 
their development – their environment. He insisted that the development of all 
                                                
17 For example, according to Jennings’s computations, the number of insane inmates would 
increase 5.7%, dependent paupers would increase 58.1%, and epileptics would increase 3.0%, 
while the number of criminals would decrease 42.4%, and the feeble-minded population in 
custodial institutions would decrease 20.9%. Ibid., 256-7.  
 
18 Jennings published two books on the subject: Prometheus, or Biology and the Advancement of 
Man (1925) and The Biological Basis of Human Nature (1930). Both books were favorably 
reviewed. E. B. Reuter, a sociology professor at the University of Iowa, noted that the importance 
of Prometheus was “out of all proportion to its [small] size. Jennings shows the inadequacy of the 
genetic conceptions at the basis of the eugenic programs and other schemes of racial 
improvement.” E. B. Reuter, review of Prometheus, or Biology and the Advancement of Man by 
Herbert Spencer Jennings in The American Journal of Sociology v. 31, n. 5 (March 1926), 692; E. 
B. Reuter, review of The Biological Basis of Human Nature by Herbert Spencer Jennings in The 
American Journal of Sociology v. 36, n. 3 (November 1930), 498; R. L. Duffus, “Modern 
Biological Science and the Future of the Race” review of The Biological Basis of Human Nature 
by Herbert Spencer Jennings in The New York Times 13 April 1930, 66. Duffus explained that a 
careful and close reading by the “intelligent layman” would help him “emerge well-armed against 
the fatalists, charlatans and fakers who of recent years have been twisting biological fact to bolster 
up a pseudo-scientific toryism.”  
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organisms was equally shaped by these two factors.19 But as Jennings explained 
this process of development, one of the great problems within the new 
paradigmatic model became clear: the process was complex and difficult to 
demonstrate. In contrast, the declaration that “like produces like,” as Laughlin, 
Davenport, Grant and other classic racialists frequently proclaimed, held an 
alluring simplicity.  
The basis of eugenics was wrong, and inheritance was not a physiological 
principle based on simple Mendelian ratios, Jennings explained. Instead, 
inheritance was directed by the “arrangement of the packets of chemicals” in cells 
and their methods of distribution within cells. In many instances of reproduction, 
“nothing resembling Mendelian inheritance” occurred. The vast majority of 
organisms have “biparental inheritance,” with every germ cell receiving two 
different groups of packets, which made accurately predicting development “more 
hazardous in this field than is sometimes represented.”20 Not only was the 
organism’s environment important in shaping its development, the hereditary 
contribution of both familial lines was a significant factor as well. Accurate 
predictions of inheritance and development within this complex perspective was, 
therefore, nearly impossible. But in the face of the simplistic determinism of “like 
produces like,” an understanding of the vast complexities of genetic inheritance 
was difficult to achieve, let alone effectively communicate to a lay population.  
                                                
19 Herbert Spencer Jennings, “Heredity and Environment” The Scientific Monthly, v. 19, n. 3 
(September 1924), 225-38; 225. 
 
20 Ibid., 227.  
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Through his laboratory work, Jennings aimed to make these complex rules 
of inheritance more comprehensible to both scientific and lay communities. His 
article explained that confidence in asserting the relative influence of environment 
and heredity could only be obtained by studying the ways embryos changed under 
microscopic examination, or by following the example of Thomas Hunt Morgan 
and interchanging the composition of the chemical packets and noting the results. 
It was the misinterpretation of Morgan’s early work that led to the inaccurate 
doctrine of the “all-might of inheritance [that] is still proclaimed by the 
popularizers of biological science.” The theory of “unit characters,” that each 
characteristic of the organism was contained in a particular place, had been 
obliterated by scientific progress in genetics. Experimental evidence of the 
genetic complexity of eye color in fruit flies – the interaction of at least 50 genes, 
Jennings explained, produced the eye color – undermined the certainty with which 
eugenicists claimed heredity worked. Jennings insisted that “Neither eye color nor 
tallness nor feeble-mindedness, nor any other characteristic, is a unit character in 
any such sense. There is indeed no such thing as a ‘unit character,’ and it would 
be a step in advance if that expression should disappear.”21 He continued, writing 
that, “Heredity is not the simple, hard-and-fast thing that old-fashioned 
Mendelism represented it [to be].”22 And Jennings pointed out the implications for 
this radical complexity of heredity beyond the laboratory as well. 
                                                
21 Ibid., 228.  
 
22 Ibid., 230. See also Carlson, Mendel’s Legacy; Allen, Morgan.  
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Discussions of immigration problems showed this inaccurate over-
simplicity in practice, he noted. The proportion of defective and diseased persons 
in the immigrant stream, Americans were told, was a result of unchangeable and 
inherited qualities that inferior immigrants would pass on to future generations. 
“There is no warrant in the science of genetics for such a statement,” Jennings 
confidently explained. A “great throwing about of false biology” had misled much 
of the public to fear the genetic makeup of the “new” immigrants, rather than try 
to understand how the environment and social factors also directed human 
development.23  
Jennings’s article elicited a great deal of support from the scientific 
community. H. F. Perkins, a professor in the Zoology Department at the 
University of Vermont wrote to Jennings that he found the article “a startling 
piece of criticism.” Perkins felt that Jennings had weakened the foundation of 
eugenics by exposing some of the experimental shortcomings of the field: “these 
[are] questions that now seem to me to be too radical to accept without a great 
deal of careful thought and considerably more evidence than I have seen brought 
forward yet.”24 Davenport wrote from Cold Spring Harbor to offer congratulations 
on the paper, which he felt “quite opens up a new Epoch.”25 Even Albert Wiggam 
– who told Jennings “yours is the best and most clean-cut discussion yet written 
                                                
23 Ibid., 237.  
 
24 H. F. Perkins to Jennings, 22 October 1924, Jennings Papers.  
 
25 Davenport to Jennings, 30 October 1924, Jennings Papers.  
 
 Chapter 8 511 
[on problems in eugenics], especially from the genetical and embryological 
standpoint” – found the article instructive.26 
The mis-statements of biological knowledge made in support of classic 
racialism continued to irk Jennings, despite the positive reception of The Scientific 
Monthly article. In Prometheus, or Biology and the Advancement of Man (1925), 
he set out to demolish those “grossly misleading and inadequate” representations 
of Mendelism that were propounded in the “conventional biological gospels,” and 
was a more detailed empirical attack on classic racialism, driven by the same 
fundamental belief that heredity and environment were equally important in 
human development.27 Jennings argued that the concept of “unit characters” was 
the single weakest scientific claim that the racialists advanced. With origins in 
Lamarck’s theory of the inheritance of acquired characteristics, its simple 
argument that development stemmed from the immutable germ plasm in each cell 
could no longer be held to be true.28  
                                                
26 Wiggam to Jennings, 18 October 1924, Jennings Papers. See also Elazar Barkan, “Reevaluating 
Progressive Eugenics: Herbert Spencer Jennings and the 1924 Immigration Legislation” Journal 
of the History of Biology v. 24, n. 1 (Spring 1991), 91-112 in which Barkan describes Jennings’s 
activities as follows: “In the biological jungle of racism and xenophobia, with no other biologist 
speaking out to counter the racist propaganda advanced in the name of biology, Jennings’s 
testimony to Congress showed civic commitment and made him the standard-bearer of biological 
egalitarianism.” 98. Also important are Bentley Glass, “Geneticists Embattled: Their Stand 
Against Rampant Eugenics and Racism in America During the 1920s and 1930s” Proceedings of 
the American Philosophical Society v. 139 (1986), 130-54; Elazar Barkan, The Retreat of 
Scientific Racism: Changing Concepts of Race in Britain and the United States Between the World 
Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).  
 
27 Herbert Spencer Jennings, Prometheus, or Biology and the Advancement of Man (New York: E. 
P. Dutton and Co., 1925), 3; quotes from Jennings, “Heredity and Environment” 262.  
 
28 Jennings, Prometheus, 29 emphasis original. See also Paul, Controlling Human Heredity: 1865 
to the Present (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1995) and Hamilton Cravens, The Triumph of 
Evolution: American Scientists and the Heredity-Environment Controversy, 1900-1941 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1978) for descriptions of the role of 
Lamarckianism in the development of evolutionary theory and eugenics.  
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But Jennings could not undermine the alluring simplicity of classic 
racialism. When he described the growth and development of organisms from 
“genes [that] are simply chemicals that enter in a great number of complex 
reactions, the final upshot of which is to produce the completed body,” and how 
“the way [the chemicals] interact and what they produce depends on the 
conditions,” he presented an argument far more scientifically accurate than one 
based unit characters, but one much more intellectually complex. In Jennings’s 
system of inheritance, chemical packets inherited from two parents – each with 
their own particular hereditary lineage – interacted specifically in relation to the 
environmental circumstances of development. “In these senses,” he explained, 
“all characteristics are hereditary and all are environmental, but no characteristic 
is exclusively hereditary or exclusively environmental.”29 But how exactly one 
would document the impact of the environment on the development of organisms 
was challenging. As Boas had learned in his study on the descendants of 
immigrants for the Dillingham Commission, the causal link in changes of body 
form was difficult to pinpoint; Jennings found the problem persisting into the 
1920s. The reality was, the Hopkins biologist felt, was that heredity and 
environment were coequal factors in determining the development of all 
organisms. How to communicate and disseminate this knowledge effectively, was 
a very different matter. 
                                                                                                                                
 
29 Jennings, Prometheus, reactions from 29, emphasis original; all characters hereditary and 
environmental from 48.  
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Two articles written in 1926 illustrate Jennings’s increasing frustration 
with the misconceptions of genetics and the biological sciences. Shortly after the 
publication of the Austrian researcher Paul Kammerer’s book on midwife toads, 
which purported to document Lamarckian evolution, Jennings wrote another 
popular article to caution readers about the limitations of scientific knowledge, 
and, more importantly, to consider the credibility of authors and researchers in the 
field. Kammerer had published his controversial book supporting the inheritance 
of environmentally acquired characteristics in 1924. When the English scientist 
William Bateson confronted Kammerer regarding the evidence provided by the 
last-remaining physical specimen that the Austrian claimed demonstrated the 
inheritance of the character, an investigation led to charges of specimen tampering 
that Kammerer denied. Then Kammerer committed suicide in September 1926.30 
Jennings addressed this issue of “acquired characteristics” in an essay in The 
Forum, in which he insisted on recognizing and accepting the limitations of 
modern genetic knowledge. Research by Morgan on fruit flies, and R. A. Emerson 
on variations in corn revealed, he explained, hundreds of cases of environmental 
change compelling species variation. This suggested that perhaps there was some 
slight element of Lamarckianism in heredity, and an overall malleability in the 
                                                
30 Paul Kammerer, The Inheritance of Acquired Characteristics trans. A. Paul Maerker-Branded 
(New York: Boni and Liveright, 1924); see also Arthur Koestler, The Case of the Midwife Toad 
(London: Hutchinson Press, 1971); Sander Gliboff, “‘Protoplasm…is the soft wax in our hands’: 
Paul Kammerer and the Art of Biological Transformation” Endeavor v. 29, n. 4 (December 2006), 
162-67; idem., “The Case of Paul Kammerer: Evolution and Experimentation in the Early 
Twentieth Century” Journal of the History of Biology v. 39, n. 3 (September 2006), 525-63.  
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genetic structure of organisms.31 The mechanism of transmission, however, was a 
mystery, and that required more knowledge, which could only be gained 
experimentally. Jennings also cautioned “ninety-nine per cent of the parent’s 
acquirements are not inherited by his descendents.”32 But near the end of article, 
he again trumpeted the achievements of experimental breeding, which showed 
“that a given stock, subjected for many generations to a changed environment, 
may become hereditarily altered, in structures, functions, or habits.”33 Although 
this was essentially the argument Kammerer had been making, and amounted to 
an endorsement of what historian Sander Gliboff calls “old-school Darwinism,” 
no one still had any concrete proof of how the variations were transmitted.34 But 
Jennings went on to describe the absolutely imperative element of proper 
scientific study: the credibility and reliability of the investigator.  
This was the crux of much of Jennings’s critiques of the scientific work of 
biological and eugenic popularizers. Kammerer’s work was experimentally and 
methodologically highly problematic – in fact, one could consider Kammerer an 
Austrian version of Davenport, except that even Davenport critiqued the quality 
of Kammerer’s work and gossiped that British academics called the Austrian a 
                                                
31 Herbert Spencer Jennings, “The Inheritance of Acquired Characters” The Forum v. 76 
(November 1926), 702-11; also Carlson, Mendel’s Legacy. Jennings’s other article was from a 
speech he gave that will be discussed below. 
 
32 Jennings, “The Inheritance of Acquired Characters” 708, 707. Jennings’s use of the singular 
male pronoun is curious considering the efforts he made to explain the limitations of “biparental 
inheritance.”  
 
33 Ibid., 709.  
 
34 Gliboff, “The Case of Paul Kammerer,” 538.  
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“charlatan.”35 Jennings urged that professional and reliable scientists try to 
confirm Kammerer’s work so that it could be “corroborated or refuted as soon as 
possible. If it is correct, it deserves the Nobel prize.”36 The implicit point was that 
only careful, experimental study by trained and creditable professional scientific 
investigators could gather the clear, definite, and generally valid answers that 
nature declined to give. What the answers were was just as important to Jennings 
as how they were obtained. Jennings made this clear in a lengthy address in June 
1926 to the crowd gathered for the dedication of the Whitman Laboratory of 
Experimental Zoology at the University of Chicago.  
Jennings’s career arc intersected with a major revolution in scientific 
knowledge. Early in his academic career, Jennings told the crowd, zoological 
work was by and large descriptive – there was no real manipulation of specimens. 
From those qualitative descriptions far-reaching conclusions were drawn. 
Quickly, however, the trend changed to experimental work that nearly every 
zoologist, himself included, embraced. The point of this trend was that to 
establish truth claims, a scientist must have empirical, experimental and 
                                                
35 Charles B. Davenport to Irving Fisher, 6 December 1923. Regarding Kammerer’s work, 
Davenport pointed out that he had never met the Austrian scientist, although he had observed 
some of Kammerer’s experiments in 1909 and 1922. Davenport felt that “The reputation of the 
gentleman among geneticists in this country is not at all what could be desired. I mean that they 
feel that he has never presented proper evidence for his conclusions and one does not get the 
evidence even when he goes to Kammerer’s own laboratory. … other Englishman regard him 
almost in the light of a charlatan.” In a letter eleven days later, Davenport curiously told Fisher 
that “The whole matter of charlatans in science is one of the most difficult to understand that there 
is. I have got glimpses of its meaning, however, in the course of thirty years of connection with 
scientists.” Davenport to Fisher, 17 December 1923, both Davenport papers. The irony, of course, 
is that many of the same criticisms were levied at Davenport. See, e.g. Boas to Hrdlicka, 18 March 
1919, Hrdlicka Papers; Jennings to “Jessica” [Mary Louise Burridge], 10 February 1895; Jennings 
to “Jessica” 24 February 1895, both in Jennings Papers.  
 
36 Jennings, “Inheritance of Acquired Characters,” 711.  
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quantitative proof. For Jennings it was critical that “We must be able to say: Such 
and such things happen under such and such conditions, and if you don’t believe 
it you may supply the conditions, you may try it for yourself, and you will find it 
to be true.”37 The ability to reproduce experimental results and verify conclusions 
was one of the essential principles of the scientific method, as it was the only way 
that scientists could be confident in the accuracy of scientific knowledge. In this 
context, the reputation and conscientiousness of the researcher in laboratory or 
experimental work was crucial. Often, Jennings explained, incautious scientists – 
though he did not name them perhaps he had in mind Kammerer, Davenport, 
Laughlin and Goddard – were beguiled by coincidental associations and 
connections that could be attributed to several causes, such as selective 
elimination and selective persistence that occur on a genetic level, but which gave 
rise to “the teleological fantasies of biology.”38 The inability to replicate 
experimental results in equivalent controlled circumstances would seriously 
undermine the confidence to be placed in the experiments, precisely what had 
happened to Kammerer’s toads.  
In addition to the printed critiques and public lectures he gave throughout 
1925 and 1926, Jennings tried to combat these biological misunderstandings and 
press the importance of knowledge gained under experimental conditions.  In 
                                                
37 Herbert Spencer Jennings, “Biology and Experimentation” Science n.s. v. 64, n. 1648 (July 30, 
1926), 97-105; address given 4 June 1926. Quote from 98. Experimentalism could also generate 
contrary results, showing that general principles that may seem obvious were wrong.  
 
38 Ibid., 104. Selective persistence may include, for example, Kammerer’s midwife toad’s nuptual 
pads, but the genetic basis of the transmission was not proven. The “teleological fantasies” were 
the nexus of both the American eugenics movement and the Nazi’s “Final Solution” that mankind 
could be scientifically purified to something approaching perfection.  
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mid-March 1926 Jennings returned to the University of Pennsylvania, where he 
had spent a few years teaching early in his career, to give what he called “An 
Unpopular Talk.” The lengthy address demonstrated the frustration that Jennings 
felt over public statements of scientific knowledge by non-academics. He lectured 
the crowd that the way that science and biology was “proclaimed in the 
headlines” to advocate eugenics and Nordic supremacy was a grave problem that 
scientists had to take more seriously. In particular, Jennings singled out Albert 
Wiggam’s book, The New Decalogue of Science as a typical example of “what is 
being received as the latest and final conclusions of biology.”39 The book claimed, 
Jennings said, that mankind was degenerating, that heredity alone and not the 
environment determined development in man, that human differences were 
inherent in germ cells, that social class was a function of nature and inheritance, 
and that the melting pot was an untenable, biologically wrong fantasy; in short, 
Wiggam laid out the orthodox classic racialist position. Wiggam used the 
“supposed present state of the knowledge of genetics” to settle matters of state 
policy on immigration, criminology, children’s education, hygiene and social 
services, and marriage.40 
It was pure fantasy. Jennings became “a bit disturbed,” he explained, when 
he looked at the “radical doctrines served up to us in the name of biological 
                                                
39 Herbert Spencer Jennings, Lecture n. 37, “Some Unsettled and Unsettling Questions in 
Biological Science: An Unpopular Talk” unpublished mss., delivered at the University of 
Pennsylvania, 11 March 1926, Jennings Papers, “Lectures,” APS, 13, 15. See also Wiggam, The 
Fruit of the Family Tree and The New Decalogue of Science, discussed in chapter 6.  
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science.”41 He offered a brief history of biological science through his own 
experience to show how inaccurate were the claims made by Wiggam and his ilk. 
The generation after Darwin – convinced of the correctness of the evolutionary 
hypothesis – tried to work out the details of evolution by studying developments 
and changes in groups of animals over geologic time. Around 1890, the same time 
that Jennings embarked on his professional academic career at the University of 
Michigan, the evolutionary hypothesis began to waver as investigators disputed 
the varying courses of evolution for any particular group of organisms.  
For Jennings, when he began his studies in zoology, such a realization was 
“very distressing,” as it made him realize that “science progresses like the rat in 
the maze, by trial and error.”42 The only solution was to base biological 
knowledge on careful experimental study. Biology must be studied in a way in 
which theories can be proven or disproven; “We must find out things that we can 
show people: we must be able to say to doubters—you try it yourself and you will 
see that it’s true.”43 This was the fatal flaw in the work presented by Wiggam, 
Davenport and Laughlin and others. There was no experimental basis of their 
knowledge that could be tested and verified. Their knowledge claims were based 
on assumptions – Jennings told how they were “very largely determined by their 
                                                
41 Ibid., 26.  
 
42 Ibid., 31-32. This is exactly the impetus toward radical changes in scientific paradigms that 
Kuhn explains: “Discovery [of new paradigms] commences with the awareness of anomaly, i.e. 
with the recognition that nature somehow was violated the paradigm-induced expectations that 
govern normal science. It then continues with a more or less extended exploration of the area of 
anomaly. And it closes only when the paradigm theory has been adjusted so that the anomalous 
has become the expected.” Kuhn, Scientific Revolutions, 52-3.  
 
43 Jennings, “Some Unsettled and Unsettling Questions,” 37. Emphasis original. 
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general views in certain matters that may be called philosophical” – that were 
scientifically and empirically untenable.44 As he stood over his laboratory tables 
conducting experiments on his little Neapolitan paramecia at the Naples 
Zoological Station around the turn of the century, Jennings came to realize that 
even simple-celled organisms behaved and developed in complex ways, just as 
dogs, cats, turtles and squirrels did. Jennings concluded the “Unpopular Talk” by 
advocating “a healthy skepticism as to the finality of the immediate doctrines just 
at present prevailing in any science.”45 That dramatic changes in government 
policy were being contemplated based on these truth claims troubled Jennings 
tremendously. He urged his audience to take the truth claims of scientific 
knowledge with a grain of salt.  
Jennings felt that the way that supporters of restriction and eugenics used 
false biology to rationalize the changes in government policy and their own social 
prejudices had to be addressed. As a teacher, he could not let stand this sloppy 
and careless work. Classic racialists and their influence over the public’s and 
politicians’ understanding of heredity had to be corrected. For a practicing 
researcher, the declarations of Laughlin and Wiggam on the state of genetics was 
fundamentally wrong. They were not scientists and had no authority or expertise 
to speak on it. At the end of 1926, as Jennings prepared to retire from the 
chairmanship of the Zoological Section of the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science, he addressed his colleagues and again emphasized the 
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importance of experimentalism as the basis for all scientific knowledge. Since he 
was speaking to a learned audience, Jennings framed his examples in more 
esoteric terms than his Philadelphia address from the spring. But the underlying 
message was the same: observation and experiment “are the primary and the final 
methods of science, never to be laid aside. They are the methods for learning of 
the universe.”46 Deductive reasoning could not prove theories of evolution, and by 
extension of eugenics and heredity. “When the reasoned conclusion conflicts with 
experiment, it is the reasoned conclusion that must give way.” Jennings explained 
how “Herbert Spencer’s tragedy of the deduction killed by an observed fact is as 
typical and necessary an event in science as is the death of the unfit in the 
evolution of organisms.”47  
Pearl shared the frustration of his friend and former teacher, and put to 
paper for public consumption many of the issues he had raised privately to 
Greenwood and Jennings. In November 1927 Pearl published an article that took 
on the idea of the racial hierarchies that lay at the core of nativist support for 
immigration restriction, and strongly denied the accuracy of Galton’s work in 
pedigree analysis and eugenics. Pearl explained that the Danish geneticist 
Wilhelm Johannsen had, like Mendel, used beans to test for a vector of 
inheritance, and like Pearl, had found great difficulty in accurately predicting the 
characters of progeny. Referencing his own Orono chickens and the literature on 
                                                
46 Herbert Spencer Jennings, “Diverse Doctrines of Evolution, Their Relation to the Practice of 
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inheritance in animal breeds, Pearl asserted that “there was no evidence whatever 
that these [superior] breeds had been produced by the method of gradually 
accumulating small superior bodily variations by continued selection.”48 The 
impossibility of accurately predicting the characteristics of offspring totally 
undermined the feasibility of eugenics. Pearl noted the methodological and 
empirical flaws in the research behind eugenic claims, and described “the ill-
advised zeal with which some of its more ardent devotees have assigned such 
complex and heterogeneous phenomena as poverty, insanity, crime, prostitution, 
cancer, etc.” that was bringing the movement into “disrepute.”49 This 
heterogeneity was becoming, for the professional scientific community, 
increasingly significant in tempering expectations of eugenics. The simplistic 
claims of the classic racialist position that “like produces like” – Supreme Court 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. had only that May issued his famous opinion 
that “three generations of imbeciles are enough” in Buck v. Bell – were grossly 
inaccurate.50 
By publishing his criticisms in his friend H. L. Mencken’s American 
Mercury, Pearl hoped to reach a large audience and remedy the misconceptions of 
eugenics, which he described as “a mingled mess of ill-grounded and uncritical 
sociology, economics, anthropology, and politics…solemnly put forth as science, 
                                                
48 Raymond Pearl, “The Biology of Superiority” The American Mercury vol. 12, n. 47 (November 
1927), 257-66; 259.  
 
49 Pearl, “The Biology of Superiority,” 260.  
 
50 On Carrie Buck, see Stephen Jay Gould, The Flamingo’s Smile: Reflections in Natural History 
(NY: W W Norton, 1985); idem., Mismeasure of Man; Paul Lombardo, “Facing Carrie Buck” The 
Hastings Center Report v. 33, n. 2 (March-April, 2003), 14-17. 
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and unfortunately accepted as such by the general public.”51 This was the essential 
problem. Not only were the scientific theories underpinning eugenics untenable in 
light of developments in genetics, they were also used to support and legitimize 
social prejudice. Pearl regarded “superiority” as a relative term, not a scientific 
one – it always seemed to mean “a. ‘My kind of people,’ or b. ‘People whom I 
happen to like.’” This was nonsense. “The Italians,” he noted, “are proud of 
themselves, of their history, and of their ancestry, noble in its achievements; but 
the new existing immigration law of the United States attests that they are an 
undesirable, and therefore by implication, inferior race.” This was a “profound 
fallacy” that science had shown to be wholly incorrect. Pearl noted that 
correspondence between Galton and Darwin in 1872 and 1873 showed that even 
Darwin was profoundly unsettled by determining who was superior, and Thomas 
Morgan’s Evolution and Genetics (1925) similarly cautioned against deciding the 
genetic superiority or inferiority of whole races.52 But although science had 
exposed this “profound fallacy,” it retained great purchase in the public mind.  
Pearl closed his article with an important warning: “Certainly modern 
genetics gives no support to the view that the somatic characteristics of the 
offspring can be predicted from a knowledge of the somatic characters of the 
parents. In preaching as they do, that like produces like, and that therefore 
superior people will have superior children, and inferior people will have inferior 
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children, the orthodox eugenicists are going contrary to the best established facts 
of genetical science, and are, in the long run, doing their cause harm.”53 Yet 
maddeningly to professional biologists, this did not matter. As the Congressional 
debates over national origins and immigration quotas showed, the theories of 
orthodox eugenicists held much more sway in the public imagination. 
The difficulty of navigating between the outdated, scientifically untenable 
classic racialism and the ambiguities and complexities of modern genetic and 
biological science can be seen in Edwin Conklin’s troubles in the late 1920s. In 
March 1928, Conklin began talking privately with Pearl about the over-emphasis 
being placed on inheritance by lay writers. Conklin was unable to take a decisive 
stand on the hereditary aspects of personality. The Princeton professor felt that 
mental capacity was indeed fixed by heredity, and the rediscovery of the 
Mendelian ratios of inheritance that were unknown to Galton seemed to him to 
reaffirm the Galtonian theory of the inheritance of genius. Certainly, Conklin 
conceded, “great men have come from unknown parents and unknown ones from 
great parents,” but he attributed that to random combinations of hereditary factors 
rather than the impact of the environment.54 Still, in a second note to Pearl sent 
shortly after the first, Conklin also affirmed the importance of environment, and 
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54 Conklin to Pearl, 27 March 1928, box 18, Conklin papers, Series II. The obvious question here 
was could not the eminent offspring of eminent persons also be attributed to the exact same 
random combinations?  
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in his professional relationships tried to remind his colleagues to consider 
environmental influences as an integral aspect of development.55  
Unable to sort out in his mind clearly how inheritance worked, and what 
were the mechanisms and consequences of inheritance, Conklin felt it necessary 
to chasten some of his associates on the limitations of scientific knowledge of 
heredity. His speech to the small audience at the Galton Society in May 1928 was 
rather dramatic in its frankness. Certain critics of eugenics could be ignored, he 
felt, as their objections tended to the sentimental or philosophical implications of 
the manipulation of human evolution. But, Conklin said, the criticism of “leading 
students of heredity” had to be taken seriously. William Bateson, Cold Spring 
Harbor’s own W. E. Castle, Thomas Hunt Morgan, Jennings and Pearl were all, in 
some form or another, critiquing the principles or programs of eugenics in the 
1920s. Conklin quickly glossed over the issues raised by Bateson, Castle and 
Morgan. It was Jennings and Pearl that worried him most because of their 
professional status and their contacts with many of the Galton Society’s 
members.56  
                                                
55 Conklin to Pearl, 29 March 1928, box 18, Conklin papers. In this note, Conklin said that 
Galton’s theory of ancestral inheritance and Mendel’s law were thoroughly compatible, the former 
explaining the average results, the latter the individual peculiarities. He also wrote that among 
organisms man alone was affected by the physical, social, and intellectual environments that were 
crucial for development, and these were an obvious vector to absorb the experience of former 
generations.  
 
56 Edwin G. Conklin, “Some Recent Criticisms of Eugenics”, The Eugenical News v. 13, n. 5 
(May 1928), 1, 61-66. The English eugenicist William Bateson read a paper to the Eugenical 
Society of Great Britain that accepted the ideological principles of eugenics, but cautioned 
advocates of sterilization because the role that heredity and environment played in human 
development had not been decisively determined. Castle’s entry in the thirteenth edition of The 
Encyclopedia Britannica on eugenics was tentative in describing the viability of the self-direction 
of human evolution, and Morgan’s second edition of Evolution and Genetics added a chapter on 
“Human Inheritance” that was critical of simplistic eugenic claims. See also Glass, “Geneticists 
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The personal and professional relationships Conklin had with Jennings 
and Pearl impressed upon him the importance of modesty in making scientific 
claims, and the significance of their reservations about eugenics. Conklin’s own 
respect for Jennings was evident in the seriousness with which the Princeton 
geneticist approached the criticism that Jennings was making in public. Conklin 
told the Galton Society audience that Prometheus “severely criticizes” the 
eugenics program on several levels, particularly pointing out that complexity in 
inheritance superceded the simplistic Mendelism many eugenicists held to be true; 
that the biparental inheritance of all individuals made impossible the successful 
prediction of individual characteristics; and that the coupling of unregulated 
immigration with American racial degradation was simply incorrect.57 Pearl’s 
work was also demonstrating effectively that the principles of eugenics were 
increasingly anachronistic in the face of scientific research. It would behoove 
members of the Galton Society to be more cautious in endorsing practical 
applications of eugenic principles, Conklin said, in light of these serious and 
justifiable criticisms.58 
Later in the year, Conklin’s doubts again surfaced when he was 
approached by Frederick Osborn, the son of the director of the New York 
Museum of Natural History, Henry Fairfield Osborn, about becoming involved in 
the eugenics movement. The younger Osborn showed a caution and reflection that 
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was often absent in his father’s writings and lectures, and felt that Conklin’s 
advice, since he specialized in genetic inheritance, would help guide him. 
Eugenics research, as Frederick saw it, cleaved into two fields, popular education 
or propaganda, and the stimulation of genetic research. The slow progress made in 
research in human heredity limited – or should limit – the public education aspect, 
Frederick felt, and he asked if Conklin thought it advisable to become involved 
with a committee of the Eugenics Research Association that had as members 
Davenport, Laughlin, Dr. Clark Wissler, Grant and Clarence Campbell?59  
Conklin’s response typifies the difficulty facing researchers in human 
heredity as they struggled to adapt to the new experimentalist paradigm. Lower 
organisms, whose brief generational lines facilitated research in physical 
inheritance, were not helpful in illuminating distinctively human traits like 
intellect, social instincts and behavior. Statistical analyses of inheritance, like 
those performed by Pearson and his students, were useful in determining patterns 
of inheritance in large populations, but were inadequate to the task of determining 
the specific vectors of inheritance, or how traits were inherited. Regarding 
American research on inheritance, Conklin was moderately critical. Davenport’s 
institution was performing some excellent work in statistical and detailed 
analytical studies in human heredity, but the Cold Spring Harbor researcher “has 
been too ready to decide whether a certain trait is a Mendelian dominant or 
recessive on the basis of too small a number of instances.” Davenport’s 
conception of Mendelian inheritance was problematic because many of the traits 
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that he treated as simple Mendelian characters were, in reality, due to the 
interplay of many different factors. Davenport’s “over-enthusiasm” for 
Mendelism had led to “severe criticism” from professional researchers – the point 
he made to the Galton Society in May – although Conklin felt that his research, in 
the main, was “sound and very useful.” But Davenport sometimes went too far, as 
in his book on thalassophilia, or in his insistence of hereditary criminality. 
Though he considered Davenport to be a “real scientist,” Conklin felt that “his 
judgment is sometimes at fault” and his positions were sometimes “contrary to 
human experience, and common sense.”60 
Conklin told Frederick that Laughlin, similarly, was a careful statistical 
worker whose service to the House Committee on Immigration was “most 
valuable.” Yet Conklin pointed out the difficulty in drawing sound conclusions 
from purely statistical data, which led to the sharp criticism – like that from 
Jennings – of Laughlin’s arguments on the worth of different racial stocks in the 
country. On the whole, Conklin regarded the Expert Eugenics Agent as a real 
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suggested that a specific hereditary disposition inherited from sea-faring ancestors – 
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scientist as well, whose work was reliable, and his conclusions sound, “though 
possibly somewhat warped in judgment by preconceived notions.” Wissler’s 
expertise in ethnography was beyond Conklin’s ken, so he felt unable to express 
any opinion on his particular contributions to eugenics research. Madison Grant, 
however, was another matter entirely.61  
Conklin’s criticism of Grant cut to the core of the objections that Pearl and 
Jennings had been making. “Madison Grant is not strictly speaking a scientist,” 
Conklin stated, “and many scientists have taken a shot at his book, ‘The Passing 
of the Great Race.’” The book, he continued, was laced with “certain prejudices 
which any strictly scientific man should avoid,” and professional scientists 
disputed many of his statements and conclusions. He told the young Osborn 
“while I regard him as a fine gentleman of high ideals, I do not think that he is a 
scientist or that his conclusions can be relied upon as being thoroughly sound.”62 
But why was Grant’s “prejudice” different from Laughlin’s “preconceived 
notions”? Conklin offered no explanation, other than pointing out Grant’s 
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“gentlemanly” status. Laughlin, at least, had a position at a research institution, if 
the Eugenics Record Office could be so considered.  
This is a significant instance of the hardening division between amateur, 
gentlemanly science and professional laboratory experimentalism. The historian 
Steven Shapin has examined this trend in seventeenth-century England, where the 
social status, trustworthiness, and credibility of researchers was imperative for 
assessing their truth claims and scientific testimony. His observation on the 
shifting scientific culture in England could be, in many ways, applied to the 
growing distinctions in this period between lay-writers and professional scientists: 
“a characteristic mark of the English natural-philosophical enterprise was its 
vigilant protection of the factual domain combined with injunctions to speak 
modestly, diffidently, and doubtingly about the domain of the theoretical.”63 
Clearly, writers like Grant, Stoddard, Wiggam, and many others in this period did 
not speak modestly or doubtingly about the theoretical potential of the infant 
scientific of genetics; the published works of Jennings, Boas, Hrdlicka and Pearl 
all express this tentativeness about the basis of their scientific truth claims. Shapin 
concludes that premodern society, because it was intimate and managed its affairs 
in essential face-to-face encounters, was able to carefully assess the veracity of 
the speakers on scientific and intellectual matters. The modern system of inquiry, 
however, is unable to do that, and therefore knowledge must be guaranteed and 
affirmed by reference to the expertise of the writer, not to their virtue.64 Shapin’s 
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thesis is quite perceptive, and like Kuhn’s work on radical paradigmatic shifts in 
the structures of scientific knowledge, there are more nuances at deeper levels. 
That Conklin felt the need to caution Frederick Osborn about the arguments Grant 
made in racial anthropology by emphasizing his “gentlemanly” social position, 
which implicitly described him as a non-expert, demonstrates that Shapin’s thesis 
continues to resonate into the modern period.  
In closing his reply to the younger Osborn, Conklin felt that the presence 
of one or two academic scientists on the committee Frederick was considering 
joining would be much preferred to its composition at present. Particularly useful 
would be students of heredity in lower forms of life, whose research and 
experimental expertise, Conklin advised, would provide a critical point of view of 
eugenics, and would thus help the work of the Eugenics Research Association 
avoid being classified as “mere propaganda.” Conklin believed that the field had 
great potential and tremendous opportunities, so he did not want to dissuade 
Osborn from becoming involved in the movement. “But above all things,” he 
wrote, “I should wish that the truth and nothing but the truth should be the aim of 
the Association and of its committees, and for this reason I should be glad to see 
some more critical geneticists associated with the Committee.”65 
But even this critical pursuit of scientific truth was complex; it was not 
solely a division between amateurs and professionals. Distinguished 
anthropologists also battled over the way scientific information was obtained, as 
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an example from the mid-1920s shows. Roland Dixon, the curator of Harvard 
University’s Peabody Museum, sparred with Ales Hrdlicka in early 1925 over the 
use of anthropological measurements that Hrdlicka controlled out of the 
Smithsonian. In 1923 Dixon had published The Racial History of Man, in which 
he attempted, like Ripley before him, to identify and classify the various races 
inhabiting the earth, but with greater scientific precision than the Harvard 
economist did in The Races of Man. The book was an experiment in method, and 
Dixon compiled data sets of measurements of breadth and height of human crania 
along with nasal indices, the most universally taken measurements in 
anthropometric studies. Dixon noted that physical anthropologists with 
backgrounds in biology and biometry had slightly different methods of 
measurement, but cranial measurements along length-breadth, length-height and 
nasal index were generally universally orthodox. These measurements generated 
twenty-seven possible combinations of racial measurements utilizing these three 
basic indices.66 
Dixon’s claims became problematic in the associations he drew from these 
twenty-seven combinations, which he perceived to be characteristic of specific 
racial groups. Louis Sullivan, who reviewed The Racial History of Man for 
American Anthropologist, pointed out the extreme caution that should be used in 
categorizing population groups by physical measurement. Sullivan, a physical 
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anthropologist trained at Columbia, singled out Dixon’s assumption of the 
immutability of body form – on which his schema rested – as highly 
problematic.67 Sergi had proposed a schema like this, based on a permanent 
skeletal form that create two great racial groups; Boas had undermined it with his 
study of immigrant children. Sullivan pointed out that the Peabody curator 
“argues that the three characters he has chosen, are immutable and that others 
which disturb his schema are superficial and malleable. While it is conceivable 
and probable that some characters change rapidly and others remain stable for a 
long time it is probably true that these have varied from time to time and from 
group to group so that no generalization in a group so diverse as man is 
possible.”68 The implication of this was that no solid associations of population 
could be imagined as “permanent.” This would also have clear implications for 
the Congressional debates on immigration restriction occurring at the same time, 
as it undermined their entire premise of fixed races of immigrants.  
Sullivan’s experience researching in the Pacific islands suggested other 
serious problems with Dixon’s hypothesis, in terms of the homogeneity of 
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population groups, and Dixon’s decision not to use structural symbols to 
designate the groups he derived from combinations of the three measurements. 
While attempting a racial history of all population groups and his novel approach 
to associations between them were, to Sullivan, admirable attempts that generated 
“a truer picture of racial history…than any previous worker,” he was unable to 
give a wholly positive review to Racial History. Yet in comparison to the reviews 
penned by Boas and Hrdlicka, Sullivan was incredibly generous.69 
Certainly Boas was qualified to discuss elements of physical anthropology 
and racial types after his important researches for the Dillingham Commission. He 
pointed out that Dixon’s measurements were based on classical morphological 
measurements, three of the head and two of the nose, which required the belief 
that these measurements had remained stable since Paleolithic times. Boas used 
his own measurements that documented the plasticity of body form of 
descendants of immigrants to demolish Dixon’s assumptions. The second 
hypothesis of Racial History, Boas explained, required acceptance that all his 
measurements could be grouped by the extreme poles of his three measurements, 
so that there were only eight possible fundamental races that represented the eight 
possible combinations of the three measurements. No biological evidence had 
been provided to support this assertion, and nothing to contradict or overturn 
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theories. A. C. H., review of The Racial History of Man by Roland Dixon, in The Geographical 
Journal, v. 62, n. 3 (September 1923), 228-229. 
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Boas’s own researches had been provided.70 Yet Dixon maintained that body 
types of his eight racial groups were fixed and stable.  
Boas pointed out, in sharply critical language, that when Dixon addressed 
German claims for racial preeminence he flatly contradicted himself. Dixon had 
posited not only that physical form was stable, but that certain racial groups were 
essentially “pure” races, and this, in turn, explained the notable achievements of 
national or ethnic groups derived from these races. It was, essentially, an 
expression of Galton’s theory of ancestral inheritance writ large. Boas, who had 
emigrated from Germany to the United States in 1887, would have none of it. He 
explained that “when it suits the author’s emotional attitude he changes his 
argument completely and indulges in flings at the assumed claim of racial 
preeminence on the part of the Germans—an attitude which hardly helps make 
convincing a treatise that attempts to be scientific.”71  
Hrdlicka was similarly unimpressed with Dixon’s foray into 
anthropological and racial typologies. His review in The American Historical 
Review was critical of The Racial History of Man, although he took pains to avoid 
being overly negative out of professional respect for Dixon’s work in linguistics 
and ethnology. But when it came to physical anthropology of racial types, 
                                                
70 Franz Boas, review of The Racial History of Man by Roland Dixon, in Science, n.s., v. 57, n. 
1481 (May 18, 1923), 587-90; 587. On the genetic level, Boas also found fault with Dixon’s racial 
typologies. The measurements that Dixon based his racial groupings upon should have been 
analyzed in the Mendelian structure of dominant and recessive genes, which would have shown 
that, in accord with most professional scientific thinking inheritance tended to reversion of 
parental type. But Dixon assumed a crossing or blending pattern of inheritance, which enabled for 
an averaging of type, generating wide varieties of crossings. In addition, echoing Davenport’s 
work on sailors, and extending back to Galton, Dixon saw mental achievements as proving the 
heredity of intellectual ability, which Boas the cultural anthropologist strongly opposed. 588. 
 
71 Ibid., 589-90; Dixon, The Racial History of Man.  
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Hrdlicka could not help feeling that the Harvard man was out of his league. “In 
this latter field,” Hrdlicka noted, “he has the very great disadvantage of a lack of 
personal observations and therefore [was] obliged to depend largely on the 
records of others,” just as William Ripley was in The Races of Europe. (This 
problem in Dixon’s work would inspire a hostile exchange between Hrdlicka and 
Dixon in the ensuing years.) His reliance on second-hand measurements, certainly 
no foundation to build sweeping generalizations of racial typologies, was a 
fundamental, almost untenable weakness of Racial History.72 Though he took no 
joy in exposing Dixon’s work as scientifically sloppy and erroneous, Hrdlicka 
could not let the major problems in the work go unaddressed.  
First, there was the obvious problem in utilizing second-hand evidence, of 
accuracy of measurement, which, along with problematic and hasty 
generalizations reflected the wider critique by the professional community of 
work done by Laughlin, Grant and Wiggam. As many in the professional 
American anthropological community had learned in the wake of the U.S. Army’s 
mental and physical measurements of soldiers during World War I, uniform 
measurements were exceedingly difficult to obtain outside of tightly and highly 
controlled experimental conditions.73 Using a small group of features or 
measurements as a basis of generalization increased the problematic nature of 
creating and organizing racial communities. Hrdlicka stated that professional 
                                                
72 Ales Hrdlicka, review of The Racial History of Man by Roland Dixon, in The American 
Historical Review, v. 28, n. 4 (July 1923), 723-26; 723.  
 
73 As an example, see Charles B. Davenport and Albert Love, The Medical Department of the 
United States Army in the World War: Vol. XV, Statistics, Part I: Army Anthropology 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1921).  
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anthropologists had all largely consigned the “fetishistic old-time value” of the 
cephalic index from the nineteenth-century, height indices of the skull and the 
nasal index to the dustbin of history. He explained that his own work on Native 
Americans had proven to him that even in isolated population groups under 
normal circumstances all characters, including cranial and nasal indices, 
possessed a wide range of variation.74  
Ultimately, Dixon’s project was relatively worthless as an anthropological 
text in Hrdlicka’s mind. For not only was the metrical basis of the generalizations 
highly problematic, but Dixon made no serious attempt to explain how his eight 
“‘fundamental’ types have originated, or how it comes that the cephalic, the 
unstable height-length, and the very changeable nasal index are preserved or 
reappear intact, regardless of admixture, time, or change of environment.”75 As 
Hrdlicka would soon learn, however, it was very difficult to provide solid 
measurements to base racial typologies on; Dixon would have his revenge on 
Hrdlicka, when the latter published a catalog from the Smithsonian Institution’s 
collections of human crania.  
Great hopes had been placed on the Smithsonian’s publication as early as 
1922, when Dixon posted a notice to the readers of Science that the Smithsonian’s 
forthcoming efforts to publish measurements from its extensive holdings – a 
project that was being guided by Hrdlicka – should ideally be followed by similar 
projects from other organizations with the goal of furthering progress in American 
                                                
74 Hrdlicka, review of The Racial History of Man, 723.  
 
75 Ibid., 724.  
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physical anthropology.76 When the formidably titled Catalogue of Human Crania 
in the United States National Museum Collections: The Eskimo, Alaska and 
Related Indians, Northeastern Asiatics was issued by the Government Printing 
Office in Proceedings of the United States National Museum in 1924, Louis 
Sullivan secured the review in American Anthropological Association’s journal. 
Like Dixon, Sullivan expressed great enthusiasm for the project and hoped that 
other institutions would follow the National Museum’s lead in publishing the 
measurements of human crania in their collections. But Sullivan felt compelled to 
include an “adverse comment,” unable to let pass serious flaws in the “notable 
contribution by one of the foremost anthropologists of the world.” Sullivan 
regarded the published measurements as extraordinarily inadequate, which 
dramatically undercut the usefulness of the catalog.77 
Sullivan explained that previous publications of similar comparative 
cranial measurements were flawed because of the dearth or peculiarity of 
measurements provided. This included such notable classic craniometric work by 
Virchow, Quatrefages, Davis, Morton, Otis, and others. These men, however, had 
an excuse in that they published their studies and catalogs when craniometry was 
in its infancy in the mid- to late-nineteenth century. Hrdlicka had no such excuse. 
                                                
76 Roland Dixon, “Measurements of Human Crania” Science n.s. v. 56, n. 1450 (October 19, 
1922), 418.  
 
77 Louis Sullivan, review of Catalogue of Human Crania in the United States National Museum 
Collections: The Eskimo, Alaska and Related Indians, Northeastern Asiatics by Ales Hrdlicka, in 
American Anthropologist n.s. v. 26, n. 4 (Oct – Dec 1924), 534-36; 534; Ales Hrdlicka, 
“Catalogue of Human Crania in the United States National Museum Collections: The Eskimo, 
Alaska and Related Indians, Northeastern Asiatics” Proceedings of the United States National 
Museum (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1924) v. 63, article 12, 1-51. 
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Sullivan pointed out that at the instant of its publication in 1924, the Smithsonian 
catalog was already out of date. Despite the International Agreement of Monaco 
in 1906 that called for a standard of thirty-two measurements of human crania, 
Hrdlicka’s catalog gave only eleven. It omitted the maximum and minimum 
frontal diameters, measurements of maxillo-alveolar length and breadth, and all 
arcs of mandibular measurements. For a scholar able to examine the material 
personally, the absence of such measurements would not be problematic, but the 
entire point of the publication was to provide students who were unable to 
examine the crania first-hand proper evidence and exact measurements. “Were 
this an ordinary publication, the omissions noted above would pass unnoticed but 
this is a catalogue of the collections in the United States National Museum,” 
Sullivan wrote, “and the lack of conformity to international standards is a more 
serious offense than it would be for a private institution to publish an 
individualistic catalogue.”78 Hrdlicka’s work was being held to a much higher 
standard because of the nature of the Smithsonian’s collection: it was a depository 
of physical specimens to be available to all scholars. The paucity of 
measurements given severely hampered the effectiveness of the National 
Museum’s mission. But Sullivan’s intent was not to dismiss the usefulness of the 
catalog; he was critical because he had hope that in future catalogs of the 
museum’s collections this would be remedied.79 
                                                
78 Sullivan, review of Catalogue of Human Crania, 535.  
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This moderate rebuke spurred Hrdlicka to find other authors to write more 
favorable reviews. When he approached Dixon about helping, however, Dixon 
exacted his revenge for Hrdlicka’s harsh review of The Racial History of Man. 
Refusing to defend the Smithsonian’s Catalogue, Dixon emphasized in a letter to 
Hrdlicka that “I believe, and I think most others will also, that Sullivan’s 
criticisms are wholly justified and might well have been even more forcibly put. 
You have a good deal to answer for.” It was “rather a case of poetic justice,” 
Dixon suggested, “that you, who so disingenuously criticized me for failing to 
utilize measurements which you knew were either unavailable or non-existent, 
should now be rightly blamed for withholding data from students which are 
actually in your hands.” The measurements that Hrdlicka provided were, for the 
scientific community, exceedingly meager data samples that severely limited the 
utility of the publication. Hrdlicka, Dixon felt, provided measurements designed 
to undercut the popular prejudices in the public mind regarding the racial 
characteristics of immigrants rather than assist serious professional study, an act 
he regarded as “inexcusable.”80 Dixon mocked Hrdlicka's acid review of The 
Racial History of Man and asked what help Hrdlicka could expect from him, 
“whose only claim to distinction in the field, lies in having written what you 
yourself have declared was an ‘appalling’ book, and one which was nothing short 
                                                
80 See first, Ales Hrdlicka to Roland Dixon, 27 January 1925; Dixon to Hrdlicka, 18 February 
1925, both box 22, Ales Hrdlicka papers. Dixon argued this because Hrdlicka described some of 
the measurements as the “unstable height-length” and “very changeable nasal index” to illustrate 
the fluidity of physical type and thus undercut the evidentiary basis of nativist arguments of 
immutable and inferior racial types. Much more useful, for Dixon and other students, would have 
been radio-humeral differentials and the form of teeth.  
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of a ‘disaster.’”81 This schism between Dixon and Hrdlicka should serve as a 
reminder that, as methods and techniques in physical anthropology were being 
refined and debated, professional scholars also fell into diverse camps. Thus 
caution should be exercised in positing monolithic groups of “professional 
scientists” in opposition to “gentlemanly” researchers, as professional scientists 
were fragmented as well.  
The tone of Hrdlicka’s reply to Dixon was equal parts cordial and angry, 
and suggests latent tension between the two institutional leaders. Hrdlicka told 
Dixon, “you are an inordinately ungrateful and greedy lot, all of you. Also, most 
unreasonable.”  But he felt that the continued publication of the Catalogue was 
important, and asked again for Dixon’s help. Hrdlicka had a “good deal of well-
rooted respect” for Dixon’s work – “even though you may have temporarily lost 
the high road in one direction” – and Dixon’s commitment to the advance of 
anthropological knowledge could help salvage professional opinion to the 
project.82  
But Dixon remained unmoved. Because he was a curator of a national 
museum, Dixon insisted that Hrdlicka had certain responsibilities to the scientific 
public. “You are a trustee for scientists everywhere. You have no right to follow 
your individual opinions in what you shall publish. It is your duty to afford to 
others the most complete information possible, when you publish an official 
                                                
 
81 Dixon to Hrdlicka, 18 February 1925, Hrdlicka Papers.  
 
82 Hrdlicka to Dixon, 21 February 1925, Hrdlicka Papers.  
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catalog of the national collections,” he wrote. Pointing out that Hrdlicka himself 
would never confine a professional discussion of crania to “the miserably few 
measurements” in the Catalogue, Dixon used a personal example of how 
significant the lack of data was for professionals: a student of Harvard 
anthropologist E. A. Hooton was attempting some significant work on 
comparative anthropology, and had anticipated using the National Museum’s 
collection, but now could not since the published data did not contain useful 
measurements.83 Hrdlicka was retarding analysis of the data of which he was the 
caretaker.  
Ultimately, some of Dixon’s criticisms must have rung true to Hrdlicka, 
for in April he published a note in American Anthropologist defending the 
National Museum’s Catalogue. He insisted the data set conformed the 
international standards established by the Monaco Agreement, which he noted 
that he had helped devise, but pointed out that the standards were for 
measurement of crania, not publication. The larger problem for the Catalogue was 
the extremely high cost of publishing statistical data sets as opposed to text, which 
necessarily limited the amount of information that could be published. Hrdlicka 
made clear that he understood that one of his jobs was to make available, for 
scientific research, the data of the collections, but had to operate within the 
financial constraints of the Smithsonian’s publication funds. He took his 
professional responsibility seriously, but also felt that as a professional 
anthropologist, he had the additional responsibility to act when anthropology was 
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being manipulated and misrepresented by non-scientists for political or social 
ends.84  
This sentiment was reflected in April 1929, when Hrdlicka delivered a 
lecture to a small group in New York City on the anthropological ramifications of 
immigration. Just as Boas had in a 1925 article titled “What is a Race?” the 
Bohemian immigrant took a public stand against immigration restriction, and the 
classical racialism that rationalized it. Although his talk was too late to affect the 
Congressional debate on restriction, or for that matter, to impact the national 
origins quotas, the biological and anthropological aspects of immigration needed 
to be addressed. The question of immigration revolved around culture as well as 
heredity, a fact that members of the professional scientific community – such as 
Jennings, Pearl, and Boas – accepted, but one that was being severely distorted by 
speakers, writers and what he called “agitators.” Hrdlicka argued that to posit 
distinct, fixed races, with specific mental, physical, and emotional characteristics 
that were hereditary, was wrong. Elevating some population groups above others 
as possessing superior qualities was mostly a function of “superficial 
impressions” mixed with cultural ignorance and prejudice. “Do not believe the 
alarmists, the Grants or Stoddards, who tell you that the American people through 
mixture with immigrants are in danger of degeneration,” he told the audience. 
“No nation of white people in the world is or has ever been racially pure. All are 
                                                
84 Ales Hrdlicka, “Catalogue of Human Crania in the U.S. National Museum” American 
Anthropologist n.s. v. 27 (April 1925), 339-40.  
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mixed.”85 But this was too late – the alarmists had already carried the day with 
their classical racialist arguments.  
There was a strange appropriateness to speaking out against the influence 
of Grant, Laughlin and other biological determinists well after the fact. The 
futility of criticism lay in the nature of scientific “speciation,” as Kuhn might have 
put it. The language of the modern scientific community was becoming 
increasingly esoteric; the “restrictionist language and epistemology” had remained 
the same for decades. The critics could say Mendelian heredity was wrong, but 
could not say what was right. Opponents of immigration, who absorbed the 
racialism of correlation, anecdote and heredity, could argue that Mendelism was 
right, and there were plenty of examples in the real world of hereditary 
characteristics. That may no longer have been an acceptable method of scientific 
investigation, but the public was much more familiar with the older lexicon of 
ontogeny recapitulating phylogeny, and like producing like. Until the Crick-
Watson model of DNA was outlined in 1953, modern biology and genetics would 
lack the certain answers of the pre-modern method, and resistance would, in a 
way, be futile.  
                                                
85 Ales Hrdlicka, “Conference on Immigration Policy” delivered 10 April 1929, Town Hall Club, 
New York City, box 19, Hrdlicka papers. The “Grants and Stoddards” from p. 4, ignorance and 
prejudice from p. 2. See also Boas, “What is a Race?” The Nation v. 120, n. 3108 (28 January 
1925), 89-91 [covered in another chapt.4]  
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Conclusion: “Eternal vigilance is the price of safety” 
 
In 1930, Herbert Spencer Jennings published a summary of the state of 
biological knowledge as it concerned the human organism, an assessment based 
on his decades in the fields of biology and zoology. As they grew from single 
cells, human beings manifested a remarkable diversity as they developed into 
individuals, he explained. The hereditary inheritance from maternal and parental 
lines combined with “the changes in the outer environment” to shape and direct a 
human’s development. The environmental changes themselves encompassed a 
wide variety of elements, from nutrition and sanitation to education and 
socialization.1 Jennings remarked upon the dramatic changes in the scientific 
knowledge of heredity and inheritance that had occurred in the previous thirty 
years, and emphasized the extraordinary role that the tiny fruit fly had played in 
advancing the basic knowledge of genes and chromosomes. One thing that had 
not changed, however, was the role of experimentalism in advancing scientific 
knowledge. Jennings was as sure of this as he had been in 1897, when he traveled 
to Naples to conduct research on his single-celled paramecia.  
In Jennings’s mind, there simply was no other way to know about science. 
Throughout his rather lengthy book, The Biological Basis of Human Nature, he 
made repeated references to the central role that experimentation played in 
confirming and demonstrating scientific truths. “Positive and inescapable 
experimental evidence proves…” hereditary theories, he noted at one point in the 
                                                
1 Herbert Spencer Jennings, The Biological Basis of Human Nature (New York: W. W. Norton, 
1930), xviii for “outer environment,” 7 for dual inheritance and 76-101 for inheritance, 201 for 
nutrition and environment and 122-138 for environmental role.  
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book, “objective determination by experimentation” explains what is scientifically 
possible, he noted in another.2 “Science is the organization of experience,” 
Jennings insisted, and “what shall go into it is entirely a matter of experience.” 
Without experimental and laboratory research to confirm scientific hypotheses of 
heredity and inheritance, there simply was, in Jennings’s mind, no experience 
from which to evaluate scientific claims.3 And still, despite these advances in 
understanding how heredity and inheritance worked, the professor conceded that 
there was still much that the scientist did not know. Experimental and laboratory 
work had to continue, with verified results and careful research contributing, brick 
by brick, to the larger edifice of scientific knowledge; Jennings believed that 
science could proceed in no other way. Decades before, he had described the 
fundamental question that scientists must seek to answer: “when an animal is put 
into new conditions, it begins to change to suit these conditions.…And the 
question is, what makes it change that way?”4 Thirty years of teaching students 
the essential importance of this method, and thirty years spent examining changes 
in simple-celled organisms, had never shaken his belief and conviction that the 
only way to answer that question, to know “what makes it change that way?” was 
through experiment, observation, careful hypothesizing, and verification by the 
professional community.  
                                                
 
2 Ibid., 73; 134.  
 
3 Ibid., 372, emphasis original.  
 
4 Jennings to Mary Louise Burridge, 1 March 1896, Jennings papers, emphasis original.  
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But if Jennings and his academic and scientific colleagues understood that 
this was the only permissible approach to developing scientific knowledge, in the 
1930s he continued to confront the hasty, incorrect, and sloppy generalizations 
that flowed from the classic racialist approach to biological knowledge, where 
anecdote, inference, association and correlation all served as the basis of proof 
that “like produces like.” And thirty years on, Jennings continued to combat these 
inaccuracies. If science was a human adventure, as he suggested in the book, 
some of the adventurers had no regard for caution, safety, rationality or reality. A 
litany of biological fallacies stemmed from the over-zealous adventurers, the 
“middlemen, near-biologists—the popular writers that have undertaken to ‘sell’ 
biology to the world.”5 These popularizers – propagandists like Wiggam, whom 
he named specifically – were responsible for circulating “a lot of fallacies, or half 
fallacies, or quarter fallacies…of biological principles applicable to human 
affairs.” These fallacies were particularly prominent, Jennings wrote, in the 
explanations of the scientific study of heredity.6 Some of these fallacies included 
the theory of unicausality, the immutability of inherited characters in the face of 
environmental pressures, that like produced like, and that superior individuals 
would produce superior children. In matters of heredity and development, any 
assertion based on non-experimental judgment was likely to be wrong. Perceiving 
heredity to be some specific, quantifiable thing, which was the underlying 
                                                
5 Jennings, Biological Basis of Human Nature, 187 for adventure; middlemen from 204.  
 
6 Ibid., Wiggam mentioned on 192; quote from 204.  
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assumption of immigration restriction, eugenics, and indeed the whole edifice of 
classic racialism – all these were wrong. Man, Jennings wrote, had only two 
methods to solve problems: rationality and empiricism. Anything else was 
basically speculation.7 Still, despite this clear and unequivocal explanation of the 
proper methods of conducting scientific research, these fallacies, half-fallacies 
and quarter-fallacies persisted.  
The defense of the process of scientific inquiry also came, as before, from 
anthropologists. In his Presidential address to the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science on June 15, 1931, Franz Boas reiterated the inherent 
skepticism with which scientists should speak about “race.” As he had in his 
criticism of Grant’s classic racialism in 1925, Boas insisted that racial groups 
shared body and “perhaps mental characteristics,” but that “in a strict sense we 
can not speak of absolutely valid hereditary racial traits.” So much of the 
immigration restriction movement’s rhetoric had assumed that physical type 
reflected racial identity, but Boas dismissed this idea as “a rash undertaking.” If 
one examined family lines, as he had with the descendants of immigrants for the 
Dillingham Commission, it was clear that even within families there was great 
physical differentiation.8 Boas cautiously reminded his professional audience that 
there were in fact common characteristics among population groups, but 
inferences from this premise that anatomical type determined behavior or that 
                                                
7 Ibid., fallacies listed on 206-218; rationality and empiricism from 204-205.  
 
8 Franz Boas, “Race and Progress” Science n.s. v. 74, n. 1905 (3 July 1931), 1-8; from 2. For his 
1925 articles, see Boas, “What is a Race?” The Nation; idem., “This Nordic Nonsense” The 
Forum.  
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body form was absolute and unchanging were simply unfounded. Just as Jennings 
insisted, Boas emphasized the impact of physical and cultural environmental 
influences on human development. “Ethnological evidence,” he said, “is all in 
favor of the assumption that hereditary racial traits are unimportant as compared 
to cultural conditions.” The present state of knowledge, the distinguished 
anthropologist noted, “justifies us in saying, that while individuals differ, 
biological differences between races are small.”9 But Boas, like Jennings, 
Morgan, Hrdlicka, Pearl and most other professional practitioners remained vexed 
by the basic question: why do individuals differ? And to this, they still had no 
answers. 
They could suggest, as Boas and Jennings did, that environmental 
influences, whether cultural or physical, shaped and changed development. 
Despite advances, however, they could not demonstrate it. They could not, as 
Jennings had insisted in his 1926 lecture in Philadelphia, “find out things that we 
can show people…”10 They could be confident in the method that would yield 
these results, but could not say with certainty how human beings developed, why 
they were different, what the basis of that difference was (if it was hereditary or 
environmental), or how practical assimilation was. And when it came to devising 
political policy, certainty – or at least the appearance of it – was essential.  
                                                
9 Boas, “Race and Progress,” 6; 5.  
 
10 Jennings, “Some Unsettled and Unsettling Questions,” 37, emphasis original. 
 
 Conclusion 549 
  
Restrictionists provided that certainty, and continued in the 1930s to use 
their perceived certainty to defend restriction against repeal. In 1930 Madison 
Grant published The Alien in Our Midst, a collection of essays from advocates of 
restriction that demonstrated the continued activism of the Immigration 
Restriction League and like-minded individuals. The book included selections 
from the founding fathers – John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, Alexander 
Hamilton, Thomas Jefferson, and John Jay among others – that purported to 
demonstrate that the opposition to immigration ranged back to the creation of the 
American republic.11 The book continued to make the standard assertions of 
immigrant inferiority from the ideology of classic racialism. Albert Johnson, still 
serving as the chairman of the House Committee of Immigration and 
Naturalization, explained the importance of maintaining and defending the gains 
of restriction. “How shall the Republic endure,” he asked, “if there be steady 
deterioration of standards by ever-recurring new forces of infection, arriving in 
the land?” Davenport contributed a brief piece emphasizing the importance of 
eugenic and hereditary quality of the few permitted aliens at a time when the 
Carnegie Institution of Washington was re-evaluating its financial support of his 
facilities at Cold Spring Harbor.12 Other contributions from Richards Bradley, 
                                                
11 Grant and Davison, eds. The Alien in Our Midst. The selections from “Words of the Founders” 
also included Fisher Ames, Christopher Gadsen, Patrick Henry, George Washington, James 
Madison, Gouveneur Morris and Rufus King. The frontispiece contained the following quote from 
Jefferson: “The mobs of great cities add just so much to the support of pure government, as sores 
do to the strength of the human body. It is the manners and spirit of a people which preserve a 
republic in vigor. A degeneracy in these is a canker which soon eats to the heart of its laws and 
constitution.”  
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Henry Pratt Fairchild, Francis Kinnicutt, Harry Laughlin, Edward Lewis, Henry 
Fairfield Osborn, Kenneth Roberts, Lothrop Stoddard and Robert DeCourcy Ward 
all demonstrated the continuing commitment to restriction by American nativists. 
Simply because National Origins went into effect in 1929 did not mean that 
restrictionist organizations like the IRL folded up and went home. They continued 
their activities.13 
Contrary to the representation of immigration restriction in the historiography, 
the IRL remained active well into the 1930s, even after the onset of the economic 
depression crippled the flow of European migrants. Having achieved significant 
legislative restriction, the Immigration Restriction League did not disband in 
triumph. They concentrated their efforts on defending the immigration laws, and 
                                                                                                                                
12 Johnson quoted on p. 10. Davenport’s essay was “As the Twig’s Bent,” in Grant and Davison, 
eds., The Alien in Our Midst, 49-53. John C. Merriam directed the CIW to re-evaluate, in 
particular, the work of the Eugenics Record office in February 1929, but he established a 
committee that would, because of its membership, recommend continuing support of the 
institution. Among the members were Laughlin (who was the superintendent of the ERO), 
Davenport, Carl C. Brigham (the Princeton professor of psychology who had written A Study of 
American Intelligence in 1923 that is discussed in chapter 5), Edward Thorndike and Clark 
Wissler (both of whom were affiliated with the restrictionist movement) and L. C. Dunn, the only 
member who was critical and skeptical of eugenics. Still, the committee pointed out three 
shortcomings of the Record Office: the techniques for properly assessing the heredity of individual 
traits was lacking, making the compilation of pedigree studies effectively subjective and thus 
useless, and the breadth of information it gathered on characteristics provided no basis for 
comparison. The committee’s work is detailed in Allen, “The Eugenics Record Office,” 250-251. 
A second committee was convened in 1935 (a year after Davenport retired) that contained a larger 
number of critics that was a factor in the CIW ultimately cutting off its funding. See ibid., 251-
252. The ERO was ultimately shut down in 1940. See also Kevles, In the Name of Eugenics.  
 
13 See Richard Bradley, “The Immigration Question”; Henry Pratt Fairchild, “Immigration and 
National Unity”; Roy Garis, “A Brief Review of Immigration Legislation”; Francis Kinnicutt, 
“Stopping the Gaps”; Harry H. Laughlin, “The Control of Trends of the Racial Composition of the 
American People”; Edward Lewis, “European Prejudices and American Politics”; Henry Fairfield 
Osborn, “Shall We Maintain Washington’s Ideal of Americanism?”; Paul Popenoe, “The 
Immigration Tide”; Kenneth L. Roberts, “Mexican Immigration in the Southwest”; Lothrop 
Stoddard, “The Permanent Menace from Europe”; Robert DeCourcy Ward, “Fallacies of the 
Melting Pot Idea and America’s Traditional Immigration Policy” all in Grant and Davison, eds. 
The Alien in our Midst.  
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by extension, maintaining the purity of the Anglo-Saxon race. With the laws on 
the books, League members realized by 1933 and 1934, that there could be 
concerted attempts to repeal the legislative provisions with a new party in control 
of Congress and the White House. The turning of the political tides to the 
Democratic Party—particularly Franklin Roosevelt’s appointment of Frances 
Perkins to head the Department of Labor—distressed the Boston nativist 
immensely. “The attitude of the administration and of Congress,” one member 
worried, “constitutes the most serious threat to immigration restriction in over 
twenty-five years.” Additionally, the possibility of a large-scale exodus of Jews 
from Hitler’s Germany was particularly frightening to League members.14  
In the five years after the National Origins quotas went into effect, the League 
continued defending and trying to expand restrictive policies. They restricted 
membership to New England in an effort to control the member’s activities 
better—to unite them under one tent. Annual reports of the League’s Executive 
Committee in the early 1930s reflect the continued worries of the leadership. In 
1930, Patten represented the IRL before Congress one again, advocating the total 
suspension of immigration, because of the economic collapse. “Every immigrant 
alien who comes to this country,” he told the Senate Committee on Immigration, 
“must necessarily affect the labor market, either as a competitor for a job, or in 
being dependent on some breadwinner who is a competitor for a job in our labor 
market.” Patten argued that if the United States was concerned about the welfare 
                                                
 
14 Richards Bradley to Members of the League, 29 March 1934; Bradley to John Moors, 3 August 
1934; Bradley to George Nutter, 23 March 1933, all box 2, Lee papers.  
 Conclusion 552 
  
of its native-born population, the senators would prohibit all immigration.15 The 
American Eugenics Society sent a petition to Congress to endorse the prohibition 
on immigration, with Robert DeCourcy Ward and John B. Trevor signing in 
support as members.16 The League leadership’s commitment to restriction was so 
great that Ward began grooming his son Henry for a leadership position in the 
organization. The Executive Committee’s annual report from 1930 laid out the 
League’s agenda for the coming years. They advocated for the extension of the 
quota system to the countries of the western hemisphere, and in addition to 
temporary suspension they wanted all of the national origins quotas reduced by an 
additional fifty percent, and the registration of all incoming immigrants with 
improved provisions to deport immigrants who became public charges.17 
The importance of continued vigilance for the IRL was clear in 1931, 
when its Annual Report noted that an old nemesis, Samuel Dickstein from New 
York, assumed the chair of the House Immigration and Naturalization Committee. 
                                                
 
15 Statement of James Horace Patten, “Suspension for Two Years of General Immigration into the 
United States” Hearings before the United States Senate Committee on Immigration 71st Congress, 
3rd Session, 16 December 1930, 34.  
 
16 American Eugenics Society, “Statement in support of the Reed Bill (S.J. Res. 207) by the 
President and the Chairman of the Committee on Selective Immigration” 24 December 1930, in 
box 3, Lee papers. The petition singled out Ward, the “president of the Immigration Restriction 
League of Boston, which organization he founded in the ‘90s and is the pioneer in this country.” 2. 
Henry Fairchild was the AES president, Madison Grant was the chairman of the Committee on 
Selective Immigration, and other committee members included Laughlin and Roy Garis.  
 
17 Immigration Restriction League, “Annual Report of the Executive Committee of the Year 
1930,” box 3, Lee papers. Western hemisphere concerns on 3; legislative program from 4. The 
Executive Committee in 1930 consisted of Robert DeCourcy Ward president, Joseph Lee 
chairman, A. Lawrence Lowell and C. C. Little as vice-presidents, along with Richards Bradley 
(treasurer), Henry DeCourcy Ward (secretary) among others. It also noted that Grant’s book The 
Alien in our Midst was “an important publication in favor of restriction.” 4.  
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Bradley, the League’s treasurer, used this potential threat to solicit money from 
members to ensure that the League would have the resources to defend their gains 
and preserve restriction.18 Lee wrote to Ward in January before the new session of 
Congress opened, to explain in greater detail how the Boston philanthropist 
regarded the temporary suspension bill. Lee feared that any temporary period of 
suspension of less than five years might endanger long-term, permanent 
restriction (including within the western hemisphere). A temporary bill would 
lapse, whereas a long-term, permanent bill would have to repealed, which Lee felt 
would give restrictionists some leverage in terms of gaining concessions in the 
fight for repeal. “In other words,” he carefully explained, “a short suspension 
law—say for two years—might merely serve to lose us our present opportunity 
for the sake of a short, temporary gain.”19 Despite the loss in November 1931 of 
one of the original founders of the League, with the death of Robert DeCourcy 
                                                
18 Immigration Restriction League, “Annual Report of the Executive Committee for the Year 
1931” box 3, Lee papers. Dickstein was not only an old opponent from the battles in the 1920s 
over restriction, he was responsible for establishing the House committee that would eventually 
evolve into the House Un-American Activities Committee (established under the Dies-Dickstein 
Resolution) in 1934 – Massachusetts Representative John McCormack was the initial chair under 
the “Dickstein Resolution,” (H.R. 198); he also made concerted efforts in the late 1930s to 
mortgage the future quotas of Jewish immigrants to enable them to escape Nazi Germany. There 
has also been information found in Soviet Union archives suggesting that he acted as a spy for the 
Soviet Union in the late 1930s, passing along information about pro-fascist and anti-Communist 
organizations in the United States to the NKVD. For the chairmanship of the House Committee on 
Immigration and Naturalization from the 72nd to the 79th Congresses (1931-1945), see his entry in 
the United States Congress, Biographical Dictionary of American Congress, 1774-1961 House 
Doc. 442, 85th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1961); for 
his involvement on HUAC, see Bertram Gross, Friendly Fascism: The New Face of Power (New 
York: M. Evans Co., 1980), 87-88; for Jewish quotas see David Kennedy, Freedom from Fear: 
The American People in Depression and War, 1929-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2005), 416-417; Soviet spying in Allen Weinstein, Alexander Vassiliev, The Haunted Wood: 
Soviet Espionage in America, the Stalin Era (New York: Random House, 1999), 140-50.  
 
19 Lee to Ward, 13 January 1931, box 2, Lee papers.  
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Ward, the IRL continued to protect their restriction gains.20 After the elections of 
1932 when the Democrats made tremendous strides – and a Democratic president 
won the election – the Executive Committee warned its members that they faced a 
great peril. Many of the new Congressional members had not taken a stand on 
immigration or restriction, and the League was worried that their policy gains 
may be undermined or repealed by this new unknown quantity. Much of the 
public mistakenly believed, the annual report from 1932 suggested, that the 
Depression had taken care of the immigration issue. This was not the case and 
there was work still to be done. The report closed warning, “Eternal vigilance is 
the price of safety.”21 
With the Roosevelt administration in power in 1933, the League’s leaders 
warned their members “The attitude of the administration and [C]ongress 
constitutes the most serious threat to immigration restriction in over twenty-five 
years.” A piecemeal assault on the carefully constructed edifice of restriction, 
Bradley explained, threatened to undo the present immigration law, and the 
League must continue to plug holes in the “immigration dike,” and protect the 
                                                
 
20 Robert T. Jackson wrote a sympathetic obituary for Ward in The Scientific Monthly in which he 
noticed that just like his friend and co-founder of the IRL, Prescott Hall, Ward suffered from 
neurasthenic tendencies. Jackson noted that Ward had “a sensitive, nervous, highstrung 
temperament…” Robert Tracy Jackson, “Robert DeCourcy Ward” The Scientific Monthly v. 34, n. 
2 (February 1932), 192-94; 194. Of Hall, his sister Lucyle Irby Hall described her brother as a 
perpetual insomniac, and a “frail little hothouse plant [who] was never allowed to romp, to climb, 
to be reckless, as other boys were.” She described his life as “a courageous battle against ill-
health.” His Brookline physician noted that in Hall “was merged the analytical mind in a 
supersensitive body.” Hall, Immigration and Other Interests, 119 from his sister; physician on 
xviii.  
 
21 Immigration Restriction League, “Annual Report of the Executive Committee for the Year 
1932,” 4. 
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gains already made. Bradley also solicited more money from members, because 
Lee had to reduce his annual contribution of $12,000 by about one-third.22 And 
the financial contribution was vital since, as Bradley noted to Patten – who was 
still lobbying for the League in Washington, D.C. – many of the new House and 
Senate members “have always been more or less blind to the real remedy for low 
living standards and are tied up with those who at heart are opposed to 
restriction.”23 In 1933 the League remained true to some of their longstanding, 
fundamental assumptions of the quality of immigration that stretched back to 
Walker. These new immigrants had much lower standards of living, and would do 
tremendous damage not only to the racial homogeneity of the nation, but to the 
standards and living conditions of native-born Americans. Immigration, even 
during the Great Depression, remained the same threat it was almost forty years 
before.  
League members also continued to exploit their Congressional contacts as 
well, sending Patten to testify at public hearings before the House Immigration 
and Naturalization Committee in May 1934. Trevor was also there to testify, and 
                                                
 
22 Richards M. Bradley, “Suggested draft of letter to be sent to the members of the Immigration 
Restriction League with the annual report for the year ending Dec. 31, 1933” box 2, Lee papers. 
When the official final annual report was sent around, Bradley included a cover letter with these 
warnings, along with a statement that, “Most people think that the immigration question was 
settled in 1924. As you know, the 1924 Immigration Act did not stop all openings in the 
immigration dike, and made no attempt to touch the immigration flow from the western 
hemisphere. We must bring to the public attention the limitations of the present law, and the 
attempts being made to break it down.” Richards Bradley to Members of the Immigration 
Restriction League, 29 March 1934, box 2, Lee papers. Cutbacks from Lee to Bradley, 20 March 
1933, box 2, Lee papers. 
 
23 Bradley to Patten, 22 August 1933, box 2, Lee papers.  
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Bradley submitted a written report to the House Committee that urged Congress 
not to expand the discretionary power of the Secretary of Labor to land 
immigrants who would otherwise be inadmissible. Perkins oversaw an 
investigatory commission on the practices at Ellis Island.24 In August Bradley 
asked Lee to suggest people that the League could send to testify before the 
House Committee who would oppose the recommendations of the Perkins 
Committee who the committee would not “suspect of personal or racial 
prejudice.”25 The leadership of the League knew what worked, and they stuck to 
it.  
But by 1934, the leadership of the League was in declining health. Hall 
had died in 1922, Ward in 1931, and in 1934 Bradley and John Moors (one of the 
earliest members) were 73, Lee was 72, Madison Grant was 69, and even Patten 
was nearing 60. Lee and Grant died in 1937, Patten in 1940, and Bradley in 1943 
(Moors lived to his 92nd birthday, passing away in 1953). This is what stopped the 
Immigration Restriction League. They simply died. The long, sustained and 
tireless campaign for immigration restriction speaks to the earnest and sincere 
                                                
24 House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization Hearings, 73rd Congress, 2nd session, 
“Amendments to the Immigration Laws as Recommended by the Department of Labor and the 
Secretary’s Ellis Island Committee” 8-10 May 1934, in box 2, Lee papers. Trevor’s testimony was 
in favor of increasing restriction and the limiting the Secretary of Labor to use discretion to land 
immigrants in favor of reuniting families, or to override deportation orders to maintain families in 
the United States. Trevor suggested, in effect, that immigrants could still be reunited if they were 
all returned back to Europe. He also strenuously objected to the influence that Secretary Perkins’s 
Ellis Island Committee wielded, since it “contains a large number of well known and eminent 
persons who, to my knowledge, have never had anything to do with building up the national 
policy of immigration restriction.” It also contained a “substantial group of antirestrictionists.” 99.  
 
25 Bradley to Lee, 17 August 1934, box 3, Lee papers.  
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dedication of this small band of men.26 In 1905, Lee had asked Charles Francis 
Adams to join with the League to protect the Anglo-Saxon character to the United 
States. Adams declined, and in his reply explained, “the question is too big and 
too intricate for me to meddle with. I have gone on the retired list, and a 
generation other than that to which I belong must in future, if possible, save the 
country from the ‘eternal bow-wows.’ My generation, for better or worse, has 
done its work.” In 1934, as this new band of men, now very old, regarded the 
future of immigration restriction, there was a similar sense. They had little energy 
left to continue fighting. In August, Bradley wrote to Moors to pass on some 
information about Perkins and Dickstein and their efforts to weaken restriction. 
Bradley asked him if Moors and Lee might speak out publicly against the “queer 
alliance between the sentimental idealist, the racial specialist, and the cheap labor 
exploiter, [who were] all in favor of this line of bills.”27 At the end of the month, 
Moors sent a note to Lee, describing the “lively correspondence” he was having 
with Bradley on the subject. Though he was not hopeless that the policies would 
                                                
 
26 For biographical information on the League’s leaders, see for Lee: Neva R. Deardoff, “Joseph 
Lee” Dictionary of American Biography, supplement 2 (New York: Charles Scriber’s Sons, 1958), 
374-5; The National Cyclopedia of American Biography v. 33 (New York: James T. White and 
Co., 1947), 66-7; Biographical Dictionary of Social Welfare in America Walter Trattner, ed. (New 
York: Greenwood Press, 1986). On Hall, Who Was Who in America (Chicago: Marquis Who’s 
Who, 1963), v. 1; and Prescott F. Hall, Immigration and Other Interests of Prescott Farnsworth 
Hall, compiled by Mrs. Prescott Hall (New York: Knickerbocker Press, 1922). For Ward, see The 
National Cyclopedia of American Biography, v. 24; Who Was Who in America, v. 1; Dictionary of 
American Biography; and Robert Tracy Jackson, “Robert DeCourcy Ward” The Scientific Monthly 
(February 1932), 192-94. For Patten, consult his brief entry in Who Was Who in America, v. 1. 
Bradley’s biographical information in The National Cyclopaedia of American Biography v. 45 
(New York: James T. White and Co., 1962); Moors is in ibid., v. 41. Madison Grant’s entry in the 
Dictionary of American Biography supplement 2, was written by Henry Fairfield Osborn.  
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survive, Moors seemed deflated: “We three are now old men. There is now no 
Robert Ward or Prescott Hall to take hold as they once did. The public mind is 
practically asleep on the subject, and the attention of social workers is turned 
much more toward individuals.” Moors despaired that it “would be a tremendous 
job to start propaganda necessary to excite people on the dangerous legislation 
now threatened when the whole world is so stirred by other and more pressing 
problems. I’ll keep on thinking what, if anything, we three old gentlemen can do, 
but it is certainly a hard task.”28 
It was ultimately old age and attrition that stopped the leadership of the 
IRL. Since its founding in 1894, the members of the League worked tirelessly to 
limit the admission of inferior immigrants to the United States. Their wealth and 
social position gave them important political and social connections that they 
exploited, as their long affiliation with Senator Lodge (who died in 1924) and 
Albert Johnson shows. They used these connections constantly, maintaining a 
professional lobbyist in the capital until the very end. Their education linked them 
with an ambitious groups of thinkers who provided the evidence and authority for 
the urgent need of restriction. Sometimes these ties would supply them with cold 
statistical data and analysis of general demographic trends. Other associations 
yielded more hysterical alarmism about the “passing of the great race” or studies 
of feeble-minded families, and some, like that between Davenport and Laughlin, 
would find kindred spirits pushing boundaries and methods of natural sciences in 
                                                
 
28 Moors to Lee, 31 August 1934, box 2, Lee papers. 
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an era when the standards and content of scientific knowledge were changing. 
They reached out to any organization, institution, friend or philosophy to provide 
useful tools to achieve restriction.  
In the final analysis, the most important tool that “racial nativists” used to 
curb immigration to the United States was their own specific episteme, which has 
been called here “classic racialism.” This broadly defined set of beliefs wove 
together certain trains of mental and biological determinism, an uncritical 
acceptance of Mendelian inheritance ratios, a certainty that the germ plasm – the 
basic element, the blood matter by which ontogeny recapitulated phylogeny – was 
unchanging and immutable. Within this set of beliefs, physical form reflected 
racial type distinctly, and from racial type could be gleaned mental characteristics. 
Like would always produce like. This xenophobia was powerful and persuasive 
because it was simple and comprehensible, because its racialist basis seemingly 
had the weight of empirical proof behind it. Logically, classic racialism provided 
a compelling and accessible narrative that biology was destiny, and its proof was 
in the anecdote, correlation and pedigree. The IRL elites remained so active 
because they believed that southern and eastern European immigrants were 
hereditarily inferior because the weight of evidence seemed to suggest so. They 
earnestly took it upon themselves to protect the racial heritage left them by the 
Anglo-Saxon forebears that populated the country. They used any method they 
could – literacy tests, pedigree analysis, numerical limits and mental tests – to 
preserve this traditional and conservative image of the United States.  
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However complicated this classic racialist ideology might be, in terms of 
the modern scientific disciplines that were emerging at the same time, this belief 
set, this particular restrictionist epistemology, was factually incorrect. The 
eugenics movement and its allied restrictionist organizations that believed that 
biology was destiny were wrong. Zoologists, biologists, anthropologists and 
geneticists all used a very different standard of conducting scientific investigation 
and theoretical speculations. Modern science was conducted in specialized and 
professionalized environments, whether in the remote hills of Orono, Maine, over 
sterile lab tables surrounded by giant, pleasing aquaria in Naples, or at Columbia 
University surrounded by masses of human bodies in America’s preeminent city. 
Peer review, experimental replicability and professional credentials became 
additional foundations of this emergent trans-Atlantic cosmopolitanism that 
pushed the evolution of the modern scientific revolution. But as this gradual 
accretion of knowledge continued, and as the classic natural scientific fields of 
description and deduction split from modern laboratory and inductive methods, 
the intelligibility and certainty of modern methods dissolved. Until the discovery 
of DNA, modern science was unable to provide “hard and fast answers,” as 
Jennings had once described, for the workings of biological inheritance. What 
made classic racialism so appealing was that it harbored none of this uncertainty. 
Giant intellectual pioneers like Galton and Lombroso had provided the basis of 
intellectual arguments in favor of this traditional and conservative ideology, and 
that provided, for its believers, all the scientific authority they needed. Common 
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sense and the basic obvious reality of physical familial similarity provided 
compelling evidence that their beliefs were scientifically accurate.  
This divergence presented an essential dilemma when it came to enacting 
policies to regulate immigration. One camp presented a narrative of immutable 
heredity, dangerously illustrated by the Kallikaks. The offspring of “Old Horror” 
would always manifest the degenerate characteristics passed on from the nameless 
feeble-minded mother. This group could point to immigrant communities or 
working class districts in large towns and point out certain obvious physical 
dissimilarities among groups of people. Classic racialism was persuasive because 
it had the support of a superficial reality. The opposing camp, agreeing in 
principle that there were differences between groups, could not explain what the 
basis of that difference might be. The racialists assumed the basis was race. The 
modernists assumed nothing. Governmental policy could not be based on nothing, 
and with its professed certainties, classic racialism helped support government 
action.  
Ultimately, this reveals much about American society in the early 1900s. 
As American influence and power expanded, there was an associated connection 
within a larger trans-Atlantic community. Ironically, this increasingly regular 
connection provided a recoil from more traditional and conservative Americans. 
Conservatives were a sophisticated and active minority that came to influence not 
only immigration restriction, but environmental conservation, large-scale 
construction of playground and recreational facilities, and intelligence 
assessments and testing. These were not particularly simple-minded folks that 
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tried to preserve the traditional values of the United States; they were well-
educated, economically comfortable and socially anxious. They believed what 
they said. They believed immigration was a grave danger. That they actively 
raised this alarm unceasingly for over forty years is itself notable. That it took the 
cataclysm of the second World War to shake the public’s confidence in the 
simplistic associations of racialism shows how difficult the process of 
“speciation” is for scientific revolutions. And that their basic policy of 
immigration restriction remained intact for almost fifty years (until 1965), 
demonstrates how effective class racialism was for arousing “public action to the 
necessity of a further exclusion of elements undesirable for citizenship or 
injurious to our national character.”29 
                                                
29 From the Immigration Restriction League, “Constitution of the Immigration Restriction League” 
box 3, Lee papers.  
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